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Abstract 
Michelle E. MARTIN 
The Political Power of Diaspora as External Actors in Armed Civil Conflict: 
Ethnonationalist Conflict-Generated Diaspora Use of Social Media in 
Transnational Political Engagement in Homeland Conflict: The Case of 
Rwanda 
 
Keywords: Diaspora, Ethnonationalism, Armed civil conflict, Social media, 
Cyberactivism, Rwanda, Genocide Denial, Peace-building, Virtual 
ethnography 
 
This study explores the power of ethnonationalist conflict-generated diasporas 
(CGD) as external actors in homeland conflict by exploring the nature of their 
political engagement on a transnational level using Internet Communication 
technologies (ICTs), with Rwanda as a case study. Virtual ethnography was 
chosen as the research methodology to explore the online activities of 
Rwandan CGD using social media (social networking sites) to form virtual 
transnational networks for political purposes. Diasporic online formations and 
activities were mapped in order to gain increased insights into ways that CGD 
use social media to engage in homeland conflict, and the effect their 
engagement has on the conflict cycle in the home country. Results of the 
study revealed that Rwandan CGDs demonstrate attitudes and motivations to 
act in ways that are consistent with other case studies of CGD, including 
exhibiting an enduring commitment and loyalty to co-ethnics, a romanticized 
conceptualization of homeland and a myth of return home. The results also 
revealed Rwandan CGDs’ strong propensity to use social media to engage in 
homeland conflict on a political level through the development of a large and 
dense transnational network used for a range of political purposes, including 
the dissemination of genocide denial and propaganda consistent with the pre-
genocide propaganda campaign. Implications for peace-building and conflict 
analysis are discussed.   
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CHAPTER 1: DIASPORA IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: 
GLOBALIZATION OF DOMESTIC POLITICS 
 
A relatively new area of study in peace studies and conflict analysis 
focuses on the effect of forced migration on civil armed conflict, particularly the 
effect of refugee and exile communities on the peace and conflict processes in 
the home country (Salehyan, & Gleditsch, 2006). This area of study has 
gained recent attention because of changing patterns of civil conflict, 
particularly in the Global South where in the last two decades there have been 
between 16 and 33 armed conflicts at any one time, primarily in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SIPRI, 1993, 2008). The dynamics surrounding these new patterns of 
conflict reflect a significant departure from historically familiar, interstate 
conflict over territory, toward new forms of ethnonationalist intrastate conflict 
that sometimes extend well beyond static borders (Demmers, 2002; Kahler, 
2006). “New war” studies are concerned with exploring these new patterns of 
conflict – and particularly violent ethnonational intrastate conflict, in a post-
Cold War era.  
The effects of globalization on these kinds of conflicts are many and 
often include the “deterritorialization”1 of conflict through the globalization of 
communication technologies; mass forced migration in response to conflict 
which scatters homeland residents throughout the world; the enduring 
psychological attachment to homeland among diaspora groups; and the 
tendency of diaspora generated from conflict to remain engaged in homeland 
politics, particularly homeland conflict due to their enduring psychological 
attachment. These dynamics are all areas of interest for “new war” scholars 
(Behr, 2008; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998. 2000, 2002; Demmers, 2002; Duffield, 
2001; Kahler, 2006; Lyons, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b).  In fact, 
intersects between a dramatic increase in migration (forced and voluntary) and 
globalization have allowed migrants to claim a stake in homeland affairs in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The concept of ‘deterritorialization’ can refer to the lessening of a nation-state’s control over its territory 
due to globalization, as well as conflict becoming ‘deterritorialized’ as a consequence of it spilling across 
	  	   2 
ways not previously possible. But other dynamics are involved as well, 
influencing diaspora attitudes and actions toward their respective home 
countries. Commenting on reasons why migrant groups are increasingly 
becoming key players in the new patterns of civil conflict, Kaldor-Robinson 
(2002) notes that: 
…as globalization increases interconnectedness and at the same time 
strengthens feelings of alienation, which in tern increase the popularity 
of fundamentalist ideologies, whether religion or ethno-nationalist, it is 
likely that diasporic networks will be of increasing importance both as 
actors in the “new wars” and in changing national narratives.  
Hence, from an analytical point of view, the study of contemporary 
conflict (e.g. the onset, duration and termination of war) is impossible in 
the absence of close attention of diasporic dynamics (p. 185). 
Ethnonational Civil Conflict and Territory 
 Territory often remains the focal point of civil conflict due to individuals’ 
attachment and/or practical interests (Demmers, 2002; Goemans, 2006; 
Kahler, 2006; Lyons, 2006). Sack defines territoriality as the exertion of 
influence or control (often by a nation state) over a geographical area (Sack, 
1985, as cited in Kahler, 2006). Consequently, individuals assert and/or are 
often identified by their territorial attachment to a region, such as their 
citizenship in a particular nation-state, often in a very symbolic manner 
(Kahler, 2006). Territoriality is so powerfully symbolic that Lyons (2006a) and 
Toft (2003) go so far as to describe “homeland” as a perception only, which in 
time often bears little resemblance to the actual region. Territorial attachments 
range in intensity, with high levels of territorial attachment involving 
considerable emotion, which increases the stakes in intrastate conflict, 
particularly when religion, cultural symbolism, and a way of life is attached to a 
certain geographical territory (Kahler, 2006; King & Melvin, 2000; Lyons, 2004, 
2006a, 2006b). In fact, conflict over territory often involves such high levels of 
intense emotions that violence emanating from conflict often escalates quickly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
borders, sometimes throughout the world as migrant groups engage in conflict from host countries, due 
to their enduring attachment to their homelands. 
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and conflicts tend to be far more protracted than other types of conflict (Kahler, 
2006).  
The links between ethnonationalism and territory are key to 
understanding why the homeland sometimes takes on mythical proportions for 
diaspora, particularly when co-ethnics perceive the territory as their ancestral 
homeland. Their perceptions of and claims to exclusivity also help to explain 
why ethnonationalist civil conflict is often more violent and remains far more 
protracted than traditional interstate conflict (Kahler, 2006), as well as why 
diaspora self-identified as co-ethnics remain engaged politically in homeland 
affairs, particularly if the ruling government is perceived as being from a 
different ethnic group.  
The Globalization of Ethnonationalist Civil Conflict 
Ethnonationalist civil conflict has become increasingly globalized, due 
to the most recent wave of globalization, which has allowed civil conflict to 
extend well beyond traditional territorial boundaries (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller, 
2003).  The development of new technologies has globalized not only market 
economies, but the areas of communication, travel, and the media as well 
(Behr, 2008). Such changes have challenged the notion of the territorially 
bound nation-state, limiting the autonomy and control of ruling governments, 
and making borders more porous; requiring changes in how sovereign nation-
states respond to conflict within their “bounded territorial units” (Kahler, 2006, 
p. 2). For instance, the globalization of communication technologies permits a 
level of rapid communication, mobilization, dissemination of information 
(including propaganda), and the exchange or transfer of technologies among 
transnational political actors on a scale unparalleled during the Cold War era 
(Behr, 2008; Kahler, 2006; Kent, 2005; Lyons, 2005, 2006a). It is interesting to 
note that despite the impact of globalization on nation-states, and the 
significant increase in migration (both voluntary and involuntary), territorial 
attachment has not declined, and in fact has remained the focal point of many 
civil conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Demmers, 2002, 2007; Kaiser, 2002; 
Wayland, 2004). 
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Ethnonationalism and territoriality take on increasing importance in the 
context of forced migration, particularly when the ethnic dimension of the 
conflict (real or perceived) is the root cause of forced displacement. Territorial 
attachment among co-ethnics and the actions associated with this type of 
attachment are best considered a form of ethnonationalism. Several studies 
have found that ethnonationalism appears to be a distinguishing feature of the 
newest wave of civil conflict, as well as the newest wave of forced migration, 
most of whom left their countries due to violence (Cederman, Weidmann, & 
Gleditsch, 2011; DeVotta, 2000; King & Melvin, 2000). The landscape of 
refugee flows has changed considerably in the post-Cold War era, mirroring 
changing patterns of civil conflict. In the past three decades the number of 
refugees and political asylum-seekers migrating to, or resettling in host 
countries in the West has increased sharply, and are increasingly a result of 
mass forced migration as a consequence of protracted ethnonationalist civil 
conflict over territory.  
In 2012 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNCHR) 
estimated that there were approximately 42.5 million individuals forcibly 
displaced from their homes worldwide. Among the world’s displaced 
population, the UNHCR is responsible for approximately 35.8 million, which 
according to the agency, is the second highest on record (UNHCR, 2012). 
Among the many worrying trends cited by the UNHCR, are the number of 
individuals being displaced on a daily basis (23,000 per day in 2012 compared 
to 10,000 per day in 2003), and a dramatic increase in the number of years 
refugees are forced to remain in a state of displacement, are of the greatest 
concern. The UNHCR cites the number of new refugees generated in 2012 
(7.6 million) as the highest since 1999. With regard to the protracted nature of 
refugee resettlement, refugees are now likely to wait in excess of five years for 
a durable solution, significantly increasing the psychological trauma, as well as 
the possibility of refugee camps becoming militarized (UNHCR, 2012). 
Refugees who are forced to migrate en mass in response to civil 
conflict tend to exhibit a far different typology than other migrant groups. For 
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instance, Lyons (2006a) discusses the difference between voluntary economic 
migrants whose attachment to their homeland tends to wane after migrating to 
a new country, compared to those who are forced to migrate due to violent 
conflict. These latter migrant groups, often by definition, retain a strong 
attachment to their homeland regardless of the amount of time they have lived 
in another land, and relate in a different manner to their home country. This 
dynamic will be explored briefly in the present chapter, and in greater depth in 
Chapter 2. 
Diaspora Involvement In Ethnonationalist Intrastate Conflict 
Diaspora Defined 
There are several terms used to describe migrant populations living 
outside their homelands, including immigrant, guest worker, refugee, political 
asylum-seeker (or “exile”), and “expatriate” (Tölölyan, 1991). One term that 
has seen a resurgence in use is “diaspora.” The word diaspora is Greek in 
origin and has ancient roots; it was originally used in reference to the historic 
Jewish exile chronicled in the Hebrew Bible. The Greek word “diaspora” 
literally means “scattering” or “dispersion” (“dia” – over, and “speiro” – to sow). 
Diaspora has since not only been used to describe ancient ethnonationalist 
groups, such as Jewish and Greek populations, but other historic groups as 
well, such as the Armenians, who persisted in a desire to return home after 
centuries of forced exile from their historic homelands (Sheffer, 2003).  
There is considerable debate among scholars regarding the definition of 
the term diaspora, including what groups of migrants should be considered as 
“diaspora,” and which groups should not. Contemporary attempts to 
operationalize the concept of diaspora are often based on the historic models 
of Jewish and Greek diaspora (Shepperson, 1966 as cited in Brubaker, 2005). 
Definitions put forth in the last several decades range from broad and inclusive 
(see Tölölyan, 1991) to more narrow definitions with a set of specific criteria 
relating to forced dispersion, a collective identity, an ongoing relationship with 
the home country, a desire to return home, and some level of alienation from 
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the host country. Several scholars have cautioned against depicting diaspora 
as a homogeneous group (Cochrane, Baser & Swain, 2009; Vertovec, 2005). 
Vertovec (2005) cites the importance of diasporic membership being self-
ascribed, and although belonging to a diaspora involves a strong emotional 
attachment to “commonly claimed origins and cultural attributes associated 
with them,” he also cautions against including criteria of diaspora membership 
based solely upon how “ethnic” one is, such as the “number of festivals 
celebrated, ethnic meals cooked, or style of dress worn” (p. 2). 
In his seminal work exploring the nature of diaspora Safran (1991) 
provided a detailed list he refers to as generic criteria that can be applied to a 
variety of contemporary diaspora groups, including Armenian, Chinese, Greek, 
Indian, Kurdish and Palestinian migrant groups. His criteria are based on a 
Jewish diaspora paradigm, and include: 
1. Dispersal from a specific original “center” to a foreign region 
2. Retaining a “collective memory, vision, or myth about their original 
homeland—its physical location, history, achievements, and, often 
enough, sufferings” 
3. A sense of alienation from their host country 
4. A regard for their “ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and 
as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) 
eventually return—if and when conditions are appropriate”  
5. A pattern of relating “personally or vicariously, to that homeland in 
one way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and 
solidarity, which reach across political boundaries…a collective 
commitment to the maintenance or restoration of their original 
homeland and to its independence, safety, and prosperity” 
6. A “wish to survive as a distinct community—in most instances as a 
minority—by maintaining and transmitting a cultural and/or religious 
heritage derived from their ancestral home and the symbols based 
on it.  
7. The development of communal institutions that reflect their “cultural, 
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religious, economic, and/or political relationships with the homeland” 
(Safran, 1999 as cited in Safran, 2005, p. 37). 
 
Shain and Barth (2003) also provide a more narrow definition of diaspora as: 
People with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent 
basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland – 
whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under 
foreign control. Diaspora members identify themselves, or are identified 
by others – inside and outside their homeland – as part of the 
homeland’s national community, and as such are often called upon to 
participate, or are entangled, in homeland-related affairs (p. 452). 
 
Politically mobilized diasporas are often categorized by their level of 
activity.  Core members are the “organizing elite” who have a high level of 
activity and participate in the mobilization of the broader diasporic members. 
“Passive members” engage in activities when called upon, and “silent 
members” of the diaspora are typically not involved in political activities, 
except in times of crisis (Shain & Barth, 2003). Diaspora groups fall into three 
distinct timeline categories: “historical diaspora,” which existed in premodern 
times (e.g., the Jewish diaspora after the Babylonian exile), “new diaspora,” 
which existed in the post-industrial era (e.g., the Turkish Armenians in the 
early 1920s), and “incipient ethnonationalist” diaspora, which are the most 
recent group of diaspora existing in current times (Smith & Stares, 2007).  
Ethnonationalism Defined 
There is considerable ambiguity in the literature regarding a precise 
definition of “ethnonationalism,” thus it is important to define this term in order 
to clarify its meaning, particularly within the diasporic context, which is the 
focus of this study. Sheffer (2003) has defined ethnonational diasporas as: 
A socio-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or 
forced migration, whose members regard themselves as of the same 
ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one 
or several host countries. Members of such entities maintain regular or 
occasional contacts with what they regard as their homelands and with 
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individuals and groups of the same background residing in other host 
countries (pp. 9-10). 
Ethnonationalism has also been defined as the loyalty an ethnic group has for 
its nation-state, whether living within or outside of the bounded territory 
(Conversi, 2007). Likewise, Brandon, Popon and Melton (2010) define 
ethnonationalism as “the source of national identity, the adoration of nation, 
making people from the same community believe they are related to each 
other and enforcing their feelings of being connected and having a common 
destiny” (p. 170).  
There is some confusion about whether nationalism and 
ethnonationalism are synonymous terms, and whether these terms are 
referencing the loyalty to a nation, or loyalty to a group of people who 
represent a nation. The term “nationalism” has been used by scholars to refer 
to both—loyalty to a nation, as well as loyalty to a group of people who 
represent a nation, such as a group of co-ethnics who may or may not live 
within a specific nation-state. Conversi (2007) asserts that the terms 
nationalism and ethnonationalism should be used when referring to loyalty to a 
group of people who represent a nation, and the term ”patriotism” should be 
used when referring to loyalty to a nation. In fact, Conversi argues that all 
nationalism among co-ethnics is actually ethnonationalism, which is practiced 
in some African and Asian countries, whereas patriotism is what is most 
commonly practiced in the West.  
Although nationalism and ethnonationalism may both refer to loyalty to 
a group representing a nation, Smith (1993) and Bradatan, Popon and Melton 
(2010) assert that there are significant differences in terms of how such loyalty 
is understood and expressed in various cultures. For instance, Smith notes 
that in most Western 2 countries national identity is based on common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In this study I use the terms ‘Western” and “non-Western” countries when making a distinction between 
more economically developed countries (often OECD member countries) from countries with an under 
developed industrial and economic base. Other terms commonly used are ‘Developed’ and “Least 
Developed Country” (LDC), ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ These designations can be controversial in 
that they do not necessarily accurately describe the stage of development reached by a particular nation-
state, and often denote notions of power differentials. I use these terms as a matter of distinction, and to 
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historical memory, symbols, folklore and traditions, whereas in non-Western 
countries national identity is more commonly based on an “ethnic model,” 
where a nation is perceived as a “community of common descent with people 
being related by birth/blood” (Smith, 1991, p. 11), who inhabit an “historic 
land.” Smith notes that in a “non-Western” context an historic homeland is 
often invested with powerful emotional attachments as it comes to represent 
the place where the people’s ancestors, “saints and heroes lived, worked, 
prayed and fought” (p. 9). This strong emotional attachment to homeland 
territory often leads to claims among co-ethnics of homeland territory being 
“exclusively theirs, consigning all non-members to the status of foreigners or 
outsiders who do not properly belong” (Kaiser, 2004, p. 230).  
Max Weber (1968) captured the essence of ethnonationalism 
(nationalism based on an ethnic model) asserting that co-ethnics operating as 
a cohesive group are by nature political. Of particular interest is his emphasis 
on the subjective belief in a common line of ancestry versus an actual kinship 
group:   
We shall call "ethnic groups" those human groups that entertain a 
subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of 
physical type or of custom or both, or because of the memories of 
colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the 
propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether 
or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership 
(Gemeinsamkeit) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a 
presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the 
latter. In our sense ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it 
only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political 
sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no 
matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common 
ethnicity (p. 389). 
In other words, the actual existence of a common ancestry is not required for a 
group to be considered an “ethnic group,” but rather it is the perception of—or 
belief in—a shared ancestry among the group members that is required, and 
in fact, often it is this subjective belief that drives group formation and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reflect terms used in the diaspora literature, but note the importance of acknowledging the contested 
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subsequent political action. Also, because ethnicity is based on self-
identification and perceived commonality, it cannot be defined externally. 
Conversi (2007) concludes that ethnicity is one of the most significant aspects 
in the development of nationalism.  
 For the purposes of this study, ethnonationalism will be defined as a 
form of nationalism, often found in non-Western regions, involving loyalty to a 
group of co-ethnics who are perceived as having a shared ancestry through 
birth/blood, and who are the “rightful owners” of a perceived historic land, to 
which they are strongly attached (whether they currently reside within the 
bounded territory or outside of it). This loyalty serves as the foundation for 
collective action (which is often political in nature) focused on their imagined 
homeland.  
Diaspora Typology: Motivations for Involvement in Homeland Affairs 
The role of diaspora in ethnonationalist intrastate conflict has become a 
focus of inquiry in the past few decades, where ways in which diaspora 
members remain strongly attached to their homeland territory and 
consequently relate to their homeland government on a political level are 
explored, including potentially positive and negative affects on peace efforts in 
post-conflict regions (Brinkerhoff, 2006; Baser & Swain, 2008; Cheran, 2003; 
Cochran, Baser & Swain, 2009; Demmers, 2002; Horst, 2008; King & Melvin, 
2000; Kahler, 2006; Lyons, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Safran,1991; Shain & Barth, 
2003; Sheffer, 2003; Vertovec, 2005; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006). 
Diasporas that result from violent forced migration often possess 
distinct characteristics that influence their political activities. Cheran (2003) 
who has studied Sri Lankan diaspora cites several characteristics of incipient 
ethnonationalist diasporas that distinguish them from other transnational 
communities. According to Cheran, diaspora tend to retain a collective 
memory of pain and loss, and experience a sense of alienation from both their 
host country and home countries that leaves them feeling isolated. They are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nature of these conceptualizations. 
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deterritorialized from their home country, which Cheran theorizes may lead to 
an exaggerated attachment to the “imagined homeland.” In addition, they tend 
to remain invested in preserving and maintaining their homelands, and 
maintain a “unique ethnonationalist consciousness” and a desire to return 
home (Cheran, 2003, p. 5). However, there have been some challenges 
though to a strict “homeland orientation and return” being applied to all 
diaspora, often presumed to be posited by some diaspora scholars such as by 
Safran, Cheran and Lyons. Khayati (2008) examined the concept of homeland 
orientation often attributed to diaspora groups and notes how a strong 
emphasis on homeland orientation (i.e., a desire to return to a physical 
homeland) may negate the experiences of diaspora who do not desire to 
return home and instead re-create their culture in their respective host 
countries. Khayati cites Safran’s newer writings where the notion of homeland 
is broadened to include homelands beyond the physical, including “spiritual, 
emotional, and/or cultural home that is outside the hostland” (Safran, 2004, p. 
13).   
Lyons (2004) developed a model of conflict-generated diaspora (CGD) 
that includes homeland orientation as a component of ways in which diaspora 
generated from conflict differ from other transnational migrant groups, and how 
these differing dynamics manifest in both collective identity and action. Lyons 
notes how the trauma CGDs experience prior to and as a result of conflict and 
subsequent forced migration leads to a desire to keep alive the memory of the 
original cause of their displacement, which ultimately becomes incorporated 
into their identity (Lyons, 2004, 2006a, 2006b). They do this by maintaining an 
imagined homeland, or as Faist (2000) describes, “a vision and memory of a 
lost or an imagined homeland still to be established” (Faist, 2000, 197). Lyons 
notes how many CGD groups keep the memories of the trauma alive by telling 
and retelling stories of their trauma, including passing these stories of trauma 
and violent dispersal on to the next generation as a sort of trauma 
“inheritance” (Lyons, 2004, 2007). The cause of and circumstances 
surrounding their mass forced migration leads to the development of what 
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Lyons (and others) refer to as a collective identity, which serves as a focal 
point for their long-distance nationalism and other political activities which are 
most often focused on their homeland (Anderson, 1992; Bernal, 2006; 
Brinkerhoff, 2012; Shain & Barth, 2003). 
 According to Lyons, the second distinguishing factor of CGDs involves 
ways in which they relate to their homeland. Lyons describes how many CGD 
groups maintain an ongoing relationship with their homeland that is different 
from other migrant groups. Although other migrants may remain connected on 
a social or humanitarian level, CGDs remain active in their homeland affairs 
primarily on a political level. Although they remain outside their country of 
origin, Lyons (2004) echoes Shain and Barth’s (2003) contentions that CGDs 
view themselves as key stakeholders in regard to homeland affairs, a 
contention borne out of their desire to return home once conditions allow. 
Lyons refers to this dynamic as the myth of return (Faist, 2000; Lyons, 2004).  
The third distinguishing factor according to Lyons involves CGDs’ 
tendency to create transnational networks, which are based on ethnic 
affiliation, a sense of collective identity, and collective goals (Lyons, 2004). 
Such transnational organizations and networks serve numerous purposes 
such as keeping nationalists’ hopes of return alive and solidifying their 
collective identity by reminding CGDs of the circumstances surrounding their 
forced migration, and often serve as the conduit for their political activities 
(Demmers, 2007). Political activism through diaspora transnational networks is 
nothing new, but with the globalization of communication technologies, CGDs 
now have far greater ability to mobilize their countrymen and women 
throughout the world through social networking websites. Transnational 
networks also engage in fund-raising activities, which often include raising 
financial support for insurgency and rebel groups actively fighting in the 
homeland region (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000, 2002; Demmers, 2005; Lyons, 
2004; Horst, 2008).  
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How Diasporas are Defined in the Present Study 
For the purposes of this study, diaspora is defined as a sub-set of the 
broader immigrant population, comprised of individuals who have been 
generated by conflict in their homelands, and who were expelled from their 
home countries by force. Drawing on Lyons’ (2004, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) work 
on collective experiences, beliefs, attitudes, motivations and activities, the 
term “conflict-generated diaspora” will be used to distinguish contemporary 
diaspora from previous waves and types of migrants. Further, drawing on the 
work of Cheran (2003), Conners (2007), and Wayland (2004), and other 
diaspora scholars cited in Chapters 1 through 3, for the purposes of this study, 
conflict-generated diasporas are considered ethnonationalist, by definition, 
since as Cheran (2003) noted, the conflicts leading to displacement are 
principally ethnonationalist in nature.  
It is important to note though that defining diaspora as ethnonationalist 
CGD is in no way intended to imply, either directly or indirectly, that diasporas 
are homogeneous populations. Rather, diaspora communities are quite 
heterogeneous with regard to attitudes, beliefs, experiences and activities, 
thus references to conflict-generated diaspora typologies pertaining to 
collective dynamics do not negate individual differences and sub-group 
deviations and uniqueness. In addition, the term ‘CGD’ is used throughout this 
manuscript in order to maintain clarity, yet not all of the sources being 
referenced and/or relied upon in the literature review use this term in their 
work, as many diaspora scholars use the term ‘diaspora’ in a generic sense 
when referring to a range of diaspora groupings. Where the meaning of the 
term ‘diaspora’ in cited passages differs from the one adopted in this work, it 
was maintained in two types of circumstances: 1) when used in a direct 
quotation; and 2) when the original author was referring to broader migrant 
groups beyond those generated from ethnonationalist conflict.   
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Conflict Generated Diaspora: Facilitators of Peace or Fomenters of 
Conflict? 
Although most scholars studying CGD dynamics agree on the major 
tenets of an identity typology they do not necessarily agree on whether CGD 
activities have a positive or negative impact on peace-building processes. At 
the heart of this debate is whether the political activities engaged in by some 
CGDs exacerbate or mitigate conflict in the homeland (Al-Ali, 2007; Baser & 
Swain, 2008, 2009; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004; Demmers, 2002; Lyons, 
2004; Mohamoud, 2005; Public International Law & Policy Group [PILPG], 
2009; Smith & Stares, 2007). Those advocating the position that CGDs’ 
political activities are generally positive argue that CGDs can make 
contributions to their homelands by assisting in peace negotiation processes, 
helping in the development of civil society and nation-building efforts, and 
providing poverty alleviation through financial remittances to family and friends 
(Baser & Swain, 2008; Cochrane, 2007; Mohamoud, 2005, 2006, 2007; 
Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006; Zunzer, 2004).  
 Baser and Swain (2008) assert that numerous CGDs living in the West 
are well positioned to have a positive impact on conditions in their homeland 
because they often have a greater understanding of the dynamics internal to 
the country than members of the international community, including having 
greater insights into local issues, and having a better understanding of the 
historical context and political complexities of the conflict. Cochrane (2007) 
echoes Baser and Swain’s assessment: “…being from outside the conflict 
zone but having a connection to it, might provide diaspora groups with specific 
abilities as third party actors in pre-negotiations or even in formal talks over a 
political settlement” (p. 27).  
 Conversely, other scholars argue that CGDs that are engaged in 
political activities stall peace efforts by interfering with politics in the homeland, 
thus prolonging ethnic and/or nationalist conflict and making compromise more 
difficult (Lyons, 2003; Vertovec, 2005), financing rebels, (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2002), taking advantage of liberal Western political systems by engaging in 
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political activities against their home countries (Shain, 1994), and utilizing 
technology available in the West that is not always available in the home 
country to engage in virtual conflict often providing them a strategic advantage 
over their home country governments (Demmers, 2007; Lyons, 2004, 
Østergaard-Nielsen 2006). 
Studies focusing on the causes of civil war reveal that a large diaspora 
increases the chances of renewed violence in a post-conflict region six-fold 
when all other factors were held constant (Collier & Hoeffler 2000, 2002). King 
and Melvin (2000) found that diaspora organizations with a strong ethnic 
identity when well organized and well funded can become powerful 
independent actors often successfully challenging the ruling governments in 
their homelands. Even with various constraints placed upon their political 
activities, King and Melvin caution that diaspora organizations are not benign 
players on the political scene and their political activities on “local, national and 
international political processes” should be taken seriously (p. 779).   
Ways in which CGDs Foster Peace 
 There are many scholars who assert that the threat of CGDs is 
exaggerated, and that CGDs contribute positively to peace-building efforts in 
the home country (or possess the potential to). Positive contributions to 
homeland dynamics by CGDs tend to fall into six categories: humanitarian aid, 
community support groups, women’s organizations, political campaigning, 
human rights, and church organizations. Many CGDs engage in a variety of 
these activities through collective action (Warnecke, 2010). 
 Brinkerhoff cites three factors that influence CGDs’ ability to positively 
contribute to the home country. The first relates to their ability to effectively 
mobilize, which enables the “bonding and bridging” of social capital. This 
dynamic can contribute to developing a sense of psychological empowerment 
and the ability to develop resources in the host country for the benefit of the 
home country. The second is the availability of opportunity structures, such as 
access to economic resources and various infrastructures (e.g., technological 
and informational) that are required to facilitate their contributions. The third 
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necessary factor involves CGDs’ willingness and motivation to act for the 
benefit of those they left behind (Brinkerhoff, 2006a). 
Numerous case studies illustrate that CGDs can and often do contribute 
positively to the development of civil society in their home countries 
(Brinkerhoff, 2006a; Mohamoud, 2005; Warnecke, 2010).  Mohamoud notes 
that a large percentage of CGD members engage in “civic-oriented” activities 
including community development and business investment through livelihood 
development, on the local level, which Mohamoud asserts helps strengthen 
civil society from the bottom up. This type of contribution can help with peace-
building through poverty alleviation, thus lessening the chances of conflict 
erupting over scarce resources (Mohamoud, 2005, 2006) 
 CGDs also assist in poverty alleviation by providing individual and 
collective remittances. Although collective remittances are often seen as a 
security risk because they are may be used to support rebels (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2001), Mohamoud argues that individual remittances are far larger 
than collective remittances and are sent primarily to relatives to help them 
meet daily living needs, such as shelter, food, health care and education.  
Such remittances help the local economy as well as individual families.  
 Although the consensus in the literature suggests that CGDs’ long-
distance nationalism will likely increase the chances of renewed conflict, Baser 
and Swain (2008) argue that not all CGDs engage politically with the intention 
of maintaining the conflict, thus some political engagement can be positive. 
While acknowledging the ways in which CGDs can negatively interfere with 
homeland affairs, Baser and Swain note the great potential CGDs have for 
engaging in activities that foster peace. One way CGD members may do this 
is by returning home after a regime change. They cite the example of many 
members of the Iraqi and Afghanistan CGD who returned home to take 
leadership roles in the post-regime governments, transferring new attitudes 
and technologies gained while living in exile in the West (Baser & Swain, 
2008). Baser and Swain also cite numerous examples of CGDs that 
successfully served as third-party mediators in homeland conflict, including the 
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Northern Ireland diaspora, and the Somali diaspora. Purdy similarly asserts 
that CGDs can be effective third-party mediators in homeland conflict because 
they are outside of the country and have a broader perspective of the issues, 
and are not as easily influenced by intense emotions, such as anger (Purdy, 
2003 as cited in Baser & Swain, 2008). 
 In his 2005 study of African CGDs Mohamoud (2005) found that many 
CGDs were involved in positive political activities, such as transmitting “new 
political ideas and practices that help the promotion of a democratic political 
life in the homeland” (p. 32). Thus, CGDs can foster peace building through 
the exchange of new ideas and technologies, contributions to civil society 
infrastructure development and poverty alleviation. 
Ways in Which CGDs Foment Conflict 
Several scholars have noted CGDs’ potential to increase the risk of 
renewed conflict, as well as make conflicts more protracted (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2000; Demmers2007; Kahler, 2006; Lyons, 2007). In fact, several scholars 
cited Lord Action’s reference to this phenomenon as early as 1862 when he 
noted that exile was the nursery of nationality, meaning that living in exile 
actually increases feelings of ethnonationalism (Demmers, 2007; Faist, 2008). 
Demmers (2007) notes how most separatist movements develop within CGDs, 
such as the Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, from Sri Lanka), Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA), National Liberation Army (NLA, Albanians from Macedonia), and 
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), all of which were founded in the United 
States or Europe by political exiles, engaging politically against their home 
countries. She argues that one of the most significant elements that allows for 
this dynamic, in addition to co-ethnic group formation in exile, is the availability 
of political opportunity structures in Western liberal democracies, such as in 
the United States.  
Mohamoud (2005) lists seven ways in which CGDs can have a negative 
effect on homeland affairs: 1) supporting rival political groups; 2) having 
unrealistic expectations and making unrealistic demands; 3) using 
undemocratic means to achieve their goals; 4) organizing around special 
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interests, e.g., ethnic, clan or religious affiliation (which can increase existing 
fragmentation in the homeland); 5) using modern technology to influence (and 
manipulate) perceptions and political processes in the homeland and host 
countries (technology often not available in the home country); 6) transferring 
technology to rebel groups, such as providing access to the Internet, mobile 
phones, etc.; and 7) acting as a distant political wing for armed rebel groups 
waging war within the homeland, or its surrounding regions.   
A considerable body of research highlights the reasons for and ways 
that CGDs increase the risk of conflict in their home countries and why this 
occurs. Lyons (2004, 2007) points out that CGDs often have an investment in 
prolonging the conflict, rooted in a combination of personal agendas and 
outdated perspectives of homeland conditions. Noting how CGDs often take 
hardline positions on issues at stake, Lyons and Mandeville point how CGDs 
have a tendency to view homeland dynamics in fixed and categorical terms 
making compromise difficult. Such attitudes often result in accusations against 
those on their side who do seek authentic compromise and reconciliation as 
“traitors to the cause” (Lyons, 2003, 2004; Lyons & Mandeville, 2008).  
Some research studies also appear to indicate that compromise and 
reconciliation may threaten the collective identity of CGDs, a dynamic that may 
act as a deterrent to compromise. Demmers describes how CGDs often base 
their collective identity on a sense of historic victimhood that reconciliation 
would threaten (Demmers, 2002).  Verotec (2005) asserts that because the 
circumstances surrounding the CGDs’ dispersal becomes engrained in their 
identity, the ancestral homeland takes on an almost mythical nature, becoming 
a symbol of all that is lost and all that must be restored. Lyons argues that this 
dynamic can lead to CGDs becoming stuck in time, unable to move beyond 
the circumstances of their forced migration, leading to an idealized conception 
of their home country based on conditions prior to the conflict (Lyons, 2003, 
2004).  
Demmers found that CGDs often portray themselves as strong 
nationalists who are authorities on the traditional ways of their homeland. They 
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often see themselves as responsible for keeping their traditions alive until the 
time when they can reclaim their homeland (Demmers, 2002). Lyons (2004) 
states that this dynamic, where CGDs members adhere strongly to old 
traditions and social structures, can render “diaspora an obsolete organization 
that clings to old ways while the homeland evolves” (p. 13).  Lyons (2004) also 
asserts that the myth of return and a collective identity born out of unresolved 
conflict and violence often leads to exaggerated claims of poor conditions and 
human rights abuses in their homeland.  
Lyons explains how exaggerated claims that the homeland government 
is brutal and oppressive are often rooted in the original conflict, particularly if 
the ruling government is from the “winning side” of a civil war.  Both Demmers 
(2007) and Lyons (2007) speculate that such exaggerations may serve 
numerous purposes, including providing a justification for remaining outside 
the country and engaging in the conflict from a position of relative safety and 
comfort, as well as giving CGDs a sense of purpose and legitimacy as they 
continue to fight for their cause. Lyons (2007) describes how such 
exaggerated claims of abuse and oppression can also be a result of outdated 
information and a lack of connection with what is actually going on in the 
homeland, as well as a reluctance to accept new information, stating:  
 
[t]here may be multiple reasons for those in the diaspora to engage in 
exaggerated criticism of the homeland government. It is not surprising 
that some diaspora have perceptions of the homeland that are frozen in 
time or distorted by nostalgia rather than recent experience. As the 
years pass, diaspora groups are likely to be increasingly distant from 
homeland events. Stories are told and retold, sometimes freezing 
images in the past and making it difficult to incorporate new information 
that may be from “untrusted” sources (Lyons, 2007, p. 533).  
 
Demmers (2007) captures the consensus among scholars who acknowledge 
CGDs’ propensity to foment conflict in their homeland, quoting Fuglerund 
(1999) who argued that “[w]hat revolutionary nationalism does in exile is to 
provide a name for individual nostalgia and shared exclusion from the host 
country” (as cited in Demmers, 2007, p. 20).  Building on Fuglerund’s 
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assertion, Demmers notes how CGDs draw on “traditional and revolutionary 
narratives” in their support for “ethnonationalist separatism” as a coping 
mechanism, something she refers to as the “exile condition” (p. 21).  
Transnational Diaspora Communities 
Diaspora members in general are often referred to—and even defined 
by—their transnationalism, in that they engage in activities that cross 
international boundaries (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Cheran, 2003; Østergaard-
Nielsen, 2003; Vertovec, 1999; Wayland, 2004). Faist (1998) describes 
diaspora transnationalism as occurring in “transnational social spaces,” which 
he defines as “the combinations of social and symbolic ties, positions in 
networks and organizations that can be found in at least two geographically 
and internationally distinct places” (p. 40). Research in the area of diaspora 
transnationalism tends to focus on both diaspora networks and diaspora 
identities with an emphasis on diaspora networks. Yet, given the 
ethnonationalist impetus for establishing and maintaining both, the distinction 
between networks and identities is more a useful abstraction than a clearly 
discernible difference. In this section the nature of transnationalism within a 
diasporic context will be briefly explored, and examples of some ways in which 
diaspora, particularly CGD, engage in transnational networks on a political 
level will be provided. Transnational identity will be explored in Chapter 2, with 
a more detailed examination of the types of activities facilitated through 
transnational networks provided in Chapter 3, including how they are used 
within a diasporic context, which is the primary focus of the study.  
Broadly speaking, transnationalism within a migrant context involves 
the internationalization of social, economic and political relationships and 
activities (Al-Ali, Black & Koser, 2001), where individuals live their lives across 
international borders (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller, 2003).  Vertovec and Cohen 
(1996) define transnationalism as a “site for political engagement,” which 
according to Khayati (2008) is a reference to the tendency of CGDs to engage 
in transnational political activities focused on homeland affairs “….realized 
largely through different transnational political, social, economic and cultural 
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performances that refugee and immigrant population sustain across the 
boundaries of nation states” (p. 28), what Anderson (1992) has termed “long-
distance nationalism.” Wayland (2004) defines diasporic transnationalism as 
involving “identities and intra-ethnic relations that transcend state borders” 
where migrants “subsume two or more languages and cultures, and who have 
frequent contact with ethnic kindred [“co- ethnics”] in other locations” (p. 408). 
Mohamoud and Osman (2008) refer to diasporic transnationalism as 
“intersecting social, economic and political bridges that link their new places of 
residence with their original homelands” (p. 39). The notion that diasporic 
identities, relationships and activities span the globe and are not contained 
within a territory is in contrast to the traditional notion of the mutually exclusive 
categories of “domestic versus international” and “state actor versus non-state 
actor.” As Turner (2008) describes it, CGDs are “at one and the same time, 
both and neither” (p. 2) domestic or international, and are often referred to as 
transnational actors. The multiple attachments within the multiple spheres 
where CGDs operate are often called transnational social fields (Schiller, 
Basch, & Blanc-Szanton, 1995).  
Bradatan et al, (2010) refer to CGDs who remain connected to their 
homelands as transmigrants and note how they present a special case in that 
they remain strongly committed to a homeland in which they no longer live, 
while exhibiting varying levels of commitment to their new country of 
residence. In this sense, they “live with their soul at home, and their body 
abroad” (p. 175). According to Bradatan, et al, the emotional life of many CGD 
members is often connected to their country of origin, which they still consider 
their home, and many “have no interest in interacting with the social life of the 
new land, as they look forward to the moment of return” (p. 175) whereas 
others can become quite connected to and invested in their new host country 
while remaining strongly attached to their homelands. 
Transnational relationships and activities can be constructed and 
maintained on an individual basis, such as is the case with migrants who 
maintain personal relationships with family and friends in their home country, 
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and includes collective activities through organized community efforts, 
membership in transnational organizations, and activities that span two or 
more nation-states (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Guarnizo, Portes, Haller, 2003; 
Østergaard-Nielson, 2003; Vertovec, 1999). Transnationalism can involve 
activities within a variety of domains as well, including social, civic and political 
realms, on an individual or collective basis.  
Much of the recent research focusing on contemporary CGDs’ political 
activities on a transnational level (political transnationalism) explores the ways 
in which CGDs relate to the home country and host country, including 
identifying collective motivations, goals and activities.  For example, Wayland 
(2004) cites several ways in which CGDs get involved in their home country 
affairs on a political level: 
• When diasporas engage directly or indirectly in homeland 
politics; when actors in the homeland – government officials, 
opposition groups, co- ethnics — actively seek their support;  
• When actors in the homeland provide diasporas with economic 
or political support;  
• When actors in the homeland deny or discredit the legitimacy of 
the diaspora;  
• When the diaspora forge ties with sympathetic third parties such 
as other ethnic groups, nongovernmental organisations, political 
parties, or international organisations (Wayland, 2004, p. 410). 
When transnational networks are based on ethnonationalist status, 
there tends to be an increase in solidarity and common goals, which appear to 
increase CGDs’ collective action on a political level. Wayland (2004) describes 
how co-ethnics operating in transnational networks frequently engage in a 
variety of concurrent political activities, often with the aid of what Wayland 
calls “international allies” – members of the international community, who may 
or may not be members of the CGD communities. Wayland echoes other 
researchers when she describes how members of transnational ethnic 
networks often take advantage of political opportunity structures in the host 
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country, advocating for their causes in the homeland, influencing foreign 
policy, and providing support to co-ethnics in the home country.  
Case Studies on CGDs Engaged in Transnational Networks 
Several case studies provide examples of CGDs and their political 
activities using transnational networks. Through advances in information 
technology, such as the Internet and mobile phones, CGDs can now develop 
immediate connections with others around the world via email, mobile phones, 
Skype, social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, and online 
newsgroups and blogs (Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Castles, 2002; Demmers, 2002; 
Koinova, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006).  Such mediums can be positively 
used by migrant groups making connections to family and friends throughout 
the world, but research indicates that CGDs often use such networks to 
spread propaganda, provide support and information to rebel groups, and 
develop strategies for political activism that can influence and interfere with 
homeland affairs (Brinkerhoff, 2006b; Demmers, 2002; Lyons, 2004).  
Transnational networks also engage in fund-raising activities, which often 
include raising funds for insurgency and rebel groups fighting in their country 
of origin (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000, 2002; Demmers, 2005; Horst, 2008; Lyons, 
2004).  
Østergaard-Nielsen (2006) and Brinkerhoff (2009) use the term “digital 
diaspora” due to the prolific use of the Internet among many CGDs to further a 
political agenda, describing how websites are used as platforms for political 
activities and campaigns, and the recruitment and the mobilizing of members. 
Demmers (2002) uses the term “virtual communities” to describe CGD 
transnational networks describing how politically active CGDs use technology-
based networks to continue the war on a virtual level, where “they live their 
conflicts through the Internet, email, television, and telephone without direct 
(physical) suffering, risk or accountability” (p. 94). The technological advances 
available in the West provide politically active exiles in Western countries a 
distinct advantage over governments in their homeland where such 
	  	   24 
technological advances are often not available on the same level (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2000).  
Case studies of CGDs engaging in political activities reveal that their 
use of transnational networks is highly organized and quite creative. For 
instance, in Lyons’ studies on Ethiopian CGDs he found that those who 
resettled in the Global North and were aligned with the former government 
(and against the current government) maintained blogs, newsgroups, and 
websites with the goal of mobilizing exiles and those they left behind to 
advocate against the new ruling government. Operating in transnational 
networks also allow CGDs to engage in well-coordinated simultaneous 
lobbying efforts of NGOs and international organizations such as the 
European Union and the United Nations. For instance, CGDs often lobby the 
host country and international organizations in support of their cause (and 
against the interests of the ruling government), appeal to human rights 
organizations, media outlets, and the general public for support while 
engaging in activities intended to create awareness of their plight.  
In their study on Kurdish separatism in Germany Lyons and Uçarer’s 
(1998) found that the ability of opposition groups to mobilize effectively using 
transnational networks depended on the existence of three dynamics: 
collective and politicized identity, operational resources, and political 
opportunity.  Smith (2007) found that it is the political opportunity structures3 in 
the host country that in large part determine the ability of CGDs to mobilize 
and act on a political level. Living in the Global North appears to provide CGDs 
with a distinct political advantage. According to Baser and Swain (2009) the 
more liberal and open a host country’s political system, the easier it is for CGD 
groups to influence foreign policy affecting their homelands. Shain (1994, 
2002) describes how the openness of the U.S. political system, which values 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Political opportunity structures generally refer to structures within a society that influence how receptive 
a nation-state is to change, particularly when initiated by a social movement or protest.  The structures of 
a nation’s political institutes will determine whether social movements are allowed to develop, and 
mobilize (Rootes, 1999). The United States is typically considered a country that is open to social 
movements, thus has political structures that provide opportunities for social mobilization (Kitschelt, 
1986). 
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ethnic diversity and individual rights, benefits CGD groups, stating that many 
CGD groups have been granted a “meaningful voice in the U.S. foreign policy, 
especially on issues concerning countries of origin or symbolic homelands” (p. 
812). 
In mapping the Ethiopian CGD opposition Lyons (2007b) found that 
they existed transnationally across several countries, but it was those CGD 
groups in North America, particularly those based in Washington, D.C., that 
had the greatest power and influence in setting a political agenda in their 
home country, because living in Washington, D.C. provided them with easy 
access to people in power. Likewise, Baser and Swain (2008) noted that many 
political opposition groups operating within the CGD chose to relocate to the 
Washington, D.C. area primarily because the locale provides them easy 
access to politicians and other political resources (Baser & Swain, 2008).  
Brinkerhoff noted a similar trend for some members of the CGD, whose 
migration to a particular Western locale was “a tactic intended to enable 
political influence” (Brinkerhoff, 2009, p. 6). 
Lyons (2007b) notes how successful many CGDs are in their lobbying 
efforts once resettled in the Washington, D.C. area, citing the example of the 
Ethiopian CGD networks who were “extremely hostile” toward the ruling 
government in Ethiopia and successfully lobbied for a significant reduction in 
U.S. foreign aid to Ethiopia. They were also exceptionally effective at fund 
raising and political lobbying using the Internet to organize political 
demonstrations. They also aggressively lobbied U.S. State Department 
employees, relevant members of Congress and even policy makers at the 
World Bank. In fact, politically active CGDs tend to be some of the strongest 
lobbies in Washington, D.C. (Vertovec, 2005). Finally, Byman, et al. (2001) 
point out that “one of the largest contributions diasporas make to insurgencies 
is through diplomatic pressures” (as cited in Brinkerhoff, 2009, p. 21). 
The Current Study 
Diasporas were traditionally conceptualized as “powerless dispersed 
ethnic communities” but with the globalization of technology, particularly the 
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Internet and communication technologies, technologically based transnational 
diasporic networks have developed which have increased the means, reach 
and collective power CGDs can wield in their homeland’s politics (Cheran, 
2003). Contemporary CGDs, defined as those diaspora generated from 
ethnonationalist conflict, increasingly claim a stake in homeland affairs even 
though they reside outside the country’s boundaries (Horst, 2007). As such, 
CGDs are now considered a dynamic force that must be considered when 
evaluating significant factors in ethnonationalist intrastate conflict situations, 
peace building efforts, post-conflict reconstruction and host country/home 
country relations (Shain & Barth, 2003). In fact, Demmers (2002) states “it is 
no longer possible to understand ethno-nationalist conflict dynamics without 
incorporating the ‘diasporic component’” (p. 88).  
Recognizing the nature and power of CGDs as key stakeholders in 
conflict, and thoroughly exploring the context and the motives of their political 
activities are vital for furthering our knowledge and understanding of peace 
and conflict processes. Demmers (2007) states that it is the task of conflict 
analysis is to “unravel the complex dynamics of interactive processes in order 
to understand how and why people resort to violence.” Regardless of whether 
CGDs are framed as “peace makers” or “peace wreckers,” future research 
must explore the complex dynamics related to CGDs’ long-distance political 
engagement in homeland conflict, as well as the interactive processes 
involved in CGDs’ role in perpetuating conflict in their homelands. Demmers 
suggests future research should map CGD activities by exploring the following 
areas: relevant CGD communities, their internal subgroups (and their 
constituencies); their respective diasporic positions, interests and needs and 
fears; their relationships with other conflict parties and their qualitative or 
quantitative asymmetries; and the various perceptions of the causes and 
nature of the conflict (pp. 24-25).   
Diaspora researcher Kenneth Bush asserts the need for additional case 
studies on CGDs, in order to better understand what circumstances influence 
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CGDs to contribute to peace or conflict. In a recent conference on the future of 
diaspora research, Bush states:  
It is a well known fact that diaspora sometimes engages in 
peacebuilding processes and other times in conflict promotion activities. 
However, we do not know when, why and how they engage in 
peacebuilding vs. conflict promotion. 
Bush (2007) notes that each case study conducted on CGD contributes to 
greater understanding of the “when, why, and how diaspora contributes to 
peacebuilding in particular cases, in specific circumstances” and conflict in 
others (p. 6). He notes that one of the most significant challenges diaspora 
researchers face is evolving from specific case understanding to “higher levels 
of systematic generalization and application” (p. 6). Bush recommends the use 
of a basic model to analyze complex CGD communities, including mapping 
collective CGD dynamics which permits the researcher to “delineate and begin 
analyzing a diverse set of nested interconnected relationships that constitute 
the narrative foundation for the peacebuilding and conflict sustaining stories 
that are captured in the case studies” (as cited in Baser & Pejcic, 2007, p. 7).   
After conducting a thorough literature review on the diaspora-conflict 
nexus, Pirkkalainen and Abdile (2009) found several areas where further 
research needed to be conducted, including the exploration of the relationship 
between members of the CGD and the home country community, a detailed 
analysis of the dynamics and context of the conflict, the political opportunity 
structures in the host country, and the dynamics that may influence some 
CGDs to avoid dichotomous “black-and white” descriptions of the conflict and 
home country dynamics. Previous case studies on the nature and effect of 
CGDs’ political activities have focused on the activities of Ethiopian CGDs 
(Lyons, 2004, 2007b), Sri Lankan CGDs (Cheran, 2003; Fair, 2005), Kurdish 
CGDs (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006, 2007), Somali CGDs (Abdile, 2010; 
Brinkerhoff, 2006b), Afghanistan CGDs (Berg & Harviken, 2008; Brinkerhoff, 
2004), and Eritrean CGDs (Bernal, 2006). As of this writing, there has been no 
case study on Rwandan diasporic transnational political engagement in 
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homeland affairs. 
The present study focuses on Rwandan CGD consisting of those 
generated from the 1990 to 1994 civil war in Rwanda and the genocide 
against the Tutsi, who are living in real and virtual communities of identity in 
Western host countries, and who are engaging in homeland conflict on a 
political level using ICTs. Rwanda is an interesting case study that can make a 
significant contribution to existing research. First, Rwanda’s conflict was 
ethnonationalist in nature, and there are only two major ethnic groups in 
Rwanda,4 which increases ethnic polarization and the risk of renewed 
violence, particularly when one ethnic group is the majority (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004). Thus, this research will then also shed light on the dynamics of ethnic 
dominance in the CGDs, and its effect on protracted conflict in the region.   
The present study will explore the context of the original conflict in 
Rwanda as recommended by Smith and Stares (2007), who caution that prior 
to coming to any conclusions about the nature and effect of diasporic political 
involvement in homeland affairs and intrastate conflict it is imperative to 
thoroughly explore the historical and sociopolitical contexts of the conflict in 
the country of origin which will shed light on the potential motives of CGDs in 
regard to their engagement in homeland affairs. This exploration will serve as 
context for further descriptions and analysis of the Rwandan CGD living in the 
Global North (primarily the North America and Western Europe), and the 
nature of their transnational political activities using Internet communication 
technologies (ICTs), primarily social media.  
This study seeks to fill current gaps in the research, including the nature 
of diaspora groupings, their positions in relation to other conflict parties and 
external actors, their interests and needs, fears and agendas, the nature of 
their online transnational networks, including ways in which they use ICTs to 
accomplish their goals, and their various perceptions of the causes and nature 
of the conflict. This will be accomplished by following the recommendations of 
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key scholars in the area of CGDs by further exploring diasporic transnational 
political engagement on a collective level by exploring the case study of 
Rwanda. A key question to be answered in this study is whether Rwandan 
CGD conform to the literature on the collective CGD typologies with regard to 
the existence and nature of their attachment to their homeland, and the 
activities that emanate from this attachment. Additionally, the nature of 
Rwandan CGD transnational networks will be examined through the 
exploration of their use of ICTs to engage in transnational political activities 
focused on homeland conflict. This study seeks to answer the following 
questions about Rwandan CGD communities: 
1. Do Rwandan CGD communities living in the West (principally North 
America and Western Europe) engage in homeland conflict on a 
political level, in a way that conforms to the typologies demonstrated in 
the literature, and if so how? 
2. How do Rwandan CGD communities use ICTs, particularly social 
media, to engage in homeland conflict on a political level? How are 
virtual communities structured, and utilized for the purposes of political 
engagement, mobilization and action? 
3. Are there significant differences in the types and nature of political 
activities between intra-diasporic virtual communities (i.e., internal to 
the Rwandan diaspora), and inter-diasporic virtual communities (i.e., 
outreach to non-Rwandans, such as Americans, or other Westerners)? 
4. What do the purported and actual aims of Rwandan CGD appear to be 
attempting to achieve, and what is the potential impact of diaspora 
political engagement on the conflict cycle in the home country? 
 
The outline of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 1,  “Diaspora in 
International Politics,” provides an overview of the globalization of domestic 
politics, including exploring the areas civil conflict and territoriality. The term 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 There are three self-identified ethnic groups in Rwanda: Hutus, which are the majority at approximately 
85 percent of the population, Tutsis, which comprise about 14 percent of the population, and Twa, which 
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“diaspora” is defined and explored within the context of diasporic involvement 
in ethnonationalist intrastate conflict. CGD typologies are also briefly explored, 
including common CGD motivations for engaging on homeland conflict on a 
political level. The role CGD play in peace processes in their homelands is 
also briefly explored with an introduction of diasporic transnational 
communities. Chapter 1 concludes with an exploration of the purpose and 
aims of the present study.  Chapter 2 “Exploration of Conflict Generated 
Diaspora,” provides a more in-depth exploration of ethnonationalist CGD, 
including how the collective identity of many CGD is shaped and expressed. A 
more thorough exploration of common typologies of ethnonationalist CGD is 
also included, linking how these common typologies are expressed in 
communities of identity, particularly virtual communities, which tend to serve 
as conduits for political action. Chapter 3, “Ethnonationalist Conflict-Generated 
Diaspora use of the Internet for Political Purposes” begins with a general 
exploration of how the Internet is used for a variety of purposes, ranging from 
social activities to political engagement, concluding with an exploration of 
ways in which CGD use the Internet for political engagement. Chapter 4, “The 
Case of Rwanda,” provides background information on the country Rwanda, 
the focus of the case study, placing Rwanda within historical and socio-
political contexts. Chapter 5, “Methodology” includes the methodology of the 
study, including a description of the methods used in the study, a description 
of virtual ethnography, the data collection plan and ethical considerations. 
Chapter 6, “Results,” includes the results of the study, and Chapter 7, 
“Discussion and Implications” includes a detailed discussion of the study 
results and their implications in several areas related to diaspora transnational 
activities, including their impact on conflict, and peace building processes.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
comprise about 1 percent of the population. 
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CHAPTER 2:  EXPLORATION OF CONFLICT GENERATED DIASPORA 
 
In Chapter 1 the concept of diaspora was introduced as a sub-set of the 
broader migrant community. In this chapter a more in-depth exploration of 
diaspora generated through conflict will be explored, including how CGD 
collective identity is shaped and expressed. A more thorough exploration of 
common typologies of CGD (briefly explored in Chapter 1) will also be will be 
undertaken, demonstrating how these common typologies are expressed in 
communities of identity, particularly virtual communities, which tend to serve 
as conduits for their long-distance nationalism.  
As explored in Chapter 1, CGDs’ ties to homeland are both tangible and 
symbolic (Lyons, 2006b; Orozco, 2003); they exhibit a strong tendency to 
create a mythical homeland, which often serves as a basis for collective action 
(Cohen, 2008; Lyons, 2006b; Safran, 1991; Vertovec, 1997). This collective 
action most often involves the mobilization of support within and outside the 
host country, with a goal of what several scholars refer to as the “myth of 
return,” an idealized desire to return to the homeland of their past (i.e., the 
symbolic homeland; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Cohen, 2008; Lyons, 2006b; Safran, 
1991). This collective action often manifests on a political level, and can 
involve action against their home country’s government, particularly if the 
diaspora were forced into exile as a result of a civil war (Lyons, 2006a, 2006b; 
Østergaard-Neilson, 2006; Safran, 1991). 
Although some scholars consider only those migrants who are forced 
from their homelands due to violence to be members of a diaspora (see 
Cheran, 2003), many offer more inclusive definitions that include voluntary 
migrants. Because the typology and collective actions of involuntary migrants 
appear to be significantly different from migrants who leave their home country 
voluntarily in search of better opportunities, Lyons (2004, 2006b) refers to 
diaspora generated from conflict (often protracted civil armed ethnonationalist 
conflict) as “conflict-generated diaspora.” Mohamoud (2005) notes that the 
term CGD is used to distinguish the wave of forced, involuntary migrants that 
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began in the 1990s from earlier waves of labor and economic migrants. 
Mohamoud estimates that there are approximately 3.8 million members of the 
African CGD living in North America and Europe, most of whom are from the 
Great Lakes Region (Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo), and the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan), two 
regions that have experienced considerable protracted armed conflict. 
Lyons theorizes that it is these diaspora members, those generated 
from conflict, who are most likely to collectively engage in homeland conflict on 
a political level, often against the homeland government, with a collective 
dream of returning to their homeland and restoring it to the imagined condition 
prior to their forced dispersion (Lyons, 2006b). As referenced in Chapter 1, 
globalization, particularly the globalization of communication technologies, 
such as the Internet, has significantly increased diaspora members, 
particularly CGDs’ ability to mobilize and engage in long-distance collective 
political action (through the development of virtual transnational networks), 
allowing them reach and influence on a global level (Adamson and Demetriou, 
2007; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Lyons, 2006b; Østergaard-Neilson, 2006; Vertovec, 
1997). 
Communities of Identity: CGDs’ Collective Identity 
Communities of identity can refer to any community of individuals who 
share mutually agreed upon and self-identified characteristics and shared 
histories, to the extent that they bind people together in a way that the group 
determines are unique in nature. Such characteristics are based primarily 
upon one’s social identity (Bradatan, Popon & Melton, 2010). A community of 
identity based on social identity is formed not only by bonding with fellow 
group members who share the community’s key identifiers (e.g., ethnic 
identity, religious identity, gender, geographic locale), but also by delineating 
those who are not members of the group (e.g., members of other ethnic and/or 
religious groups, alternate gender, members of other communities). Scholars 
often refer to the identified members of a group as having “in-group” status, 
and those not accepted into a community of identity as having “out-group” 
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status. Bradatan, Popon and Melton (2010) note how social identity in relation 
to group membership is strengthened when group membership is difficult to 
attain, because membership is more likely to be deemed special. Thus the 
more distinct members consider the characteristics required to become a 
member of a community of identity, the stronger the collective identity among 
members. Fixed or immutable qualities, such as gender or ethnicity create 
even stronger bonds, because there will always be an “out-group,” and 
mobility opportunities between in-groups and out-groups are limited. 
When communities of national identity are based on ethnic group 
membership (as they are with ethnonationalism) they combine elements of 
both national identity and ethnic identity (Conner, 1997; Smith, 1991). Smith 
(1991) offers a comprehensive description of communities of national identity 
based ethnic group membership, which extends to diaspora communities. 
First, Smith distinguishes between “ethnic categories” —a designation of a 
group as a separate cultural grouping that is determined by outsiders (of which 
the group may or may not be aware)— and “ethnic communities,” which 
involves a self-ascribed designation as culturally separate, based on specific 
attributes, often called “key identifiers” or “cultural markers.” According to 
Smith, ethnic communities contain the following attributes:  
1. A collective proper name; 
2. A myth of common ancestry; 
3. Shared historical memories; 
4. One or more differentiating elements of common culture; 
5. An association with a specific “homeland”; and 
6. A sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population (p. 
21). 
Smith (1991) points out that although objective cultural identifiers of ethnic 
community membership do exist (e.g., skin color and language), the majority 
of attributes or cultural markers are subjective. For instance, notions of 
common ancestry are subjective because they are often based on the myth of 
shared genealogy, which translates into a belief that members of the ethnic 
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community/group emanate from interrelated families comprising one large 
extended family. Smith states that self-ascribed membership in such “ethnic 
families” persists even when members are in exile, which is accomplished 
through “an intense nostalgia and spiritual attachment” to homeland (p. 23).   
Smith (1991) describes how in communities of national identity, 
dimensions of territoriality are commonly blended with genealogy while 
encompassing ‘bonds of solidarity’ among community members who are 
unified through “shared memories, myths and traditions” (p. 15). When 
ethnicity is involved in the formation of national identity, the concept of national 
identity becomes even more complex, involving what Smith describes as a 
type of cultural collectivity “bound by historical forces, both with regard to 
national identity as well as a perceived historical culture, involving culturally-
based myths believed to be rooted in pre-modern ethnic identities” (p. 21). 
The collective cultural identity associated with ethnic group membership 
can be malleable, flexible, and fluid, in terms of boundaries and cultural 
content. This flexibility enables ethnic groupings to remain durable over time, 
despite changing conditions, such as distance from the homeland (Conner, 
1997; Smith, 1991).  Yet the boundaries are also fixed, particularly with regard 
to group membership, because blood ties are required as an attribute/cultural 
marker. Thus, it is virtually impossible for outsiders to be fully accepted as 
members of an ethnonationalist community of identity because no amount of 
embracing relevant nationalist values could ever reach the level of “binding 
through blood” (Bradatan, Popon & Melton, 2010).   
Communities of Ethnic Identity and In-Group/Out-Group Dynamics 
Keeping the idea of rather nonpermeable membership boundaries in 
mind, communities of national identity that are based on ethnic membership 
often exhibit strong in-group/out-group dynamics, which involves the favoring 
and privileging of co-ethnics, at the expense of those in the out-group. Conner 
recognized this phenomenon as early as 1973 when he stated: 
The peculiar emotional depth of the ‘us’-‘them’ syndrome which is an 
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intrinsic part of national consciousness, by bifurcating as it does all 
mankind into ‘members of the nation’ versus ‘all others’ appears 
thereby to pose a particularly severe impediment to coordinated action 
with any of the ‘others’ 
 
For instance, the favoring of co-ethnics (referenced in Chapter 1 in connection 
with a CGDs’ enduring connection to homeland), is based on a sense of social 
identity, and often results in collective action, sometimes against another 
group. As noted above, this sense of social identity is based on the subjective 
belief among co-ethnics that they, and others within their group, have a 
common ancestry, and therefore an “extended family” (Conversi, 2007).  
Whether a group does in fact share a common ancestry is immaterial. Rather, 
the perception of commonality is what matters (Conner, 1997).  
Closely related to the process of privileging ingroup members are 
dynamics called “suprahumanization” and “infrahumanization.” These 
theoretical propositions hold that ingroup members will tend to attribute more 
refined human emotions (e.g., hope, grief, openness, warmth, humility, moral 
reasoning.) to ingroup members (suprahumanization), while attributing 
principally base animal-like emotions (e.g., fear, anger, pleasure) to outgroup 
members (infrahumanization) (Bain, Kashima, & Haslam, 2006; Leyens, 
Paladino, Rodriguez, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, & Gaunt, 2000). This 
dynamic is considered one form of outgroup dehumanization, and occurs with 
varying frequency depending upon the type of group and the nature of the 
characteristics used to identify group membership. For instance, studies on 
groups based on nationality found that ingroups tended to engage in levels of 
suprahumanization of ingroup members and infrahumanization and 
dehumanization of outgroup members (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Viki & Calitri, 
2008). It is noteworthy that these results did not hold true for groups formed 
based on patriotism,5 leading the authors to predict that ethnonationalist 
groups6 possessed more intangible cultural identifiers, which may have led to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Previously defined as loyalty to a nation-state. 
6 Previously defined as those exhibiting loyalty to co-ethnics representing a nation-state. 
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great interethnic group competition, which in turn may have led to higher levels 
of “animalistic dehumanization” of outgroup members (Viki & Calitri, 2008, p. 
1060).  
Studies on the suprahumanization and infrahumanization processes 
related to ingroup/outgroup dynamics, particularly those exploring 
communities of identity based on intangible identifiers (i.e., ethnic identity), 
provide additional insights into why conflicts over intangible issues are almost 
always zero-sum games, particularly when they involve “identity, beliefs, 
values, cultural norms or a way of life” and occur in unstructured 
environments, such as civil wars. According to Bercovitch (2007), intangible 
issues such as these, which are almost always found in ethnonationalist 
communities of identity, virtually always make conflict more violent and less 
likely to be resolved through conflict resolution strategies (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 
24), which in order to be successful requires increased empathy toward—and 
understanding of—opposing sides. Because ethnonationalism involves the 
“privileging of coethnics,” (based on a belief that members of a particular 
ethnic group are a part of an “extended family” (Berghe as cited in Conversi, 
2007, p. 2), ingroup/outgroup dynamics in CDGs become a powerful force in 
determining group cohesion, which often serves as a foundation for collective 
action. This issue will be discussed in greater detail in the sections on CGDs’ 
unique typology, and their effect on the conflict cycle.  
Transnational Communities Based on Hybrid Identities  
The number of intangible variables that contribute to forming 
ethnonationalist communities of identity often include not only one’s ethnic 
clan or tribe and country of origin, but also the diasporas’ particular 
immigration wave,7 the circumstances surrounding the dispersal (forced and 
violent or voluntary and peaceful; Brinkerhoff, 2007; Demmers, 2007; Lyons, 
2004), religious affiliation (Brinkerhoff, 2007), and gender (Al-Ali, 2007).  
Safran (1991) cites four aspects of CGD identity that bind them in a 
	  	   37 
community of identity, including common language, historical memory, shared 
religious beliefs, and chronic minority status within a dominant society. The 
unique nature of CGDs is an outcome of their shared history of involuntary 
migration marked by violence and trauma and their “deterritorialized” 
commitment to their homelands, both of which influence the quality and 
substance of their collective identity (this dynamic will be explored further in 
the subsequent section on CGD typology).  
CGD communities of identity are also based on their status as 
transmigrants, which serve as a foundation for activity, commonly referred to 
as their “transnationalism.” Transnationalism in a migrant context has been 
defined as “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multistranded 
social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” where 
immigrants “build social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political 
borders” (Basch, Schiller, & Blac-Szanton, 1994, p. 7). Migrant 
transnationalism has gained increasing attention in the literature due in large 
part to the increased ways in which it can be exercised because of the 
globalization of transportation, economic markets, and communication 
technologies, such as the Internet and easily cellular telephones (Castles, 
2002; Demmers, 2002; Koinova, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006).  
Although there has always been a transnational dimension to diasporas 
by virtue of the fact that they live outside of their country of origin, globalization 
has rendered CGDs transnational far more dynamic, because it is now easier 
than ever before to act “transnationally” by initiating cross-continent contact 
with a few keystrokes on a computer connected to the Internet, or by making a 
relatively inexpensive telephone call to another country using a hand-held 
mobile device. According to a UN Human Development report on the effect of 
globalization on human development and relationships, “[t]he cost of a three-
minute telephone call from New York to London fell from $245 (USD) in 1930 
(in 1990 prices) to under $50 (USD) in 1960 to $3 (USD) in 1990 to about 35 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Brinkerhoff (2009) notes that CGDs often define themselves according to a particular refugee wave, 
such as pre-or post some significant event. 
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cents in 1999 (UNDP, 1999, p. 28). In 2014 it would likely be free, or almost 
free if one has access to a communication devise using a Voice Over Internet 
Protocol (VOIP), or one of Internet-based communication applications, such as 
Skype. 
Hybrid identity is at the core of CGDs transnationalism, which is defined 
as “a sense of self that is neither wholly of the homeland nor exclusively 
reflective of the hostland” (Brinkerhoff, 2009, p. 339). The body of research on 
immigration, ethnic identity, and transnationalism has evolved considerably 
over the last several decades, with an increasing focus on the importance of 
hybrid identity, particularly within transnational CGDs. Traditional migration 
theories tended to focus on the experiences of Europeans who migrated to the 
United States during a significant immigration wave occurring between 1880 
and 1920. These theories were then applied quite broadly, which assumed 
that all immigrants shared similar experiences. These classic immigration 
theories have as their centerpiece the prescriptive concept of the complete 
assimilation of migrants into the host country as ideal (Guarnizo, Portes & 
Haller, 2003).  Although classic immigration theorists noted challenges first-
generation migrants would face in the assimilation process, the overarching 
belief was that with each successive generation would see increased 
opportunities to assimilate into the dominant culture. The assimilation process 
was perceived to be dependent in large part on an immigrant’s willingness to 
cut virtually all ties with his or her home country in order to integrate into the 
new host country (Gordon, 1961; Hansen, 1952). 
Classic immigration assimilation theories were based on the belief that 
cultural identity was an “either/or” proposition, and hybrid identity was not 
possible. Although newer theories of immigration allow for hybrid identities, 
even more recent studies of CGDs transnationalism cite host country 
receptivity and opportunities for migrant integration into the host country’s 
society as key factors discouraging long-distance nationalism, particularly 
political activities that involve violent opposition to the home country (activities 
that are posited to be juxtaposed to cultural assimilation; Brynen, 2002).  In 
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other words, the more a migrant community assimilates into a host country 
culture and is accepted by that culture, the less they will feel compelled to 
remain connected to home country dynamics. 
A growing body of research reveals that at least with regard to CGD 
members who were forced from their countries of origin and did not migrate 
voluntarily, host country receptivity does not appear to have an impact on 
long-distance nationalism. In fact, CGD can show high levels of integration into 
the host country’s society, engaging in society on a range of levels (e.g., 
educational, occupational, social) and maintain a hybrid identity, particularly 
within multicultural societies (Bradatan, Popan, & Melton, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 
2009; Conversi, 2004; Inglehart, 2000; Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton, 
1995). For instance, Adamson and Demetriou (2007) describe CGD 
transnationalism as follows: 
They are not sojourners because they settle and become incorporated 
in the economy and political institutions, localities, and patterns of daily 
life of the country in which they reside. However, at the very same time, 
they are engaged elsewhere in the sense that they maintain 
connections, build institutions, conduct transactions, and influence local 
and national events in the countries from which they emigrated (p. 48). 
 
The reasons for this hybridity are threefold—first, many Western 
countries have an increased tolerance for multiculturalism and hybrid identity, 
due in part to a dramatic increase in global migration, therefore there is less 
pressure for CGD (and all migrants in general) to assimilate into their host 
countries by completely cutting off ties with their homeland and/or homeland 
cultures (Safran, 1991; Sheffer, 1994; Weiner, 1986). Second, facilities and 
opportunities, such as the globalization of communication technologies have 
made remaining connected to the homeland far easier despite the fact that 
they are “deterritorialized” (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2009; 
Castles, 2002; Demmers, 2002; Koinova, 2009; Lyons, 2006b; Sheffer, 1994; 
Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006); and third, there appears to be qualitative 
differences between voluntary and involuntary migrants in terms of how they 
relate their host country and home county (Demmers, 2007; Lyons, 2004, 
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2006a, 2006b; Østergaard-Nielson, 2006; Vertovec, 1997).  
Hybrid identity, therefore, is at the core of the CGD identity and serves 
as the foundation for the development of communities of identity as well as 
collective and transnational activities and activism. Research on hybrid identity 
among migrant populations extends back to the early 1990s, coinciding with 
the most recent wave of globalization (Brinkerhoff, 2009). Hybrid identity 
involves a synthesized identity the migrant manifests through the differences 
they embody and encounter (not despite them) (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Hall, 1990). 
Hybrid identities among CGDs are not static, but “are constantly produced and 
reproduced” (Brinkerhoff, 2009, p. 727).   
Many variables influence CGD hybrid identity development. Most 
significant among these influences are the circumstances surrounding CGD 
migration. Other variables include ethnic group membership, religious 
affiliation, age, gender, the receptivity of host country, and conditions in the 
home country (Brinkerhoff, 2009).  Navarro (2003) discusses how storytelling 
contributes to the formation of identity, where telling and retelling stories helps 
to make sense out of collective experiences, which then helps to craft identity. 
This is an important insight (explored in more detail later in this chapter), as it 
highlights the fluidity of CGDs identity and how it is constantly being 
negotiated and renegotiated as CGDs adapt to their new host society while 
maintaining ties to their homeland. Finally, the Internet, particularly social 
connections maintained through cyberspace, offers the ability to negotiate 
CGDs identity, which in turn reinforces hybridity (Brainard & Brinkerhoff, 
2004).  
Transnational Virtual Communities 
Diaspora members as a whole have always had a yearning for “home,” 
but globalization has made the world smaller, and as such, the worlds of 
CGDs have shrunk as well, making it easier for them to act on their desires to 
remain connected to their homelands (Fullilove, 2008). Brinkerhoff (2006) 
notes how CGDs tend to engage in formal and informal CGD organizations, 
which assist with several aspects of their relocation and displacement 
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experience. These organizations can exist in real world domains, or in an 
online (i.e., virtual) domain. Online community participation in what is often 
called “virtual communities” (or “cyber-communities”) has increased 
significantly in recent years, with some CGD engaging with other members of 
the CGDs solely online (Castles, 2002; Demmers, 2002; Koinova, 2009; 
Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006).  In fact, virtual communities are one of the fastest 
growing phenomena on the Internet, allowing users to access knowledge, 
exchange information and interact socially without geographical limitations 
(Caverlee & Webb, 2008).   
CGDs’ virtual communities serve multiple purposes. They provide a 
place where CGD members can engage with fellow CGD members across the 
globe, thus providing them with a social outlet, and reducing potential 
loneliness often inherent in moving to a new country. Virtual communities can 
also provide CGDs with much sought-after information about home 
(Brinkerhoff, 2009).  CGDs’ online engagement in virtual communities can also 
provide much-needed assistance with identity development (or 
redevelopment). For instance, online engagement helps to reinforce existing 
identities through the telling and retelling of stories of past experiences in the 
homeland, or sharing home country cultural artifacts from the home country 
online. Online engagement in virtual communities also helps to recreate 
identities of CGD members through the sharing of information about their new 
host country, which can help with the acculturation process (Brinkerhoff, 
2006b; Cohen, 1996). In her study on the Eritrean CGD, Bernal (2006) found 
that CGD members used the Internet as a `“transnational public sphere where 
they produce and debate narratives of history, culture, democracy and 
identity,” and where CGDs could rise above their circumstances and create 
new forms of “citizenship, community and political practice” (p. 161). 
The Internet has increased the ease of developing transnational 
communities by permitting CGD members to remain up-to-date on events 
occurring in their homelands by following international news, and local news 
about the home country via Internet “newspapers,” online radio and Internet 
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television. As Fullilove (2008) observed, the increased connectivity that the 
Internet offers “…is herding like-minded individuals towards each other” 
(Fullilove, 2008, p. 9). For instance, relationships are expanded through social 
media using online applications that allow free “telephone” calling and texting 
(SMS) between electronic devices, such as Skype, iChat, Tango, Viber, 
WhatsApp, and FaceTime.8 Most of these applications can be used on various 
devices, such as computers, laptops, tablets, and “smart phones.” CGD 
members are increasingly using online blogs to facilitate social, civic and 
political engagement (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Fullilove, 2008; Lyons, 2006b; 
Østergaard-Nielson, 2006). CGD are also increasingly engaging in online 
(virtual) environments using the Internet, specifically social media (web-based 
media used for the purposes of social interaction), where opinions are 
expressed and exchanged, ideas are debated, and relationships are built 
(Brinkerhoff, 2006b, 2009).  
A virtual community can include chat rooms, newsgroups, interactive 
websites (i.e., the ability to post comments at the end of an online news 
article), blogs, and online forums. A subset of these virtual communities is 
called online “social networking sites” (SNS), and though the terms ‘virtual 
community’ and SNS are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature, the 
term SNS is most often reserved for online forums that exist with the chief 
purpose of encouraging social networking among groups and individuals 
(Caverlee & Webb, 2008). These include Facebook, MySpace, Oruk (Google), 
Tumblr, and Twitter, for example. The communication that occurs within these 
SNSs is most commonly referred to in the literature as computer-mediated 
communication (CMC; Walther, 1996), and data that involves posts within 
virtual communities is referred to most commonly as text artifacts, or cultural 
artifacts (e.g., photos of old national flags, former leaders of the homeland; 
Caverlee & Webb, 2008). 
Some of the newer SNSs are built upon a more visual platform. For 
instance, Pinterest is a content-sharing website that allows users to “pin” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Specifically for Apple products 
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artifacts they find on the web to a “virtual pinboard” according to selected 
themes (e.g. food, travel, home design, hobbies, social interests), which can 
be auto-posted on other SNSs, such as Facebook. Pinterest also allows users 
to “follow” others’ Pinterest “pinboards,” and then like, share or comment on 
posts, thus providing an interactive component. Instagram, another visually 
based interactive SNS, is a photo-sharing social networking site that allows 
users to digitally edit and artistically enhance their photographs and then post 
them on both the Instagram site as well as a user’s additional, integrated 
SNSs. Instragram users can also “follow” each other and “like,” share and 
comment on the posted photos on Instragram’s application or on the user’s 
other associated SNSs (if they are linked). Although both of these sites are 
relatively new (both started in late 2010), CGDs using these sites have the 
ability to post photos of cultural artifacts related to their homelands, such as 
home country architecture, and traditional foods, or even more politically 
motivated photos, such as political demonstrations. Because these new SNSs 
can be linked to users’ other SNSs, they become a part of a virtual web of 
social interconnectivity, but also a part of broader transnational networks 
where various linkages that can assist in large-scale mobilization and the 
dissemination of a broad range of materials (Brinkerhoff, 2009). Although it is 
important to note that immigrants in general use virtual communities based on 
web-based social media for a broad range of purposes, Lyons (2004) notes 
that CGD often use these communities to engage politically in homeland 
conflict. The nature of these types of political transnational networks will be 
explored more thoroughly at the end of this chapter. 
Motivations to Act: The Unique Nature of CGD 
As noted above, CGDs, at their most elementary level, are built on the 
basis of their self-identified membership in a deterritorialized ethnic group, 
their enduring connection to their imagined homeland (Anderson, 1992; 
Brinkerhoff, 2009; Crisp 1999; Kleist & Hansen, 2006; Lyons, 2004), and their 
shared migration experience (Cohen 2008). These collective experiences are 
shared in a variety of ways within their transnational communities of identity 
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(Brah, 1996, Lyons, 2006a, 2006b; Safran 1991).  But increasingly research is 
illustrating how CGDs are unique in both their identity and activities, with their 
collective identity serving as motivation for collective action, often on a political 
level. In fact, Adamson and Demetriou (2007) found that the binding nature of 
CGD internal organizational structures, which are built on common identity and 
shared goals, have enabled them to effectively mobilize group members and 
engage in long-term political activities, in both their host and home countries. 
Although the existence of these types of networks has been solidly 
established through a growing body of empirical research, the question as to 
why CGDs are motivated to engage in long-distance nationalism through 
virtual transnational networks is still being explored. 
Lyons (2006a, 2007b) developed a typology for CGD collective 
motivation and action based on his study of Ethiopian CGD. He found that 
CGDs differ from other migrant groups in terms of their motivation to act, in 
three primary ways. The first relates to the cause of their migration (which is 
associated with a strong attachment to homeland); second, the nature of their 
relationship with their home country; and third, their tendency to develop 
transnational networks that serve as primary conduits for political activism 
related to the original conflict in their home country.   
Cause of Migration 
Lyons (2007a, 2007b) asserts that by definition CGDs have 
experienced violent forced migration. It is the experience of violence, trauma, 
and forced expulsion from their home country that sets this group apart from 
all other migrant groups, and that influences their collective identity, attitudes 
(particularly about their home country), and the types of activities in which they 
tend to engage, involving home country dynamics.  
Lyons (2007a, 2007b) notes that ethnonationalist CGDs have been 
violently displaced from their home country as a result of armed civil conflict, 
often in large numbers. CGD are often forced to flee their homes and villages 
quickly, leaving most or all of their possessions behind. As such, the majority 
of CGDs experience significant trauma prior to arriving in the host country. 
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Although they may have been perpetrators of violence (e.g., the regime 
oppressors who flee the home country following international intervention), 
many others experience wartime civilian victimization involving an array of 
human rights violations, such as political persecution, massacres of entire 
villages; ethnic cleanings, and genocide (Bellamy, 2011). Many women and 
girls are raped as tactic of war (Kivlahan & Ewigman, 2010), children are 
conscripted into armed conflict (Betancourt et al, 2010; Vindevogal, Coppens, 
Derluyn, De Schryver, Loots, & Broekaert, 2011), men are often targeted as 
threats and killed, and elders and the physically weak often perish (Fox & 
Tang, 2000; Hoeffler & Reynal-Querol, 2003). These traumatic events may 
occur during the original conflict (particularly during armed civil conflict), during 
the escape across borders, or while temporarily residing in refugee camps 
(UNHCR, 2011). 
Lyons (2007a, 2007b) notes that the consequences of these traumatic 
experiences include an enduring desire to keep the memory of their traumatic 
displacement alive and an unrelenting desire to go home. Lyons describes 
that a primary way in which displacement memories are kept alive is by telling 
and retelling the story of their violent forced migration. It is important to recall 
Navarro’s (2003) reference to the importance of storytelling in the crafting of 
identity in migrant communities. The relevance of this dynamic in terms of 
CGDs is not necessarily in the mere act of story telling, but in the stories’ 
content.  
According to several diaspora scholars, CGDs often cast themselves as 
victims in their stories of exile, even if they were perpetrators in the original 
conflict, because they were the ones who were violently expelled. As such, 
their storytelling often reflects their victimhood status. In fact, in her description 
of various types of diaspora groupings, Brinkerhoff (2008) refers to CGDs who 
perceive that they are the victims in the original conflict as “victim diaspora,” 
noting how the collective perception of themselves as victims has implications 
not only for their identity development as a distinct diaspora grouping, but also 
for assimilation into the host country and subsequent mobilization and action. 
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Shain (2002) and Demmers (2007) note that when ethnonationalist CGDs 
perceive themselves as the victims (e.g., in the original conflict, of forced 
expulsion, of violent civil war, of persecution by the home country regime) the 
telling and retelling of stories of their victimhood often becomes so endemic to 
their collective identity that attempts at reconciliation can be threatening to 
their victimhood status, contributing to a reluctance to compromise. This 
reluctance can then become a polarizing force in ongoing reconciliation efforts 
in homeland conflict.  
Imagined Homeland 
Another way in which CGDs keep the memory of the trauma 
surrounding their displacement alive is by retaining ties to the homeland, and 
though CGDs are deterritorialized, much of their identity remains centered on 
their homeland, and is expressed in symbolic terms (Lyons, 2007). For 
instance, Adamson and Demetriou (2007) note how CGDs often unite in 
common purpose on the basis of ethnonationalist pride, manifested in the 
adoption of territorial symbols and nationalist ideologies. Likewise, Lyons 
(2004) cites how CGD social networks, particularly online social networks, 
tend to focus less on general issues related to acculturation and daily living, 
and more on the original conflict, and a collective desire to return home—what 
Lyons (2004) describes as the “aspiration of return to a particular piece of 
territory that is the symbolically important homeland” (p. 9).  
Lyons (2004) also describes ways in which this symbolism is deployed, 
noting that often CGD social networks “link past conflict, the contemporary 
challenges of living in a host state, and an aspiration of return” (p. 7) 
symbolically through “imaginations of homeland.” Lyons describes the 
“language of exiles” as being filled with literary images that depict the 
homeland as an “earthy place by speaking of the ‘original soil’ and the need to 
maintain ‘roots’” (p. 7). He also notes how many CGD websites and 
publications feature a variety of symbols representing the homeland such as 
maps, flags, images of past leaders, icons representing homeland geography, 
use of nationalist colors, and other symbolic icons.  Other examples of 
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symbolism representing an imagined homeland include annual 
commemorations celebrating events of the pre-exile homeland. Although most 
migrant groups may become nostalgic about their respective homelands, 
Lyons describes the relationship between CGDs and their symbolic 
homelands as taking on mythical overtones so that in time, CGDs’ vision of 
their original homeland has little resemblance with the current homeland. For 
instance, in Lyons’ (2004, 2006a) studies on Ethiopian CGD, he found that 
they tended to have a “territorially defined concept of an Ethiopian homeland 
which was key to their identity” (p. 19), that included Eritrea, despite the fact 
that Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1991. Likewise, Lyons 
(2004) cites how the Oromo CGD (also from Ethiopia), which generally 
opposes the current Ethiopian government and advocates for an independent 
Oromo, has websites and publications that are replete with “maps, nationalist 
colors, and images of the Oromo national symbol the odaa tree” reflecting their 
desire to return to an imagined homeland independent from Ethiopia.   
Cohen (2008) notes how CGD imagined homeland is filled with 
sentimental notions expressed through terms such as “motherland, fatherland, 
native land…the ancestral land…” —terms that are consistently emotional and 
referential. He also notes the interchange between feminine and masculine 
depictions of homeland where ‘motherland’ represents nurturing, represented 
by the “biblical Promised Land [which] was said to be ‘flowing with milk and 
honey’ ” (p. 103), and ‘fatherland’ represents fighting and protection, where 
“the nurturing white milk of motherland is replaced by the blood of soldiers 
gallantly defending fatherland” (p. 103). 
The Nature of CGDs Relationship with the Home Country  
The nature of the relationship between many CGD communities and 
their home countries is varied and complex. As noted above, a commonly 
cited characteristic of CGDs is their orientation toward their homeland. Cohen 
(2008) asserts that a common feature among all CGDs is the “idealization of 
the…ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, 
restoration, safety and prosperity” (p. 184). Although diasporic 
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conceptualizations of homeland may have similar characteristics across CGD 
groupings, the nature of the relationship can vary considerably, depending in 
large part on the circumstances surrounding the dispersal. Mohamoud (2005) 
describes four primary ways in which African CGD members relate to their 
respective homelands (many of which he notes are positive in nature): 
providing financial remittance, making contributions to civil society, lobbying in 
the hostland, and engaging in homeland affairs on a political level.  
Relating through Financial Remittance 
Financial remittance is defined as “transfers of money by foreign 
workers to their home countries” (Brinkerhoff, 2006a, p. 1).  Foreign 
remittances to developing countries equaled $372 billion (USD) in 2011, which 
represents a 12 percent increase over 2010, and over a 400 percent increase 
over 2004 (Mohapatra, Ratha, & Silwal, 2011), outpacing funding for 
international development (Brinkerhoff, 2006a). Although Mohamoud (2005) 
acknowledges that some financial remittances are collective and may be used 
to finance conflict, he asserts that the overwhelming majority of remittances 
sent by migrants, including CGD, are generated on individual bases to family 
and friends, with the money being used for poverty alleviation, and building up 
local business infrastructure. Mohamoud notes, however that there is limited 
hard data on the “amount, nature of transfer and use” of CGDs’ financial 
remittances to rebel groups, acknowledging that in his study he was unable to 
ascertain the answer to these questions because the CGD members he 
interviewed were not forthcoming in their responses, and for the most part 
claimed that financing rebel groups was impossible. Mohamoud asserts that 
what is of critical importance and which has not yet been answered is “how 
much of the collective remittances fund community welfare activities and how 
much is used to fund conflict?” He recommends further investigation “through 
extensive interviews with diverse political groups, actors, civil society 
organisations, human rights groups, journalists, peace activists and locally 
operating international NGOs and agencies” (p. 24). 
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Other scholars strongly contend that CGDs cause more harm than 
good, particularly when it comes to contributing financially to rebel 
movements. Abdile (2010) states that whether financial remittances have a 
positive or negative effect depends in large part on the circumstances 
surrounding CGDs’ engagement, such as ethnic affiliation and generational 
status. For instance, in the case of the Somali diaspora, Abdile found that first-
generation Somalis were motivated to contribute financially based on strong 
ethnic ties and ethnic clan obligations, and felt an obligation to support ethnic 
fighting when called upon to do so by a clan elder, whereas second-
generation Somali diaspora were far less motivated by ethnic interest and 
ideology, stating that they did not believe it was their obligation to “blindly” 
support clan militias, but rather they were primarily moved to support specific 
causes related to poverty alleviation. Van Hear (2003) found that Sri Lankan 
diaspora provided considerable financial support to the LTTE, which increased 
the conflict in Sri Lanka. He points out, however, that not all financial 
remittances are voluntary, explaining that sometimes these financial 
remittances may be a result of “extractions” from migrants because “the LTTE 
regulates movement out of the areas they control. Exit taxes are levied on 
people leaving, and appropriations are made from households with members 
abroad” (p. 11). 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) predict that a large diaspora (relative to the 
home country population) increases the risk of renewed conflict significantly 
(up to six-fold), due in large part to the financial remittances that support rebel 
groups. The “Collier and Hoeffler Model of Civil War” is based on a 
quantitative analysis of 73 civil wars in 161 countries during eight five-year 
subsets between 1960 and 1999. The model predicts that certain factors 
(characteristic variants) significantly increase the risk of civil war (defined as 
an internal conflict in with at least 1000 battle-related civilian and military 
deaths) in post-conflict regions in sub-Saharan Africa (the Great Lakes Region 
and the Horn of Africa). The study (and succeeding studies based on the 
model) found that variations in characteristic variants could either exacerbate 
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or mediate this risk (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004). Collier and 
Hoeffler evaluated whether the initiation of wars were prompted more by 
economic factors or grievances. Among both sets of circumstances they found 
that diaspora have a significant exacerbating effect on certain variants 
contributing to an increase in risk of civil war, particularly in cases where there 
is ethnic dominance. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler’s model predicts that if 
all characteristics are held constant, a country in sub-Saharan Africa in a stage 
of post-conflict, with a risk of renewed conflict of 6 percent would experience 
an increase in risk of conflict to 36 percent if the country had a large diaspora 
living in the West (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). The reasons cited for this 
increased risk of renewed conflict relate to the impact of CGDs’ political 
activities, which increase both economic opportunities and perceived 
grievances. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002, 2004, 2008) found 
that CGDs provide the economic opportunity for civil war by financing rebel 
groups through collective remittances, and serving as long-distance 
representatives for rebel and insurgency groups fighting the governments in 
their homeland—activities can facilitate and exacerbate conflict, making 
conflicts more protracted.  
Although there does appear to be significant evidence that in some 
circumstances CGDs contribute to war efforts through collective financial 
remittances, Brinkerhoff (2006) argues that CGD individual and collective 
financial remittances can have a significantly positive effect on home countries 
particularly concerning cultural and civil development, and disaster relief. In 
fact, Brinkerhoff (2006) notes that the benefit of remittances to home countries 
often balances out the loss most experience in terms of social capital (i.e., 
‘brain drain’). 
Relating through Contributions to Civil Society 
The second way that CGDs relate to their homeland, according to 
Mohamoud (2005), is by making contributions to the civil societies in their 
respective home countries. This type of contribution is often referred to as a 
‘humanitarian contribution’, and involves multiple dynamics, depending upon 
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the state of the home country and the nature of the relationship with its 
diaspora. Definitions of what constitutes civil society vary. Cochrane (2007) 
states that although the concept of civil society is quite broad, in general “it 
refers to the dynamics of political power [that] go beyond the narrow level of 
the state and are woven into the other sinews of society and community” (p. 
19). The World Bank defines civil society as “…the wide array of non-
governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public 
life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on 
ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations” 
(The World Bank, 2010, para 5).  
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) include community groups, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), women’s cooperatives, charitable 
organizations, not-for-profit foundations, human rights organizations, 
professional associations, faith-based organizations, and indigenous groups 
that exist to provide support to society by strengthening the polity and 
democracy (Cochrane, 2007; World Bank, 2010). Contributions to civil society 
are particularly important in post-conflict regions where there are fledgling 
democracies, as is the case in many countries making the transition from 
oppressive undemocratic regimes to democracies. The process of 
strengthening these new democracies through the development of social 
institutions that partner with and influence the polity and economic systems 
can in many contexts also contribute toward peace, ensuring that countries, 
particularly those in post-conflict development and transformation, avoid risks 
of renewed conflict (Cochrane, 2007).  
Mohamoud (2005) refers to the strategic support of civil society as 
social remittances. He notes how CGDs provide social remittances to their 
home countries by contributing to the capacity building of civil society by 
transferring “organisational know-how, financial management and 
administration skills” (p. 36). Mohamoud asserts that within an African context 
the sustainability and success of civil society organizations within the home 
country are dependent on the contributions of its diasporas in the building of 
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the social infrastructures, stating that diaspora CSOs “are filling a vacuum 
created by the weakening or the collapse of governance structures at all levels 
of society” (p. 37). 
Relating through Lobbying the Hostland 
The third way in which CGDs relate to their homeland is through 
lobbying the hostland and international agencies either for or against the 
interests of the home country governments. Lobbying activities vary but often 
include lobbying for issues of interest to CGDs in the hostland, as well as 
attempting to change foreign policy toward the home country. Mohamoud 
(2007) notes that when CGDs lobby against the home country (as is often the 
case when the losing side of a civil war goes into exile), the chances of such 
lobbying activities exacerbating conflict are significant. 
Relating through Political Engagement in Homeland Affairs 
The fourth way that Mohamoud notes that CGD relate to their 
homelands is through political engagement in homeland affairs, with 
transnational networks serving as primary conduits for political engagement 
and activism (Mohamoud, 2005; Lyons, 2004). The nature of CGD political 
engagement may vary, but often includes mobilizing others to their cause, 
disseminating information, including propaganda, supporting rival political 
groups, and acting as a political wing of a rebel group (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2000; Demmers, 2007; Lyons, 2004; Mohamoud, 2005).   
The nature of political involvement of CGD in home country dynamics 
has evolved over the years. For instance, during the Cold War era, many host 
countries in the West, such as the U.S., took a stance against communism, 
and often granted political asylum to exiles based on their political ideology as 
a part of the host country’s foreign policy. In fact it was post-World War II 
anticommunism policy that ushered in a new era in U.S. immigration policy, 
away from its traditional isolationist stance, and toward a more expansionist 
immigration policy particularly toward refugees from Communistic-dominated 
Eastern Europe. When diaspora from communist countries demonstrated and 
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protested against the oppressive regimes in their home countries, U.S. leaders 
believed these political activities bolstered U.S. anticommunist policies 
(Tichenor, 2002).  Although diaspora motivations may be similar, political 
engagement of contemporary CGDs in homeland affairs has changed 
significantly since the Cold War era, in large part due to the development of 
the Internet, and other communication devices, such as mobile phones.  
Political Transnational Networks Explored: Motivations for Engagement 
and the Impact on the Conflict Cycle 
Political Networks and Activities 
 CGDs engage politically in homeland affairs on a domestic level within 
the host country, on a regional level within the host country, on a transnational 
level involving two or more nation states, and on a global level (Bercovitch, 
2007; Mohamoud, 2007). Their political activities tend to focus on maintaining 
a sense of ethnic identity and cohesion, and promoting CGDs’ interests, which 
may include “activities where diaspora works actively through the political and 
economic channels in its host country to promote the concerns and interests of 
its homeland” (Bercovitch, 2007). Shain points out that CGD also attempt to 
influence foreign policy in their host countries through organizing around 
special interests and using their “transnational economic or political clout (or 
both)” to affect homeland policies (Shain, 2001). Because of their ability to 
successfully leverage their collective political power, particularly through their 
virtual transnational networks, CGDs are increasingly recognized as 
formidable external actors in homeland conflict situations. 
CGDs can wield their influence for either positive or destructive ends, 
thus it is important to evaluate not only the overall pattern and processes of 
CGD political engagement, but also their motivations to engage in political 
activity. When CGDs engage in political activity by lobbying for or about the 
home country, they can significantly influence host country foreign policy 
toward the CGDs’ homeland, but the motivation for this may be to support the 
homeland government (Mohamoud, 2007). For instance, the Israeli diaspora 
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living in the U.S. is a very powerful lobby for the Israeli government and are 
believed to have significant influence over U.S. policy in relation to the Jewish 
state (Demmers, 2007; Sheffer, 2007; Vertovec, 2005). In fact, although many 
home countries, such as Israel and Ireland initially perceived their diaspora 
negatively for reasons relating to patriotism, Vertovec points out that currently 
many countries, including Israel, now perceive their diaspora as “strategically 
vital political assets” (p. 1).   
CDGs also engage in lobbying efforts against their home countries, 
particularly if the home country government represents the interests of the 
opposing side of an ethnonationalist conflict. At times it is difficult to determine 
whether the nature of the activities of CGDs fall into the category of 
humanitarian (as would be the case with making contributions to civil society 
explored in the preceding section), or political since much of the political 
engagement that involves lobbying host countries against home country 
regimes is framed in humanitarian terms. Thus, what is actually a continuation 
of war on a virtual level, is often masked as a fight for human rights, or as 
attempts to contribute to the development of democracy in the home country 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Lyons, 2004, 2007).  Lyons (2004, 2007) notes that 
the relationship that CGD most often have with their home countries is 
overridingly political in nature (rather than social or humanitarian), although 
many diaspora-based political movements are presented as humanitarian in 
nature by framing their grievances about their homelands in human rights 
terms.  
There are many variables that motivate ethnonationalist CGD to 
engage politically against the home country. One powerful motivating factor 
referred to in Chapter 1 is what Faist (2000) and Lyons (2004) characterize as 
the myth of return home or what Kaiser (2004) calls the call of the homeland. 
The ethnonationalist CGDs’ seemingly unwavering desire to return to their 
homeland, despite an extended absence, is often considered the most 
effective tool available to mobilize co-ethnics across the globe for political 
action. This longing, coupled with an intense desire to return the homeland 
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back to its pre-departure state appears to motivate CGDs into action against 
the home country (particularly when the home country is governed by the 
opposing side in an ethnonationalist conflict), by “activating an exclusionary 
national territoriality among ethnonational members of the homeland group” 
(Kaiser, 2004, p. 229).  
An example of the nature and power of virtual transnational CGD 
communities is highlighted in Østergaard-Nielsen’s (2006) study on Kurdish 
CGD living in four different countries. The study revealed that because 
transnational networks were facilitated primarily through the Internet, Kurdish 
CGDs were able to coordinate resources and exchange information on a 
grand scale in their efforts to lobby host countries in their fight against the 
Turkish government. She cites the examples of a series of well-coordinated 
political demonstrations that occurred simultaneously around the world, as well 
as well-coordinated simultaneous lobbying efforts of NGOs and other 
international organizations such as the European Union and the UN. 
Østergaard-Nielsen states that such virtual transnational networking enable 
CGD to coordinate political engagement in such a way that it gives the 
appearance of a broad-based global constituency rather than as more isolated 
regionally based movements. 
Impact on the Conflict Cycle 
 Most violent conflicts follow a somewhat predictable progression, 
evolving through various phases. The first phase is often referred to as the 
latent phase of conflict (Bercovitch, 2007). During the latent phase parties 
become aware of the existence of a discord on some level, but neither party 
escalates the conflict, thus the relationships involved remain stable. The 
second stage of a conflict begins when the disagreement escalates to a level 
where differences become concrete. This stage is often called the emergence 
stage, because the nature of the conflict rises to the point where both parties 
become increasingly polarized and mobilization of resources takes place 
(Brahm, 2003).  The third phase of conflict is called the escalation phase, 
where violence occurs, and in a particularly protracted conflict, severe loss of 
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life is likely (Bercovitch, 2007). During the escalation phase, leaders often 
remain determined to win, believing that compromise would represent losing 
face in the eyes of supporters. The fourth phase of conflict is often called the 
hurting stalemate. Zartman (2001) and Brahm (2003) describe the hurting 
stalemate as the stage when both sides of a conflict experience violence 
fatigue due among other things, to heavy loss of life. During this stage both 
parties recognize that any perceived benefit of keeping the conflict going (in 
hopes of a zero-sum win) is outweighed by the cost of the conflict, leading to 
both sides becoming increasingly weary of the consequences of war. This is 
the phase when intervention in the form of conflict resolution strategies is most 
likely to be successful (Zartman, 2001). Subsequent phases in the conflict 
cycle reflect patterns of de-escalation, dispute settlement and post-conflict 
peacebuilding (Brahm, 2003).  
Although most scholars agree that conflict cycles have not necessarily 
changed in terms of the linear nature of their evolution, most would agree that 
globalization has changed the ways conflicts are fought, and as such, 
contemporary conflicts are rarely bi-lateral affairs involving just two parties. 
Rather, the majority of conflicts now involve multiple parties, including those 
central to the conflict (often called primary actors), as well as external actors 
(often called secondary actors) (Bercovitch, 2007). External actors that 
influence the course and outcome of conflicts may include international 
organizations such as NGOs, the United Nations, other organized 
communities, other nation states, and diaspora.  The greater the number of 
external actors with a vested interest in the outcome of a conflict, the more 
difficult it is to resolve the conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011). 
How external actors, such as diaspora, affect the conflict cycle depends in 
large part upon when and how they intervene in the conflict cycle. According to 
Bercovitch if CGDs desire to constructively assist in peacebuilding processes 
by encouraging compromise and supporting moderate positions then they can 
contribute to conflict avoidance efforts in the early stages of a conflict, or 
conflict reconciliation and peace-making in the later stages of conflict. But if 
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they adopt hardline or extremist positions, and discourage compromise among 
their co-ethnics in the home country, their role in the conflict cycle will be a 
destructive one.  
CGDs’ role in violent conflict also depends upon their size, strength, 
and ability to organize politically (Bercovitch, 2007), as well as the political 
opportunity structures available in the host country (Smith & Stares, 2007). It is 
important to note Bercovitch’s observations, noted earlier in this chapter, that 
conflicts involving “identity, beliefs, values, cultural norms or a way of life” are 
not only more violent and less likely to be resolved through conflict resolution 
strategies (p. 24), but are also of the type in which CGDs are most likely to 
become involved as external actors. Further, since CGDs are external actors 
and do not have to directly suffer the consequences of violent conflict in their 
home country, they are unlikely to experience either violence fatigue, or the 
hurting stalemate stage, which ushers in the phase of conflict de-escalation; 
and conflict resolution among the primary parties, may be perceived by an 
engaged CGD as a sign that co-ethnics at home are betraying the cause 
(Lyons, 2004). It is in this vein that Anderson frames ethnonationalist CGD 
engagement in conflict in the home country as self-serving and irresponsible, 
stating that individuals so engaged see themselves as key stakeholders in 
country where: 
…he does not intend to live, where he pays no taxes, where he cannot 
be arrested, where he will not be brought before the courts, and where 
he does not vote; in effect, a politics without responsibility or 
accountability (Anderson, 1992, p. 11, as cited in Demmers, 2002). 
 
It is important to note once again though that despite the seeming 
solidarity demonstrated in the identities and actions of many CGDs, often, 
under the veneer of solidarity lay many fractures. In Kleist and Hansen’s study 
of the Somaliland diaspora, they note that what initially appeared as a 
homogeneous group, standing “shoulder to shoulder united through shared 
symbols of flags, songs, slogans, colonial histories, memories of civil war and 
oppression,” was actually, upon more in-depth analysis a community that 
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experienced a fair amount of conflict, described by Kleist and Hansen as 
“dangerous liminal identities not yet certain of what to be, where to go, whom 
or what to support and how and when to do so” (p. 21). This seeming 
divergence between public image and internal dynamics may have significant 
relevance to peace-building processes since efforts toward compromise and 
ethnic reconciliation may be met with increased fragmentation, as once 
cohesive CGDs may splinter off in response to external pressure (or perceived 
opportunity). 
Regardless of potential behind-the-scenes fragmentation, the political 
power of CGDs as external political actors has increased markedly in the last 
three decades, directed in large part by the technology era “that has made 
communication instantaneous over large distances, breaks down the barriers 
of territorial identity, facilitating the development of new kinds of ‘imagined 
community’,” (Bercovitch, 2007, p. 20) thus allowing CGDs to transcend 
territorial borders, and to link up with co-ethnics from around the globe. 
Through the Internet, CGDs can engage in transnational political activities as 
independent external actors, without authorization of the host state in which 
they reside. Further, as referenced in Chapter 1, as well as in the present 
chapter, CGDs can actively migrate to liberal democracies that embrace 
multiculturalism, and are now able to maintain almost constant contact with 
other diaspora members from their home country, displaced all over the world, 
through online chat rooms, websites, and online newspapers, which enable 
them to remain abreast of conditions in their respective home countries, 
increasing their interest and investment. Bercovitch puts it this way: 
“Developments resulting from globalization have brought conflicts closer to the 
diaspora and simultaneously brought the diaspora closer to the conflict” (p. 
20). Consequently, CGDs often use the increased access they have to 
information about their homeland through the Internet as a basis for mobilizing 
co-ethnics for political action.  
According to several scholars, CGDs that engage in political activities 
using virtual transnational networks based on an ethnonationalist agenda, with 
	  	   59 
the goal of destabilizing the home country government, may have the potential 
of significantly increasing the risk of renewed conflict (Anderson, 1992; Collier 
& Hoeffler, 2002; Demmers, 2002; Ignatieff, 2001, Kaldor, et al., 2003; Lyons, 
2004). Studies exploring the relationship between CGD transnational political 
engagement and conflict are important because they highlight both how CGDs 
use information communication technology (ICTs) in virtual communities and 
online social networks to engage politically, but they also shed light on the 
impact such activities have on the conflict cycle. Determining whether the 
political activities of CGDs have a positive or negative effect on the conflict 
cycle is a difficult and controversial task.9  
 Despite the controversy surrounding whether there is a direct or 
tangential relationship between CGDs political activities and conflict in the 
homeland, gaining greater understanding into the ways in which CGD use 
virtual transnational networks to engage in homeland conflict on a political 
level is worthy of further exploration, particularly since technology continues to 
develop at such a rapid pace, rendering studies a mere decade ago likely 
outdated. In Chapter 3 CGD technologically-based political transnational 
networks are further explored, including ways in which CGDs mobilize for 
political action on various levels, and for various purposes. It is through this 
deeper examination of the ways in which CGDs form virtual transnational 
networks and use new technologies to engage within and outside of CGD 
communities that the questions posed in this study will be addressed within 
the Rwandan diasporic context. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Whether the activities of some CGDs are justified, must be considered separately from the issue of 
whether their involvement in homeland conflict on a political level increases the risk of conflict generation 
or perpetuation, and are beyond the scope of this study. 
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CHAPTER 3:  ETHNONATIONALIST CONFLICT-GENERATED 
DIASPORAS’ USE OF THE INTERNET FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES 
 
Using the Internet, and online social media in particular, for the 
purposes of political engagement is not unique to diaspora, thus it is 
worthwhile to explore its uses by the other collectivities for the purposes of 
political activism. For instance, scholars exploring the area of Internet use for 
political engagement have revealed the strengths and limitations of ICTs, 
particularly for the purposes of political engagement and activism (often 
referred to as “cyberactivism”), and the various methods activists employ when 
using the Internet to achieve their collective ends. The first part of this chapter 
will explore these methods and uses in general terms by various collectives 
with the latter part of the chapter focusing on ways in which CGDs use the 
Internet, and social media in particular, for the purposes of political 
engagement in homeland affairs, with a focus on a growing body of literature 
that explores the rapid development of online social media, including its uses 
and possible outcomes. 
General Nature and Use of the Internet for Social Interaction: The Social 
Media “Revolution” 
Prior to any discussion of how the Internet is used for the purposes of political 
engagement and activism it is important to first provide some basic information 
about common terms and relevant concepts related to the online relational 
sphere. First, information and communications technologies (ICTs) have been 
defined as “a diverse set of technological tools and resources used to 
communicate, and to create, disseminate, store, and manage information” 
(Blurton, 1999, p. 46). ICT is an umbrella term used to describe any means of 
communication using technology. ICTs can include everything from 
communication via the telephone, radio, television, and computers.  
As referenced in Chapter 2, a subsection of ICTs includes forms of 
technology using the Internet. The Internet is used for the purposes of 
communication in a variety of ways, and is increasingly used as a platform for 
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social media, defined in Chapter 2 as any web-based media used for the 
purposes of social interaction. The engagement of social interaction on a 
broad scale is referred to as online social networking. The difference between 
social media and online social networking lay in the act of engagement. 
Whereas social media is the term used to describe the way in which 
information is shared with a broad audience (i.e., the format), social 
networking involves the actual act of engagement in an online or virtual 
community (Stelzner, 2009). Thus, all online social networking occurs through 
social media, but not all social media involves online social networking. In 
general, online social networking sites (SNS) offer a wide range of 
opportunities for communities of individuals to come together and use social 
media for sharing common interests and/or pursuing common goals and 
purposes (Akin, 2011; Brinkerhoff, 2006b; Carty & Oynett, 2006; Hogan, 
2007). The nature of SNS has been described as:  
[W]eb-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or 
semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other 
users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse 
their list of connections and those made by others within the system. 
The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site 
to site (boyd10 & Ellison, 2008, p. 211). 
 
Online SNS came into existence in the late 1990s, shortly after the 
Internet became more widely available (boyd & Ellison, 2008). Early SNS were 
primarily “profile-centric” allowing for only the most basic of networking – 
creating a personal profile, and the ability to search for other users, called 
“friends,” “contacts,” “connections” or “buddies” (boyd & Ellison, 2008).  
Subsequent waves of SNS added increased functionality with both site-
initiated tools, and third-party tools, often called “add-ons.”  SNS that offered a 
singular functionality, such as “online chatting,” were increasingly merged or 
duplicated on SNS allowing for tethered or integrated sites that offered a 
multitude of functions. For instance, Facebook was one of the first online SNS 
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that combined online chatting, email, online posting of statuses with 
interactivity (posting replies, liking posts, interacting with friends of friends, 
etc.), online games, networking through the posting of other website links, 
posting of photographs and video, the development of profile niches, such as 
a common area of interest (e.g., a bird watcher’s club), joining Facebook 
groups based on profession, political affiliations, etc., and the addition of 
Community pages and Causes, which users can like and/or join. Facebook 
was also one of the first SNS that allowed for the linking to other online social 
networking sites such as Pinterest and Twitter, thus when a user sends a 
“tweet,” they have the option of having this show up on their Facebook page 
as a status. Adding third-party applications enables the user to use Facebook 
for a multitude of more specific purposes, such as online dating, business 
networking, posting articles to an online newspaper, microblogging, and 
political activism (boyd & Ellison, 2008).  With each additional function comes 
an increased opportunity for networked communication, for various purposes. 
For instance, the Internet is increasingly being considered a great power 
equalizer in the sense that it is providing a voice to the voiceless thus 
countering hegemonic forces within society (Akin, 2011; Bernal, 2006; Kellner, 
2001), or as a report from the World Bank asserts, the Internet is putting 
“unequal beings on an equal footing and that makes it the most potent 
democratizing tool ever devised” (in Wheeler 2001, p. 187).  
As a consequence, the Internet is increasingly the medium of choice 
among disenfranchised members of society, such as ethnic groups, 
particularly for political purposes, including mobilization and recruitment, 
communication among activists, generating media coverage for political 
causes and social movements, and the organization of political protests (Akin, 
2011; Lyons, 2004, 2007). One of the most common mediums for political 
engagement on the Internet is through SNS. When an SNS is used for political 
purposes every aspect of social movement engagement appears to be larger 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The surname is not capitalized in order to comply with the author’s stated preference for how her 
name is expressed in written form. 
	  	   63 
and faster, including mobilization, coalition-building, lobbying, communication, 
and information dissemination. This is in large part due to the immediacy and 
interactivity that the Internet offers users (McCaughey & Ayers, 2003) as well 
as the general ease of access, together with the fact that the Internet sphere 
has no geographic boundaries (Carty & Onyett, 2006).  
Network vs. Networking 
boyd and Ellison make a distinction between network sites and 
networking sites, stating that the term networking “emphasizes relationship 
initiation, often between strangers,” whereas many network sites do not. 
However, this distinction may soon be irrelevant since many social network 
sites are increasingly providing networking opportunities (such as those 
described above with Facebook), increasing their interactive capabilities (p. 
20).  Thus, sites that previously offered solely network opportunities are now 
providing networking opportunities. For instance, when LinkedIn.com was first 
launched in May of 2003, the site was strictly designed for the purposes of 
publishing professional profiles and making professional connections through 
the addition of network contacts to one’s LinkedIn community, allowing mutual 
profile viewing and the sharing of contact information. There was no 
functionality that allowed for posting status updates, and no ability to post 
responses to another’s posts. In response to increased interactivity of other 
online social networking sites, LinkedIn recently added a networking function 
allowing users to post comments, link to other websites such as online news 
articles, and post replies to others’ posts  (i.e., networking). In addition, 
LinkedIn now includes a running newsfeed on its landing page, and also 
invites users to post recommendations and endorsements on behalf of their 
connections. These additional features increased the networking functionality, 
rendering this site somewhat more comparable to other SNS such as 
Facebook. Likewise, Twitter has also significantly increased its functionality, 
with the ability to post photos, engage in online discussions, and the sharing of 
“tweets” from users from those one is “following”. In addition to cross-status 
posting and the linking of outside media (such as online news articles), many 
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social networking sites also provide the opportunity to increase networks by 
making user contact lists visible, thus allowing for inter-and intranetworking 
possibilities (e.g. “Friends you should Know,” “People you may Know,” 
“Suggested Friends,” “Who Viewed Your Profile?”). 
Social Networking Site Usage: Breakdown by Demographics 
The use of social media, and SNS in particular has dramatically 
increased on a worldwide basis in recent years. According to a 2011 study 
conducted by the Pew Research Center, almost 47 percent of adults in the 
United States use an SNS, compared to 26 percent of adults who used the 
Internet in 2008. This represents a doubling of SNS use among the U.S. adult 
population in only three years (Hampton, Goulet, Rainie, & Purcell, 2011). 
Worldwide Internet usage is at about 34 percent (often referred to as the 
penetration rate), with a growth rate between the years 2000 and 2012 of over 
566 percent. Growth of Internet access worldwide is expected to continue to 
grow rapidly, particularly with the increase in access via mobile telephone 
devices that have Internet access capabilities. Growth of Internet usage in 
developing countries is particularly dramatic, with Internet access in Africa 
alone growing over 3600 percent between 2000 and 2012. The percentage of 
individuals in Africa who now have access to the Internet ranges from 0 
percent in South Sudan to 50 percent in Morocco. The Middle East has also 
experienced a sharp increase in Internet usage, with just over 40 percent of 
the population now having Internet access, representing a 2640 percent 
increase between 2000 and 2012 (Internet World Stats, 2012).  
In the United States, Internet usage has increased significantly and 
rapidly as well. For instance, in 2008 only 5 percent of Americans had Internet 
access in their homes, compared to 78 percent in 2012 (Internet World Stats, 
2012; NAS Insights, 2010). With regard to social media usage, a recent study 
on global usage of SNS conducted by eMarketer (2012) indicates that as of 
2012 there were approximately 1.43 billion individuals worldwide using SNS, 
representing a 20 percent increase in just one year. With regard to global 
usage, an estimated 20 percent of people worldwide used SNS in 2012, but 
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this number is expected to increase significantly along with increased Internet 
access globally (eMarketer, 2012). In fact, in 2012 just over 20 percent of 
people worldwide used an SNS at least once per month from any device, 
compared to 17 percent in 2011. This number is expected to increase to about 
26 percent in 2014. Further, in 2012, of all adults with Internet access globally, 
approximately 63 percent used an SNS, and in 2014 this is expected to 
increase to over 70 percent.  Facebook remains the leading SNS, with 
approximately 840 million worldwide users in 2012,11 a 27 percent increase 
from 2011 (eMarketer, 2012).  
According to a recent Pew Research Center poll on social media usage 
in the United States, usage levels can be correlated with demographics such 
as gender, race/ethnicity, income and education levels (Brenner, 2012). For 
instance, among all adults who use the Internet, more women access SNS 
than men (75 percent versus 63 percent). Younger adults use SNS far more 
frequently than older adults, with approximately 92 percent of Internet users 
between the ages of 18 to 29 using SNS, compared to 73 percent of Internet 
users between the ages of 30 to 49 years, 57 percent of Internet users 
between the ages of 50 to 64 years, and 38 percent of Internet users being 65 
years and older. Further, with increased education and income appears to 
come increased use of SNS (see Figure 3.1). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In a Facebook status posted on October 4, 2012, Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook CEO announced that 
Facebook had 1.01 billion users worldwide (compared to just 20 million in April 2007), with 584 million 
daily users (see “Facebook Now has 1 Billion Users…” at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/04/facebook-1-billion-users_n_1938675.html 
	  	   66 
 
Based upon Pew Internet Civic Engagement Tracking Survey, July 16 – 
August 7, 2012 (Brenner, 2012). 
 
 
Further, usage of SNS among younger adult Internet users has increased 
significantly in recent years, with the use of SNS by individuals between the 
ages of 18 and 29 increasing from 9 percent in 2005, to 55 percent in 2006, to 
73 percent in 2009, and to 92 percent in 2012  (Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & 
Zickuhr, 2010) (see Figure 3.2). 
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Based upon Pew Internet Civic Engagement Tracking Survey, July 16 – 
August 7, 2012 (Brenner, 2012). 
 
 
 
An interesting trend found in the research involves SNS usage among 
various ethnic minority groups with Internet access. For instance, despite 
research that shows that racial minority groups in the United States use the 
Internet at significantly lesser rates compared to Caucasians (Kamalu, 2012; 
Smith, 2010), a recent Pew study on social media usage in the United States 
indicates that the use of SNS among ethnic minority groups with Internet 
access is either equal to or higher than that of Caucasians (see Figure 3.3). A 
2012 Pew Research Center’s study on SNS usage among mobile phone users 
might explain this trend. The study found that among mobile phone users, 
approximately 40 percent use their mobile phone to access an SNS, and 
among these, a significantly higher number of Black and Hispanic mobile 
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phone users access SNS compared to Caucasian mobile phone users. This 
trend may be explained by the very recent phenomenon of decreased cost 
and increased access to the Internet via mobile phones, rendering access 
through costly computers and Internet subscriptions unnecessary. For 
instance mobile phone usage in the United States has increased sharply in 
recent years, with only five percent of the American population owning a 
mobile phone device in 2005, compared to 88 percent in 2012. This dramatic 
increase in access to mobile telephones, coupled with the increased number 
of Internet-ready mobile phones, has made the Internet available to segments 
of the population that previously did not have access. The increased access of 
the Internet, particularly via mobile phone devices, as well as the decentralized 
nature of the Internet may be a powerful amelioration of cultural hegemony 
(Krueger, 2002), a dynamic that has implications for the current study, 
particularly since use of social media by CGDs is considered prolific, despite 
CGDs’ often marginalized ethnic minority status (Brinkerhoff, 2009).  
 
 
Based upon Pew Internet Civic Engagement Tracking Survey, July 16 – 
August 7, 2012 (Brenner, 2012). 
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Source: Pew Internet Spring Tracking Survey, March 15 – April 3, 2012 
available online at: http://pewInternet.org/Commentary/2012/March/Pew-
Internet-Social-Networking-full-detail.aspx 
 
Use of SNS has not only increased significantly in the last five years 
(among all demographic categories), but preferences for SNS have changed 
as well. For instance, in 2008 MySpace was more popular with younger adults 
(18 to 29 years), and Facebook was more popular with mid-range adults (30 to 
49 years). But by 2012, the majority of adults with Internet access used 
Facebook (89 percent of all adult SNS users) (Brenner, 2012). Facebook also 
appears to be more frequently used among all demographics compared to 
other SNS in 2012, with 66 percent of all Internet users using Facebook, 
followed by LinkedIn (20 percent), Twitter (16 percent), Instagram (12 
percent), Pinterest (12 percent), and Tumblr (5 percent) (Brenner, 2012). Yet 
in light of various changes demonstrated in studies between 2005 and 2012, it 
would be expected that SNS preference might continue to change, particularly 
as the trend toward SNS linking and functionality embeddedness continue to 
increase.  
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Recent research has also revealed the social impact of SNS usage. A 
2010 study found that SNS are increasingly used to remain close with social 
connections. Additionally, the study found that compared to those without 
Internet access, SNS users have more close ties, are less likely to be socially 
isolated, and receive more social support from their social connections. 
Additionally, Facebook users tend to be more trusting, have more close 
relationships, many of which have been revived through Facebook. Also, 
Facebook users tend to be more politically engaged than the average 
American (for instance), and other SNS users (Brenner, 2012).  
Relationship between Online and Offline Spheres 
Several researchers have explored the ways in which online and offline 
spheres interact on a continuum in order to better understand how cyberspace 
affects “real world” interactions (and visa versa), particularly with regard to 
how cyberspace is used as a form of social interaction, and civic and political 
engagement. These conceptualizations help us to better understand the ways 
in which activities in cyberspace fit holistically into broader living spaciality, 
since online and offline worlds are rarely dichotomous spaces, but overlap and 
intersect along a continuum of relating, in ways that have the potential to have 
both limiting and enriching effects on each binary sphere. For instance, Bailey 
(2011) describes how “online territory becomes a network in which ideas and 
discourses travel through a complex system of connections which link and 
disconnect the alternative and mainstream” (p. 4). This continuum of relating 
represents “smooth space” in the sense that it is non-linear, and non-
hierarchical, “anarchic and nomadic” (p. 2). In describing the relationship 
between online and offline spheres, Bailey relies on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of rhizome, an alternative model for understanding knowledge and 
how one’s self is situated within contemporary society. The rhizome concept 
has been increasingly applied to understanding cyberspace, including how 
communication and relationships are interwoven, and networked, not as a 
linear and hierarchical processes (such as “real life”), but as one where 
connections can occur at any point of the network, where the rules are 
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“constantly in motion because new elements are constantly included” (Bailey, 
2011, p. 2), and where connections “may be broken, shattered at a given spot, 
but… will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 9). Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) principle of cartography 
applied to cyberspace aptly describes the nature of interconnectivity of the 
Internet (juxtaposed to “real life” communication and relating) if it were to be 
mapped:  
The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is 
detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be 
torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an 
individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, 
conceived as of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as 
a meditation. Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the 
rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways (p. 12). 
 
Bailey’s use of rhizome as a metaphor for the connections and synergy 
between online and offline spheres, illustrates how the “map” of cyberspace 
interconnectivity is vastly different to that of offline spheres, illustrating how the 
two spheres are highly interrelated in a non-linear fashion, “with each space in 
a constant process of engagement and disengagement with striated 
(mainstream) spaces” (p. 2). These differences are particularly pronounced 
within diasporic contexts. In fact, Bailey’s conceptualization of rhizome not 
only provides insights into the ways that CGDs’ hybrid identity is influenced by 
cyberspace (where CGDs’ identity is a both formed and transformed), but also 
helps to better understand the fluidity of these online and offline spheres in 
terms of relatedness and connectivity, with some relationships and activities 
occurring solely in cyberspace, and some online activities acting as extensions 
of real-life social interactions and activities. This conceptualization is 
particularly useful in understanding ways in which cyberspace is used for civic 
and political engagement in virtual transnational networks, and how its use 
interacts and influences offline (“real life”) engagement (and visa versa).12 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This dynamic is explored more fully in the section entitled “Types of Cyberactivism,” where Morris and 
Langman’s work on social activism in cyberspace is introduced and explored. 
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Using the Internet for Civic and Political Engagement 
The Internet, and particularly social media, is increasingly being used 
for civic engagement in public life, particularly for political purposes. A recent 
study by the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project found 
that about 66 percent of social media users have used an SNS for civil 
engagement and political purposes. The study organized civic engagement 
into eight categories, including (1) “liking” political material on an SNS, (2) 
using an SNS to encourage voting, (3) posting opinions about political and 
social issues on an SNS, (4) reposting political content, (5) encouraging others 
to take action on a political or social issue, (6) posting links to political stories 
on an SNS, (7) joining a group on an SNS of a political nature, and (8) 
following an elected official or political candidate on a SNS (Rainie, Smith, 
Schlozman, Brady & Verba, 2012). The study found that among all individuals 
who use social media, approximately 30 to 35 percent use social media for 
civil and political engagement, particularly young adults ages 18 to 29 (Rainie, 
et al, 2012).  
Civic engagement in public life can involve a variety of activities, but 
most often refers to political activity such as voting or active support of a 
political candidate, (e.g., political canvassing). Political engagement has been 
defined as “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government 
action – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public 
policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those 
policies” (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, p. 38). Since the advent of the 
Internet, political engagement has been increasingly conducted online, using 
social media as a facilitation aid. Research indicates that not only is political 
engagement facilitated online just as successful as the traditional forms of 
engagement, but it may be even more successful when the engagement 
involves mobilization for the purposes of political activism, since the Internet is 
faster, and has no geographic bounds (Castell, 1997, 2001, 2007; Margolis & 
Resnick, 2000; Vissers, Hooghe, Mahé, & Stolle, 2008).  The next section will 
explore the use of the Internet for the purposes of political engagement, in 
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particular political activism by the general public, followed by a more focused 
exploration of CGDs’ use of online political engagement and activism, with a 
particular focus on trends, possible motivations, methods and effects. 
Cyberactivism: Social Mobilization and Social Mobilization on the Net 
The term cyberactivism has been defined as “the extensive use of the 
Internet to provide counter-hegemonic information and inspire social 
mobilization” (Morris & Langman, 2002, p. 3). In Carty and Onyett’s 2006 
analysis of the role of cyberactivism in peace movements they explore the 
many ways in which the Internet affects the processes involved in collective 
activism. For instance, Carty and Onyett describe how political organizers 
present grievances in such a way as to tap into the beliefs and values of their 
target audience, and thus have a greater likelihood of influencing public 
opinion. In order to motivate others to spring into action, organizers sometimes 
appeal to their sense of justice by rooting their grievances in matters of 
injustice and identity. Taylor and Van Dyke (2003) refer to the need for the 
development of a collective identity necessary for political activism to be 
successful, emphasizing the importance of developing not only a sense of 
solidarity among like-minded members, but also an oppositional 
consciousness that allows a challenging group to identify common injustices, 
to oppose those injustices, and to define a shared interest in opposing the 
dominant group or resisting the system of authority responsible for those 
injustices.  
Carty and Onyett (2006) refer to an activism strategy called radical 
empathy, which increases the general public’s empathy for the plight of others 
by immersing them into their “authentic life-experiences,” thus shrinking the 
distance between observer and victim – a distance that typically allows the 
general public to remain emotionally distant and aloof. By closing the gap 
between  “us” and “them” solidarity is enhanced “through a shared sense of 
morality and consciousness of human rights” (p. 242). This is easily 
accomplished in an online social networking environment where photo 
streams, videos, and personal testimonies bring distant dynamics into the very 
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living rooms of potential recruits. Another strategy often used by political 
activists and organizers is called swarming.  Carty and Onyett (2006) describe 
swarming as the virtual organizing of multiple wired groups that appear at live 
demonstrations, seemingly spontaneously, but in actuality, they are organized 
through the Internet.   
The Internet has enabled social movements and protests to grow in 
size far faster than in previous generations. Often these movements have no 
identifiable leader, thus rather than the traditional top-down movement, the 
Internet has enabled formerly disconnected groups from all over the world to 
connect and coordinate through online social networks in a free-flowing and 
non-hierarchical fashion. Thus in the past where a demonstration had to be 
organized over several months by a few key organizers who mailed paper 
flyers and made hard wired telephone calls, the Internet permits information 
about protests to be disseminated instantly, and broadly, allowing news of an 
event to go “viral” through email, text, Twitter, listservs, and Facebook (for 
example).  
Essentially, the Internet’s ability for mass mobilization allows organizers 
and participants the potential of reaching thousands of people in a matter of 
minutes, something not possible in the pre-Internet era. Rheingold (2002) 
refers to this type of Internet-driven mass mobilization as “smart mobs,” where 
people who are most often strangers work in concert with one another via the 
Internet. In describing how the Internet has and will continue to change the 
way protest movements are facilitating, Rheingold states:  
The people who make up smart mobs cooperate in ways never before 
possible because they carry devices that possess both communication 
and computing capabilities. Their mobile devices connect them with 
other people’s telephones …These devices will help people coordinate 
actions with others around the world – and, perhaps more importantly 
with people nearby. Groups of people using these tools will gain new 
forms of social power, new ways to organize their interactions and 
exchanges just in time and just in place…Location-sensing wireless 
organizers, wireless networks, and community supercomputing 
collectives all have one thing in common: They enable people to act 
together in new ways and in situations where collective action was not 
possible before, (emphasis in original) (p. xviii).  
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It is the very fact that swarming by smart mobs does not require central 
leadership that makes it so effective, and so difficult for political elites to 
manage, since it is “multi-headed [thus] impossible to decapitate” (Carty & 
Onyett, 2006, p. 242). As an example of the power of smart mobs Rheingold 
cites how President Joseph Estrada of the Philippines was ousted from power 
in response to mass demonstrations organized almost solely through instant 
text (SMS) messaging. 
Types of Cyberactivism 
Morris and Langman (2002) have developed an analytical model for 
better understanding the different types of cyberactivism. They posit that there 
are six types of cyberactivism, combining two factors:  
1. The type of social action engaged in (either through the Net, 
where the Internet is used as a tool for offline [“real life”] activity, 
or in the Net, where the Internet is used as a “social space or site 
of contestation”) (p. 3); and,  
2. The social sphere in which the activity occurs (e.g., economic, 
political-relational, and cultural spheres). 
The six types of cyberactivism Morris and Langman describe include activism 
within economic, political-relational and cultural spheres that are facilitated 
either through the Net as an extension of “real world” activities, including 1) 
“Internetworking,” 2) “Capital and information flows,” and 3) “Alternative media 
and alternative theory networks”; or in the Net, including 1) “Direct 
cyberactivism,” (also called “hacktivism”), 2) “Contesting and constructing the 
Internet,” and 3) “Online alternative community formation.” 13  
The first type of through the Net cyberactivism is “Internetworking,” 
which involves the linking of various forms of online media, such as email, 
listservs, and websites in a social movement campaign, referred to as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Morris and Langman clarify that categorizing types of cyberactivism in this way are for political 
purposes only, since in actuality “many of these phenomena develop in tandem, in synergy and/or 
dialectically” (p. 4). 
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organization and network coordination.  Morris and Langman (2002) cite the 
example of Internetworking efforts of the NGO, the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines (ICBL), which engaged in a proactive campaign of online 
social movement networking, extending its offline campaigning–ultimately 
leading to the passage of the Landmine Treaty Act of 1997. Internetworking 
also involves political networking with other online social movements, where 
the linkages of smaller movements come together to create a sort of “super 
movement sphere” that has the ability to network information and resources. 
This type of internetworking is often referred to as grassroots and global 
interetworking. Morris and Langman describe how global grassroots 
networking has allowed social movements that formerly operated in somewhat 
of a silo, to join forces with movements across a variety of domains. They use 
the example of feminist groups linking up with union groups, citing how “the 
various memberships and universal charters overlap in networks that forward 
social justice initiatives in many social domains” (p. 5). Internetworking may 
also include direct action coordination such as the coordination of on-the-
ground social action with online sources being used for logistical purposes.  
The second type of through the Net cyberactivism is “Capital and 
Information flows” and involves using the Internet within economic spheres to 
solicit donations and transmit funds. This type of cyberactivism can also 
include the development of contact via the Internet for the purposes of 
coalition-building for political support in addition to soliciting donations. The 
third type of “through the Net” cyberactivism is called “alternative media,” 
which refers to new web-based media formats, such as online news sites and 
blogs. Morris and Langman (2002) describe how the Internet has dramatically 
changed traditional forms of media by increasing fluidity, interactivity, and 
responsiveness.  
 The first type of in the Net cyberactivism is called “Direct cyberactivism” 
and includes civil disobedience via the Internet, such as disrupting Internet 
traffic, or hacking websites (hactivism). In its extreme form, direct 
cyberactivism can include cyberterrorism, such as the purposeful spread of 
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computer viruses. As the world becomes increasingly dependent upon the 
Internet for global functioning (economic markets, the health sector, defense, 
transportation, etc.), cyberterrorism has the potential to exact profoundly 
catastrophic consequences. For instance, Morris and Langman (2002) argue 
that cyberterrorism could result in the collapse of “vital global transportation, 
health care, energy, and food distribution networks,” since all of these systems 
are now highly reliant on the Internet (pp. 8-9). 
The second type of cyberactivism is called “Contesting and constructing 
the Internet” and involves a type of social movement that is aimed at the 
further development of the Internet, but in a particular direction. An example 
are cyberactivists who advocate for equity in Internet access, such as ensuring 
the availability of open access and open source websites and software, 
particularly for historically marginalized and excluded populations. The third 
type of in the Net cyberactivism is called “Online alternative community 
formation” and refers to the development of virtual communities for political 
purposes. Although there may be a range of goals in developing virtual 
communities, most virtual communities are based on pre-existing social 
identities, such as nationality or religion (Morris and Langman refer to this type 
of virtual community as “Solidaristic associations”). Another type of virtual 
community is based on novel motives, where identities who have not 
previously connected come together online for a collective mutual purpose. 
Often these types of virtual communities are comprised of diverse groups with 
shared values (Morris and Langman refer to this type of virtual community as 
“New forms of mutuality”). Morris and Langman’s analysis contributes to the 
growing body of literature in the area of social movement theory, exploring the 
role of the Internet, and social networking sites, in political engagement and 
cyberactivism, particularly among everyday people who engage in grassroots 
movements (see Carty & Onyett, 2012; Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Langman, 
2005; McCaughey & Ayers, 2013; Milan & Hintz, 2013; Sandoval-Almazan & 
Gil-Garcia, 2013). 
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Examples of Cyberactivism 
Carty and Onyett (2006) cite the activities of MoveOn.org as an 
example of the effectiveness of cyberactivism. MoveOn.org is a public policy 
advocacy organization, founded in the United States in 1998. This virtual 
grassroots political peace movement boasts over seven million online 
members and consists of a Political Action Committee (PAC), and a civic 
action website. MoveOn.org organizers engage in online activities in the Net, 
such as the facilitation of online petitions where they have effectively collected 
millions of digital signatures of everyday citizens typically not involved in 
politics. MoveOn.org has also engaged in online activities through the Net, 
such as sending emails and texts to members encouraging them to call and 
FAX their Congressional representatives in support or against various causes. 
For instance, in opposition to the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq, MoveOn.org 
engaged in a virtual civil disobedience campaign resulting in U.S. 
Congressional offices receiving hundreds of thousands of telephone calls and 
faxes with the simple message: “DON’T ATTACK IRAQ!,” which not only sent 
a clear message of dissent among a very large constituency, but it also 
illustrated the sheer power of the Internet since this action resulted in Senate 
office FAX machine and telephone lines being clogged for hours.  
It is important to note though that while many cyberactivists frame their 
efforts in terms of working for peace, not all cyberactivism results in increased 
peace, and in fact, many types of cyberactivism actually results in contributing 
to the conflict cycle and ultimately can make conflict more protracted 
(Brinkerhoff, 2008; Lyons, 2004) (as explored briefly in Chapter 2).  
Conflict-Generated Diasporas’ Engagement In Homeland Affairs through 
Cyberactivism  
CGDs have a long history of political engagement in both their host 
countries and their home countries (Anderson, 1992; Shain, 1994-1995), with 
CGDs’ political engagement increasing since the end of the Cold War era 
(Fullilove, 2008). Increased lobbying opportunities along with the globalization 
of communication technologies that allow for cheap travel, instantaneous 
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communication, and virtual networking, coupled with the deterritorialization of 
conflict (primarily ethnonationalist in nature) has resulted in a contemporary 
picture that often finds CGDs as key players in conflict situations, working to 
exert power and influence, and determining outcomes to unprecedented 
degrees.   
Research in the area of diaspora studies indicates that CGDs become 
engages in politics in their homeland in two primary ways – they are recruited 
by their homelands for lobbying or on-the-ground support, particularly during 
periods of post-conflict reconstruction (Abdile, 2010; Fullilove, 2008; Lyons & 
Mandeville, 2008; Turner, 2008), such as the case of the American Jewish 
diaspora, or the Afghani diaspora (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Fullilove, 2008; 
Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006; Mohamoud, 2005; Smith & Stares, 2007), or they 
are working against their homeland governments, such as the case of the 
Ethiopian diaspora (Lyons, 2004), the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora (International 
Crisis Group, 2010), and the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora (Østergaard-Neilson, 
2006). And while not all CGD political engagement is conducted through the 
Internet, research shows that CGDs are increasingly engaged in social action 
both in the Net and through the Net within a variety of social spheres (Bernal, 
2006; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Conversi, 2004; Demmers, 2002; Lyons, 2007).   
Just as CGDs engage politically in the real world as well as through the 
Internet, CGDs also use the Internet for a variety of purposes beyond the 
political realm. For instance, CGDs often use the Internet to maintain social 
connections with members of the home country (both those who remained at 
home and those who live abroad), or as Hirji (2006) puts it, many CGDs use 
the Internet to substitute a “virtual community for geographic closeness” (p. 
129), where the effect of geographical distances are minimized, giving the 
sense of greater immediacy and community (Alinejad, 2011; Helland, 2007). 
Eriksen (2006) notes that networking via the Internet can even create a sense 
of “virtual return,” which serves as a surrogate for an actual return to the 
homeland. CGDs also use the Internet for the purposes of social and cultural 
expression, and to produce and debate historical narratives (Bernal, 2006).  
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 But the research is clear that in addition to the various types of activities 
CGDs use the Internet for, those activities that are political in nature are 
increasingly common. For instance, Vissers, Hooghe, Mahé, and Stolle (2008) 
have noted evidence that CGDs’ online political engagement in homeland 
affairs, particularly conflict, has sharply increased in recent years. In fact, the 
increase in CGD cyberactivism has been so rapid, that in 2006 Østergaard-
Nielsen noted that while general CGD usage of the Internet was quite high, 
she had not noted that the Internet was being used much for political 
purposes, such as lobbying. And yet, just a few years later several scholars 
have noted how CGDs are becoming prolific users of the Internet for various 
types of political engagement, indicating just how quickly this phenomenon is 
developing within CGD communities (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Conversi, 2012; Leurs 
& Ponzanesi, 2011; Vissers, et al, 2008). Kent (2005) describes how the 
dramatic expansion of the Internet and other forms of communication, such as 
mobile telephones, in the last three decades has` enabled CGDs to develop 
organized transnational networks in a way not previously possible. Kent notes 
how the Internet has made it possible for organized diaspora to develop vast 
worldwide networks where virtual linkages permit real-time communication for 
the purposes of political debate, discussing and formulating goals and 
implementing plans pertaining to peacebuilding and reconstruction in their 
respective homelands.   
Although Kent’s study focused on diaspora contributions to peace-
building in the homeland, the same can be alleged for how CGDs’ political 
engagement through virtual transnational networks can contribute to conflict 
as well. Gauging the actual level of CGD engagement in political activities in 
regard to homeland affairs, particularly conflict, is challenging since many 
CGD political activities are actually masked as humanitarian or informational 
efforts (Skjerdal, 2009), thus in order to gain greater understanding of the 
nature and effect of CGD online political engagement (cyberactivism), it is 
important to explore the both the overt and covert motives, agendas and 
activities of CGD through more in-depth analyses of CGD online behavior.   
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Motivation to Act: Identity Formation and Political Outcomes 
Identity Formation through Cyberactivism 
CGDs’ online political engagement in homeland affairs serves many 
purposes, but most often research has shown that such activities tend to 1) 
reinforce aspects of CGD identity; and 2) influence political outcomes in the 
homeland, with each dynamic interacting and influencing the other. A 
considerable amount of time was spent in Chapters 1 and 2 describing CGDs’ 
motivations to engage politically in homeland conflict, particularly as they 
relate to identity and a desire to return to the traditional homeland, thus these 
analyses will not be repeated here, but it is important to note that the Internet 
provides a powerful means to engage politically in homeland conflict while at 
the same time reinforcing CGD identity.  
In summary, CGDs’ online political engagement in homeland conflict 
contributes to the development of CGD identity, both with regard to their hybrid 
and transnational qualities, but also with regard to reinforcing dynamics related 
to the reasons for their forced displacement. Chapter 2 cited the fluidity of 
CGD identity and how it is constantly being negotiated and re-negotiated as 
CGD adapt to their new host society, while at the same time maintaining ties 
to their homeland. Østergaard-Nielsen (2006) touches on this very issue when 
she notes how the Internet provides CGD “diagonal space” where historic 
tradition and contemporary society converge to produce new types of self-
understandings. Similarly, Lyons (2006) notes how CGDs have a “territorially 
defined sense of identity” that link past conflicts with current challenges of 
living in the host state. He also argues that for diaspora, identity, territory and 
conflict are conflated concepts, which when combined often serve as the 
motivation to act.  
Themes Involved in Online Political Engagement in Homeland Affairs 
Due to the relative novelty of the phenomenon of CGDs using the 
Internet to engage politically in homeland conflict, there is not a well-
developed body of research that explores the actor dynamics involved to any 
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level of real specificity. Rather, the majority of research in this area is in the 
form of case studies, which tend to concentrate on the means employed with 
examples of cyberactivism used to illustrate a wide range of political activities. 
These case studies are very useful in developing a more comprehensive 
representation of ways in which the Internet is used, but the literature is still 
being informed in this regard, which points to the contribution the current study 
will be making.  
Mobilization 
Virtual ethnographies of CGDs’ online political engagement have found 
that CGD are prolific users of the Internet for political purposes, particularly 
social media, online newspapers, and blogs (Bernal, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2009, 
2012; Lyons, 2004, 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006). Most of the studies on 
CGD online engagement in homeland politics found that CGDs’ use the 
Internet for mobilization (both internally and externally), debate, dissemination 
of information and propaganda, and lobbying. For instance, in Østergaard-
Nielsen’s study of Kurdish refugees she found that websites served as 
platforms mobilizing CGDs as well as the wider public through the 
dissemination of information, often propaganda.  
Bernal’s (2006) study on Eritrean diaspora found that they have used 
the Internet to mobilize demonstrators, fundraise for war efforts, and used 
social media to debate the political issues, such as the new Eritrean 
Constitution. Bernal notes how the Internet has had a particularly strong 
impact on Eritrean politics since the development of the Internet coincided with 
Eritrean independence in 1993; and that nation-building projects in Eritrea 
developed within the “context of late millennial/twenty-first century conditions 
and communications” (p. 162). In Bernal’s study of an Eritrean interactive 
website (www.dehai.org), he noted that its primary purpose (stated in its online 
charter) was to “promote freedom of expression, and to facilitate an open 
environment in which members may express a diversity of opinion that is to be 
both welcomed and respected” (p. 169). The website contains a space for 
users to post news articles about Eritrea, as well as an interactive community 
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discussion forum where users exchanged ideas and debated issues. The 
website also had a space for world news, where videos pertaining to Eritrea 
could be posted (primarily links to YouTube videos). Bernal explains that due 
to limited access to the Internet in Eritrea, most political activism occurred 
within the diaspora, but that is changing now that Internet penetration is 
increasing in many African countries, including Eritrea. Bernal also notes that 
the Eritrea website he studied was a source of cultural production as well as a 
forum for political expression, and that while on the surface the Dehai website 
appeared to exist solely as an open access information portal, on a deeper 
level it served, among other things, as a place where national and virtual 
history was constructed, and a place where civic engagement and political 
dissent was facilitated. 
  Lyons’ study of the Ethiopian diaspora and their political activism 
against the government of Ethiopia found many of the same dynamics as 
Østergaard-Nielsen and Bernal, but Lyons noted that the Ethiopian diaspora 
engaged in cyberactivism both in the Net (similar in fashion to the Dehai 
website), as well as through the Net. For example, Lyons found that the 
Ethiopian diaspora living in the West, particularly those strategically located in 
Washington, D.C. used online newspapers, blogs, email lists, and online radio 
stations to lobby the U.S. government as well as the international community 
demanding that aid be reduced to the Ethiopian government due to human 
rights conditions within the country. Thus, not only did some activism occur 
primarily within cyberspace, a considerable amount of political engagement 
used the Internet to complement more familiar forms of political engagement, 
such as real life demonstrations, and lobbying the U.S. government against 
the Ethiopian government. Lyons found that the techniques used by the 
CGDs, both in cyberspace and in real life, had a strong influence on the 
international community, as well as on political actors in Ethiopia. 
Photographic Displays of Victim Status 
CGD also use the Internet as a medium for using photographs as a way 
of expressing their victimhood. For instance, in Axel’s (2004) virtual 
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ethnography of Sikh diaspora online narratives (the Sikh population has 
endured significant trauma as a result of long-standing persecution on the part 
of the Indian government), he describes how the Sikh used the Internet to 
develop a collectively romanticized new homeland called “Khalistan” given to 
them by God. In describing this online narrative, Axel frames the rationale for 
the Sikh separatist movement in this way:  
Khalistani discourse constitutes the homeland, Khalistan, as a unique 
place created by God, later given by the Sikhs to the British, and, as 
Punjab, is presently occupied by alien polity, the Indian nation-state. 
 
Axel describes the Sikh diaspora website www.khalistan.net as 
featuring on its landing page a map of the world with the imagined homeland 
of “Khalistan” prominently featured, with the tagline “Khalistan: The New 
Global Reality.”  Axel also describes how the website, among other purposes, 
is used to raise awareness of Sikh persecution by the Indian government 
through the posting of numerous photographs labeled “Glimpses of Genocide,” 
depicting incidences of torture of Sikhs in India, alleged to have been 
committed by Indian government officials. Axel cites one particularly gruesome 
photograph of a tortured and ultimately murdered Sikh man labeled with the 
following statement: “A candidate for Punjab Assembly brutally tortured (with 
hot iron and electric shock) and murdered by the Indian Police” (see Axel, 
2004, pp. 35 – 37). Axel refers to the posting of such photographs online by 
CGD as a cyber-archive intended to document diaspora struggles and used to 
create a “transnational spectacle of subjectification” (also referred to by Axel 
as a “transnational domain of visual images”) as an expression of diaspora 
displacement and temporalization (a form of nostalgia unique to CGD 
populations14), where CGDs perceive themselves as a self-identified 
subjugated ethnic population (p. 35). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Daniel Martin Carter refers to the concept of temporalization within a diasporic context as ‘diasporic 
nostalgia,” encompassing not only traditional notions of temporalization (looking back in time), but also a 
concurrent looking forward in time to a return to home country under the right circumstances. Thus, 
diaspora nostalgia involves a yearning "for only a part of the past and some part of a future” (p. 148). 
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Hybrid Journalism: CGDs’ Online Newspapers and Political Activism. 
Several researchers analyzing online content on diaspora-run websites 
found that many involved various types of journalism, some mainstream, but a 
considerable amount that was quite political in nature, or what Skjerdal refers 
to as political activism masked as journalism. In Hiriji’s study of Muslim CGD 
online activity, he noted that despite CGD members’ criticism of mainstream 
media, alternate media outlets outside of the diaspora joined forces with 
diaspora activists in criticizing mainstream media. He also found that social 
justice activists outside the diaspora formed partnerships with CGD in their 
attempts to fight for social justice. In Skjerdal’s analysis of Ethiopian diaspora 
online newspapers’ professional journalist standards, he found that each of the 
nine Ethiopian online newspapers were far more political in nature than they 
were journalistic, with the majority of the news stories being centered on 
politics. Even in cases where articles appeared to be focused on a non-
political topic, they were depicted in what Skjerdal referred to as “politicized 
wrapping,” with impartial and objective stories being rare, and opinion often 
presented as fact. Skjerdal also noted that in articles about the Ethiopian 
government, the word “government” was consistently replaced with the word 
“regime.” Further, the Ethiopian prime minister was not referred to by his 
official title, but rather by the term “dictator” or “tyrant.” Skjerdal provides the 
following example from an online story about the reelection of the Prime 
Minister of Ethiopia:  
The 14th African Union Summit on Tuesday unanimously re-elected 
Ethiopian Prime Minister [sic] genocidal dictator Meles Zenawi to 
represent Africa in future global climate conferences (p. 736). 
 
Additionally, adjacent to various online articles were photographs and 
illustrations featuring the prime minister with “(manipulated) horns and vampire 
teeth, or with a long, forked snake tongue (also manipulated).”  
Skjerdal also found that the majority of the online newspapers had 
connections to political opposition groups, all working against the Ethiopian 
government, but for different reasons (some, but not all, were allied with 
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Eritrea). This was evidenced by fact that the writers (identified as journalists) 
and other contributors were for the most part former Ethiopian politicians (or 
those affiliated with their political parties) now residing in the diaspora. Most of 
the online newspapers analyzed in the study would be considered SNS in that 
they allowed for interactivity by encouraging readers to post responses and 
comments to the various stories, although on most sites editors retained 
control over what comments remained on the sites, and efforts were made to 
ensure that the dominant opinions of the editors prevailed where the editors 
served “as both gatekeepers and participants in the debate” (p. 737-738).   
Additionally, each online newspaper included in the study claimed to 
exist in order to provide a public service through professional journalism, 
rather than as an “outlet for advocating political ideas,” yet Skjerdal notes that 
when asked about the overt political activism they engaged in via their online 
newspapers, several of the editors justified the simultaneous engagement of 
journalism and political activism by “blaming the (in their view) detrimental 
political situation in Ethiopia, or maintaining that the activism aspect is only 
associated with campaigning for free speech, human rights and democracy, 
not with party politics” (p. 739). In fact, one editor referred to this brand of 
reporting as journalism and activism combined. Skjerdal cites the common 
nature of this type of “hybrid journalism” throughout Africa, invoking Kperogi’s 
(2008) reference to guerrilla journalism.  
Skjerdal’s findings regarding the extent to which the Ethiopian diaspora 
online newspapers adhered to professional journalism standards, included the 
following: 1) with regard to objectivity, the online newspapers demonstrated 
political bias in both the reporting of news as well as in the analysis of events 
and situations; 2) with regard to journalistic independence, the online 
newspapers were autonomous from the Ethiopian incumbent, but identified 
with political opposition groups; and 3) with regard to public participation, the 
online newspapers appeared to support participation on the surface, but 
maintained distance from the public in practice. Skjerdal concludes, “given the 
political character of the Ethiopian diaspora websites … the immediate 
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impression would be that the editors are primarily motivated by political 
activism rather than journalistic professionalism” (p. 738).  
Hirji (2006) conducted content analysis of an interactive online 
newspaper facilitated by Muslim diaspora living in Canada, called MMN 
(www.montrealmuslimnews.net). MMN included “electronic versions of 
mainstream media, Internet-only news Web sites, and media aimed 
specifically at Muslim audiences,” as well as commentary, editorials, and 
action alerts. Hirji notes that although the website provided information on a 
variety of topics, its primary focus was on political issues affecting the Muslim 
world, such as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and the US-Iraqi war. Hirji’s 
analysis yielded numerous themes emerging from the various online 
newspapers’ postings, including accusations of colonialism and imperialism on 
the part of the world’s superpowers (primarily the United States and Great 
Britain), and accusations that the mainstream media outlets were biased and 
working on behalf of governments churning out propaganda.  
Hirji also found that MMN had a considerable amount of content 
focusing the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, with expert analysis, that 
demonstrated significant anger and despair about the Western invasion of Iraq 
and its resulting consequences. Particularly noteworthy in light of the related 
research in this area is Hirji’s observation that a common discourse expressed 
throughout the site involved calling for the exercising of their democratic 
political rights to dissent and protest. Hirji cites a particular action alert posted 
on the site where the editors called on the moral and faith obligations of every 
Muslim and other people of conscience to lobby the UN in advance of a 
General Assembly emergency session focusing on the legality of the Iraqi war. 
The action alert went so far as to assert that “…anyone failing to take such 
action…”would be a partner in killing the innocents and helping in the human 
and material losses of both sides’” (p. 135). Hirji found that while much of the 
content on MMN was quite partisan in nature and had the potential to increase 
division between Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Canada, the nature of 
the articles, posts and CMC may also represent ways in which online portals 
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can serve as a safe place where Muslims can collectively express a range of 
contrary views while still maintaining their individual identities. Hirji also posits 
the possibility that rather than creating division, MMN may present 
opportunities for collective expression and action among Muslims and non-
Muslims committed to social justice causes. 
Uncompromising Attitudes and Online Bullying 
Not all cyberactivism offers such productive possibilities. For instance, 
Conversi (2012) found that some CGDs engaging in cyberactivism became 
aggressive when faced with dissenting opinion. Conversi theorized that ethnic 
diaspora, who she refers to as “state-related nationalist diaspora,” often 
became more radicalized in exile compared to those who remained in their 
respective homelands, particularly when they were defending their ethnic 
boundaries which they perceived were under threat (p.1358). For instance, 
Conversi found that diaspora participating in online political activism 
(cyberactivism) engaged in a type of “rule of the online mob” behavior where 
they “bully more liberal and tolerant participants by accusing them of 
complacency, cowardice and even treason” (p. 1359). This dynamic is 
consistent with Lyons and Mandeville’s (2008) and Demmers’ (2007) 
assertions of CGDs’ tendency to view homeland dynamics in categorical terms 
often results in accusations that diaspora who do seek authentic compromise 
and reconciliation are traitors to the cause. 
CGD Political Engagement using Social Media 
Although the area of research focusing on CGDs’ use of social media 
for political purposes is relatively new, there have been a few key studies – 
including case-specific empirical studies, that have shown that in general, 
CGDs are using SNS, such as Facebook and Twitter, as both a social media 
outlet, as well as a political tool (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Oiarzabal, 2012; 
Wilson & Dunn 2011).  For instance, in Khamis and Vaughn’s study of an 
Egyptian diaspora Facebook page created during the recent Egypt revolution, 
they found that Facebook served a number of important needs for Egyptian 
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diaspora, such as providing a place to speak freely in a public domain, as well 
as providing a safe place to openly share political views. Facebook also 
offered Egyptian diaspora users the opportunity to engage in “citizen 
journalism,” through the posting of politically-related photographs and videos. 
One interviewee quoted by Khamis and Vaughn stated how the Facebook 
page and its networked activities helped him feel far more connected to what 
was going on in Egypt, than he had felt before, stating:  “As soon as I joined 
this page and “liked” it on Facebook, I started to receive many messages, 
updates, links and videos that kept me informed of all the developments on 
the ground. I felt that I was there in Egypt living the revolution and participating 
in it moment by moment through my close attention to this page on a daily 
basis” (p. 153). These comments reflect the power of social media 
embeddedness (with other social media sites) and networking capabilities, as 
well as the multiple purposes served by an SNS during a time of political 
unrest. 
In their analysis of the role the diaspora Facebook page played in 
Egypt’s political revolution, Khamis and Vaughn found that it was used for: 
1. Disseminating news, increasing international awareness, and creating 
motivation in the pre-revolutionary phase;  
2. Mobilizing and coordinating protests, inspiring political activism, and 
exposing brutality and violations of human rights during the 
revolutionary phase; and 
3. Engaging in nation-building, democracy-building and consensus-
building in the post-revolutionary phase. This shows the flexibility and 
dynamism of social media tools and their ability to serve multiple roles.  
Khamis and Vaughn also noted that when users had a common goal, such as 
ousting Mubarak, the Facebook page had high traffic, but traffic dropped off 
when multiple visions for a future Egypt led to too many online debates. 
Ultimately they found that online activism was often coordinated with off-line 
activism (through the Net), but they concurred with Wilson and Dunn’s (2011) 
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findings that mobilization conducted through Facebook was significantly more 
successful than traditional off-line mobilization efforts. 
The Tahrir Project was initiated in recognition of the need for a 
structured empirical analysis of the use of the Internet for political purposes, 
particularly the use of social media (Wilson & Dunn, 2011). The Tahrir Project 
is a longitudinal study evaluating how “digital media” is being used by those 
engaged in Egypt’s revolution that resulted in President Mubarak’s overthrow. 
The study involves online analysis as well as interviews with “digital actors” 
who used the following types of social media: “text messaging, telephone 
(mobile and landlines), satellite television, radio, print media (including 
newspapers and revolutionary leaflets), Twitter, Facebook, blogs, E-mail and 
live communication (face-to-face conversations, graffiti, banners, and 
speeches at the protests)” (Wilson & Dunn, 2011, p. 1250). This ongoing study 
is examining such variables as:  
• Frequency of use; 
• Type of Information obtained from the source; 
• The perceived reliability of the content; 
• The reasons for use of information obtained; 
• How information was linked to other media; 
• What media was used to view or distribute citizen-produced 
documentation, such as videos or pictures; 
• How various media was ranked by users with regard to 
“importance, informativeness, frequency of use, and motivating 
effect” (p. 1250). 
Preliminary results have yielded some very interesting information 
about usage, patterns, and related phenomena, and since it is a longitudinal 
study, more data will be forthcoming that will no doubt have implications for all 
research related to cyberactivism. Although the study did not focus exclusively 
on diaspora, the results of the study yielded valuable information that has 
definite implications for better understanding diaspora behavior in social 
protest situations, particularly with regard to the use of SNS for communication 
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and mobilization purposes.  
Although the study did not fully support the anecdotal theory that the 
2011 Egyptian protest to oust President Mubarak was solely a “Facebook 
Revolution,” the authors did contend that the data demonstrated that the 
Internet was a powerful driving force behind the protest, and while most 
protesters still preferred traditional forms of media for the purposes of 
obtaining news, information dissemination and communication (such as face-
to-face communication, satellite television and print media), social media 
significantly changed the way in which the protest evolved, illustrating the 
power of SNS in political engagement (Wilson & Dunn, 2011). 
Among an array of results, the study found that the majority of those 
engaging in the Egyptian protest through social media were educated young 
males. In general, social media—Facebook, Twitter, online newspapers and 
blogs—were valued the most highly and used the most prolifically among 
respondents who were already using social media; and Facebook was used 
more than other media for relaying information. Facebook was also rated as 
one of the top three media choices for its importance and informative qualities  
(after telephone and face-to-face); and Twitter and Facebook were ranked the 
highest among all media in terms of increasing motivation to participate (i.e., 
the power to mobilize) (Wilson & Dunn, 2011). Existing SNS users also 
reported that they believed social media to be more reliable and more 
proficient at relaying information than more traditional forms of media, 
indicating that as the availability and use of social media increases, reliance 
on them will likely increase as well (currently, Internet penetration in Egypt is 
only about 17 percent) (Wilson & Dunn, 2011).  
Although the Tahrir Project does not focus specifically on CGDs, the 
study did reveal findings that have implications for diaspora studies, including 
the finding that the majority of those who used Twitter were outside of Egypt, 
while the majority of those who retweeted were inside Egypt, reflecting the 
dynamic of information dissemination between those outside the country to 
those inside the country. For instance, the study found that among all tweets 
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captured during the study (675,713 tweets sent by 106,563 Twitter users), the 
majority of the tweets were sent by about 200 “power users,” 75 percent of 
whom resided outside of Egypt, primarily in Western countries (North America 
and Europe), with 96 percent of tweets being written in English, and only 1 
percent being written in Arabic (Wilson & Dunn, 2011).  
The authors concluded that while digital media was not the dominant 
media used by protestors during the Egyptian revolution, it was nonetheless a 
powerful driving force. This was especially true for social media, in particular 
Twitter, which propelled “a significant transnational discourse and support 
network” (Wilson & Dunn, 2011, p. 1269). Further, despite the fact that Twitter 
was used by a very small number of “power users,” their contribution to the 
protest movement was substantial, particularly in the area of mobilization 
through motivating others to participate and by keeping morale among 
protestors high, since the transnational nature of the tweets reinforced to the 
protestors that their plight was receiving worldwide attention. Ultimately, 
Wilson and Dunn (2011) assert that social media, particularly Twitter and 
Facebook, may be “distinctively well suited to dynamic protest contexts” (p. 
1270). Additionally, they recommend future research focus on how social 
media is being used for political activism in protest situations, including how 
digital media interacts with traditional media, and the nature and influence of 
online information flow, with a particular focus on the geographic mapping of 
social media users engaging in cyberactivism.  
Conclusion 
Studies on CGDs’ online social networks have found that those who are 
the most active politically are not always those with the most power in society 
(Akin, 2011; Kellner, 2001). In fact, the opposite appears to be true in many 
instances. For instance, in Bernal’s (2006) study of politically active Eritrean 
diaspora engaging in an interactive website focusing on historic, cultural and 
political dynamics, he found that the most active online posters often held low-
level positions, such as parking lot attendants and taxi drivers. Online political 
engagement may serve multiple purposes then relating to both stated and 
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unstated goals. In fact, Bernal has posited that online social networks have the 
ability to mend “ruptures in the social body…through the ability of the Internet 
to bridge distance or at least render it invisible, making physical location 
irrelevant” (p. 168), countering the sense of isolation, disenfranchisement and 
alienation often experienced by those living in the diaspora due to forced 
displacement. Brinkerhoff (2009); Lyons (2006; 2007), and Østergaard-Nielsen 
(2006) found similar dynamics, where online political engagement served a 
number of purposes for CGDs, many of which seem less focused on achieving 
stated desired political ends, and more pertaining to unresolved psychological 
dynamics, as a result of their violent dispersal from their homelands. This may 
indicate that as long as the psychological dynamics related to trauma are not 
resolved, there is some indication that even if political ends were met, the 
target may shift, and the fight would likely continue.   
Not all cyberactivists are diaspora members, and not all diaspora 
members are cyberactivists; further, not all diaspora who use social media use 
it for political purposes, just as not all diaspora who engage politically use 
social media as a tool of activism. But what these studies do indicate is how 
social media, particularly SNSs are significantly altering the way people 
connect to each other, particularly when they are dispersed widely 
geographically, as well as how social media is changing the way protest 
movements are facilitated. With regard to CGDs’ political engagement in 
homeland affairs, the body of research is new, but has provided clues into to 
ways in which CGDs use the Internet, particularly social media such as 
Facebook, Twitter, online blogs, and online newspapers (often one and the 
same), to engage politically using transnational networks of social media 
users, both within and outside of the CGD. Most notable is the matter of 
whether the “power users” in the CGD are working on behalf of the homeland 
regime or against it, as this will often determine the ways in which social media 
are used, and for what purposes.  
Equally relevant are the types of social media used, and the nature of 
the relay between the various mediums (i.e., interlinking and exchange of 
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information between mediums). Greater understanding is also needed in 
regard to how online political engagement influences and reinforces identity, 
and how identity dynamics motivate CGDs to engage politically in the first 
place. In relation to motivation and desired political outcomes, greater insights 
into overt and covert goals will be useful in understanding the range of 
agendas of politically engaged CGDs. The extent and nature of partnerships 
between CGDs and Western allies is also worthy of further exploration, 
particularly for gaining increased insight into the range of motivations for, and 
ways in which politically active CGDs and non-state actors (such as members 
of Western media and social justice activists) partner in political and social 
justice-related activities. Types of online political engagement (lobbying, etc.) 
and ways in which the Internet is used for these purposes are important to 
explore as well. Other areas of further exploration can include ways in which 
CGDs come together for collective purposes with seeming homogeneity, yet 
on closer inspection reveal fissures and conflicts indicating far greater 
heterogeneity within CGDs than may appear on the surface (Kleist & Hansen, 
2005). Finally, online behavior is an area in need of further exploration, 
particularly with regard to achieving overt and covert agendas, online 
strategies for achieving goals, and behavior toward other online users. 
It is the goal of the present study to explore these very dynamics using 
the Rwandan CGD as a case study. Rwanda serves as a compelling case 
because of a history of enduring ethnonationalist conflict, a large diaspora 
living in the West (relative to population totals inside the country), which 
appears similar in many respects to other ethnonationalist CGD who engage 
politically using the Internet and social media (particularly the Ethiopian 
diaspora who engage politically against the current Ethiopian government). In 
the subsequent chapter I will provide necessary context of the country of 
Rwanda, exploring the history of ethnonationalist conflict within the broader 
socio-political context, beginning with Colonial occupation through 
contemporary times. The case will focus primarily upon the 1990 to 1994 civil 
war between the majority ethnic Hutu and minority ethnic Tutsi population, the 
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genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, and the ensuing exodus of over one 
million ethnic Hutus into exile. Providing this contextual information about 
Rwanda is in accordance with the recommendations of Smith and Stares 
(2007), who caution that prior to coming to any conclusions about the effect of 
CGDs on a conflict situation it is vitally important to thoroughly explore the 
historical context and background of the conflict in the country of origin, as well 
as the potential motives of the CGDs.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE CASE OF RWANDA 
 
There are currently an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 Rwandan refugees 
and political exiles living in the United States and Europe, many of whom are 
engaging in various levels of political and social advocacy in relation to their 
home country (U.S. Rwanda Embassy, 2012). It is necessary to understand 
the history of Rwanda, the complex nature of the Hutu-Tutsi relational 
dynamics and the 1990 to 1994 civil war, as well as the events leading up to 
the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, if we are to understand Rwandan CGD 
political activism in matters related to Rwanda. 
Relevant History of Pre-Genocide Rwanda 
Pre-Colonial Rwanda 
 The history of Rwanda is controversial, in large part due to the “divide 
and conquer” politics rooted in Belgian colonization (Des Forges, 1999; 
Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2009). The brief history of Rwanda presented in 
this chapter is relevant to the contemporary Hutu-Tutsi conflict, as well as to 
current political activities within the diaspora, and will be based on the 
consensus of objective scholars (see Appendix A for a summarized timeline of 
key events). However, it is important to note that much of Rwandan history 
remains contested. Further, it is equally important to note that Rwandan 
history, particularly within sociopolitical contexts, is inextricably linked to its 
regional neighbors, Burundi, Uganda, and in particular the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Prunier, 2009).  
Rwanda was settled approximately 2000 years ago by people who are 
believed to have lived as a relatively cohesive group, speaking a common 
language, and practicing collective cultural traditions (Chretien, Dupaquier, 
Kabanda & Ngarambe, 1995). What evolved through the 18th century was the 
development of two loosely defined groups, based primarily upon differing 
economic and labor traditions, but who for the most part shared a single 
culture. The two groups consisted of cultivators who worked the land, and a 
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smaller group of pastoralists who raised cattle.  In time, ownership of cattle 
became a sign of wealth and privilege, with the wealthiest members of society 
and its rulers measuring wealth by head of cattle. Cattle owners were called 
“Tutsi” (Kinyarwanda15 for a person rich in cattle), and cultivators were known 
as “Bahina”, who were eventually referred to as “Hutu” (Kinyarwanda for 
“cultivators of land”, signifying “the masses”). It is important to note that the 
original Hutus and Tutsis were not considered ethnic groups, but rather were 
groups distinguished primarily by economic livelihood and eventually social 
status. Traditionally, it was possible to switch between the two groups by 
changing one’s economic activity. For instance, Des Forges (1999) describes 
how one could become Tutsi by acquiring more cattle.  
 A working balance existed between Hutu and Tutsi groups throughout 
the 18th century, but the groups remained relatively distinct. Des Forges (1999) 
asserts that physical distinctions between Hutus and Tutsis were a result of 
the tendency of individuals to marry within their occupational groups, with 
Tutsis being taller and thinner, and Hutus being shorter and stockier, with 
broader features. Because Tutsis were pastoralists, they became recognized 
as the elite, and Hutus, who were farmers and far greater in numbers, became 
known as workers and as “the masses.” A smaller group of inhabitants called 
the Twa, comprising about 1 percent of the population. Twa primarily lived in 
the forest and were considered hunters and gatherers. Twa were distinguished 
from both Hutu and Tutsi by their small “pygmie-like” stature (Des Forges, 
1999; Prunier, 2009). 
During Rwanda’s pre-colonial period the government was centrally 
organized as a kingdom and ruled by a Tutsi king. Most of the rulers within the 
kingdom were also Tutsi with a few rare exceptions. Although there was some 
marginalization of Twa and Hutu, scholars believe that these groups lived 
relatively peaceably together in an organized and interdependent social 
structure. Mamdani (2002) offers an alternative theory of early Hutu/Tutsi 
identities, asserting that they were neither market-based identities, nor cultural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Kinyarwanda is the native language in Rwanda 
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identities, but political identities. Mamdani argues that the Hutu identity was 
one of subjugation, whereas the Tutsi identity was one of power. He posits 
that Hutus could become Tutsi over generations, primarily through 
intermarriage, and Tutsis could become Hutus over generations through a 
process he refers to as being “discarded.” Mamdami proposes that race did 
not become incorporated as a factor in Hutu/Tutsi identity until colonial 
occupation introduced race as an ideological concept. As evidence of his 
theory, Mamdani cites how the Hutu of northern Rwanda were called “Bakiga,” 
“just like their cousins in Western Uganda,” but were called Hutu once 
incorporated into the state of Rwanda. Mamdani states that “rather than a 
transhistorical ethnic identity, Hutu was really a transethnic identity of subjects, 
of all those who came to be subjugated to Tutsi power in Rwanda” (p. 498). 
Despite the controversy regarding the origins and divergent meaning of Hutu 
and Tutsi identities, there is general agreement about the impact of 
colonialism, including the ideology of race on Rwandan culture. 
Colonial Rwanda 
Rwanda (along with the country of Burundi) was originally colonized by 
Germany in the late 1800s, and under the Treaty of Versailles it became a 
League of Nations trust territory under Belgian colonial rule in 1918. At that 
time Rwanda had a population of approximately 10 million, comprised of the 
three groups – the Hutu (85% of the population), the Tutsi (14%), and the Twa, 
(1%). Despite the League of Nations mandate that required colonial power be 
used to protect countries considered incapable of self-rule, Belgium’s 
management of Rwanda was quite abusive, particularly toward the Hutu 
(Melvern, 2006).  
The Belgian colonialists applied scientific racism to Rwandan social 
structures, an ideology that was based primarily upon physical anthropology, 
and a belief that the intellect necessary to develop a civilization was reserved 
solely for the Caucasian race. Because the stereotypical Tutsi was tall and thin 
with slender features, the Belgians presumed they were racially superior, and 
therefore more able to rule the masses. As a consequence, Tutsis were 
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elevated to a superior racial status over Hutus and Twa due to their more 
“European” look.  
The formal categorization of all Rwandans into racial groups of Hutu, 
Tutsi or Twa occurred during a comprehensive census conducted by the 
Belgians between 1926 and 1933.  Melvern (2006) notes how Belgian 
administrators descended upon Rwanda and subjected all Rwandans to a 
racial evaluation, a completely arbitrary and rudimentary process involving the 
measurement of perceived “racial markers,” including height, nose shape and 
size, and eye shape. The result of this process was the issuance of an ethnic 
identity card, which included a designation of Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. Individuals 
from mixed marriages were registered with the race of their fathers, consistent 
with a cultural tradition that recognized a paternal lineage system 
(Lemarchand, 1970; Prunier, 2009). Thus what had been very loose and 
porous groupings based on labor activities, evolved into rigid ethnic groups 
involving false narratives of social and intellectual elitism (Melvern, 2006).  
The initiation of a racial identity program did not end the potential of 
switching ethnic groups, but it did make it significantly more difficult (Des 
Forges, 1999). In fact, Des Forges describes how the initiation of ethnic 
registration and use of identity cards created a powerful and enduring “in 
group/out group” dynamic in which Tutsi elite began to embrace their elevated 
separateness and the socially excluded Hutu began to unite around their 
collective experiences of oppression and exclusion. Niane (1984) cites these 
dynamics as the precursor to subsequent ethnic conflict, which “left a veritable 
powder keg in Rwanda and Burundi on the eve of independence” (p. 13). 
Des Forges (1999) asserts that it was not necessarily the intention of 
the Belgians to “divide and conquer,” but rather this was the result of their 
attempt to establish social structure based on racist ideology prevalent in early 
20th-century Europe. During the colonial era, Tutsi rulers appeared to have 
taken advantage of this belief system by crediting the majority of 
achievements in Rwanda’s early history to the Tutsi group. Although this 
version of history was false it was consistent with the “Hamitic hypothesis,” 
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(sometimes referred to as the “Hamitic myth”), a theory popular during the 
colonial era that credited the development of civilization to Caucasians. 
According to the “Hamitic hypothesis,” Caucasians from the north migrated 
into Central Africa bringing with them pastoralism, a caste system and other 
advancements (Lemarchand, 1999; Niane, 1984). This theory, which has no 
basis in fact, supported the European colonial belief in the superiority of 
Caucasian over black, and herdsmen over farmers. Because the average Hutu 
resembled the traditional image of the African “negro” and the average Tutsi 
appeared more “Caucasian-like,” the “Hamitic hypothesis” was easily applied 
to Rwanda by the Belgians eventualy leading to the false belief that Tutsis 
were foreigners who invaded Central Africa from the north (primarily Ethiopia), 
civilized it, and in the process exploited and oppressed its original (and 
rightful) inhabitants (Lemarchand, 1999; Niane, 1984).  
Of the widespread belief in the “Hamitic theory” and its damaging 
effects, Des Forges states: 
This distorted version of the past told more about the intellectual 
atmosphere of Europe in the 1920s than about the early history of 
Rwanda. Packaged in Europe, it was returned to Rwanda where it was 
disseminated through the schools and seminaries. So great was 
Rwandan respect for European education that this faulty history was 
accepted by the Hutu, who stood to suffer from it, as well as by the 
Tutsi who helped to create it and were bound to profit from it. People of 
both groups learned to think of the Tutsi as the winners and the Hutu as 
the losers in every great contest in Rwandan history (p. 48). 
 
Referring to the introduction of the “Hamitic hypothesis” by Belgian 
colonizers, Prunier (2009) notes that the Belgians (in similar vein to other 
colonial powers) engaged in “manic cultural reengineering” and historical 
revisionism that although playing on historic Rwandan culture, created a 
dynamic that made the genocide possible.  Unfortunately, the “Hamitic 
hypothesis” has remained an underlying theme in Rwanda, fanning the flames 
of ethnic hatred that served as the genesis of genocidal thinking decades later 
(Prunier, 2009). Another justification for the international community’s policy of 
noninterference during the genocide (and the months leading up to the mass 
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killings), was the tendency by many in the West to frame civil conflict as the 
result of nothing more than tribal fighting, believed to be a common occurrence 
in Africa (Melvern, 2006).    
The “Hutu Revolution” of 1959 
In the early 1950s, the colonial administrators started to allow some 
Hutus access to educational and leadership opportunities (Des Forges, 1999).  
It wasn’t until Tutsis began to push for independence in the late 1950s (during 
the same time that the UN was pushing for the end of colonial rule), that the 
Belgians switched sides and began supporting the Hutus. Although moderate 
parties advocated a Hutu-Tutsi power-sharing scheme, extremist groups on 
both sides began to advocate for power on behalf of their respective groups. 
Extremist Hutus formed the Parmehutu organization (eventually coming to 
represent “Hutu Power”), and conservative Tutsis developed the Union 
Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), with each side advocating for exclusive control 
– Tutsis because they had been elevated to the social elite, and Hutus out of a 
fear of returning to prior years of oppression and marginalization (some 
considered this a manufactured fear; Melvern, 2006). Several events occurred 
between 1957 and 1961 that led to the eventual “Hutu Revolution,” in which 
elections and a social uprising ended the Tutsi monarchy and put the 
Parmehutu in control (Lemarchand, 1970). Des Forges (1999) points out that 
although Hutu extremists later used the “revolution” as a sign of their people’s 
triumphant victory over oppression, the Belgians actually orchestrated much of 
the shift in power.  
One event that added to the momentum resulting in the “Hutu 
Revolution” was the publication of what has become knows as the “Hutu 
Manifesto”16 in March of 1957. The Hutu Manifesto, a 10-page document 
prepared by nine “Hutu intellectuals” and addressed to the vice-governor 
general of Rwanda, attributed the racial problems in Rwanda to the social, 
economic, and political monopolies held by the Tutsi. The Manifesto 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 “Le Manifeste des Bahutu: Note sur l'aspect social du problème racial indigène au Ruanda” 
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demanded the end of Hutu oppression by Tutsi elites (referred to as the 
“Hamitic oppressors” of the Hutu), the end of colonial rule, and the initiation of 
system of majority rule, where the Hutus would have exclusive control of the 
country. 
Grégoire Kayibanda was elected as the president of Rwanda in 1962, 
and his MDR party (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain), the Parmehutu 
party of Hutu power and reigned until 1973. According to Melvern (2006), 
Kayibanda was an authoritarian ruler who considered the Tutsi an enemy of 
the state. Over the course of the next few years there were several Tutsi 
attempts to regain power, with each of these incidents being put down by a 
powerful response by the Hutu government, including increased exclusion and 
mass killings, leading to thousands more Tutsis fleeing into exile 
(Lemarchand, 1970). What was evolving during this time was a spiraling 
dynamic involving Tutsis attempting to combat their oppression and social 
exclusion with Hutus in power responding by using perceptions of their past 
oppression to justify increasingly harsh treatment of the Tutsi population. In 
fact, the conditions the Tutsis were facing in the country prompted the UN 
General Assembly to establish a Commission of Inquiry in 1962 charged with 
the responsibility to investigate the racial problems in Rwanda. The 
Commission’s final conclusion was that racism against the Tutsi minority was 
so dire it bordered on Nazism. The Commission attributed the racial situation 
to the Hutu government and the Belgians, which the Commission accused of 
artificially manufacturing the racial divide. The Commission concluded that if 
racial reconciliation wasn’t implemented, Rwanda’s future was “bleak” (UN 
General Assembly, 1962 as cited in Melvern, 2006). Consistent with the UN 
Commission of Inquiry, Des Forges’ investigation into the events leading up to 
the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi revealed that the Hutu government used 
the false narrative created by the Belgians, including, “…ideas about Tutsi 
distinctiveness, foreign origins, and complete control over the Hutu—to justify 
the violence of the revolution and the discriminatory measures of the years 
after” (p. 37).  
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Despite the UN’s acknowledgement of the serious threat to Tutsi safety 
in Rwanda, Kayibanda initiated a campaign to kill Tutsis after an attempted 
coup d’état by exiled Tutsis wishing to return home. Melvern describes how 
Kayibanda orchestrated this killing campaign by spreading rumors that Tutsis 
were planning to kill Hutus. Government officials and propagandists were sent 
throughout Rwanda to engage the local Hutu community to hunt down, 
capture and kill their Tutsi neighbors, believing that if they didn’t, they were 
soon be victims of Tutsi aggression. Roadblocks were erected throughout the 
country, and an estimated 10,000 to 14,000 Tutsis were killed with everyday 
tools, such as hoes and machetes used for farming (Melvern, 2006). Melvern 
describes how then army officer Theoneste Bagosora, broadly considered the 
architect of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, was involved in these Tutsi 
pogroms and included the following reference on his resume as an 
accomplishment: “1963 Campaigns in the Bugesera against Inyenzi.” Melvern 
(2006) also notes how Bagosora frequently repeated Kayibanda’s warning to 
the Tutsi in March of 1963: “Some of you are causing trouble for your brothers 
who live in peace in a democratic Rwanda…and suppose you take Kigali by 
force how will you measure the chaos of which you will be the first victims…it 
will be the total end of the Tutsi race… Kayibanda warned the Tutsi population 
that if they ever tried to gain political power in Rwanda again, “they would find 
that ‘the whole Tutsi race will be wiped out’” (p. 9).   
Contributing to the belief among Rwandan Hutus that Tutsis were a 
significant threat to their survival were ethnic conflicts in neighboring countries, 
such as the 1972 conflict in Burundi in which the Tutsi-dominated army 
massacred thousands of Hutus, causing hundreds of thousands of Hutus to 
flee into refugee camps (Des Forges, 1999). Des Forges (1999) proposed that 
the Tutsi pogroms also may have served to test the resolve of the international 
community, and when the response was one of seeming indifference to the 
plight of the Tutsi, a culture of impunity evolved among the extremist Hutu 
population. 
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The Habyarimana Administration 
Juvenal Habyarimana took control of Rwanda in a bloodless coup in 
1973. In fact, long-standing tensions between Hutus from the south who 
supported Kayibanda, and Hutus in the north who supported Habyarimana 
resulted in the transition of power from Kayibanda to Habyarimana. Both 
camps professed to be the true representatives and protectors of the Hutu 
people, the “true” Rwandans, and both camps consistently scapegoated the 
Tutsi for the country’s problems, yet Habyarimana ultimately prevailed 
espousing a platform of unity and reform. Despite promises of a more 
transparent and egalitarian government, Rwanda quickly became a single-
party state with mandatory membership in Habyarimana’s MRND party17 
(Lemarchand, 1970).  
Habyarimana and the MRND controlled Rwandans through a complex 
system of micromanagement and manipulation, which resulted in an obedient 
Rwandan following, particularly in the Northern provinces, which was 
Habyarimana’s home (McDoom, 2005). The Tutsis continued to be 
scapegoated leading to widespread resentment and a strong “in-group/out-
group” mentality, with the belief that Tutsis were not legitimate residents of 
Rwanda and therefore had no rights. Although there has been much 
discussion about the pre-genocide propaganda campaign waged by 
Habyarimana’s regime, and the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), it is important 
to reiterate that the spreading of anti-Tutsi propaganda actually began during 
the “Hutu Social Revolution of 1959.” For instance, Des Forges (1999) 
describes how schools taught children the distinct differences between Hutus 
and Tutsis, with Hutus being described as descending from the Bantu tribe, 
the original inhabitants of Rwanda, and the Tutsis being described as 
“Hamitic” or “Ethiopid,” having migrated from the north (see discussion of the 
“Hamitic hypothesis, above).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development; French: Mouvement républicain 
national pour la démocratie et le développement 
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By the late 1980s, with many Tutsis fleeing to bordering countries, the 
international community recognized the need to address “the Rwandan 
refugee problem.” As many as 600,000 Tutsis had sought refuge in 
neighboring countries, and many were now claiming the right to return home 
(Des Forges, 1999). Many of these refugees were living in Uganda and were 
part of the Ugandan Army–Paul Kagame among them. Kagame ultimately 
helped create and lead a rebel group of Rwandan Tutsi refugees, called the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF attacked Rwanda in October 1990, 
entering the country from the north, demanding the right of all Tutsi exiles to 
return home.  Prunier (1995) cites that the regime’s response to the invasion 
was to clamp down even harder on dissent, including increasing its oppression 
of Tutsis. Numerous pogroms against Tutsis were executed in the next few 
years, justified by accusations that all Tutsis were RPF collaborators (Ibyitso). 
In fact, even some Hutus who opposed the Habyarimana regime, or anyone 
who attempted to rescue Tutsis (including priests and nuns) were deemed 
Ibyitso, or “no better than a Tutsi” and killed as well (p. 231).  
The Pre-Genocide Propaganda Campaign 
Despite Habyarimana’s claim to the outside world that he considered all 
Tutsis to be brothers, from 1990 to 1994 the Habyarimana regime engaged in 
a well-documented and widespread propaganda campaign against the Tutsis. 
As a part of his anti-Tutsi campaign Habyarimana encouraged Hutu civilians to 
view their Tutsi neighbors as threats, not only to the country, but also to the 
lives of all Hutus, as well as of their families. Des Forges’ (1999) research 
study Leave None to Tell the Story is considered one of the most reliable and 
detailed accounts of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, and the events 
leading up to it. Within her report, Des Forges provides a detailed account of 
the propaganda the Habyarimana government, and its military, the FAR, 
engaged in leading up to the genocide. She cites widespread governmental 
efforts to eradicate the RPF threat and its alleged supporters such as widely 
disseminating documents that clearly defined the “enemy” as all Tutsi, not 
solely the RPF. 
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Des Forges (1999) points out that at no time were there any 
government attempts to distinguish average Tutsi civilians from the RPF. In 
fact, Des Forges cites government documents that clearly attempted to 
categorize all Tutsis as Inyenzi supporters of RPF, bent on destroying Hutu 
solidarity. She notes how Habyarimana even considered any Hutu-led political 
opposition groups to be the result of Tutsi infiltration. Hutus who attempted to 
sound a voice of reason were accused of being “bought off” by the RPF and 
Tutsi infiltrators, and were considered enemies as well.  
Prunier (1995) cites a speech delivered on November 22, 1992 by an 
influential MRND leader that clearly demonstrated the government’s 
propaganda war. In his speech, Leon Mugasera, a high-ranking MRND leader 
addressed party militants and accused the opposition (Tutsi and moderate 
Hutus) of plotting with the Inyenzi enemy18 in order to undermine 
Habyarimana’s armed forces. Mugasera stated that anyone caught conspiring 
with the enemy would be condemned to death:  
…and what about those Ibyiyso here who are sending their children to 
the RPF? Why are we waiting to get rid of these families? […] We have 
to take responsibility into our own hands and wipe out these hoodlums. 
[…] The fatal mistake we made in 1959 was to let them [the Tutsi] get 
out. […] They belong in Ethiopia and we are going to find them a 
shortcut to get there by throwing them into the Nyabarongo river [which 
flows northwards]. I must insist on this point. We have to act. Wipe 
them all out! (as cited in Prunier, 1995, pp. 171-172).  
 
It is important to note Mugasera’s threat to send Tutsis back north to Ethiopia 
was a clear reference to the “Hamitic hypothesis.” This speech was repeated 
numerous times throughout Rwanda reinforcing the notion that all Tutsis were 
foreign invaders, were collaborating with the RPF enemies, and that the only 
solution was complete eradication.19 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Inyenzi is a term that means cockroach in Kinyarwanda, and was used by Hutu power extremists to 
refer to the Tutsi army during the 1960s and was later used during the genocide to refer to all Tutsi. 
19 There is some controversy, among legal scholars about the accuracy of the translation of the speech. 
In particular, attorneys representing Mugasera in his bid to remain in Canada (where he had fled in 
1992), and avoid extradition to Rwanda to face charges of inciting genocide, argued that Mugasera’s 
speech did not include any references to killing Tutsis or throwing their bodies in the river. His speech, 
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In describing the intentional nature of the anti-Tutsi propaganda, Des 
Forges (1999) references a document “Note Relative à la Propagande 
d’Expansion et de Recrutement” (Note on the Propagation of Expansion and 
Recruitment) written by a government official. The Note provides detailed 
instructions to government officials and Interahamwe militia (the extremist 
youth wing of the MRND) on tactics for using propaganda to manipulate the 
Hutus in Rwanda (the tactics were based on a French book on the psychology 
of propaganda published in 1970). The propagandist provides instructions on 
the use of propaganda, as well as descriptions of two techniques most 
frequently used in Rwanda in advance of the genocide – “creating events” and 
“accusations in the mirror.” In describing the propagandist’s instructions, Des 
Forges (1999) writes:  
The author of the note claims to convey lessons learned from the book . 
. .  He advocates using lies, exaggeration, ridicule, and innuendo to 
attack the opponent, in both his public and his private life. He suggests 
that moral considerations are irrelevant, except when they happen to 
offer another weapon against the other side. He adds that it is important 
to not underestimate the strength of the adversary nor to overestimate 
the intelligence of the general public targeted by the campaign. 
Propagandists must aim both to win over the uncommitted and to cause 
divisions among supporters of the other point of view. They must 
persuade the public that the adversary stands for war, death, slavery, 
repression, injustice, and sadistic cruelty…In addition to these 
suggestions, the propagandist proposes two techniques that were to 
become often used in Rwanda. The first is to “create” events to lend 
credence to propaganda. He remarks that this tactic is not honest, but 
that it works well, provided the deception is not discovered. The “attack” 
on Kigali on October 4-5, 1990 was such a “created” event, as were 
others—the reported discovery of hidden arms, the passage of a 
stranger with a mysterious bag, the discovery of radio communications 
equipment—that were exploited later, especially during the genocide. 
The propagandist calls his second proposal “Accusation in a mirror,” 
meaning his colleagues should impute to enemies exactly what they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
which was neither televised nor videotaped, was translated from a cassette tape. The ICTR verified the 
existence of the portion of the speech referred to in Prunier’s book, but a translation accepted by the 
Canadian Court of Appeals does not include this inflammatory language (see 
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Mackin/mugesera.pdf for a copy of the judgment). The alternate 
version accepted by the Canadian court still reflects numerous calls to kills Tutsi “cockroaches” in self-
defense, (“Do not be afraid, know that anyone whose neck you do not cut is the one who will cut your 
neck”), but it is important to note that there remains controversy about whether the section of the speech 
most often cited as being the most inflammatory, is accurate. 
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and their own party are planning to do. He explains, “In this way, the 
party which is using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror.” With 
such a tactic, propagandists can persuade listeners and “honest 
people” that they are being attacked and are justified in taking whatever 
measures are necessary “for legitimate [self-] defense (pp. 79–80). 
 
Melvern also describes the regime’s use of “accusations in the mirror” 
including a staged attack on Kigali on October 4, 1990 that the regime claimed 
was perpetrated by the RPF. Melvern notes how the regime staged the all-
night attack (which included gunfire and explosions) to make it look as if the 
RPF was responsible in order to incite fear among the majority Hutus. The 
regime even encouraged Hutu citizens to “make arrests of ‘Tutsi suspects’” (p. 
15). 
The Habyarimana regime also used the media to disseminate 
propaganda that included false reports of Tutsi and/or RPF-generated 
violence, using both print media (articles as well as cartoons), and radio to 
spread messages of hatred toward the Tutsi. For instance, the government-
linked radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Radio RTLM) 
pumped nonstop messages of hate into the airwaves, as well as constant 
reports warning of impending Tutsi attacks on Hutus. Although these reports 
were false, they were successful in prompting defensive attacks against 
Tutsis. The radio announcers also engaged in a campaign of dehumanizing 
Tutsis using an interactive format style in which Tutsis were consistently 
referred to as invaders, oppressors, traitors, cockroaches, and snakes. Radio 
announcers also played on the collective memory of perceived historic 
oppression in order to incite fear among Hutu civilians by claiming that their 
Tutsi neighbors were planning to reinstate the regime of the past in which the 
Hutus would be forced to lay down for their Tutsi masters (Dallaire, 2003; Des 
Forges, 1999; Melvern, 2006).  
Des Forges (1999) argues that extremist Hutus warned against any 
type of Rwandan unity, alleging that such sentiments were used by the enemy 
to destroy Hutu solidarity. Des Forges describes the regime’s characterization 
of the Tutsi, as “ruthless conquerors…[who] had ground the Hutu under their 
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heel in a repressive and bloody regime.” Des Forges cites the regime’s 
description of the Hutu response to attempts to challenge their solidarity: 
“…the great mass had become conscious of its own strength and had come 
together…[and] had been able to overthrow the ‘feudal’ oppressors in the 
great revolution of 1959” (p. 86).  
In a similar vein, Melvern (2006) cites a report generated from a 
meeting on December 4, 1991, organized by Habyarimana with more than 100 
top gendarmerie (presidential guards) and military officers in attendance, with 
a focus on resolving dissent and charting a way forward in order to defeat the 
enemy Tutsi. Melvern quotes the testimony of some attendees who spoke of a 
developing consensus that Habyarimana was losing power and control over 
the country, creating a “power vacuum.” The report issued by senior army 
officers who attended high-level military commission meetings (chaired by 
Colonel Bagosora) was later identified by the ICTR as a key piece of evidence 
that the meetings probably served as the genesis of the 1994 genocide 
against the Tutsi. Melvern references a key passage in the report that 
describes how the enemy of Rwanda was defined: 
The principle enemy is the Tutsi inside and outside the country, 
extremist and nostalgic for power and who have never recognized and 
will never recognize the realities of the social revolution of 1959 and 
who want to take back their power by any means, including weapons. 
The accomplice of the enemy is anyone who supports the enemy (Des 
Forges, 1999, p. 50). 
 
Propagandists also characterized Tutsis as having a single, collective 
identity that could not be changed. A famous article that demonstrated this 
anti-Tutsi sentiment was published in Kangura Magazine in December of 1990 
just two months after the RPF invaded Rwanda. The article, “Hutu Ten 
Commandments” and was written by the Coalition for the Defense of the 
Republic (Coalition pour la Défense de la République, CDR), 20 an extremist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  A	  virulently	  anti-­‐Tutsi	  party,	  advocating	  for	  ‘Hutu	  Power’	  and	  ‘majority	  rules.”	  Critical	  of	  Habyarimana	  and	  MRND	  on	  the	  surface	  but	  frequently	  collaborated	  with	  them	  “leading	  some	  observers	  to	  conclude	  that	  this	  bitterly	  anti-­‐Tutsi	  party	  existed	  only	  to	  state	  positions	  favored	  by	  the	  MRND	  but	  too	  radical	  for	  them	  to	  support	  openly”	  (Des	  Forges,	  p.	  44).	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Hutu political party formed in 1991 after Habyarimana was forced to allow a 
multiparty state in response to a constitutional amendment. The 
commandments provided a list of rules all Hutus were commanded to live by, 
lest they be considered a traitor (see Appendix B for entire transcript). Among 
the 10 commandments were prohibitions against Hutus taking Tutsi wives or 
concubines, prohibitions against doing business with Tutsis because “every 
Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic 
group.” Additional commandments include admonitions that all leadership 
positions in Rwanda be held by Hutus, including “political, administrative, 
economic, military and security,” as well as all positions within the educational 
system, and the FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces).  The final commandment 
provides this grave warning: 
The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the Hutu 
Ideology, must be taught to every Hutu at every level. Every Hutu must 
spread this ideology widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu 
for having read, spread, and taught this ideology is a traitor (Kangura 
Magazine, 1990). 
 
The “Hutu Ten Commandments” is an important document because it 
illustrates how the concept of national loyalty came to be defined – as 
complete and unconditional support for Hutu nationalism, as well as how being 
a traitor came to be defined – as all Tutsi, everywhere, whether inside or 
outside of the country.  
Likely one of the most virulent and well known articles published in the 
Kangura, the state-run newspaper, in February 1993 is entitled “A Cockroach 
(Inyenzi) cannot bring forth a Butterfly,” which portrayed Tutsis as insects 
deserving of annihilation because they are the same as the Tutsis of the past 
that purportedly enslaved the Hutus. This article reads in part: 
From the outset, we said that a cockroach cannot bring forth a 
butterfly, and that is true. A cockroach brings forth a cockroach. I do 
not agree with those who state the contrary. The history of Rwanda 
tells us that the Tutsi has remained the same and has never changed. 
His treachery and wickedness are intact in our country’s history. 
Administratively, the Tutsi regime has been marked by two factors: 
their women and cows. These two truths have kept the Hutus in 
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bondage for 400 years. Following their overthrow during the 1959 
social revolution, the Tutsis have never given up. They are doing 
everything possible to restore their regime by using their vamps and 
money, which has replaced the cow. In the past, the latter was a 
symbol of riches…We are not wrong to say that an Inyenzi brings forth 
another Inyenzi. And in fact, can a distinction be made between the 
Inyenzi that attacked Rwanda in October 1990 and those of the 
1960s? They are all related since some are the grand children of 
others. Their wickedness is identical. All the attacks were meant to 
restore the feudal-monarchy regime. The atrocities that the Inyenzi of 
today are perpetrating against the population are identical to those 
they perpetrated in the past, namely killings, plundering, rape of young 
girls and women… etc. (Kangura Magazine, 1993, p. 78; see Appendix 
C for entire article). 
 
Finally, another article, “I am Not Concerned, I am a CDR Member,” 
published in the Kangura Magazine in July 1993 also reflects anti-Tutsi 
sentiment and a strong warning to Hutus who agreed with the Arusha 
Accords21  (see Appendix D for the entire article). The article was written as a 
chant, and provided a stern warning to Hutus not to acquiesce to demands of 
compromise, followed with the refrain, “I am not concerned, I am a CDR 
member.” The article espouses a clear admonition against the signing the 
Arusha Accords (Kangura Magazine, 1993). 
The civil war and propaganda campaign raged on through 1994 despite 
international attempts at conflict resolution such as the aforementioned Arusha 
Accords. The Arusha Accords were signed by Habyarimana and the president 
of the RPF in August of 1993, and consisted of three agreements designed to 
end the civil war with the RPF. Among the agreements was a power-sharing 
scheme that established a transitional government that included RPF 
representation, as well as a plan for the repatriation of refugees and the 
integration of rebel RPF soldiers into the government’s army (Dallaire 2003, 
Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995).  
The Arusha Accords were not realized, however, due to considerable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The Arusha Accords is a peace agreement between the the MRND and the RPF, facilitated by the 
United States, France, and the Organization for African Unity. A copy of the Arusha Accords is 
available athttp://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf. 
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attempts to sabotage their implementation, culminating in the assassination of 
Habyarimana. Despite significant controversy regarding which side sabotaged 
the agreement (with each side blaming the other), there is considerable 
evidence to suggest that Habyarimana and eventually the more extremist wing 
of his regime engaged in overt attempts to circumvent the implementation of 
the Arusha agreements, including sabotaging any attempt to form a coalition 
government.22  The general consensus that any attempt at ethnic 
reconciliation or power sharing would destroy Hutu national unity and security 
was demonstrated in editorials published in the Kangura Magazine while the 
Arusha Accords were being negotiated in the months leading up to the 
genocide. An example of this dynamic is demonstrated in a February 1993 
editorial, “Be Vigilant, or else, the Arusha Talks would bring us back to the 
Feudal Regime we Rejected in 1959.” This article initially supports the Arusha 
talks, but then quickly reveals its true motive, stating that the Accords should 
focus on the 16 Hutu political parties, but should exclude the RPF (Kangura 
Magazine, 1993). 
The Genocide 
On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying Rwandan president Juvenal 
Habyarimana, and Burundi’s president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was shot down on 
its descent into the airport in Kigali, which eventially ushered in 100 days of 
genocide of Tutsi men, women and children (Des Forges, 1999). President 
Habyarimana was returning from having signed the Arusha Accords, which 
would have compelled power sharing, thus ensuring RPF representation in the 
government (Dallaire, 2003). Dallaire notes how the extremist Hutu faction of 
Habyarimana’s regime immediately barricaded the airport and refused to allow 
UN investigators to inspect the crash site.  He also notes how these same 
factions, led by the head of the Interahamwe militia, Colonel Theoneste 
Bagosora; MRND president Mathieu Ngirumpatse; the Minister of Defense, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For a more detailed discussion of the nature of the MRND’s repeated attempts to sabotage peace 
negotiations and the implementation of the transitional government mandated by the Arusha Accords 
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Augustin Bizimana; Gendarmerie Nationale, Major-General Augustin 
Ndindiliyimana; and Army Chief, General Deogratias Nsabimana, immediately 
accused the RPF of shooting down the plane, while setting up roadblocks, and 
distributing machetes and lists of individuals registered as Tutsis to local 
authorities with instructions to kill them all (Dallaire, 2003; Melvern, 2006).  
Dallaire (2003), who was head of the UN peacekeeping mission in 
Rwanda (UNAMIR), asserts that there were ample indications that Hutu 
extremists had long prepared for the genocide against the Tutsi, reflected in 
Bagosora’s own words to a UNAMIR sector commander, that he did not 
support the Arusha Accords and that once they were signed, he would return 
to Kigali and prepare for an apocalypse. Dallaire asserts that Bagosora and 
his cohorts used the downing of the president’s plane as the launching point 
for the genocide. Melvern (2006) notes that during the months leading up to 
the plane crash, the Interahamwe were “flexing their muscles” by harassing 
Tutsis throughout the country. Dallaire cites the immediate and systematic 
killing of moderate Hutus who didn’t agree with plans to exterminate the Tutsi, 
the setting up of roadblocks by the Interahamwe for capturing and killing Tutsis 
attempting to escape (Dallaire, 2003; Des Forges, 1999). Dallaire and Des 
Forges both cite the ongoing anti-Tutsi propaganda campaign, which in print 
as well as via radio waves on Radio RTLM demanded that Hutus exterminate 
all Tutsi in the country as a national obligation in order to protect their 
motherland from the Inyenzi enemy. 
Accounts of Atrocities 
Genocide scholars as well as ICTR records cite how several top military 
leaders took control of the country immediately following the crash of the 
president’s plane, and began orchestrating the genocide. George Rutaganda, 
vice president of the Interahamwe, was a key player, organizing the on-the-
ground operations of the genocide. In fact, ICTR records state that the 
genocide was so systemic because of Rutaganda’s ability to organize the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
see Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda by Romeo Dallaire, and Conspiracy 
to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide by Linda Melvern 
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Interahamwe youth. In addition to facilitating the distribution of weapons to 
local Interahamwe forces, he coordinated roadblocks operations, the checking 
of national identity cards of all Rwandans, and the detaining of Tutsis who 
were subsequently systematically slaughtered. Rutaganda also oversaw 
house-to-house searches for Tutsis, ordering the Interahamwe forces to kill 
any Tutsi they found, sometimes ordering them to throw the bodies in the river. 
He also oversaw many of the killings of Tutsis at churches and schools where 
Tutsis and some moderate Hutus took refuge, often coordinating efforts with 
the Presidential Guard, the National Gendarmerie, and the FAR. According to 
the ICTR, Rutaganda was on the scene of many of these killing sites and 
directed the Interahamwe’s actions, including separating Hutus from Tutsis, 
while sparing the Hutus and ordering that all Tutsis be killed. He also ordered 
the Interahamwe to bury the bodies of Tutsis in order to cover their crimes 
(ICTR, 1996). 
There are also numerous personal accounts of atrocities that occurred 
during the genocide, including rape as a weapon of war, torture, infanticide, 
and the killings of thousands of Tutsis hiding in churches and other venues 
that held large numbers of people. Des Forges (1999) cites the genocidal 
government’s strategy of offering Tutsis protection by encouraging them to 
congregate in locations such as churches and schools, only to later slaughter 
them. Des Forges quotes a Rwandan’s characterization of this strategy, 
explaining, “it was like sweeping dry banana leaves into a pile to burn them 
more easily” (p. 161).  
What was unique about the Rwandan genocide was not solely the level 
of violence involved in the massacres, but also the fact that the every day 
citizens responded to the calls to kill their Tutsi friends and neighbors, by the 
extremist Hutu government, national police, military and the Interahamwe 
militia (Dallaire, 2003; Des Forges, 1999; Ilibagiza & Erwin, 2006; Prunier, 
2009).  The reasons for the civilian nature of the genocide are complex, but 
McDoom (2005) attempts to explain why so many ordinary civilian Hutus 
engaged in the killings by describing a top-down/bottom-up dynamic where 
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state control interacted with local grassroots genocidal movements. This 
illustrates the success of the ambitious anti-Tutsi propaganda war leading up 
to the genocide. Hatzfeld (2005) provides an example of the local grassroots 
genocidal movement by quoting an explanation of the violence from a 
convicted genocidaire he interviewed: “in the rural land of Rwanda, genocide 
was meant to purify the earth, to cleanse if of its cockroach farmers” (p. 70).  
Des Forges (1999) documented several atrocities in her study, 
including the following: 
An elderly Tutsi woman in Kibirira commune had her legs cut off and 
was left to bleed to death...A Tutsi baby was thrown alive into a latrine 
in Nyamirambo, Kigali, to die of suffocation or hunger…Assailants 
tortured Tutsi by demanding that they kill their own children and 
tormented Hutu married to Tutsi partners by insisting that they kill their 
spouses…Victims generally regarded being shot as the least painful 
way to die and, if given the choice and possessing the means, they 
willingly paid to die that way …Assailants often stripped victims naked 
before killing them, both to acquire their clothes without stains or tears 
and to humiliate them…In many places, killers refused to permit the 
burial of victims and insisted that their bodies be left to rot where they 
had fallen (p. 164). 
 
The rape of women and girls during the Rwandan genocide was 
unparalleled, and the sexual crimes were so gruesome that scholars continue 
to struggle to provide explanations for the brutality. Infants and elderly women 
were savagely raped, with some women were raped with sharp objects, which 
caused injuries that eventually resulted in their deaths. Further, there were 
numerous accounts of women being sexually mutilated while being raped 
(Melvern, 2006; Mukamana, & Brysiewicz, 2008). In fact, Bijleveld, 
Morssinkhof and Smeulers (2009) noted that rape was the norm during the 
genocide, not the exception. They estimate that approximately 80 percent of 
non-surviving females and 60 percent of surviving females were raped. 
Cohen, et al, (2009) estimate that approximately 250,000 women, who 
constituted the majority of female survivors, were victims of rape as a weapon 
of war, with tens of thousands of them contracting the HIV virus (Cohen, et al., 
2009; HRW, 1996). In addition, Prunier (2009) estimates that approximately 
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300,000 children were orphaned during the genocide, some of whom were 
taken in by already fractured survivor families, and some of whom lived in 
“minor headed-households” (Melvern, 2006).  
Genocidaire Justifications 
Research is replete with examples of genocidaire justifications, 
including genocide denial, trivialization, and historical revisionism, as well as 
reversing dynamics claiming that Hutus, not Tutsis, were the victims. In 
addition, there was a continuation of the pre-genocide propaganda campaign 
subsequent to the genocide, and although some professions of denial are 
clearly rooted in dishonesty, others may very well be rooted in the enduring 
belief in a misinformation campaign rooted in colonial false narratives. Melvern 
(2006) describes former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda’s 23 guilty plea in the 
ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, noting that he not only acknowledged the genocide 
against the Tutsi, but also explained that the purpose of the genocide was to 
exterminate all Tutsi. Within the transcripts of Kambanda’s interrogation, 
reflecting 60 hours of interviews with investigators, he articulates the extensive 
efforts the government went to in planning the genocide, as well detailing the 
ways in which the genocide was carried out. Melvern notes Kambanda’s 
complete lack of remorse for his and his colleagues’ actions. She also notes 
the extensive collaboration among other government and military officials 
charged with genocide and held by the ICTR in the UN prison in Arusha, 
Tanzania, including their collective coordination in relation to their defense: 
The Arusha prisoners remain convinced of the rectitude of their actions. 
They have formed an association to plan and coordinate their defence 
and to maintain contact where possible with their co-conspirators who 
are still at large, those still planning and agitating for Hutu Power. They 
blame their fate on the skill of the Tutsi in attracting the sympathy of the 
‘international community.” They claim the Tutsi are the masters of 
deceit and accuse them of undertaking a campaign to compare 
themselves with the Jews in order to get sympathy (Melvern, 2006, p. 
3). 
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Melvern also references Colonel Theoneste Bagosora’s writings while 
awaiting trial, where he justified the genocide based in part on the “Hamitic 
Hypothesis”:  
The Tutsi never had a country of their own to make themselves into a 
people…They are people who came to Rwanda and were 
naturalised…[rather than remaining in neighboring countries]…with 
arrogance and pride [they imposed] “their supremacy” [on the Hutu of 
Rwanda]. The Tutsi had eliminated all the Hutu kings and their 
descendants and rule the Hutu with cruelty until the colonisers had 
arrived] (as cited in Melvern, 2006, p. 3).   
 
Melvern describes Bagosora’s depiction of Tutsi as “proud, arrogant, tricky 
and untrustworthy…[who believed that] the only good Tutsi was a Tutsi in 
power” whereas Hutus were “modest, honest, loyal, independent and 
impulsive” (p. 3). Melvern asserts this ideology was the foundation of the 
genocide against the Tutsi. 
Hatzfeld (2005) cites first-hand reports from genocide perpetrators who 
described initially being ordered by Interahamwe militia to engage in the 
killings or suffer consequences such as financial sanctions or public 
humiliation, noting that the majority of civilians who participated in the 
genocide only needed such threats to serve as initial encouragement at the 
start of the genocide, and were self-motivated after a few weeks into the 
killings. Hatzfeld’s interviewees described how they engaged in the slaughter 
of Tutsis by hunting them like animals in the marshes as well as other hiding 
places. They consistently referred to the killings as if these activities were like 
a “9 to 5” job, as well as referring to the killings as “getting the job done.” For 
example, one interviewee stated that “[w]e had to put off our good manners at 
the edge of the muck until we heard the whistle to quit working. Kindness, too, 
was forbidden in the marshes. The marshes left no room for exceptions. To 
forget doubt, we had meanness and ruthlessness in killing, and a job to do 
and do well, that’s all” (p. 47). Hatzfeld’s subjects also stated that any initial 
hesitancy quickly vanished when they realized that the international 
community was not going to intervene. This realization, according to the 
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genocidaires interviewed, resulted in a sense of impunity, where Hutu men 
and boys hunted by day, and their female family members looted the 
belongings of those massacred, without much guilt or fear of reprisal: 
Since I was killing often, I began to feel it did not mean anything to me. 
It gave me no pleasure, I knew I would not be punished, I was killing 
without consequences, I adapted without a problem. I left every 
morning free and easy, in a hurry to get going. I saw that the work and 
the results were good for me, that’s all. During the killings I no longer 
considered anything in particular in the Tutsi except that the person had 
to be done away with. I want to make clear that from the first gentleman 
I killed to the last, I was not sorry about a single one (p. 51). 
 
In describing the sheer ruthlessness among most of the killers, another 
interviewee described his feelings about the killings in this way: 
We no longer saw a human being when we turned up a Tutsi in the 
swamps. I mean a person like us, sharing similar thoughts and feelings. 
The hunt was savage, the hunters were savage, the prey was savage— 
savagery took over the mind. Not only had we become criminals, we 
had become a ferocious species in a barbarous world. This truth is not 
believable to someone who has not lived it in his muscles. Our daily life 
was unnatural and bloody, and that suited us (pp. 47-48). 
 
Hatzfeld’s book is organized thematically, identifying various influences 
and dimensions of the genocide as they pertain to the genocidaires’ 
perspectives and motivations, including the role of religion in the lives of the 
killers. For instance, the interviewees noted the various ways in which they 
rationalized their activities within the context of their relationship with God, 
which appears to include a combination of compartmentalization and 
scapegoating: 
 
FULGENCE: I was a deacon, the one who made arrangements for 
Christian gatherings on the hill of Kibungo. In the priest’s absence, it 
was I who conducted ordinary services. During the killings, I chose not 
to pray to God. I sensed that it was not appropriate to involve Him in 
that. This choice came up naturally. Still, when dread would grip me 
suddenly in the night, if I had done too much during the day, I would ask 
God as a personal favor to let me stop for just a few days. God 
preserved us from genocide until the crash of the president’s plane; 
afterward He allowed Satan to win the match. That is my point of view. 
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Since it was Satan who pushed us into this predicament, it is God alone 
who can judge us and punish us, not men, who are surpassed by the 
power of those other two, especially in this unnatural situation (p. 142). 
 
IGNACE: The white priests took off at the first skirmishes. The black 
priests joined the killers or the killed. God kept silent, and the churches 
stand from abandoned bodies. Religion could not find its place in our 
activities. For a little while, we were no longer ordinary Christians, we 
had to forget our duties learned in catechism class. We had first of all to 
obey our leaders – and God only afterward, very long afterward, to 
make confession and penance. When the job was done” (p. 142). 
 
 
ÉLIE:  Once we found a little group of Tutsis in the papyrus. They were 
awaiting the machete blows with prayers. They did not plead with us, 
they did not ask us for mercy or even for a painless death. They said 
nothing to us. They did not even seem to be addressing heaven. They 
were praying and psalming among themselves. We made fun of them, 
we laughed at their Amens, we taunted them about the kindness of the 
Lord, we joked about the paradise awaiting them. That fired us up even 
more. Now the memory of those prayers just gnaws at my heart (p. 
143). 
 
LÉOPORD: We no longer considered the Tutsis as humans or even as 
creatures of God. We had stopped seeing the world as it is, I mean as 
an expression of God’s will. That is why it was easy for us to wipe them 
out. And why those of us who prayed in secret did so for themselves, 
never for their victims. They prayed to ask for their crimes to be a bit 
forgotten, or to get just a little forgiveness— and they returned to the 
marshes in the morning… Through killing well, eating well, looting well, 
we felt so puffed up and important, we didn’t even care about the 
presence of God. Those who say otherwise are half-witted liars. Some 
claim today that they sent up prayers during the killings. They’re lying: 
no one ever heard an Ave Maria or the like, they’re only trying to jump 
in front of their colleagues on line for repentance. In truth, we thought 
that from then on we could manage for ourselves without God. The 
proof— we killed even on Sunday without ever noticing it. That’s all (p. 
143). 
 
The Death Toll 
Most genocide scholars estimate that between 500,000 and 1 million 
people, primarily Tutsi, were killed during the genocide (Des Forges, 1999; 
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Prunier, 1995). Determining how many people were killed in the genocide, 
particularly how many Tutsis were killed compared to Hutus, remains not only 
contested, but is often subject to statistical manipulation in post-genocide 
political wrangling (Prunier, 2009). It is important to understand how scholars 
arrived at their estimates in order to evaluate the validity of arguments 
surrounding the nature of the genocide. The controversy involved in 
determining with any level of confidence the death toll during the genocide 
includes not only how many Rwandans were killed, but also the demographic 
make-up of these deaths, including whether more Tutsis were killed than 
Hutus (which would support the notion that a Tutsi genocide did occur), or 
whether more Hutus were killed than Tutsis (which would support theories that 
a genocide did not occur), or whether generally the same number of Tutsis 
and Hutus were killed (which may support the double genocide theory).  
There have been four major studies that have attempted to determine 
the number of deaths as a result of the genocide (Davenport & Stam, 2009; 
Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995; Verpoortan, 2005). In addition, one study 
has attempted to determine the percentage of Tutsi and Hutu families that 
experienced the loss of one or more direct family members as a result of the 
genocide (a test for the double genocide theory) (Verwimp, 2003).  Based on 
these studies, estimates of total Rwandans killed in the genocide rage from 
550,000 (Des Forges, 1999) to 1.2 million (Davenport & Stam, 2009). 
Estimates of total Tutsis killed during the genocide range from 300,000 
(Davenport & Stam, 2009) to 800,000 (Des Forges, 1999), and estimates of 
total number of Hutus killed during the genocide range from 10,000 (Prunier, 
1995) to 700,000 (Davenport & Stam, 2009). These estimates illustrate a 
broad range, therefore some analysis of how these scholars arrived at these 
calculations is important. 
Verpoortan (2005) utilized a quantitative research design using 
regression analysis and sensitivity analysis and determined that approximately 
660,000 to 860,000 Rwandans were killed during the genocide, of which 
approximately 60,000 were Hutu, and about 600,000 to 800,000 were Tutsi 
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(representing about 84% of the Tutsi population). Des Forges (1999) utilized a 
mixed method research design, which included field work, quantitative 
analysis and secondary data analysis and estimated that approximately 
547,000 to 567,000 Rwandans were killed during the genocide, of which 
between 45,000 to 60,000 were Hutu, and about 507,000 were Tutsi, 
(representing 77% of the Tutsi population). Prunier (1995) utilized a qualitative 
research design using primarily fieldwork, and estimated that approximately 
850,000 Rwandans were killed during the genocide, of which approximately 
10,000 to 50,000 were Hutus, with the remaining 800,000 being Tutsi.  
Davenport and Stam’s (2009) study involved qualitative field work and 
estimated that between 800,000 and 1.2 million Rwandans were killed in the 
genocide, although they assert that the majority of those killed were Hutu, not 
Tutsi, estimating that approximately 300,000 to 500,000 Tutsi and 500,000 to 
700,000 Hutu were killed during the genocide. Describing how they arrived at 
these estimates, they state: 
In the end, our best estimate of who died during the 1994 massacre 
was, really, an educated guess based on an estimate of the number of 
Tutsi in the country at the outset of the war and the number who 
survived the war. Using a simple method —subtracting the survivors 
from the number of Tutsi residents at the outset of the violence — we 
arrived at an estimated total of somewhere between 300,000 and 
500,000 Tutsi victims. If we believe the estimate of close to 1 million 
total civilian deaths in the war and genocide, we are then left with 
between 500,000 and 700,000 Hutu deaths, and a best guess that the 
majority of victims were in fact Hutu, not Tutsi. 
 
They arrive at these estimates by utilizing 1991 census data, yet 
several scholars, including Des Forges (1999), Prunier (1995) and Verpoortan 
(2005), assert that the 1991 census grossly underestimated the number of 
Tutsis in Rwanda, in an attempt to further socially exclude Tutsis which were 
granted government benefits (such as education and jobs) based on 
population demographics. The consensus in the literature appears to support 
the contention that the actual pre-genocide Tutsi population likely exceeded 
the 1991 census by several hundred thousand (rendering Tutsis 17.5% of the 
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total Rwandan population, rather than the reported 8.6%) (Des Forges, 1999; 
Verpoortan, 2005). Davenport and Stam also appear to have grossly 
overestimated the number of Tutsis who survived the genocide, by using the 
figure of 300,000, which is unsubstantiated and unsupported in the research. 
The number of Tutsi survivors already established in the literature as being 
reliable, is approximately 150,000. This number is based on Prunier’s work, 
refugee head counts, and Human Rights Watch estimates (Prunier, 1995). 
Davenport and Stam calculate the number of survivors by subtracting their 
overestimation of Tutsi survivors of 300,000 from their underestimation of 
Tutsi’s pre-genocide of 596,400 to determine that approximately 300,000 
Tutsis were killed in the genocide. Thus if 800,000 to 1 million Rwandans were 
killed in the genocide, according to Davenport and Stam’s calculations, they 
deduce that between 500,000 to 700,000 Hutus were killed during the 
genocide compared to only 300,000 Tutsis. The table below provides an 
overview of these four studies, including the estimates of pre-and post-
populations of both ethnic groups relied upon in calculating the various death 
toll estimates.  
 
Table 4.1 Comparison of studies estimating deaths due to genocide 
 Marjike Verpoortan Allison Des 
Forges 
Gerard 
Prunier 
Davenport 
& Stam 
Type of 
Study 
 
Quantitative study 
with regression 
analysis and 
sensitivity 
analyses 
Mixed 
methods 
(field work, 
quantitative 
and 
secondary 
data 
analysis) 
Quantitative 
(Secondary 
data 
analysis) 
  
Qualitative 
(field 
work) 
 
Total 
Estimated 
Killed in 
Genocide 
660,000 to 860,000 547,000 to 
567,000 
850,000 800,000 to 
1.2 million 
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Pre-
Genocide 
Tutsi 
Population 
837,100 657,000 Does not 
state, but 
cites the 
1991 census 
number as 
low 
596,400 
(1991 
census 
data) 
Post-
genocide 
Tutsi 
survivors 
150,000 150,000 130,000 300,000 
 
Total Tutsi 
killed in 
Genocide 
 
600,000 to 800,000 
(84% of Tutsi 
population) 
  
507,000 
(77% of 
Tutsi 
population) 
800,000  300,000 to 
500,000 
(total) 
Total 
Hutus 
killed in 
genocide 
(includes 
months 
after) 
 
60,000 45,000 to 
60,000 
10,000 to 
50,000 
500,000 to 
700,000 
 
As stated previously, demographic breakdowns of the death toll are 
often used as evidence of varying political positions regarding the nature of 
the genocide. One theory often advanced involves a sort of “leveling of the 
playing field,” where both ethnic groups are purported to have killed the other. 
Verwimp (2003) set out to test the “double genocide theory” empirically, and 
found that there was a distinct difference in killing patterns between Tutsis and 
Hutus. Using pre-genocide census data, the author located almost 2000 of the 
original households (both Tutsi and Hutu) and solicited information regarding 
the extent and types of losses experienced by both groups. Verwimp found 
that among the 2000 households interviewed: 
• 89 percent of all deceased Tutsi in census households were killed 
during the genocide,  compared to 27 percent of Hutus.  
• Of all Tutsi deaths 85% were executed by Interahamwe (comprised of 
MRND  youth forces and civilian Hutus) and 7.5 percent by government 
soldiers, the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR).  
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• Half of all Hutu deaths during the genocide were a result of RPF 
executions of  alleged Hutu genocidairs.  
• 0.6 percent of Hutus were killed by Interahamwe (presumably because 
they were  moderates and considered “Tutsi sympathizers”).  
• 8.3 percent of Tutsi households reported no members lost during the 
genocide,  whereas 91 percent of Hutu families reported no members 
lost during the genocide.  
• One out of three Tutsi households lost all of their family members in the 
 genocide, whereas none of the Hutu households lost all of its 
members. 
 In disputing the “double genocide” theory, Verwimp states:  
One out of 3 Tutsi households in the pre-genocide sample had all its 
members exterminated in 1994, very often on the same day and in the 
same place by the same people. Only 2 of the 27 Tutsi households 
(8.3%) reported no members lost during the genocide. This genocidal 
pattern is not found in the killings of Hutu household members. From 
the Hutu households with full information on all members, 91% reported 
not to have lost members who died violently. Even when a number of 
false testimonies and missing information on members of Hutu 
households who stayed or died in Congo are accepted, the pattern of 
killing of Hutu and Tutsi was clearly different. In effect, we have traced 
and found, in a material and physical sense, a large majority of Hutu 
households from the pre-genocide sample, including wives and 
children. This is not the case for most members of Tutsi households. 
We therefore argue that for those prefectures in which we performed 
our fieldwork, the term genocide should be reserved for the killings 
committed by the Interahamwe and the FAR, and another word should 
be used for the killings committed by the RPF (p. 441).  
 
There is equal controversy surrounding the estimates of the number of 
Hutus who participated in the genocide, with some asserting that the majority 
of Hutus were actively engaged  (see Hatzfeld, 2005), whereas others 
estimate that approximately 200,000 Hutus participated in the genocide 
(Straus, 2004). In fact, Straus stresses the importance of recognizing that not 
all Hutus participated in the genocide, and not all genocidaires participated at 
the same level. Further, the conflict was far more complex than a Hutu/Tutsi 
dyad, and also included regional dynamics with northern provinces, such as 
	  	   125 
Ruhrengeri and Gisenyi being favored by Habyarimana and his regime, and 
southern provinces often feeling socially excluded. Government favoritism of 
the north created some level of conflict within the Hutu population, and spurred 
the development of political parties that opposed the Habyarimana regime and 
its MRND party (McDoom, 2005). McDoom also describes how killing patterns 
were regionally influenced with Hutus in the North engaging in killings of Tutsis 
far in advance of the downing of the president’s plane, whereas Hutus in the 
South did not begin killing Tutsis until mid-April. Also, in some regions, 
participation in the killings was low solely because there were no Tutsis to kill, 
as they had already fled to other regions (McDoom, 2005). 
The motives for participation in the genocide are equally complex. 
McDoom’s (2005) field work reinforces the results of Hatzfeld’s work–that 
those who participated in the genocide frequently offered contradictory 
reasons for their involvement. For instance, McDoom’s study includes a 
statement from a nonparticipant, who initially stated that Hutus in his 
community engaged in the slaughter of their Tutsi neighbors solely because 
they were told to by their leaders, but then later admitted that many killed for 
financial profit: 
If they were going to attack a rich person, more people would join. If 
they were going to attack a poor person, there would be less people 
[…] When they attacked a home, somebody would say that “so and so 
had cows” and they would plan to meet there. In the first days people 
went by force to go and fight in the war (gutabara) and after that they 
went voluntarily because they could get property (p. 12). 
 
McDoom concludes that although it may be impossible to ever determine the 
exact number of Hutus who participated in the genocide, their motives for 
having done so include a “complex interaction of racism, ideological 
indoctrination, opportunism, habituation, conformity, and coercion” (p. 14). 
Post-Genocide Rwanda 
 In July of 1994 the RPF took Kigali, and by August a new government 
was sworn into power. At the same time the former regime fled into the jungles 
of Zaire, (now the DRC), “taking all the money from the Central Bank and 
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herding into exile approximately 2.1 million people (out of a post-genocide 
population of about 6.9 million)” (Prunier, 2009, p. 5). Prunier describes what 
ensued in Zaire as a state of complete chaos. The Interahamwe occupied 
refugee camps alongside innocent civilians, and together with the former 
regime continued to fight to regain power in Rwanda. Prunier (2009) describes 
similar levels of chaos in Rwanda following the genocide.  
Any remaining social balance was significantly affected by the mass 
influx of Tutsi returnees, who settled primarily in the capital city of Kigali, often 
displacing the remaining Hutus from jobs, and thus creating further social 
division (Prunier, 2009). Factions on both sides of the ethnic divide are alleged 
to have used the genocide for political and financial gain, where revenge was 
sought, and where both Hutus and Tutsis were sometimes wrongly imprisoned 
through false accusations based upon historic grudges. Also, Prunier 
describes rampant Hutu indifference to the plight of Tutsi survivors, which 
further exacerbated Tutsi trauma, stating: 
Many Hutu showed little or no sensitivity toward what had just 
happened and equated their own real but limited plight with the massive 
horrors suffered by the Tutsi. Some even denied that any genocide had 
taken place at all and attributed the many deaths to “the war” (Prunier, 
2009, p. 4). 
Post-Genocide Political Dynamics in Rwanda 
After the genocide a transitional government was created called the 
Broad Based Government of National Unity (BBGN). The new government, led 
by then-President Pasteur Bizimungu, a moderate Hutu, and then-Vice-
president, and RPF leader Paul Kagame, was based partly upon the country’s 
constitution, and partly on the Arusha Accords. Paul Kagame, the current 
president of Rwanda, succeeded Bizimungu in 2003. The Kagame 
administration has been extolled for its many accomplishments in the 
aftermath of the genocide, including creating an atmosphere where 
development has flourished (Terrill, 2012). Yet the RPF-dominated 
government has also been harshly criticized, with some alleging that the RPF 
lost its idealistic values, and came to resemble an authoritarian regime (Des 
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Forges, 1999). Regardless of the nature and validity of such critiques, it is 
important to keep context in mind, and recognize that the genocide resulted in 
a decimated country that lacked any real social, civil, or political 
infrastructures. A judicial system needed to be established to try hundreds of 
thousands of alleged perpetrators of genocide, and ethnic reconciliation and 
trauma programs needed to be established in order to manage the aftermath 
of the propaganda war, the widespread slaughter, and the psychological 
recovery of genocide survivors.  
Prunier (2009) states that many Westerners theorize about the causes 
and outcomes of the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi without fully 
understanding the complexities involved, which has resulted in inappropriate 
and/or ineffectual international responses. He describes how this genocide 
cannot be compared to any other genocide because in Rwanda the 
government engaged the community to rise up against neighbors, friends and 
family members who were Tutsi. Prunier explains that unlike other genocides, 
in Rwanda it was a “hill by hill and home-by-home thing. And it is this 
neighborly quality, this grisly homespun flavor, that contaminated the world of 
the survivors after the killing had stopped” (p. 1). To complicate matters 
further, although Hutu-Tutsi marriages were discouraged, they did exist, 
especially in the capital city of Kigali, and in the southern provinces (McDoom, 
2005), and although some Hutu husbands did kill their Tutsi wives, many did 
not. Further, children with a Hutu father and a Tutsi mother complicate the 
concept of “genocide survivor,” particularly if the mother was killed in the 
genocide, because ethnic identity is passed down through the father in 
Rwandan culture, thus the offspring in such situations would be considered 
Hutu, not Tutsi. Finally, the genocide occurred essentially with international 
knowledge, but with little to no intervention, other than a generally ineffectual 
peacekeeping mission that was poorly equipped and banned from using force 
(Dallaire, 2003; Des Forges, 1999). 
The post-genocide climate in Rwanda remains tainted by the long-
standing pre-genocide anti-Tutsi propaganda campaign. In fact, in McDoom’s 
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(2005) qualitative study of the extent and nature of Hutu participation in the 
genocide, he found that the collective Hutu memory of perceived past 
oppression persists. Approximately 85 percent of the Hutus interviewed stated 
that they still believed that their Hutu ancestors were historically oppressed by 
the Tutsi. Further, 92 percent of Hutus interviewed said they believed the 
“Hamitic hypothesis.” In addition, 72 percent of Hutu respondents reported that 
at the time of the genocide they believed all Tutsi to be enemies of the state, 
not solely those in the RPF. And finally, the majority of Hutu respondents (86% 
in the north, and 65% in the south) reported that they believed that the actions 
of the genocidaires were justified for a variety of reasons, including that the 
Tutsis were the enemy, that the authorities had ordered Hutus to kill, and 
because the authorities did not punish them. 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the Rwandan civil war and 
Tutsi genocide bled across borders, particularly into the DRC, which has 
experienced several cycles of violence since largely rooted in Hutu-Tutsi 
conflict. For instance, the mass exodus of primarily Rwandan Hutus into then-
Zaire displaced hundreds of thousands of Congolese, primarily Tutsi, living in 
the Kivus regions along the DRC/Rwandan border. The former regime, 
according to Prunier, also used the Rwandan Hutu civilian exile population as 
a buffer to continue their fight from the refugee camps along the DRC/Rwanda 
border. The initial post-genocide Rwanda was devoid of all infrastructures 
since most police, “judges, school-teachers, doctors, and nurses” fled along 
with the former regime into the jungles of Zaire (p. 6).  
Genocide Denial and Revisionism 
Prunier (2009) notes how the Catholic Church was deeply involved with 
the former regime, and assisted in the carrying out of the genocide, and did 
not appear willing to accept responsibility for this complicity due in large part to 
the deep involvement of many Hutu priests and nuns in the genocide (p. 6). In 
fact, Prunier points out that many Hutu priests were so indignant that the 
former Hutu regime lost power in Rwanda that they wrote an appeal to Pope 
John Paul II after they fled with the former regime into Zaire (now DRC), 
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expressing fear that the Hutu refugees would how be forced back into slavery 
conditions experienced prior to the “1959 social revolution.” Pleading for help, 
the Hutu priests wrote of the events in Rwanda, stating  
This is a vast plot prepared a long time ago…It is an anti-Catholic 
movement supported by some priest who work with the RPF. Some 
have become Muslims and others dug mass graves financed by the 
RPF….This explains the anger of the people… . Let us forget about this 
International Tribunal where the criminals will be both prosecutors and 
judges” (Letter d’un groupe d’Abbis a Sa Saintete le Pape, Coma, 
August 2, 1994 as cited in Prunier, 2009, p. 6).   
Prunier also notes how many in the Catholic Church believed that the Hutus 
were the actual victims of the genocide, not the perpetrators, stating that:  
The Catholic Church was using the fact that about half of its clergy had 
been killed to wrap itself in martyrs’ shrouds, omitting to say that most 
of the victims were Tutsi and that the Hutu priests who were killed trying 
to protect their flocks were often considered traitors by their fellow Hutu 
clerics (Prunier, 2009, p. 8). 
  
This perspective helped to bolster the widespread revisionist and denial 
propaganda disseminated by the former government and those allied with 
them, which culminated in calls for an investigation into the possibility of a 
“double genocide.” Prunier (2009) notes that the former regime living in exile 
consistently leveled accusations of a double genocide at the same time that 
they patently denied that a genocide against the Tutsi even occurred. He 
notes how as early as November 1994 the Hutu extremists and members of 
the MDR party24 demanded an investigation into an RPF genocide of Hutus, 
and used rumors of post-genocide RPF killings as well as a seeming “global 
disdain for the RPF” as justification for such an investigation, in order to 
“confuse issues and develop a revisionist argument” (p. 8). Tutsi factions 
agreed to an open debate instead of a formal investigation, but Prunier notes 
that public debates did not help the issue of polarization and mutual blame as 
neither side appeared willing to alter its position.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24 The MDR was the Hutu component of the new coalition government, which consisted of remnants 
from the former government not believed to be involved in the genocide. 
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Amidst the ongoing dissemination of pre-genocide anti-Tutsi 
propaganda and genocide denial was a climate of fear and general 
suspiciousness that rendered attempts to balance the need for justice with the 
need for reconciliation challenging. Because the international community or 
the UN had failed to intervene and stop the genocide, attempts to intervene 
after the genocide were often treated with great levels of suspicion and 
resentment, particularly on the part of Tutsi survivors, and the RPF. For 
instance, Prunier (2009) notes that the MDR’s quick and urgent demands for 
democratic elections, which was supported by the international community, 
were actually self-serving due to the ethnic divide and significant Hutu 
majority, stating “…democracy was itself a loaded word in the Tutsi-Hutu 
context, and the MDR’s ‘innocent’ appeal to the ballot box was far from free of 
ethnic calculations” (p. 8; emphasis in original).  
The climate of fear aided the former regime’s attempts to revise and/or 
outright deny the genocide by fueling reciprocal allegations between extremist 
Hutus and the new Tutsi-dominated government. For instance, allegations of 
genocide denial and revisionism have been made by Tutsi genocide survivors 
and the Rwandan government, particularly against extremist Hutus living in the 
diaspora, including against political opposition figures allied with the former 
regime (Johnson, 2010). Counter-allegations included claims that accusations 
of genocide denial and revisionism were a “smoke screen” for the Rwandan 
government’s ongoing attempts to maintain power in Rwanda by keeping the 
political space closed (HRW, 2010a). A commonly cited example of this 
dynamic includes complaints that Rwanda’s new genocide ideology laws are 
designed to limit free speech and enforce a government-sanctioned genocide 
narrative on all Rwandans (and non-Rwandans), which effectively makes it 
illegal to challenge the government’s “script” (Amnesty International, 2010).   
 It is important to evaluate these dynamics within the context of current 
scholarship in the area of genocide denial and revisionism. Charny (2003) 
explored this area extensively and developed a typology of genocide denial 
and revisionism that categorizes such behavior according to a range of 
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different motivations. Charny notes that it is not just perpetrators who engage 
in genocide denial and historical revisionism, and his classification system 
includes a “broader range of individuals, coalition of deniers,” which includes 
not only perpetrators but bigots and racists, as well as many other categories 
of individuals drawn to denials because they serve their interests (p. 11).   
Charny’s (2003) first category of genocide denial is entitled Malevolent 
Bigotry, which includes genocide denial and revisionism engaged in by 
perpetrators. Charny describes a range of ways in which genocidaires and 
genocidal governments deny a genocide, and/or engage in historical 
revisionism, often beginning with blatant denials while they are actively 
engaged in the killings. Perpetrators’ denials and revisionism include a diverse 
set of tactics driven by a variety of motivations. For instance, one common 
form of revisionism includes the manipulation of statistics whereby 
perpetrators begrudgingly acknowledge the killings but claim that the number 
of victims killed has been grossly exaggerated. Other examples of denials and 
revisionism by genocidaires include admissions that perpetrators did engage 
in killings but only because they were following orders (and would have been 
killed if they refused); that the deaths were a result of wartime conditions; and 
that although killings did occur, both sides in the conflict were affected; that the 
killings were caused by low-level military squads, not higher level government 
officials; that the killings were the result of “civilians running wild”; and that the 
government was just cracking down on a resistance movement (p. 14). Charny 
also notes how genocidaires “may complain about a subsequent strike against 
them, as if it cancels the record of their genocidal actions” (p. 16). 
 A particularly egregious form of genocide denial, according to Charny 
(2003), is when the genocidaires and their sympathizers “turn the tables” on 
truth, and accuse the victims of being the actual perpetrators of the genocide, 
contradicting historical documentation. In describing the nature of this type of 
denial Charny states that often the deniers will rely on “pseudo-
documentation” in support of their claims that “the victims were really the 
victimizers.” Using the examples of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, 
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Charny states: 
The Turks claim that the Armenians massacred more than a million 
Turks and several communities in Turkey have actually erected 
memorials to the martyrs of the genocide of the Turks by the 
Armenians! Even the Jews have been accused of having been the 
aggressors against the Nazis (pp. 14-15). 
 
Charny also notes how genocidaires and genocidal regimes often go so far as 
to politicize denials and historical revisions by attempting to gain the 
cooperation and assistance of the international community, such as 
democratic nations and the UN, which lends a level of legitimacy for their 
denials. 
 Charny’s (2003) second category in his genocide denial/revisionism 
classification system is entitled Self-Serving Opportunism, which is 
characterized by “denials in the service of personal or collective self-interest or 
power such as careerism, pragmatism, exhibitionism and realpolitik” (p. 16).  
Charny notes these types of deniers are the most dangerous and perplexing 
because they do not involve genocide perpetrators or bigots (e.g., white 
supremacist groups), but seemingly well-intentioned individuals who have the 
ability to give legitimacy (often unintentionally) for the genocidaires’ cause. 
Charny describes how many deniers that fall into this category are “peace-
seeking people, including a considerable number of bona fide academics—
who unfortunately are to be found in all Western countries” (p. 16). Other 
examples of deniers falling within this category include governments that 
acknowledge a genocide, but go along with denials for the purposes of 
realpolitik; self-promoting individuals who draw attention to themselves for 
being “problematic people to be reckoned with” for their counterculture 
perspectives; individuals “jockeying for intellectual or academic exclusivity and 
power by creating for themselves high visibility”; and generally conscientious 
individuals who are searching for “truth and justice” who partner with deniers 
and revisionists because they gain power and advantage, either economically 
or politically. Charny asserts that these types of denials and revisionism do not 
necessarily involve an overt desire to deny a genocide, but are motivated by 
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self-serving opportunism, including a desire to acquiesce and conform to a 
particular organizational culture or political climate. 
 The third category of genocide denials and historical revisionism is 
Innocent Denials/Innocent Disavowals of Violence, which involves a need on 
the part of some individuals to maintain a worldview that people are incapable 
of engaging acts as evil as genocide. These types of deniers are most often 
motivated by a belief in a “just world” view that posits that the world (i.e., 
society, people, even the “universe”) is a just and good place where evils, 
such as genocides, cannot exist. Charny cautions that the desire of decent 
people to see the world as generally good, and people as generally just has 
been exploited by many deniers in the first and second categories in order to 
gain a consensus and legitimacy. Charny (2003) explains how often the more 
insidious deniers will recruit well-intentioned individuals by reframing genocide 
denial as attempts to contribute to reconciliation efforts; most innocent deniers 
in this category do not realize the harm they are causing. According to Charny, 
many innocent deniers are uninformed about the facts of a genocide and for 
whatever reason do not take the necessary steps to become informed, despite 
the availability of fact-based resources. 
  Also included in Charny’s (2003) third category are those who advocate 
that deniers and revisionists should have a voice based on “the grand 
democratic principle of free speech,” where it is perceived a violation of 
democratic principles to deny alternate perspectives from being expressed. 
Charny warns that this perspective can be easily manipulated by self-serving 
deniers and revisionists because they frame their denials in such a way as to 
give the appearance of being based on democratic ideals and a desire to 
promote diversity of opinion, when in actuality the motivations are based on 
anti-democratic ideas and “demagogic movements” (p. 21). Charny notes 
though that not all seemingly innocent denials are so, as some may be a 
smoke screen for attempts to introduce denials and revisionism into 
mainstream academia. For instance, deniers often use academics’ 
commitment to open debate as a pretense for spreading false propaganda 
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about a genocide, amounting to a “calculated strategy to befuddle and 
confound the thinking of well-intentioned people” (p. 21). By mixing fact and 
fiction and even expressing some regret that the genocide occurred, 
purposeful denials made to look innocent can “seriously weaken or cripple the 
factual basis of a genocide” (p. 21). For example, 
…the declaration that one regrets the deaths of so many Armenians 
may be coupled with statements that wartime conditions were prevailing 
and no fewer Turks and Kurds died than Armenians, and that they died 
at the hands of the warring Armenians. Making people believe that all 
sides were equally at fault is often the goal of deniers (although as 
noted they also can progress to reversing the roles, hence claims that 
the Armenians were the authors of the real genocide and not the 
Turks). 
  
Charny’s (2003) fourth category of genocide denial is entitled 
Definitionalism, and involves the debating of competing definitions of genocide 
by academics, or the debate over loopholes in legal definitions of genocide by 
legal scholars. Scholars who engage in this type denial will often argue that a 
killing event is more appropriately considered “mass killings” or “war crimes” 
because it does not meet some arbitrary criterion, or legal standard for 
genocide. Charny argues that these types of denials and revisionism are 
particularly dangerous because “hairsplitting” of this type often leads to the 
marginalization of moral outrage and reverence for victims, whereas debating 
competing definitions becomes an end in its own right.  
Charny’s fifth and sixth categories include Nationalistic Hubris and 
Human Shallowness, involving indifference toward the targeted group, and the 
human tendency to trivialize or become desensitized to significant events in 
history, respectively. 
Political Opposition Groups Developed in the Diaspora 
Also important to note is the evolution of political opposition parties that 
emerged in the diaspora, many of which had deep roots in the former regime, 
most of which were created along ethnic lines, and many of which were 
heavily involved in post-genocide regional conflicts, particularly in the DRC, as 
	  	   135 
well as the continued promulgation of pre-genocide propaganda and post-
genocide denial and revisionism. Geographic borders in the Great Lakes 
Region are quite porous (Prunier, 2009), thus conflicts, particularly those 
falling along ethnic lines, are not contained within country borders and often 
spill over boundaries, affecting broader geo-political dynamics. For instance, 
ethnic conflicts in Burundi, the DRC, as well as in Rwanda “have tended to 
merge giving rise to an expanding zone of insecurity and the export of wars to 
neighboring countries” (Elijah, 2011, p. 2). It is for this reason that having 
some sense of regional dynamics and their relationship to pre and post-
genocide conflicts in Rwanda is important, in order to gain contextual 
understanding of Rwandan diaspora political engagement in homeland 
conflict.  
Hutu Rebel/Political Opposition Groups Formed in Exile 
Any exploration of post-genocide political dynamics will be as 
controversial as pre-genocide dynamics, given the polarized nature of the 
conflicts occurring in the Great Lakes Region, the deeply rooted nature of the 
propaganda campaigns and the continuing efforts of the former regime to 
regain power.  Yet despite the various controversies over which parties are 
responsible for the ongoing conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, having some 
contextual knowledge about post-genocide regional conflicts, as well as the 
evolution and development of various rebel groups is important in order to 
better understand the contextual meaning of current political activities. For 
instance, much of the fighting in the DRC, including the First Congo War from 
1996 to 1997, as well as the Second Congo War from 1998 to 2003, is directly 
related to the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda, and the Tutsi genocide that 
destabilized the entire region (Prunier, 2008).  
A very complex dynamic related to the ongoing regional conflicts rooted 
in Rwandan ethnic conflict is the number of rebel groups that sprouted up after 
the Tutsi genocide, particularly in the DRC. For instance, remnants of the 
former regime formed a number of rebel groups (many of which continue to 
operate today), and engaged in fighting that has contributed to the conflict 
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cycle in the DRC, as well as the displacement and targeted rape and killings of 
Congolese Tutsi in the Kivus when they flooded into the region after fleeing 
the RPF take-over. These dynamics eventually led to the creation of Tutsi-
dominated rebel groups formed in the DRC (Prunier, 2009). 
Tracing the evolution of the various rebel groups, formed in the 
diaspora is a daunting task, given the consistent splitting and merging of 
various rebel groups, but a summary of these dynamics will be explored, with 
a particular focus on political and military groups that developed in the 
Rwandan diaspora. Although this is not an exhaustive list of diaspora-based 
rebel opposition groups, the following summary includes most of the viable 
opposition groups formed in exile, that have remained steadily active since 
their inception.  
One of the first rebel groups formed shortly after the ending of the Tutsi 
genocide, and the RPF gaining control of Rwanda was the Armée pour la 
Libération du Rwanda (Army for the Liberation of Rwanda; ALiR). The ALiR 
was formed in the refugee camps in the DRC, and was comprised of the 
former regime (ex-FAR), including the military, and Interahamwe. The primary 
goal of the ALiR was to retake control of Rwanda, and ousting the transitional 
government, including Kagame’s RPF. In the fall of 1997 the ALiR formed a 
political wing called the Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (Armed People 
for the Liberation of Rwanda; PALIR). In 1999 the group of ALiR/PALIR rebels 
kidnapped a tour group of 14 Westerners, brutally killing eight (including two 
U.S. citizens) as well as one game warden, claiming as their motive the 
US/UK support for Kagame and the RPF/RPA (BBC, 2006).   
On April 3, 1995, another rebel group was formed in the refugee 
camps, also comprised of ex-FAR and Interahamwe, called the 
Rassemblement Républicain pour la Démocratie au Rwanda (Rally for the 
Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda; RDR).  Despite denying that 
they were connected to genocidaires in the camps, the RDR disseminated 
extremist Hutu propaganda similar in nature to propaganda used prior to the 
genocide (Kenyon-Lischer, 2006). In response to the continued attacks on 
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Rwanda by Hutu extremists waged inside and outside of Rwanda, and 
concerns that the refugee camps were being used as a base for these attacks, 
as well as the belief that the Interahamwe was holding innocent Hutus as 
captives (information confirmed by the UN), the RPF decided on April 13, 1997 
to close all refugee camps, and repatriate those civilians who did not 
participate in the genocide, and apprehend and prosecute (and at times 
execute) the genocidaires (Prunier, 2009).  
On April 27, 1995 the Rwandan Patriotic Army (the military wing of the 
RPF; RPA) arrived at the Kibeho camp located in the southwest region of 
Rwanda (formerly the “Turquoise Zone” established by the French), with the 
intention of forcibly closing the camp. Prunier notes that the Interahamwe and 
former members of the regime purposely incited fear in the civilian refugees25 
by spreading rumors that if they returned to Rwanda, as instructed, they would 
be indiscriminately killed. Hutu civilians who attempted to leave the camp and 
return home were threatened and harassed by the Interahamwe, and many 
were even killed to prevent them from leaving the camps. The Kibeho camp 
housed between 80,000 and 100,000 Hutu refugee. The RPA’s military 
incursion into the Kibeho camp was described by many as a massacre since 
the RPA engaged in a “show down” with the Interahamwe and refugees who 
refused to leave the camp (Prunier, 2009). The military incursion resulted in a 
number of civilian deaths (the exact number is unknown and is a point of 
controversy), and even more deaths as the remaining refugees faced a 
treacherous evacuation to Butare, Rwanda. The estimates of deaths range 
from 330 to 5000, and according to Australian forces while many deaths were 
clearly the result of RPA gunfire, the Interahamwe killed a significant number 
of Hutu civilian refugees, using what appeared to be machetes.  
Members of Australian medical forces present that day reported that the 
RPA was processing refugees out of the camps, and a part of this processing 
involved determining whether the refugees were genocidaires (e.g., civilian 
	  	   138 
genocidaires, Interahamwe members, or ex-FAR), or innocent civilians. 
Australian forces reported that the RPA was accompanied by genocide 
survivors who were identifying potential genocide perpetrators. When 
Interahamwe leaders saw this occurring they reacted by attempting to use 
Hutu civilian refugees as human shields. The Australian forces theorized that 
the Interahamwe leaders were attempting to create a distraction so that they 
could escape, as well as likely killing potential informants. The witnesses also 
reported that their actions caused the crowd to panic, leading some IDPs to 
rush the RPA line, and “the RPA soldiers, fearing a riot began to shoot into the 
crowd and soon most joined in, firing indiscriminately” (Office of Air Force 
History, 2002). The Kibeho tragedy has remained a focal point of Hutu 
grievances with many Hutus, particularly those in the diaspora, referring to the 
massacre as a genocide against Hutus.   
  In 1997 after Rwanda and Uganda shut down the militarized refugee 
camps along its border in eastern DRC (the Kivus), the RDR leaders met in 
Paris, and decided to change the name to their organization to 
Rassemblement Républicain pour la Démocratie au Rwanda (Republican 
Rally for Democracy in Rwanda; RDR), and moved the rebel group’s 
headquarters from the camps in eastern DRC, to the Netherlands.  Victoire 
Ingabire Umuhoza was named president of the Dutch branch in 2000, and 
Ignace Murwanashyaka was appointed as president of the German branch. In 
September of 1998 the RDR developed a coalition called the Union of 
Rwandese Democratic Forces (Union des Forces Démocratiques 
Rwandaises, UFDR), which included the RDR, the Forces de Defence 
Rwandaises (Democratic Forces for Resistance; FDR), and the Groupe 
d'Initiative pour la Réconciliation (Initiative Group for Reconciliation; GID/IGR). 
Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza was president of the UFDR from 2003 to 2008. In 
April 2006 three rebel opposition groups created in exile, (Umuhoza’s RDR, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For the sake of consistency and clarity he term “refugee” is being used to describe the camps 
residents, but legally, they would be considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) since they were 
displaced within their country of origin. 
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the Democratic Alliance for Rwanda [ADR-ISANGANO]26, and the FRD), 
joined together to create the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda 
(United Democratic Forces of Rwanda; FDU-Inkingi). It was the goal of 
Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza that the FDU-Inkingi serve as an umbrella 
organization for all political opposition parties formed in exile (FDU-Inkingi, 
2013). 
Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza also created and participated in numerous 
other groups, many of which were structured as human rights groups, focusing 
on “truth and reconciliation,” peace, and democracy. One of these 
organizations was the International Forum for Truth and Justice in Great Lakes 
Africa (Forum Internacional para la Verdad y la Justicia en el Africa de los 
Grandes Lagos), most commonly referred to as Veritas Rwanda Forum (see 
www.veritasrwandaforum.org), which was created in 2000 in Barcelona, Spain 
in partnership with Spanish human rights advocates Juan Carrero Saralegui, 
Adolfo Pérez Esquivel and Federico Mayor Zaragoza. In 2005, Saralegui, 
Esqquivel and Zaragoza, with their attorney, Jordi Palou, filed a lawsuit 
against 40 members of the RPF government for their alleged murder of nine 
priests and nuns during the genocide. According to a U.S. diplomatic cable, 
the lawsuit was based on the testimony of 40 Hutu witnesses currently in exile, 
brought forth by Veritas Rwanda Forum. Victoire worked with the Spanish 
human rights advocates Saralegui, Esqquivel and Zaragoza in the 
coordination and facilitation of three meetings with Veritas Rwanda Forum in 
Barcelona, Spain, with a focus on creating a path toward peace and “truth and 
reconciliation” in Rwanda. These meetings were called the Highly Inclusive 
Inter-Rwandan Dialogue (HIIRD) and occurred in 2006, 2007 and 2009, and 
were attended by approximately 20 Rwandan exiles at each meeting.27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 ADR-Isangano was formed in exile in Brussels, Belgium in January 2002 when it merged 
with the African Democratic Congress (Congres Democratique Africain, CDA) and the 
Movement for Peace, Democracy and Development (Mouvement pour la Paix, la Democratie 
et le Development (MPDD). 
27 For information on Veritas Rwanda Forum and the HIIRD meetings see 
http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/dialogo.htm), and a U.S. Embassy cable, located at 
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MADRID409_a.html. 
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On September 30, 2000 the ALiR changed its name to the Forces 
Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda; FDLR), after it was placed on the U.S. terrorist watch-
list (Straus & Waldorf, 2011). The FDLR is based in the Kivus, and is 
comprised primarily of remnants of the original Hutu power group, including 
ex-FAR, and the Interahamwe who were opposed to Tutsi rule. Many scholars 
consider the FDLR as the military wing of FDU-Inkingi/RDR in East DRC, 
fighting along Rwanda border. Paul Rwarakabije was appointed commander in 
chief of the entire FDLR force and RDR leader Ignace Murwanashyaka28 was 
named as named First President of FDLR. The First Vice President of FDLR 
was Jean Marie-Vianney Higiro (former Habyarimana government official 
evacuated prior to the genocide; currently a university professor in New 
Hampshire), and the Executive Secretary was Callixte Mbarushimana,29 (Rafti, 
2004-2005). 
Major General Sylvestre Mudacumura, former deputy commander of 
the FAR Presidential Guard in Rwanda in 1995, is currently the overall military 
commander of the FDLR (Straus & Waldorf, 2011). FDLR rebels are 
considered the primary contributor of conflict in Eastern DRC, including 
slaughtering civilians, including ethnic Congolese Tutsi called the 
Banyamulenge 30 (HRW, 2009), as well as committing thousands of rapes of 
women and girls. For instance, in 2010 the UN estimated that in the first six 
months of 2009 at least 5400 civilian women and girls in South Kivu were 
raped (Aljazeera, 2010). These rapes were attributed to FDLR rebels as well 
as soldiers from DRC’s military, the FARDC (Worship, 2010). Additionally, 
there is considerable evidence that the DRC government has provided support 
for the FDLR, despite proclamations to the opposite (Prunier, 2009). In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ignace Murwanashyaka was recently arrested on genocide charges in Germany in April 2009 (BBC, 
2009) 
29 Callixte Mbarushimana was arrested in France on October 10, 2009 on a warrant issued by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) on several counts of crimes against humanity including murder, 
torture, rape, inhumane acts and persecution, as well as several counts of war crimes including attacks 
against the civilian population, murder, mutilation, torture, rape, inhuman treatment, destruction of 
property and pillaging in Eastern DRC (ICC, 2012). 
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September 12, 2004 Jean Marie-Vianney Higiro left the FDLR with treasurer, 
Félicien Kanyamibwa and formed the Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD-
URUNANA) in the diaspora. Higiro is currently a professor in Massachusetts 
and Kanyamibwa is now Executive Secretary of RUD-URANA and lives in 
New Jersey. 
In advance of the presidential elections in Rwanda on August 9, 2010, 
Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza returned to Rwanda in January 2010 after 16 years 
in exile, in order to register her party, FDU-Inkingi and enter the race as a 
presidential candidate. She went directly to the Gisozi Genocide Memorial 
Centre, with flowers in hand, and made a speech on behalf of her party, the 
FDU-Inkingi. Although she acknowledged the genocide, she also asserted that 
in order for true and lasting reconciliation to occur both sides needed to be 
held accountable for their crimes, including RPF crimes against the Hutu. 
These comments were seen as an authentic form of reconciliation by some, 
but were perceived as inflammatory by others, particularly Tutsi genocide 
survivors, because her comments were delivered at a Tutsi genocide 
memorial. She followed up her comments with a letter to the editor of 
Rwanda’s primary newspaper: 
We are here honouring at this Memorial the Tutsi victims of the 
Genocide; there are also Hutu who were victims of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, not remembered or honoured here. Hutus 
are also suffering. They are wondering when their time will come to 
remember their people. In order for us to get to that desirable 
reconciliation, we must be fair and compassionate towards every 
Rwandan’s suffering (Victoire2010, 2010). 
  
Umuhoza was placed under house arrest in April 2010, and arrested in 
October 2010 and charged with “endangering state security, destabilizing 
public order, divisionism, defamation, and forming a criminal enterprise” 
(HRW, 2012a, p. 1). Four co-defendants, FDLR members, implicated 
Umuhoza in the coordination of the collaboration FDU-Inkingi and the FDLR 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The Banyamulenge are a historic group of Tutsis that migrated from Rwanda into South Kivu in the 
Congo in the 17th and 18th centuries 
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(HRW, 2012a). Victoire was sentenced on October 30, 2012 to eight years in 
prison (the prosecution was asking for life) (BBC, 2012). 
Another Hutu opposition group formed in exile is PDR-Ihumure, created 
in 2005 in the United States by Paul Rusesabagina (of the film “Hotel 
Rwanda”) and several ex-FAR members. PDR-Ihumure has actively lobbied 
the U.S. government and international community against the current 
Rwandan government, challenged the government’s genocide narrative, 31 
and many members have served as defense witnesses at the ICTR on behalf 
of accused and convicted genocidaires. Additionally, in 2004 the Partenariat- 
Intwari (Intrawri-Partnership) was formed in Brussels by Emmanuel 
Habyarimana, a Hutu who was a part of the RPF government before going into 
exile in 2003. The co-founder was Déogratias Mushayidi, a Tutsi who served 
as Secretary General and spokesperson. Partenariat-Intwari is a Hutu 
umbrella group that includes CNA-Ubumwe, FDLR-CMC, and PDN-Igihango. 
In 2008 Déogratias Mushayidi founded Pact Defence of the People (People’s 
Defense Pact; PDP-IMANZI) in Brussels and served as president until his 
arrest and capture, and transfer to Kigali in 2010.32 In 2010, the Intrawri-
Partnership, the FDLR, ARENA, and Nation-Imbaga came together to form an 
alliance called the Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Reconciliation Nationale 
(ADRN-Igihango; Rafti, 2003-2004). 
Tutsi Political Opposition Groups Formed in Exile 
The Congolese Rally for Democracy, sometimes referred to as the 
Rally for Congolese Democracy or by its French name, Le Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) is a Tutsi-dominated rebel group that 
operated out of Goma (in the Kivu regions) in eastern DRC from 1998 to 2003. 
The RCD was created in large part as a response to anti-Tutsi sentiment 
growing in the ADFL, and the ongoing persecution of the Banyamulenge by 
the Congolese government. President Laurent Kabila of the DRC, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Rusesabagina’s not-for-profit charity website to review recent letters he has written regarding the 
current state of Rwanda. The website can be found here: http://hrrfoundation.org/ 
32 Déogratias Mushayidi was charged with crimes related to supporting terrorist groups and is currently 
serving a life sentence in Rwanda. 
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government allied rebel groups, including extremist Rwandan Hutu militias, 
and the Mai-Mai, an ethnic group from the Kivus area of the DRC also are 
accused of persecuting the Banyamulenge, particularly after the 1994 
genocide against the Tutsi (HRW, 2012b; IRBC, 2000; Lemarchand, 2009; 
Mandami, 2000; Prunier, 2009). There are currently an estimated 50,000 to 
150,00033 Banyamulenge concentrated primarily in South and North Kivu, in 
Eastern DRC, along the Rwanda and Ugandan borders.  
Persecutions of the Banyamulenge often center on land and citizenship 
disputes. In fact, the Congolese government, under both Kabilas (Laurent, and 
his successor, his son Joseph) have attempted on numerous occasions to 
strip indigenous Banyamulenge of their citizenship status, despite the 
Banyamulenges’ presence in the region for over 200 years (Mamdani, 2001). 
Lemarchand (2009) notes that despite many distinct differences between 
indigenous Banyamulenge and more recently arrived Tutsi refugees from 
Rwanda, there is a growing tendency for people within the region to perceive 
all Tutsis in the Congo as “Rwandan Tutsi in disguise,” feeding concerns 
among many in the Kivus that the Banyamulenge property rights represent 
Rwandan attempts to expand into the Kivus regions (p. 66). A further blurring 
of the lines between Congolese and Rwandan Tutsis occurred when many 
young male Banyamulenge crossed the border into Rwanda and fought 
alongside the RPF in the 1990 to 1994 civil war against the Hutu extremist 
government (Lemarchand, 2009; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 2009). 
Central African scholars describe how conflict in Rwanda spilled across 
borders after the Rwandan genocide when over a million Hutus flooded into 
the Kivus onto historic Tutsi Congolese lands, much of which belonged to the 
Banyamulenge. Thus, thousands of Congolese Tutsi, including Banyamulenge 
who had avoided earlier governmental efforts to remove them from their 
historic land were now forced to flee to Rwanda when extremist Rwandan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 This population of the Banyamulenge is often contested, based on disputes regarding who is 
legitimately considered a member of this ethnic minority group (based on the date of migration). Some 
estimates put the number of Banyamulenge as low as 50,000 (Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2009), 
whereas others place their numbers is high as 150,000 (IRBC, 2000).   
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Hutus fled into the region, and began terrorizing them (Mandami, 2001). 34 
When asked about the decision to leave their historic lands, the 
Banyamulenge stated that armed Hutu refugees associated them with 
Rwandan Tutsis and had threatened them, killing some of them before they 
had a chance to flee (Lange, 2010).  
The Rwandan-backed RCD, led by Laurent Nkunda (a member of the 
Banyamulenge ethnic group) took control of the Kivus in order to protect the 
Banyamulenge people, while also fighting a proxy war on behalf of Rwanda, 
against Rwandan extremist Hutus fighting in the region (Lemarchand, 2009; 
Prunier, 2009). This spill-over of ethnic fighting into the DRC ultimately 
evolved into the First Congo War (1996 to 1997), fueled in large part by 
ongoing fighting between the RPF and ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces, who, 
as previously mentioned, used Hutu refugee camps in the Kivus as military 
bases (Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2009). In 1998, once the fighting 
diminished, DRC President Laurent Kabila35 expelled all Rwandans from the 
country (both Hutus and Tutsi) in an attempt to reduce Rwandan interference, 
as well as to limit the possibility of renewed violence (Prunier, 2009). This 
decision was not well received by the remaining Banyamulenge population, 
who relied on Rwandan forces in the DRC for protection from ex-FAR and 
Interahamwe militia (Minorities at Risk, 2006).  
Fighting broke out again in 1998, resulting in the Second Congo war 
(1998-2003). The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999, which provided for 
the disarmament of ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces operating in the DRC, 
failed to stop the fighting (Turner, 2008). In January of 2001 Laurent Kabila 
was assassinated and was immediately replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. 
Despite numerous allegations that both Kabilas were working alongside 
extremist Hutu factions (now called the FDLR), Joseph Kabila entered into a 
peace agreement with Rwanda in 2002 in an attempt to stop the fighting. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Mamdani (2001) notes that some Hutus civilian refugees were targeted as well, many of who fled to 
Uganda. 
35 By way of reminder, Laurent Kabila was initially allied with Tutsis when fighting with the ADFL since he 
was fighting against Hutus serving under then president Mobutu Seso Seko, but then later allied with the 
Hutu population, and against the Tutsis. 
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peace agreement called for the immediate withdrawal of Rwandan forces from 
the DRC in exchange for the DRC addressing Rwandan security concerns, 
particularly those caused by continued cross-border raids by the FDLR. In 
response, the DRC agreed to take all necessary steps to track down and 
capture ex-FAR and Interahamwe factions, dismantle the FDLR, and return 
any militia members who had participated in the 1994 genocide (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, 2002). 
This peace agreement would ultimately fail, and in response, Laurent 
Nkunda formed the Le Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (the 
National Congress for the Defense of the People; CNDP) in 2006 comprised 
primarily of Congolese Tutsis, with the primary goal of protecting Congolese 
Tutsi in the DRC (primarily in the Kivus areas). The CNDP focused on the 
eradication of the FDLR and was the primary source of persecution of the 
ethnic Tutsis living in the Congo (Minorities at Risk Project, 2006), yet Prunier 
(2009) theorizes that an additional goal of Nkunda was to move beyond the 
Kivus to Kinsasha, expanding “his ‘crusade’ beyond the local level” (p. 323). 
The CNDP played a key role in the Second Congo War, and has been cited 
for numerous human rights violations by human rights groups and UN 
peacekeeping forces (HRW, 2010b; Lemarchand, 2009; MONUC, 2009). 
Central African scholars also noted that some of the violence committed by the 
CNDP was likely in retaliation for FDLR persecution of Congolese Tutsis 
(Lemarchand, 2009; Minorities at Risk, 2006; Prunier, 2009).  
Bosco Ntaganda36 took control of the CNDP in January 2009 when 
Laurent Nkunda was arrested for war crimes as a part of an agreement 
between the DRC and Rwandan governments (U.S. Congress, 2012). On 
March 23, 2009 the DRC government entered into yet another peace 
agreement with the CNDP, which included the conscription of the CNDP 
members into DRC”s national army, the FARDC; the transformation of the 
CNDP into a political party; the release of CNDP political prisoners; amnesty 
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for CNDP rebel forces; and the implementation of national reconciliation 
efforts. The development of a community police force was also a part of the 
agreement, focusing on the resolution of conflicts on a local level. The 
agreement stipulated that former members of the CNDP would be included in 
the community police force in order to ensure equal ethnic representation 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2009).  
An additional––and crucial––component of the 2009 peace agreement 
included the “quick implementation” of a strategic plan in order to facilitate the 
return of Congolese refugees (primarily Tutsi) from neighboring countries, 
such as Rwanda (Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2009, p. 11). The plan 
called for 1) the identification of refugees, 2) an analysis of their locations, 3) 
an analysis of the viability of the return areas (e.g., security and infrastructure), 
and 4) a plan for social integration. Finally, several articles in the agreement 
concerned the complete integration and national representation of the CNDP, 
with CNDP interests demonstrated at all levels of the DRC government  
(Democratic Republic of Congo, 2009). 
In order to facilitate the return of refugees, in February 2010, the DRC, 
Rwanda and the UNHCR signed the Tripartite Agreement, which stipulated the 
facilitation and return of approximately 53,362 refugees registered with the 
UNHCR. Ultimately the return of refugees experienced significant challenges 
at local, national and even international levels, as national efforts of Tutsi 
refugee repatriation gave way to historic fears of Rwandan expansionist 
efforts, contributing to the continuation of historic ethnic tensions in the region. 
In addition, land disputes were common with Hutu chiefs often refusing to 
relinquish land to Tutsi returnees, claiming that the returnees were Rwandan, 
not Congolese (Refugees International, 2010). According to Lange (2010) 
local ethnic groups along with local politicians: 
… express[ed] fears about plots by the “Rwandans” (often code for 
“Tutsis”) to “re-occupy” parts of North Kivu, aided by the international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Bosco Ntganda was indicted by the ICC in August 2006 for war crimes. In March of 2013 Ntganda 
surrendered to the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda and was subsequently transferred to the ICC in The Hague 
(ICC, 2013). 
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community. There are also legitimate fears voiced by Congolese who 
live in areas where the refugees will return, largely focused on land 
conflicts that may arise when refugees who sold or lost their land come 
back to reclaim it (p. 48). 
Lange further described how many Congolese living on disputed lands “firmly 
believe that Rwandan citizens are mixing themselves in with returning 
refugees so as to escape land scarcity in Rwanda and “occupy” North Kivu” (p. 
49).   
Growing dissent grew among many ex-CNDP, culminating when the 
DRC government announced plans to deploy ex-CNDP soldiers away from 
their families in North Kivu, meaning that they would no longer be able to 
protect their family members (Webb, 2012). In April 2012 about 300 ex-CNDP 
soldiers deserted the FARDC and formed a new military group called the 
Mouvement du 23-Mars (the Movement of March 23; M23). The new rebel 
group cited the DRC government’s failure to implement the March 23, 2009 
peace agreement as the primary reason for their desertion, as well as poor 
conditions in the FARDC, and the government’s decision to move them out of 
the Kivus and away from their families (Webb, 2012). The group was named 
after the date of the failed peace agreement, March 23, but is most frequently 
referred to as the M23. Bertrand Bisimwa is the current leader of this rebel 
movement. Bisimwa took over as leader, when its former leader, Bosco 
Ntganda, was arrested for war crimes in March 2013 and transferred to the 
ICC (ICC, 2013). In a recent interview, Bisimwa claimed that the M23 would 
continue fighting until the DRC government fully implemented the 2009 Peace 
Agreement. The M23 is also asking for a legitimate government that supports 
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the development of infrastructure in the country, as well as the complete 
dismantling of the FDLR. Bisimwa has also accused the DRC government of 
collaborating with the FDLR, responsible for mass human rights violations 
against civilians, particularly the Banyamulenge (Patel, 2013).  
The M23 has grown from about 300 soldiers to over 5,500 soldiers, and 
they recently surprised the international community by briefly taking control of 
Goma in November 2012, despite a strong FARDC and UN presence. Several 
members of the international community have accused Rwanda of providing 
material support to the M23, although Rwanda has denied doing so (Pflanz, 
2012). The UN has accused the M23 of contributing to renewed ethnic fighting 
in the region, as well as committing human rights violations against the civilian 
population, although the M23 has vehemently denied these allegations (UN 
News Centre, 2013). The UN is also investigating reports by its peacekeeping 
mission MONUSCO of alleged FARDC abuses committed against M23 
detainees and desecrating their corpses (Reuters, 2013). In September 2013 
the M23 announced that it would disarm and return to civilian life if Tutsi 
refugees currently living in camps in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi were 
returned home, and the FDLR militia was completely disbanded (AFP, 2013).  
This detailed exploration of Rwanda’s sociopolitical history, and the 
ongoing ethnic fighting in the DRC is important as it provides insights into the 
contested, complex and controversial nature of the ongoing Hutu/Tutsi 
conflicts ensuing throughout the region. It is also within this context that the 
political activities of the Rwandan CGD operating within virtual transnational 
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networks and engaging in homeland conflict will be explored, evaluated and 
analyzed.  
	  	   150 
CHAPTER 5:  METHODOLOGY 
 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge on the global dynamics 
involved in ethnonationalist armed civil conflict, by exploring the role of 
diasporic transnational political engagement in homeland conflict. In particular, 
this study explores the ways in which ethnonationalist CGD, traversing both 
real and virtual communities of identity in Western host countries use social 
media to engage in homeland conflict on a political level. The Republic of 
Rwanda was used as a case study due to its recent history of ethnonationalist 
conflict, its large diaspora (relative to its in-country population), and the 
tendency for many members of the Rwandan diaspora to use social media for 
the purposes of political engagement in homeland conflict. Additionally, among 
the 22 case studies located in the literature on ethnonationalist CGD typology 
and political engagement, there have to date been no studies conducted on 
Rwandan CGD and the nature of their political engagement. 
Due to the nature of this study, and its focus on activities occurring on 
the Internet, it was decided that a qualitative research approach was the most 
appropriate methodology, using virtual ethnology for the research design. 
Since virtual ethnography is a newer research method, it is important to fully 
explore its methodology in order to better understand how it is used in the 
present study. Thus in this chapter I provide a detailed description of virtual 
ethnography, exploring its underlying principles and characteristics, including a 
summary of the current status of ethical issues and established ethical 
standards pertinent to Internet research as demonstrated in the literature.  
Providing a comprehensive description of virtual ethnography also 
contributes to the body of knowledge related to this emerging research 
methodology. Research methodologies that are well suited for exploring 
activities in cyberspace are likely going to be increasingly used in the future 
due to the dramatic evolution of new technologies, and the significant growth 
of the use of the Internet for a variety of purposes. Accompanying the 
increased use of the Internet, particularly social media, is an increase in the 
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number of social scientists researching this phenomenon. The importance of 
Internet research in order to better understand this socio-political and socio-
cultural phenomenon is articulated by Carverlee and Webb (2008), authors of 
large-scale study of MySpace users, who state: 
There is a growing demand for understanding this new social 
phenomenon, understanding the processes by which communities 
come together, how virtual communities attract new members and 
develop over time, and understanding what it takes to empower the 
online communities with the ability to attract and retain a core of 
members who participate actively (Carverlee & Webb, 2008, p. 1).  
The recognition of the Internet as a rich source of data for researchers is also 
attracting increasing attention among social and political scientists, with a 
particular focus on how data collection strategies can be adapted to the virtual 
world (Dholakia & Zhang, 2004).  
Research studies focusing on Internet dynamics have been referred to 
in a variety of ways, including Cyberethnography (Rybas & Gajjala, 2007); 
Internet-mediated Research (Mathy, Kerr & Haydin, 2003); Internet-based 
Research (Battles, 2010); Netnography (Kozinets, 2002); and Cyber-research 
(Tulbure, 2011). Some of these terms are used to denote research using the 
Internet, or research of activities on the Internet in a generic sense, while other 
terms refer to specific methodologies used when studying phenomena 
occurring in cyberspace. When the social phenomenon being studied focuses 
on higher levels of electronically mediated human interaction in virtual 
communities, the techniques employed are most frequently referred to in the 
literature as virtual ethnography (Hine, 2000). A nascent research 
methodology has begun to develop to guide virtual ethnographers, which is in 
large part drawn from methodology used in traditional ethnography and 
adapted to an online world. 
Virtual Ethnography as an Emerging Research Methodology 
Virtual ethnography is a research method that is used when the 
ethnographer’s sustained presence in the field is located in the Internet. Virtual 
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ethnography allows researchers to systematically explore relational and 
behavioral activities occurring within virtual communities (Boellstorff, Nardi, 
Pearce, & Taylor, 2012) where the ethnographer engages in the “making and 
remaking of space through mediated interaction” (Hine, 2000, p. 1061). 
Traditional ethnography is defined as “the sustained presence of an 
ethnographer in the field setting, combined with intensive engagement with the 
everyday life of the inhabitants of the field site… by the ethnographer” (Hine, 
2000, p. 1061).  An aspect of ethnography that distinguishes it from other 
qualitative research methodologies is the researcher’s sustained immersion in 
a culture that provides insights into other people’s way of life (Geertz, 1993 as 
cited in Fereday, & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Virtual ethnography is defined 
similarly, but rather than the ethnographer being immersed in one specific 
place and/or culture, the virtual ethnographer is immersed in a virtual 
community, or a virtual network of communities (Beneito-Montagut, 2011). 
Virtual ethnography offers insights into the lives of online participants 
engaging in virtual communities due to the interactive nature of many social 
media sites, which allows for the formation of social connections that are often 
reciprocal in nature. According to Hine (2000), the virtual ethnographer makes 
sense out of the Internet by exploring how it is “used, interpreted and 
reinterpreted” primarily in three ways: as a form of communication, “as an 
object within people’s lives, and as a site for community-like formations” (Hine, 
2000, p. 1067). The Internet is a dynamic data source rich in information, “a 
place of ongoing activity and static, pre-existing information, both of which can 
inform the ethnography being undertaken” (Evans, 2010, p. 6), meaning that a 
virtual ethnographer can analyze real-time, asynchronous, and archival data 
simultaneously.  
Virtual communities are not wholly abstracted from “real world” 
dynamics. In fact, it is often “real world” dynamics that give rise to online 
interaction (a point that even applies to online gamers). This is particularly true 
when the purpose of a virtual community is to bring about some form and/or 
degree of social and/or political change. In situations where online interaction 
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is in some manner connected to, or arises out of off-line phenomena, the 
boundaries between the online and offline worlds can become quite indistinct, 
requiring the virtual ethnographer to make methodological decisions about the 
boundaries of the virtual field site. 
The Virtual Field Site: Altered Space and Time 
The “field site” in virtual ethnography differs from the field site in 
traditional ethnography in that the field is located not in a bounded geographic 
location, but in cyberspace where space and time are conceptualized 
differently. For instance, in virtual ethnography, space relates to “flow and 
connectivity” of culture and community, and not to physical boundaries. 
Knowing where the boundaries of the field site begin and end can be 
challenging. The virtual ethnographer must first abandon the concept of 
natural geographic boundaries of the culture and focus instead on when to 
stop expanding the online exploration. Although the virtual field site is framed 
primarily by the research questions, which in a qualitative study answers the 
“how” question, according to Hine (2000), the field in virtual ethnography is 
limited by the ethnographer’s “constraints in time, space and ingenuity” (p. 
1070). Hine notes that the determination of the field boundaries in virtual 
ethnography is an integral part of the methodology, stating: “finding the field 
becomes as much a part of the research project as any data collection which 
is done once the field is found” (p. 15), where “the ethnographic object itself 
…[is]… reformulated with each decision to either follow yet another connection 
or retrace steps to a previous point” (Hine, 2008, p. 1070).   
Time in a virtual world is also conceptualized differently since some 
observations may be synchronous (i.e., real time), and some may be 
asynchronous. Further, online observation often includes what could be 
considered “archival research,” since postings may have been posted years 
ago, depending upon user preferences and medium functionality (i.e., some 
social media sites only show recent history, while others date back several 
years). Since sustained immersion is not possible in a traditional sense, and 
because subjects may be posting on a variety of social media at any given 
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time, it is important to remember that virtual ethnography can never capture 
the entire picture of an online culture. In traditional ethnography the researcher 
is fully immersed in a specific culture for a considerable, albeit fixed amount of 
time, leading to a faithful representation of that culture. Yet in virtual 
ethnography the concept of “sustained presence” in the field is qualitatively 
different in a variety of ways, thus it captures only glimpses of informants, 
communities and cultures, rendering the representation of the culture only 
partial. How the “field” is defined then, and what data is collected, is based on 
what is deemed to be of strategic relevance to the ethnographer(s), as guided 
by the research questions (Hine, 2005, 2008).  
Although virtual ethnography provides an in-depth exploration of an 
exciting new medium and the range of human activities that take place within 
it, it is not without its critics. Some ethnographers note that it is impossible to 
truly be immersed in a culture that is primarily textual in nature. Dholakia and 
Zhang (2004) cite the limitations of virtual ethnography, noting that with online 
ethnography the researcher cannot compare (or triangulate) narratives with 
observed behaviors, which is a key component of traditional ethnography. 
Comparing the one-dimensional nature of online textual interactions with real-
life behavioral and relational activities, Dholakia and Zhang note the rich 
amount of information that can be gleaned in a traditional field from visual and 
aural cues, such as “pausing and reflection… loudness and pitch of speech” 
as well as other visually-noted characteristics such as age, gender, race, 
attire, “eye contact, body language and gestures, and emotive responses” 
(para 12). 
Dholakia and Zhang (2004) note that the absence of aural and visual 
cues in an online environment is a limitation because “important information is 
lost, making it hard for the researcher to be sure about the real meanings and 
intentions of the ‘online informants’” (para 12). Many of Dholakia and Zhang’s 
concerns may no longer be as valid since in the decade since the publication 
of their article, social media sites have evolved considerably, and now include 
far more than textual CMC. For instance, technological advances now permit 
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the posting of, and linking to visual data in the form of videos and photographs 
as well as aural data in the form sound clips and online radio stations. 
Additionally, many social media sites permit interactions in non-textual ways 
through the online expression of emotion and attitudes, including “likes,” 
“emoticons,” and “shares.” 
In response to criticism that virtual ethnography does not permit the 
ethnographer to become fully immersed into the culture for a sustained period 
of time, Evans (2010) notes that traditional and virtual ethnography offer 
different types of “sustained immersion.” Although sustained immersion in 
traditional ethnography provides a “faithful portrayal” of one particular culture, 
the virtual ethnographer can explore multiple online cultures simultaneously 
(since they are fluid, with indistinct boundaries), producing an “ethnographic 
survey.” Thus while there are certainly differences in the types of data 
produced by traditional and virtual ethnography, each approach is unique with 
advantages and disadvantages.  
Data Collection in Virtual Ethnography 
Many of the data collection strategies available to traditional 
ethnographers are also available to virtual ethnographers, including interviews, 
surveys, and archival research. In fact, there is a growing body of knowledge 
regarding ways in which traditional data collection strategies can be adapted 
to Internet-based research (Alessi & Martin, 2010; Payne & Barnfather, 2012). 
Although several data collection strategies can be used in ethnographic 
research, the primary method used in studying social phenomena in virtual 
communities is observation; participant observation, if subjects are aware of 
the presence of the researcher, and naturalistic observation if they are not. 
The primary form of communication used on the Internet is called CMC, which 
is defined as a text-based communication that lay somewhere between oral 
and written speech since it includes visual components as well (Paccagnella, 
1997). CMC is quite transient in nature, compared to off-line communication, 
in that textual and cultural communication can be posted, and then 
subsequently edited or deleted, often with no trace of its original format. Thus, 
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in order to obtain a holistic picture of the social phenomena occurring within a 
virtual community the ethnographer must make a commitment to spend a 
considerable amount of time exploring online environments of interest. 
Studying the culture of an online community is accomplished through 
the observation and analysis of its artifacts, as well as through the journals of 
the ethnographer, who documents impressions, insights, and experiences 
while engaging in the ethnographic immersion (Hine, 2005). As mentioned 
previously, participant observation occurs when the ethnographer observes a 
culture the members of who are aware of the observation. In traditional 
ethnography, a sustained presence in a community almost always warrants 
disclosure of the existence of the researcher to the community members, but 
this is often not the case in the virtual world. Naturalistic observation of virtual 
communities is becoming increasingly popular, and is often referred to as 
“lurking.” Although concerns have been raised about the ethical nature of 
naturalistic observation (many of which will be explored later in this chapter), 
significant benefits have been noted as well, particularly when used in an 
online environment. For instance, Paccagnella (1997) notes:  
It is well known how, in social sciences as well as in other fields, the 
phenomena being studied are modified by the very act of observing 
them. Even in the case of soft, qualitative techniques, as in participant 
observation, problems arise because of the presence of the researcher 
in the field.  
Paccagnella discusses Internet research in particular, and strongly advocates 
for the use of naturalistic (unobtrusive) observation in order to avoid altering 
subject behavior, something he notes would be unavoidable in many 
situations, if online participants knew they were being observed. 
Triangulation of the data is as important in virtual ethnography as it is in 
traditional ethnography. Triangulation of data obtained in a traditional 
ethnographic study is accomplished through the collection of multiple forms of 
data, such as observations, interviews, the taking of photographs, etc., while in 
virtual ethnography data is triangulated through the collection of data from a 
variety of CMC, from a variety of online sources (Hine, 2000, 2008), such as 
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textual CMC posted on various social media sites, including Facebook, 
Twitter, online newspapers, and public blogs, as well as other types of CMCs, 
such as photographs, videos, and online radio stations. Evans (2010) asserts 
that what ultimately matters with regard to reliability and validity of study 
results is that the ethnographic study is credible. To this end Evans stresses 
the importance of the researcher providing detailed information about the 
ethnographic process (a roadmap of sorts), which validates the study’s 
credibility.   
Ethical Considerations for Conducting Internet Research: The 
Consensus of the Literature 
Accompanying the development of new methodologies used in online 
environments is the concomitant development of ethical considerations and 
standards appropriate to research occurring within cyberspace. Buchannan 
and Ess (2008) define Internet research ethics (IRE) as a “multi- and 
interdisciplinary field that systematically studies the ethical implications which 
arise from the use of the Internet as a space or locale of, and/or tool for, 
research” (p. xxvi). The area of IRE is evolving rapidly, and while to date there 
is no universally accepted set of ethical standards guiding Internet research, 
there is a relatively well developed body of knowledge that can provide 
significant guidance to Internet researchers.  
A well developed set of guidelines and recommendations that is 
frequently adopted by Internet researchers was developed by the Association 
of Internet Research (AoIR), a global working committee representing 
numerous disciplines engaging in various types of Internet research (Markham 
& Buchanan, 2012). AoIR developed the original guidelines in 2002 (Ess & 
AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002), and recently published an updated 
version in 2012 (see the original guidelines updated guidelines here: 
http://ethics.aoir.org/index.php?title=Main_Page). The AoIR working 
committee also provides a comprehensive definition of Internet research, 
noting the broad nature of Internet research, as well as the wide range of 
disciplines engaging in Internet research of some type. The AoIR working 
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committee stipulates that their recommendations are considered ethical 
guidelines and not an ethical code, in order to reflect the need to be flexible 
enough to deal with the range of complexities involved in Internet research. By 
not being too rigid or prescriptive, the AoIR ethical guidelines can be adopted 
by a wide range of disciplines (e.g., political science, business, sociology, 
social work and psychology, the humanities, and the natural sciences), each of 
which utilize a range of research designs, exploring an equally wide range of 
phenomena (Basset & O’Riordan, 2002).  
In general, ethical considerations in Internet research are concerned 
with the protection of online participants where the benefits of the research are 
weighed against any possible risk to subjects. Questions related to the 
protection of online participants being studied include how, when and even 
whether such protection can and should be afforded, how “participants” are 
defined (as “human subjects,” or as authors of text and/or cultural artifacts), 
whether informed consent is required, concerns about privacy, and proprietary 
rights (Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002; Heilferty, 2010; Markham 
& Buchanan, 2012). For instance, determining whether information posted 
online is considered confidential, even if posted publically, and whether 
expectations of privacy on the part of the online participants are reasonable 
and/or should even be considered in ethical decision-making, have all been 
evaluated by numerous researchers on a study-by-study basis, as well as 
within collective efforts seeking the development of some general ethical 
guidelines for Internet researchers (Battles, 2010; Bober, 2004; Buchanan, 
2004; Clegg Smith, 2004; Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002; 
Eysenbach & Till, 2001; Jacobson, 1999; Pittenger, 2003; Paccagnella, 1997; 
Rafaeli, Sudweeks, Konstain, & Mabry, 1998; Sveningsson, 2004; and 
Whiteman, 2007).  
The various debates about Internet research ethics reflect the complex 
nature of Internet research, such as the ability of online participants to mask 
their real identity through the use of pseudonyms, the different types of online 
forums (from online social networking sites that provide users the ability to set 
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their preferred privacy levels, to message boards that explicitly and repeatedly 
remind users that there is no guarantee of privacy). Although ethical decision-
making can be based on the adoption of some ethical model, some 
researchers emphasise the importance of making decisions contextually, 
based on the nature of the research, the specific methods being utilized in the 
study, the level of sensitivity of the topics being discussed (i.e., parents 
grieving the loss of a child, sexual orientation, illness, etc.), and the perceived 
expectations of privacy of online participants (Ess & AoIR Ethics Working 
Committee, 2002; Eysenbach & Till, 2001). Despite this complexity and the 
numerous variables at play, it is both important and useful to explore the array 
of ethical issues inherent in Internet research and adopt some framework for 
ethical decision-making in the methodology of an Internet research study.  The 
following is a summary of the consensus of the literature focusing on IRE. 
Essentially, ethical considerations are concerned with whether the 
object of research is a person, and the human subject model should apply, 
and whether online space (the “virtual field”) should be considered public, 
private, or a combination of both, including whether online participants’ 
reasonable expectations of privacy should be considered. These are not 
issues that are easily resolved due to the complexities involved, and the 
difficulty in resolving these ethical issues are demonstrated in the wide range 
of opinions among Internet research scholars. 
Application of the Human Subject Model: Text as Object/Text as Author 
Markham and Buchanan (2012) authors of the AoIR Ethical Guidelines 
for Internet Research, pose the question whether virtual ethnographers are 
working with human subjects at all, or with artifacts: 
If information is collected directly from individuals, such as an email 
exchange, instant message, or an interview in a virtual world, we are 
likely to naturally define the research scenario as one that involves a 
person. If the connection between the object of research and the 
person who produced it is indistinct, there may be a tendency to define 
the research scenario as one that does not involve any persons. 
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If the researcher determines (using the guidance of ethical guidelines) 
that the object of research are human beings, then the CMC data collected are 
considered “text by author” and the human subject model will likely need to be 
applied, and issues related to privacy and the appropriateness of providing 
informed consent must be considered. If it is determined that privacy is a 
reasonable expectation of the online participants, and informed consent is 
deemed necessary, the researcher must then determine the best way to 
provide notice to online participants, including determining the appropriate 
parties to notify. If the researcher determines that the object of research is 
detached from personal identity, then the CMC data collected are considered 
text and/or cultural artifacts, and the human subject model does not apply.  
Basset and O’Riordan (2002) argue against applying the “human 
subject model” in most cases of Internet research, stating that the Internet is a 
form of “cultural production” where users can produce cultural artifacts, 
including online books, articles, radio shows, news blogs, and visual media. 
Advocating for a “text as object” perspective (versus “text as author”), where 
the object of research is considered detached from its author, Basset and 
O’Riordan cite the example of independent media sites, which are often used 
by freelance human rights advocates and journalists to express counter-
political perspectives. Basset and O’Riordan caution that treating such CMC 
as “text as author” (i.e., as real people), would be counter-productive and quite 
likely impossible, asserting that “nobody would suggest that the text of a news 
item published in a newspaper be conflated with its author and considered as 
a human subject, yet this is exactly what is happening regarding Internet text” 
(p. 236). In fact, they express concern about the risk of being over-protective 
of virtual material, which may actually undermine the expectations of online 
participants who are posting online because of a desire for public 
representation. Basset and O’Riordan caution that “overly protective research 
ethics risk diminishing the cultural capital of those engaging in cultural 
production through Internet technologies, and inadvertently contributing to 
their further marginalization” (p. 244). 
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Public or Private: The Need for Informed Consent 
If the researcher determines that the object of research involves 
persons, and applies the human subject model, a determination must then be 
made as to whether the online participants should be provided with informed 
consent. Internet research scholars have expressed a variety of perspectives 
on the ethical considerations regarding how to determine when informed 
consent is necessary, when it is not, and when providing informed consent is 
not only unnecessary, but may actually be damaging to the online participants 
(Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002; Eysenbach & Till, 2001; 
Markham & Buchanan, 2012; Pittenger, 2003; Paccagnella, 1997).  
Ethical considerations focus on how decisions about privacy on the 
Internet should be made. For instance, should the Internet be considered 
public in all circumstances? If not, how does a researcher determine when an 
online forum is private? And, should online participants’ expectations of 
privacy be a factor to be considered when making this decision, even if their 
expectations are unrealistic? What are the benefits and risks of providing 
informed consent, and what are the benefits and risks of not providing 
informed consent? The position taken on these issues has a significant impact 
on research designs, thus decisions about the public or private nature of the 
Internet, and under what conditions informed consent is warranted are of 
fundamental importance. Although it might be tempting to take an “either/or” 
approach – the Internet is always a public sphere/ the Internet is always a 
private sphere–dichotomous positions negate the heterogeneous nature of the 
Internet, and fail to recognize the range of forums with differing levels of 
perceived privacy. For instance, if the researcher takes the position that online 
participants’ CMC are always private and confidentiality must always be 
presumed in an online environment, (and informed consent always obtained), 
then conducting any naturalistic observation would be impossible. But if the 
Internet is presumed public under all circumstances (as suggested by ProjectH 
Research Group), and no informed consent provided, then online participants 
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may be harmed if a sensitive CMC is traced back to the author, which is a 
possibility even if CMC are anonymized (Markham & Buchanan, 2012).  
Thus the issue of whether online participants have a right to privacy, 
and whether informed consent must be secured depends in large part on the 
nature and purpose of the online forum, whether the online forum is public, 
private or somewhere in between, whether informed consent would be 
possible (in light of the frequent use of pseudonyms in online environments 
sometimes obtaining informed consent is impossible), whether providing 
informed consent is in the best interests of the online participants (some online 
participants may not want to be contacted), and whether an expectation of 
privacy is even reasonable.  
Determining the Difference between Public and Private Domains 
The first step in resolving the problem of whether informed consent is 
required (presuming that the nature of the research deems the human subject 
model be applied), is to determine whether the object of research is posted in 
a public or private environment, a determination that must include the 
expectations of the online participants (as well as whether their expectation is 
reasonable) (Battles, 2010; Bober, 2004; Buchanan, 2004; Clegg Smith, 2004; 
Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002; Eysenbach & Till, 2001; 
Jacobson, 1999; Pittenger, 2003; Paccagnella, 1997; Rafaeli, Sudweeks, 
Konstain, & Mabry,1998; Sveningsson, 2004; Whiteman, 2007).  
The level of privacy in some online forums is relatively clear and as 
such Ess asserts that “the greater the acknowledged publicity of the venue, 
the less obligation there may be to protect individual privacy, confidentiality, 
right to informed consent, etc.” (Ess & AoIR, 2002, p. 5). Pittenger (2003) cites 
the importance of developing a set of criteria to assist in making this 
determination stating, “it is necessary to develop a schema that proves a 
general test for determining the boundary of expected privacy within the 
Internet and the domain in which behavioral researchers can stand as non-
participatory observers of the behavior of others” (p. 49).  
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Another consideration relates to the level of Internet savviness of online 
participants who might have a range of privacy settings available to them 
(increasingly common in social networking sites), but not understand how to 
set the privacy settings at the desired level. In this situation, some online 
participants new to the Internet may believe they have complete privacy when 
in fact they do not. Yet even if an online forum can be deemed public, there 
are numerous issues to consider relating to the expectations of the online 
participant. Considerations include whether online participants expect that 
their posts are public, or private, whether online participants are posting for 
public consumption and whether they want to remain relatively anonymous, 
and finally, whether online participants have the technological sophistication to 
determine the difference between a public forum and a private one.  
Whiteman (2007) cites the common problem of online participants 
navigating out of a private forum and into a public one without realizing it. 
Whiteman notes how this would not be possible in the real world, and uses the 
example of how in the real world one would certainly notice leaving a public 
shopping mall and entering into the privacy of one’s car, yet in cyberspace one 
can transition into different types of spaces with varying illusions of privacy by 
clicking on a few links.  
The public/private nature of the CMC must be considered within the 
context of the poster’s expectations, including whether any expectation of 
privacy of the poster is reasonable (Sveningsson, 2004). For example, Battles 
(2010) points out that even in cases where messages are posted in forums 
that are clearly public, if the nature of the posts are of a private nature, such as 
dealing with a sexually transmitted disease, or being a victim of a crime, and 
the online environment appears private, then the expectations of privacy 
among posters is likely reasonable, and lurking will likely be considered 
intrusive.  
In addition to determining the online participant’s expectations of 
privacy the researcher must evaluate whether these expectations are 
reasonable. Eysenbach and Till (2001) have developed a set of ethical 
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guidelines for Internet researchers and Institutional Review Boards that 
specifically deals with issues of privacy expectations of online participants. 
The guidelines suggest that Internet researchers discuss the following seven 
issues when making decisions about privacy and the reasonable nature of 
online participants’ expectations: 
1. Intrusiveness— discuss to what degree the research conducted is 
intrusive (“passive” analysis of Internet postings versus active 
involvement in the community by participating in communications) 
2. Perceived privacy—Discuss (preferably in consultation with members of 
the community) the level of perceived privacy of the community (Is it a 
closed group requiring registration? What is the membership size? 
What are the group norms?) 
3. Vulnerability—Discuss how vulnerable the community is: for example, a 
mailing list for victims of sexual abuse or AIDS patients will be a highly 
vulnerable community 
4. Potential harm—As a result of the above considerations, discuss 
whether the intrusion of the researcher or publication of results has the 
potential to harm individuals or the community as a whole 
5. Informed consent—Discuss whether informed consent is required or 
can be waived (If it is required how will it be obtained?) 
6. Confidentiality—How can the anonymity of participants be protected (if 
verbatim quotes are given originators can be identified easily using 
search engines, thus informed consent is always required) 
7. Intellectual property rights—In some cases, participants may not seek 
anonymity, but publicity, so that use of postings without attribution may 
not be appropriate 
 
Pittenger (2003) asserts that online participants should have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a public forum, suggesting that 
reasonable perceptions of online privacy should increase with the number of 
barriers provided by the forum, such as application processes, the need for 
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usernames and confidential passwords, all of which “creates prima facie 
evidence for the presumption of expected privacy” (p. 51). One way of 
determining the reasonable expectation of privacy is to make a direct 
comparison with how a similar situation would be handled in a real-life 
environment. Thus, an online participant who posts material in a pubic online 
forum but has the expectation of privacy could be compared to an individual 
who engages in private behavior in a public park (for instance). Despite this 
individual’s wish that his or her behavior was private, no reasonable 
expectation of privacy would exist due to the public nature of the environment. 
Pittenger (2003) describes the basis for this position, asserting that the 
Internet is public by design, thus people should for the most part be free to 
observe others’ online activities stating,  “whether I kiss my wife or scold my 
children in public, I cannot expect others to avert their eyes to avoid seeing me 
do something that I might consider intimate or embarrassing for the simple 
reason that I have acted where it is easy for others to see what I do and hear 
what I say,” adding, “what I send through the Internet, no matter how intimate 
or embarrassing I believe the information may be, passes through a public 
medium. Therefore, I cannot expect that others will avert their gaze” (pp. 49 – 
50). 
If a virtual forum or community is deemed public Pittenger is adamant 
that informed consent is not required, even if the research involves naturalistic 
observation (i.e., lurking) since “the collective exchanges among persons in 
various virtual communities are public events that support no expectation of 
privacy. Consequently, a researcher may have access to these records and 
publish them, exercising moderate discretion, as he or she sees fit.” (p. 51). 
Yet even in cases where the domain or forum is determined to be public, and 
informed consent unnecessary, it is still important to protect the confidentiality 
of online participants, including using pseudonyms and limiting quotations from 
online participants since quotations are searchable and can be traced back to 
the original poster. Additionally, AoIR ethical guidelines require that the age of 
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the participants also be considered with child and youth participants 
warranting greater protection.  
Challenges in Obtaining Informed Consent   
Assuming that informed consent may be deemed necessary, the 
Internet researcher must determine whether obtaining it is even possible, and 
if it is, the researcher must determine who to obtain informed consent from 
(e.g., by the webmaster, moderator, facilitator, or online participant), and 
further, how the information is to be used (direct quotation, paraphrased, 
attributed to a specific person or pseudonym, etc.). Further, the researcher 
must determine whether attempting to provide informed consent may actually 
harm online participants.  
Assuming the Internet researcher determines that the object of 
research exists in an environment where online participants may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, providing informed consent may not be 
possible, or even desirable. For instance, some online participants post in 
forums under a pseudonym because they believe that anonymity will enable 
them to be freer in expressing dissenting opinions, and they have no desire to 
disclose their real identity (Battles, 2010; Jacobson, 1999). These online 
participants may fully intend to have their posts read publically (despite logging 
into the virtual community with a screen name and password), but they may 
not wish to be contacted and asked for permission to be observed, believing 
this will compromise their anonymity. Further, it may not be possible to provide 
informed consent if a pseudonym is used since often online participants who 
use pseudonyms do not provide contact information (Bruckman et al., 2010; 
Whitman, 2007). Posting a generic notice in a virtual community notifying 
participants that their activity is being observed is one possible solution but 
Battles (2010) discourages this since such an action may violate the very 
privacy researchers are attempting to protect as such a posting would likely 
render the forums searchable through online search engines, such as Google. 
In other words, providing informed consent may negate all other attempts to 
protect online participants’ privacy and confidentiality (see Battles, 2010, p. 
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34).  
In regard to the present study, ethical considerations relating to whether 
the objects of research were text as object or text as author, whether the 
application of the human subject model was warranted, whether the online 
forums observed were public or private and whether online participants’ 
perceived expectations of privacy were explored using both the 2012 AoIR 
Ethical Decision-Making Guidelines and Eysenbach and Till’s ethical 
considerations (referenced above), and the determinations are explored in 
detail in the subsequent section on methodology. 
Methodology of the Current Study 
As outlined in Chapter 1, this study seeks to answer the following 
questions: 
1. Do Rwandan CGD communities living in the West (principally North 
America and Europe) engage in homeland conflict on a political level, in 
a way that conforms to the typologies demonstrated in the literature, 
and if so how? 
2. How do Rwandan CGD communities use ICTs, particularly social 
media, to engage in homeland conflict on a political level? How are 
virtual communities structured, and utilized for the purposes of political 
engagement, mobilization and action? 
3. Are there significant differences in the types and nature of political 
activities between intra-diasporic virtual communities (i.e. internal to the 
Rwandan diaspora), and inter-diasporic virtual communities (i.e. 
outreach to non-Rwandans, such as Americans, or other Westerners)? 
4. What do the purported and actual aims of the Rwandan CGD appear to 
be attempting to achieve, and what is the potential impact of diaspora 
political engagement on the conflict cycle in the home country? 
 
I utilized virtual ethnography as my research method, and naturalistic 
observation as my data collection method. I drew data primarily from two 
sources: 1) CMCs of online community participants with public profiles on 
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social media sites that self-identified as Rwandan diaspora living in Western 
host countries, who were using social media to engage in political activities37 
focusing on homeland affairs; and 2) a journal containing my reflective field 
notes, where I logged my impressions, observations and experiences as an 
ethnographic researcher.38 I used a purposive sampling approach to identify 
the initial online data sources (social media sites). I then used a snowball 
sampling approach adapted for an online environment in order to identify and 
then map additional social media sites used by Rwandan CGD by utilizing site-
specific networking search functions. In this way I was able to map Rwandan 
CGD political virtual communities that were a part of broader transnational 
networks. 
Identification of Data Sources 
I developed a data collection plan that was limited to public online social 
media sites with CMCs intended for public consumption, so that all data mined 
was deemed textual and cultural artifacts, thus no informed consent was 
provided to participants. I adopted a conservative approach to determining 
whether online profiles’ CMCs, forums, and virtual communities in general 
were public or private, utilizing the guidelines provided by Eysenbach & Till 
(2001), referenced earlier in this chapter. If it was determined that an online 
profile, forum and/or virtual community was private, or that online participants 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy based on moderator/webmaster 
posts, group policies, the nature of online participants’ CMCs, the sensitive 
nature of forum topics, purpose of the virtual community, size of the virtual 
community, and the age of the online participants, then the online social media 
was excluded as a data source. To this end, I took the following steps before 
selecting a data source:  
1. Identified the existence of an online moderator’s reference to the 
public/private nature of the forum and/or virtual community, including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  “Political activities” was operationalized using Lyons’ and Mohamoud’s conceptual models.  
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whether messages were archived (thus available for a longer time 
period than online participants may have understood).  
2. Evaluated whether the posters’ intentions were to make their CMCs 
public, through an examination of privacy settings (if possible), the 
nature of the SNS, and whether the user made reference to their 
intentions.  
3. Determined the purpose of the virtual community, including whether the 
sharing of highly sensitive and confidential information was 
encouraged.  
4. Determined the age of the online participants.   
5. Determined the nature of the CMCs, including whether they would 
indicate that the textual or cultural artifacts posted were intended for 
public consumption (e.g., public blog, online newspaper). 
 
All data collected were from online sources generated by members of 
the Rwandan CGD, and all textual and cultural artifacts were of a political 
nature focusing on matters relating to the online participants’ home country of 
Rwanda; in particular, ethnonationalist conflict in Rwanda and the surrounding 
regions. Online data sources included the following: 
1. Facebook community pages and profiles39 that were clearly public with 
no personal identifying information (e.g., memorial pages, community 
groups, pseudonyms, online newspapers, etc.) used for internal and 
external mobilization, dissemination of information, recruitment, 
lobbying, debate and discussion. 
2. Twitter tweets that were posted on public Facebook pages. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 A researcher’s reflective field notes are a key component of ethnography (see Emerson, Fretz and 
Shaw, 2011), and can be adapted to virtual or online ethnography per the guidance provided by Kozinets 
(2010).  
39 Facebook’s most recent Statements of Rights and Responsibilities for individual profile users, prohibits 
naturalistic observations of individual profiles, and requires that researchers (or observers) provide 
disclosure to the individual profile user if his or her profile and posts are being observed, recorded and 
analyzed. Although many social networking sites, such as Facebook and MySpace allow users to create 
profiles with varying levels of privacy, based on Facebook’s TOS, data from online participants with 
individual identities, evidenced by the individual posting	  of	  personal	  identifying	  information,	  including	  personal	  photographs,	  were	  excluded	  as	  a	  data	  source.	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3. Typewritten articles posted on public online newspapers. 
4. Public online blogs used for internal and external mobilization, 
dissemination of information, debate and discussion.  
5. YouTube videos used for internal and external mobilization, 
dissemination of information, debate and discussion. 
6. Public websites operated by self-identified political organizations within 
the Rwandan CGD, utilized for internal and external mobilization, 
dissemination of information, debate and discussion, including posted 
position statements, open letters to dignitaries and political identities, 
and press releases available for download. 
7. Public websites operated by self-identified human rights and advocacy 
organizations located within the Rwandan CGD, used for internal and 
external mobilization, dissemination of information, debate and 
discussion. 
 
Initial data source identification began with an Internet search utilizing 
Google.com using a rage of keywords in order to locate self-identified 
members of the Rwandan CGD living in a Western host country, operating in 
virtual communities and virtual transnational networks. Keywords included 
“Rwanda,” “Rwanda conflict,” “Refugee,” “Kagame,” “Rwanda Genocide,” 
“Tutsi,” “Hutu,” “Rwanda diaspora,” “Rwanda Exile,” “Rwanda Youth,” 
“Rwanda Women,” “Rwanda opposition,” “Rwanda, Congo,” “Interahamwe,” 
“Rwanda human rights,” “Rwanda ethnic reconciliation,” “Rwanda genocide 
survivor,” “Juvenal Habyarimana” (the president of the former regime), 
Theoneste Bagosora (often considered the “architect” of the genocide), the 
“FDLR,” “RPF,” “RPA,” and “Hutu refugee.” More specific keywords included 
political opposition groups currently operating out of the diaspora and in the 
Great Lakes Region, such as the RCD (Tutsi), CNDP (Tutsi), FDU-Inkingi 
(Hutu), P.S. Imberakuri (Hutu), PDR-Ihumure (Hutu), as well as prominent 
members of these groups, such as Bosco Ntganda (former leader of the 
CNDP), and Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza (president of FDU-Inkingi). Using 
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these keywords served as a starting point for the search process, and were 
designed to potentially “tap into” any CMCs with related tagged words. Once 
some potential data sources were identified, the process of searching for 
additional data sources became a creative and intuitive process, where one 
identified source opened the door to potentially new sources. 
Additional SNSs were discovered through politically-oriented public 
profiles on Facebook that linked to other social media forums.  For instance, 
many identified public profiles on Facebook included website links in the 
“About” section to other social networking sites the online identities facilitated. 
Further, most CMCs posted on politically-oriented public domains included 
links to online blogs, online newspaper articles, YouTube videos, online radio 
stations, and other public websites, for the purposes of the dissemination of 
information and propaganda. The way in which linked social media sites were 
discovered depended upon the functionality of the original SNS being viewed. 
For instance, public Facebook pages and Twitter accounts allow users to view 
others’ connections, and members of the same online group. Identifying online 
identities engaging in political dynamics and conflict in Rwanda became easier 
as the process evolved (e.g., profile photos depicting a former regime leader, 
or a photo of Rwanda’s pre-genocide flag). Group memberships, “likes,” and 
“shares” were also cross-referenced. 
Since the largest data source was Facebook, it is important to further 
clarify how public profiles were distinguished from individual identities in order 
to remain in compliance with Facebook’s TOC, and the AoIR Ethics Working 
Committee’s ethical guidelines. All profiles deemed public that were selected 
as data sources included no personal information, but rather utilized a 
pseudonym, had a profile photograph that was politically related (i.e., a 
political figure, a flag, a cultural artifact, a famous advocate such as Nelson 
Mandela or Martin Luther King, Jr., etc.), and included information that clearly 
indicated that the profile owner(s) had an expectation (and even a desire) that 
the profile was intended to be public. For instance, one Facebook profile that 
was deemed public included the following statement in the “About” section: 
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“We are a Rwandan opposition party in exile, formed by young, 
disillusioned by anti-democratic practices [sic], ... IF YOU WANT TO 
HELP, JOIN U.S., [sic] YES WE CAN Educate young people around you.” The 
profile then included a link to the organization’s online blog located outside of 
Facebook. Other examples of statements on Facebook profiles indicating the 
expectation that the content was intended for public consumption include the 
following: “We must remember that one determined person can make a 
significant difference, and that a small group of determined people can change 
the course of history. Stay tunned [sic]!!!” The profile then included a link to the 
owner(s)’ YouTube channel, and Twitter account. Another example of a 
Facebook profile deemed public included a statement in the “About” section 
pleading with all observers to disseminate the profile link widely so that they 
could have “open debate” about politically-related topics affecting Rwanda, 
and to “get the word out.” Again, each profile selected as a data source for the 
present study included no personal information and no information that could 
be connected with an individual.  
An additional way of determining the public or private nature of a SNS, 
and its associated CMCs included the manner in which the online identity 
posted CMCs, including the level of boldness (if any) in their online 
engagement. For instance, it would be a reasonable expectation that 
members of the Rwandan diaspora who are ardent opponents of the current 
government of Rwanda would be fearful of the Rwandan government 
discovering their hostile and critical CMCs. Yet, a significant number of online 
identities not only openly posted critical comments about the current Rwandan 
government, but often they posted these CMCs on the Facebook walls and 
Twitter accounts of key members of the Rwandan government, as well as on 
SNSs of government agencies in their host countries. 
Data Collection 
Data was collected over a 10-month period from April of 2012 through 
May of 2013, with most CMCs collected being posted between 2009 and 
2013. Data was collected through sustained immersion in a range of SNSs, 
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defined as monitoring the sites for between four to seven hours per day, five 
out of seven days per week. Data that was mined from identified data sources 
included CMCs posted as statuses (Facebook, Twitter, etc.), and interactive 
discussions in response to statuses; online newspaper articles, including 
related interactive comments; blogs, including related interactive comments; 
photographs posted on various SNSs; Facebook “Notes”; YouTube videos, 
and online radio stations. Data also included the nature of linkages, and 
networked patterns, such as posting a YouTube video or link to an online radio 
on a Facebook wall or website, linking Twitter with Facebook, posting an 
online newspaper story on Facebook, or Twitter; patterns noted with regard to 
posted CMCs, such as frequency of postings, duplicative postings, and 
number of “likes,” “shares,” and “seen” on Facebook. Due to the Rwandan 
diaspora’s prolific use of Facebook, the Facebook community pages included 
in the ethnographic survey served as the initial site of immersion in the study, 
with linked SNS sites such as Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest, online newspapers, 
blogs, and other related websites, such as organizations and charities.  
The physical collection of data was accomplished in a number of ways. 
First, all data sources were bookmarked using Google Chrome, a freeware 
web browser. If a social media site was compatible with printing (i.e., all 
information was formatted to correctly appear on the printed page, including 
photographs) then the data was saved as PDF through the “print to PDF 
function” and saved to a laptop. Documents available for download from public 
websites, blogs, online newspapers and Facebook, such as press releases, 
lobbying letters to dignitaries and government figures, and photographs, were 
downloaded to a laptop. Downloaded documents were kept in their original 
format with original file names, and were also saved to PDF format and given 
a document name reflecting the data source, data type, truncated date, and 
any other identifying information deemed pertinent. Data contained in the 
“Properties” section under “File” in Microsoft Word documents were collected 
in order to determine the date of creation. 
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Since new social media provides for communication that extends far 
beyond the text-based CMC it was important to utilize a data collection method 
that permitted the capturing of the entire screen. For instance, text-based 
CMC on many social media sites often includes appended photographs, 
emoticons, various types of icons, as well as other visually-based data 
providing links to related data (e.g., linked groups, user “likes,” etc.). 
Boellstorff, et al. (2012) recommend the taking of screenshots40 in order to 
capture visual elements of an online environment constituting cultural artifacts, 
stating that screenshots: 
…can help illustrate an observation or show the appearance of the 
virtual world we are studying. They can jog our memories, reminding us 
about a significant event or issue. A screenshot, for instance, can 
provide an instant summary of who was present at an event or help us 
recall patterns of movement and visual details. We can also use 
screenshot analysis to provide a visual explanation of cultural 
phenomena (p. 115-116). 
 
Screenshots were particularly useful in the present study since “print to 
PDF” often captured only a single live segment of the screen, and omitted 
other segments that were relevant to the data. Further, since CMC can be 
deleted, a screenshot provides holistic information about each data source 
that may only be available for a short time (such as the website address). 
Each screenshot was saved in two formats, in the original .jpg format with the 
auto file name signifying the date and time of the shot, and as a PDF 
document with a given file name reflecting the data source, data type, 
truncated date, and any other identifying information deemed pertinent. Saving 
all .jpg documents in PDF format also allowed for the redacting of CMC posted 
by online participants with individual profiles.  
All data was retained on an Apple MacBook Pro that was password 
protected, as well as an Apple iPad for the purposes of data management. 
The data on the Apple iPad was managed using an App called Photo Manager 
Pro by Linkus, which allowed for the initial organization of data into thematic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 A ‘screenshot’ is a system photograph taken of the laptop desktop, by pressing CMD, Shift and 3 keys 
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folders titled during the data analysis stage. Data was backed up to an Apple 
Time Machine hard drive over a wireless connection that was password 
protected and encrypted. Data was additionally backed up to Digital Dropbox, 
a private, password protected web-based document storage site, which 
allowed for mobile access.   
Translation of Data 
The majority of the CMC were written in a combination of English, 
French and Kinyarwanda (the native language of Rwanda). English is my 
native language, and I have a working knowledge of French, but used Google 
online translator as a back up, in order to confirm an accurate translation.  
Translating the CMC written in Kinyarwanda was more complicated due to the 
challenge inherent in finding a certified translator who could translate the text 
accurately, without risk of bias. Because of Rwanda’s history of 
ethnonationalist conflict between Tutsis and Hutu, it was assumed that there 
was some potential that a Rwandan translator would translate content through 
a biased lens, influenced by historical narratives. In order to minimize this risk, 
I contracted two certified translators for the purposes of cross-verification. 
Although both translators disclosed that they were Tutsi, increasing the 
potential for some bias, they also disclosed that they were raised in the 
diaspora thus were not in the country during the genocide. The issue of 
language translation will be explored in a subsequent chapter, in the section 
on possible limitations of the study, but it is important to note that from a 
methodological perspective significant attempts were made to limit the 
possibility of bias (conscious and unconscious) in the translation process. 
Data Analysis 
There is no one officially sanctioned way of analyzing data collected in 
an ethnographic study, including virtual ethnography, and in fact, data analysis 
methods used in ethnography have often been shrouded in mystery 
(Boellstorff, et al., 2012). Boellstroff, et al. (2012), assert that data analysis in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
simultaneously. 
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virtual ethnography is “profoundly exploratory and deeply identified with 
discovery... a rigorous intellectual process of working deeply and intimately 
with ideas” (p. 159).  Although there are computer software programs 
designed to aid in the analysis of qualitative data, Boellstroff, et al, strongly 
discourage their use asserting that “it is erroneous to assume that a piece of 
technology (which, incidentally, is made by people) can do the interpretive 
work of a thoughtful human mind” (p. 166). Thus, in the present study I did not 
rely upon a computer software program for qualitative analysis, but rather, 
followed the guidance of Boellstroff, et al. (2012) in analyzing ethnographic 
data using a thematic analysis approach adapted for an online environment to 
analyze both the field notes, as well as the data collected from time immersed 
in the “field.”  
Thematic analysis has historically been considered a tool to encode 
qualitative data in a systematic and disciplined way, particularly when the data 
is rich and complex (Boyatzis, 1998). Yet thematic analysis can also be used 
in a manner that is flexible and adaptable. According to Braun & Clarke (2006) 
thematic analysis is a very effective method for qualitative research because it 
has the potential to provide “a rich and detailed, yet complex account of data” 
(p. 78). Thematic analysis is a particularly effective method for analyzing data 
mined from a virtual field since it allows the researcher the flexibility to deeply 
reflect upon the data in a systematic manner without being too rigid. This is 
important, particularly in light of Boellstroff, et al.’s assertion that data analysis 
in ethnographic research, particularly virtual ethnography, is “deeply personal, 
almost idiosyncratic,” involving “stretching cognitive and perceptual horizons to 
encounter, absorb, and react to relevant literatures and conversations” (p. 
160).  Thematic analysis of online data mined from a virtual field must be 
approached creatively and with flexibility in a way that supports the researcher 
in “finding, creating, and bringing thoughtful, provocative, productive ideas to 
acts of writing” (p. 159). Additionally, the data analysis scheme is developed 
after data collection, not before as with other qualitative research approaches. 
Boellstroff et al, note that waiting until after the data is mined to develop the 
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data analysis plan allows the researcher to be more responsive to the 
unexpected, stating “it is up to us to develop sound, persuasive arguments 
about what we find interesting, and to convince others that these arguments 
illuminate our data and speak to crucial concerns and debates” (p. 160).  
Approaching data analysis in this more flexible and reflective manner is 
particularly important since ethnographic data is “culturally situated” thus the 
researcher must be able to “modify methods and research questions to 
respond to what we find in the field” (p. 160).    
Thematic analysis defined broadly is a data analysis technique that is 
used in many qualitative approaches to identify themes or schemas through 
the methodical, thoughtful and repeated reading of the qualitative data 
(Attride–Stirling, 2001). Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) describe thematic 
analysis as “a form of pattern recognition within the data, where emerging 
themes become the categories for analysis” (p. 4). Boyatzis (1998) describes 
thematic analysis as: 
A way of seeing, a way of making sense out of seemingly unrelated 
material, a way of analyzing qualitative information, a way of 
systematically observing a person, an interaction, a group, a situation, 
an organization, or a culture, a way of converting qualitative information 
into qualitative data (p. 5).  
 
Themes are described as patterns observed in complex information that 
assist the researcher in organizing, then interpreting various phenomena 
within the data. In thematic analysis, thematic categories are not 
predetermined by the researcher, but are allowed to “emerge” as the 
researcher explores the data. Thus, in thematic analysis the researcher can 
include newly recognized themes throughout the analysis process, rather than 
adhering to the predetermined coded list of themes/patterns. In fact, a key 
aspect of thematic analysis involves the development of a set of skills within 
the researcher, that allows him or her to recognize patterns and themes within 
a data set through the “careful reading and re-reading of the data” throughout 
the analysis process (Rice & Ezzy, 1999, p. 258).  
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Thematic analysis generally occurs in two levels – the initial coding of 
the data, and then “thematicizing” the coded data. The process of encoding 
involves the classification and analysis of themes seen in the data, with the 
ultimate goal of developing a “code book” that is then used as a guide in the 
on-going process of interpretation and analysis of the thematic patterns seen 
in the data (Boyatzis, 1998). Upon reviewing and re-reviewing the data 
collected in the present study, as well as considerable reflection of both the 
data and the relevant literature, numerous patterns emerged that allowed for 
the coding of data. Once the data was coded, it was organized thematically. I 
created numerous documents that assisted me in thematically organizing the 
data in a way that demonstrated a variety of patterns and themes. For 
instance, I used Microsoft Excel to assist with the mapping of online identities, 
noting screen names, additional social media accounts that are cross-
referenced with the identity, associated charities, etc. Additional tools related 
to coding and thematic analysis will be explored in the subsequent chapter 
focusing on the results of the data analysis.  
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The Nature of Rwandan Diaspora Political Engagement and their 
Motivations, Patterns and Outcomes 
 
The data being analyzed in this study, as referenced in Chapter 5, was 
drawn from several sources and consistent with methods used in ethnography 
including “hard data” as well as the general impressions and experiences of 
the researcher as noted in an ethnographic journal. Hard data consisted of 
946 screen shots of CMCs on SNSs (drawn from the original collection of 
2031 screen shots 41), as well as 37 photographs, and 22 PDF documents 
(e.g., political party statements, media releases, open letters to political 
figures.) mined while engaging in the ethnographic immersion of the Rwandan 
CGD virtual transnational networks. 42  Yet, consistent with Hine’s principles of 
virtual ethnography, rather than being immersed in specific field sites, data 
was drawn by following the field connections of approximately 121 deeply 
nested and densely intertwined online identities. Also consistent with virtual 
ethnography methodologies, the results also include the author’s impressions, 
insights and experiences gleaned while engaging in the extended intermittent 
ethnographic immersion, recorded in an ethnographic journal. In addition, 
numerous documents were collected for the purposes of triangulation, 
including ICTR transcripts and exhibits, and other historical documents (e.g., 
Karunga newspaper articles, mainstream media articles about the Rwandan 
genocide, UN documents about the ethnonationalist conflict in Rwanda). 
In order to comply with the ethical framework and guidelines adopted in 
this study, a conservative approach was taken in what was determined to be 
within the public domain. As such, the data in its entirety is not included in the 
appendices, as revealing this information could potentially lead to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Several screen shots were not included in the analysis, either because they were not political in 
nature, or included CMCs posted by real identities. 
42 The term ‘online identity’ is used throughout this chapter to identify SNS users, facilitators and/or 
‘admins,” thus the use of this term does not reflect a personal identity or individual. For instance, one 
online identity may represent an individual using a pseudonym, a political opposition or a virtual 
community operating within the broader network.   
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inadvertent disclosure of data not included in the study. For instance, many 
screen shots included the entire URL of the SNSs, CMCs posted by online 
identities that may not be using pseudonyms, and non-political CMCs. Thus 
revealing the data in its entirety opens up the possibility of violating a SNSs’ 
TOS, and the ethical guidelines adopted in this study. A balance was struck by 
including examples of what the data revealed in text format, as well as 
“snippets” of CMCs in the appendices that accurately reflect the nature of the 
data collected and analyzed. The entire data set remains intact, in electronic 
format on a password protected hard drive and online cloud service as 
specified in Chapter 5. 
An analysis of the hard data, in combination with the information 
gleaned through the ethnographic immersion (consistent with the tradition of 
ethnography) demonstrated that the online identities included in this study 
used SNSs in a variety of ways for purposes related to their political 
engagement in homeland affairs and homeland conflict, including fund-raising; 
lobbying the host country (and international community); dissemination of anti-
Tutsi propaganda (against the Rwandan government and President Kagame, 
primarily); and mobilizing other diaspora to engage in politically-related 
activities, such as participating in anti-Kagame demonstrations, letter-writing, 
and signing petitions. The first part of this chapter explores the nature of the 
virtual transnational networks within which the online identities operated (the 
“who,” the “what,” the “why,” and the “how”), whereas the second part of this 
chapter presents an analysis of the themes and sub-themes that emerged in 
the process of subjecting the data to an ethnographic thematic analysis. 
Identification of Diaspora Status and Ethnic Membership: The “Who” 
Virtually all Rwandan diaspora included in the study who actively used 
social media to engage politically in homeland affairs and homeland conflict, 
and who were represented by one or more online identities, self-identified as 
Hutu. Further, the online identities included in the study engaged in online 
activities of a political nature using public pages and profiles on Facebook, 
public online blogs, public websites, online newspapers, and public Twitter 
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accounts. And although no personal identifying information was included on 
any SNS or computer-mediated communication (CMC) used in this study, the 
nature of the posts, as well as the descriptions of the identities in the “bio” and 
“About” sections indicated that those posting CMCs of a political nature, were 
likely male. For instance, despite using pseudonyms, online dialogues 
consistently referred to each other using male personal pronouns and terms 
such as “brother.” With regard to age, among those online identities that 
appeared to represent a single identity (i.e., authors of online newspapers) 
and who made reference to their age in some respect, it appeared as though 
most online identities included in the study represented both those who were 
adults during the genocide (determined by the sharing of personal 
experiences that signified an age range, such as “I was in college during the 
genocide…”), as well as those who were children during the genocide (i.e., “I 
was seven years old when we fled to the Congo, and my father was arrested 
for genocide crimes…”).  
A search for Tutsi diaspora groups using social media for political 
purposes was largely unsuccessful. Four public Facebook pages were located 
that appeared to have primarily Tutsi members, although these SNSs were not 
used for political purposes, but rather for social purposes. For instance, two 
SNSs appeared to focus on the facilitation of social gatherings within the 
diaspora, and two SNSs were dedicated to genocide survivor causes. The 
former two groups were generally active, but the CMCs were clearly social in 
nature, and while the latter two groups contained some CMCs that could be 
considered somewhat political, the SNSs were generally inactive, with the 
most recent CMC being posted in 2009.  
The majority of online identities self-identified as Hutu in a very direct 
manner, demonstrated by CMCs 1) declaring membership in the Hutu ethnic 
group, 2) advocating for a Hutu cause such as Parmehutu ideology, and/or 3) 
describing ethnic affiliation in the “About” section of an SNS that self-identified 
as Hutu (e.g., “I am Hutu…” “We are proud to be Hutu…” “We are a Hutu 
youth fighting for our country…”).  Essentially, online identities included in the 
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study primarily fell within the following six categories: 1) Memorial pages and 
Facebook profiles dedicated to members of the former Hutu regime, 2) open 
groups and memorial pages dedicated to Hutus killed in post-genocide 
violence (particularly in the DRC), 3) Hutu rebel groups self-identified as 
political opposition parties based in the diaspora, 4) Diaspora-based human 
rights groups fighting for social justice and democracy in Rwanda, 5) Diaspora 
online identities dedicated to Hutu Power, and 6) Diaspora-based online 
media, most commonly in the form of online newspapers and online radio 
stations. It is important to note though that there was some overlap in these 
categories, particularly with the final category, the diaspora-facilitated online 
newspapers. 
The first category of online identities included those dedicated to 
members of the former Rwandan regime, including Hutus who were known for 
their adherence to Hutu Power (Parmehutu) ideology, as well as for those who 
engaged actively in the genocide against the Tutsi. Some of these SNSs were 
established and facilitated as if the former regime members were the actual 
profile owners, and others were established as memorial pages. Examples of 
the former include eleven Facebook profiles that were named after the former 
president, Juvenal Habyarimana, ten of which were created as if Habyarimana 
himself was facilitating the page and writing the CMCs, with the remaining 
page having been established as a true memorial page. Most of these SNSs 
were simply called “Juvenal Habyarimana” or “Habyarimana Juvenal,” and 
included the former president’s actual hometown, and educational and work 
experiences (i.e., “Presidence-Rwanda”). Many of the CMCs were written as if 
authored by Habyarimana himself, and included what appeared to be primarily 
propaganda, focusing almost exclusively on the current Rwandan government, 
with a particular focus on the Tutsi president, Paul Kagame (i.e., “Kagame is a 
real killer for sure I do not know why God created him and yet he is a 
murderer...”). CMCs posted on these SNSs also included dedications to 
Habyarimana, as well as posts reflecting a nostalgic longing for the past. 
Several of the SNSs also included online photo albums containing cultural 
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artifacts pertaining to the former president. For example, a photo album 
contained on one of the memorial pages contained six photographs of 
Habyarimana when he was president of Rwanda, and had the following title 
and description: “PRESIDENT OF RWANDA FROM 1973-1994…This is the 
album to help the children of Rwanda know and understand the history of 
Rwanda.”  
Another Facebook page was named after Theoneste Bagosora, the 
architect of the genocide against the Tutsi, who was convicted by the ICTR for 
genocide crimes, and is currently serving a life sentence in Arusha, Tanzania. 
This page was also operated as if Bagosora was the owner and facilitator. The 
Theoneste Bagosora open Facebook community page had 230 “friends,” 
many of which were online identities included in the study. Although the 
facilitator(s) of the Theoneste Bagosora page rarely posted CMCs, the page 
appeared to be used for three primary purposes: 1) the dissemination of 
propaganda, 2) the memorializing of Bagosora, and 3) expressing sentimental 
nostalgia (e.g., wishing Bagosora a happy birthday, expressions of missing 
Bagosora, referring to him as a hero, etc.). 
The second category of online identities included memorial pages 
dedicated to survivors of post-genocide violence, including those killed in Hutu 
refugee camps in Rwanda and the DRC (formerly Zaire). Two such online 
identities were “TingiTingi Survivors” and “Tingi Tingi Congo” both named after 
the Tingi Tingi refugee camp in Kinsasha, DRC. Additionally, some SNSs were 
dedicated to those killed at the Kibeho refugee camps in southwest Rwanda 
(explored in Chapter 4). These SNSs included both textual artifacts as well as 
cultural artifacts in the form of CMC containing analysis, dedications and 
commentary, and photographs of victims (respectively). 
The third category of online identities appeared to be created and 
facilitated by Hutu political opposition/rebel groups operating out of the 
diaspora (many of which were referenced in Chapter 4). Online identities 
within this category facilitated a range of SNSs, such as public Facebook 
pages, public websites, online blogs, and online media (newspapers and radio 
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stations), most of which were facilitated in a simultaneous fashion. For 
instance, many of the major Hutu political opposition group formed in the 
diaspora that utilized SNSs for political purposes also facilitated a YouTube 
channel and an Internet Radio station, both of which were disseminated on 
almost a daily basis via Facebook and Twitter.  Additionally, most of the online 
identities operating within in this category were overt in identifying their 
organizational affiliation, but were at times were covert in identifying the ways 
in which their various SNSs were linked. The majority of major political 
opposition groups created in the diaspora (as explored in Chapter 4) appeared 
to facilitate numerous SNSs. For instance, two online identities were named 
after Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, president of the political opposition group, 
FDU-Inkingi, who is currently imprisoned in Rwanda. Online identities named 
on behalf of Victoire and her political party included five public Facebook 
pages and Twitter accounts entitled “Free-Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza,” FDU-
Inkingi, including “FDU Musanze Rwanda,” “FDU-Inkingi-Musanze-Rwanda,” 
and “FDU-Inkingi FDU-Inkingi.” These SNSs were coordinated with the party’s 
public website and blog. Several other Hutu-dominated opposition groups also 
facilitated a rage of SNSs, including public Facebook pages, public websites, 
online newspapers, and/or public Twitter accounts, each of which was 
represented by pseudonyms. These political opposition groups, and 
corresponding SNSs include PDR-Ihumure (“Pdr Ihumure”), PDP-Imanzi 
(“Pdp-imanzi Parti de Mushayidi”), and PS Imberakuri (“Imberakuri PS PS”).  
Additional Hutu political opposition groups formed in the diaspora 
facilitated SNSs as well. For instance, a newer political group called 
Movement for the Liberation of Rwanda (“MLR Rwanda”) self-identified as a 
movement formed by disillusioned Rwandan youth in the diaspora, 
announcing on its primary SNS: “We are a Rwandan opposition political party 
formed by young, disappointed [sic] by anti-democratic practices,….” The 
“About” statement on a related blog was similar, but written in French, stating: 
“We are a political opposition party formed by young Rwandans in exile, 
disillusioned by anti-democratic practices, which, since independence, 
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continued to be applied by power-hungry leaders (posted in French as, “Nous 
sommes un partipolitique d’opposition Rwandaise en exil, formé par des 
jeunes, déçus par des pratiques anti-démocratiques, qui, depuis 
l’indépendance, ont continué à être appliqués par des chefs assoiffés du 
pouvoir”). Often the only personal identifying information included on these 
SNSs pertained to party leaders, while those engaging in the postings (on 
behalf of the leaders) were identified with pseudonyms and profile photos 
reflecting a range of cultural symbols pertaining to human rights and/or 
Rwanda. 
The fourth category of online identities included organizations that 
appeared or purported to exist for the purposes of advocating for human rights 
and democracy in Rwanda, often in opposition to the current Tutsi-dominated 
government. The nature and goals of these online identities was demonstrated 
in a variety of ways, including in the SNSs’ “About” or “Bio” sections (which 
often included goals of the organization), the nature of the CMCs, as well as 
the names of the online identity profiles and pages. For example, most of the 
online identities identifying their goals as advocating for human rights and 
democracy in Rwanda had names with words such as freedom, justice, 
reconciliation, patriotic, democracy and human rights (e.g., “Freedom for 
Rwanda Now,” “Justice Rwanda Reconciliation,” “Fight Democracy 
Rwanda”43). This category also included several online identities with 
Kagame’s name included, reflecting disdain for him in some respect. For 
instance, Kagame’s name was often combined with English, French and/or 
Kinyarwanda words such as “anti,” “hate,” “dictator,” “genocidaire,” and “evil.” 
Although these online identities had names that appeared to be intentionally 
offensive to the Rwandan government, they included descriptive information in 
their “About” and “Bio” sections that in some respect related to fighting for 
human rights, democracy, peace and reconciliation in Rwanda. For instance, 
one online identity included the following statement in its “About” section: “We 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 These are is not actual online identities name, but serves as an example of how the names of the 
online identities were structured. 
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hate Kagame and his dictatorship. We are looking for people (men and 
women) who're ready to bring a non violent fight against him.” Yet in a 
subsequent section pertaining to the organization’s goals, the following 
statement was included: “[…] association aims to promote socio-cultural 
exchanges on the Great Lakes region and conduct projects for peace, justice, 
coexistence and development in this region.”  Many of the online identities in 
this section also included profile photos and logos reflecting a commitment to 
peace and social justice. For instance, many online identities included the 
same logo with a picture of a balance weight scale representing justice, and 
the acronym ERFR, which standards for “Equal Rights for Rwandans.” Despite 
the focus on human rights, virtually all CMCs posted on these SNSs were 
highly political in nature, and included content that was often quite aggressive 
and conflictual in nature.  
The fifth category of online identities included in the study focused on 
themes related to Hutu Power consistent with Parmehutu ideology. Many 
online identities within this category facilitated SNSs with the word “Hutu” in 
their pseudonyms along with terms reflecting pride and/or power, or names 
that demonstrated their cause in some respect. For instance, one online 
identity facilitated an SNS entitled “I am Proud to be a Hutu […]” using a 
combination of English, French and Kinyarwanda. In the “About” section the 
facilitators included the following statement (in part) also in a combination of 
English, French and Kinyarwanda: 
This group is to restore the dignity of all Hutus' dignity damaged by the 
regime of the dictator and war criminal Bwana Paul Kagome. Whose 
regime has shed Hutu blood as a glass of water without any attention to 
the suffering of the children of Rwanda. ...[…]…Say I am proud to be a 
Hutu by joining this group and inviting other Hutus we all know who are 
proud to be a Hutu.... go and read the story of RUKARA RWA 
BISHINGWE...44 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  A famous Hutu chief during pre-Colonial Rwanda known for his rebellion against the Tutsi 
king and his murder of a missionary sent to manage rebellious Hutu chiefs in the northern part 
of the country, and rumored murders of German soldiers sent to arrest him. Rukara rwa 
Bishingwe became a national hero among Hutus representing collective rebellion against Tutsi 
domination. 
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Additionally, several online identities within this category used the term “the 
Fifth Column,” a term that refers to those within a country that sympathizes 
with invading rebels, or enemy invaders.  
SNSs that focused on Hutu Power often included what appeared to be 
relatively recent photographs and videos of FDLR soldiers with machine guns 
and traditional weapons used during the genocide, as well as photographs 
and videos allegedly of Rwandan soldiers in the Congo (Tutsis) who were 
captured, and some of whom appeared dead. CMCs on these SNSs included 
prayers for their “brothers and sisters” in the FLDR, and one “Hutu Power” 
SNS was used to post recent YouTube “documentaries” of FDLR soldiers, 
featuring their daily rituals (including their evening prayers). Additionally, 
several of these online identities listed Parmehutu under political views. Many 
of these SNSs were used to disseminate positive propaganda about Hutu 
Power, and the FDLR in particular, as well as anti-Tutsi propaganda.  
 The sixth category of online identities included online media, including 
online newspapers, online videos, and Internet radio stations. Although many 
online identities falling within each category listed above also facilitated online 
media, many of the online media SNSs emerged as a distinct category, in that 
some appeared to be facilitated by self-identified journalists in exile from 
Rwanda. The online newspapers included Jambo News, ReDacteur en Chef, 
Inyenyerinews, Jambo Asbl, and Rwanda Infozone.  The majority of the online 
newspapers had affiliated and integrated Facebook, Twitter and YouTube 
accounts. These SNSs appeared to serve as a mirror to the online 
newspapers and radio stations. For instance, Jambo News, an online 
newspaper facilitated by diaspora members in Brussels, was facilitated as 
both a dedicated public webpage as well as a public Facebook page 
(“Redacteur en Chef – Jambo News”), with the Facebook page being used to 
disseminate linked new stories generated from its primary website. The self-
identified purpose of this online newspaper states that it exists to “…inform our 
readers on current issues affecting the Great Lakes of Africa in general and in 
	  	   188 
Rwanda,” a statement included on both it’s public website, as well as on its 
public Facebook page. Additional online newspapers included “Inyenyerinews 
Inyenyeri,” and “The Rwandan,” each of which used Facebook in the same 
manner, as a mirror of their corresponding public websites, for the purposes of 
further dissemination. Three online radio stations were also facilitated by 
diaspora online identities included in the study, using Blogtalkradio.com. Each 
online radio was also linked to a corresponding Facebook page and Twitter 
account. Numerous YouTube channels were identified that were facilitated by 
online identities identifying themselves as documentary filmmakers and 
journalists. These channels were also linked to public Facebook pages and 
Twitter accounts, operated by the same online identities. Additionally, the 
online media included in this category purported to cover a wide range of 
topics, although the majority of the published stories focused solely on politics 
and conflict in Rwanda and the DRC, with virtually all stories reflecting 
negative criticism of the current Rwandan government.  
Virtual Transnational Networks and Networking: The “How” 
The online identities included in the study were operating in large virtual 
transnational networks that appeared to be based on a sense of collective 
identity, shared ethnic affiliation, a shared history of trauma, as well as what is 
often referred to as the “exile condition”—the experience of being forced from 
one’s homeland and living as an outsider in a new land. Online identities 
operating within the virtual network also were drawn together through a 
relatively clear set of collective goals, which were demonstrated in the nature 
of the SNSs within which they operated, and by the CMCs they posted. 
Further, the online identities were located within the Rwandan diaspora, 
primarily in North America and Western Europe.  
The locations of the online identities were determined in a variety of 
ways, including the biographical information contained on the online identity’s 
SNS, as well as by the “GeoStamp”45 contained adjacent to CMCs, a feature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Also called a “Geotag” 
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included with several SNSs, including Facebook and Twitter. The majority of 
SNSs contained information that explicitly identified the location of the posters, 
including making clear that the facilitators were members of the Rwandan 
diaspora. In some instances though, there appeared to be an attempt to 
indicate that the SNS facilitators were residing in Kigali, Rwanda, while the 
CMCs demonstrated a location stamp within the diaspora. For instance, one 
SNS consisted of an open Facebook page facilitated by Rwandans, with a 
pseudonym with the word “freedom,” and a profile photo of Malcolm X (a 
famous U.S. black activist). The “current city” was listed as Kigali, Rwanda, yet 
the GeoStamp on all CMCs showed that the “geolocation” was Brussels, 
Belgium. In instances where the biographical information conflicted with the 
CMC location stamp, the location was determined based on the location 
stamp.  
As previously stated, CMCs were posted primarily from Western 
regions, such as North America (United States and Canada), and Western 
Europe (primarily the UK, France and the Netherlands). The CMCs from the 
United States originated from throughout the country, but tended to be 
concentrated in immigrant gateway communities, such as Indiana, Kentucky, 
Ohio, and Texas (known to have high concentrations of Rwandan diaspora), 
as well as large urban centers, such as Washington, D.C. and Chicago, 
Illinois. The majority of CMCs from Europe originated in Brussels and the UK. 
Additionally, a smaller proportion of posts originated from Uganda, South 
Africa and Zambia. Further, while a content analysis was not conducted in this 
study, it appears as though many of the original CMCs posted by the 
Rwandan diaspora online identities were from a smaller group of “power 
posters” and “power tweeters,” with the majority of networked online identities 
(also from the Rwandan diaspora) reposting and re-tweeting the original 
CMCs.  
How Networks Developed and Grew 
Online identities included in the study networked (i.e., connected) in 
several ways, with the primary motivation for becoming networked appearing 
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to be based on the perception of mutual interest and mutual causes (i.e., like-
mindedness). Since the primary purpose of SNSs is to encourage the 
development of increasingly broad networks of online identities, there are 
numerous ways that like-minded people can find each other online, including 
CMCs appearing on feeds and walls of unrelated online identities, unrelated 
online identities posting CMCs in an open group, or community page focused 
on a particular cause or collective goal, and online identities requesting to be 
added to unrelated online users’ networks on the basis of mutual connections 
and mutual causes. For instance, it was common to note the simultaneous 
adding of the same online identities among many of the identities included in 
the study (e.g., online Identities A, B and C would be added to numerous 
networks on the same day). Additionally, many of the open groups on 
Facebook had thousands of members, thus the potential for networks to grow 
quickly and significantly (among like-minded people) was substantial.  
How Online Identities SNSs were Linked  
The majority of online identities had several SNSs, including Facebook, 
Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube channels, public blogs, online radios, online 
newspapers and public websites. Online identities that facilitated more than 
one SNS often linked them together in a variety of ways. For instance, linked 
SNSs may be included on each SNS bio section (e.g., the inclusion of an 
associated website and/or Twitter account in the “About” section), as well as 
by utilizing the SNSs’ integrative functionality that permits the linking of 
multiple SNSs facilitated by the same online identity. Thus, many online 
identities linked their Facebook accounts to their Twitter accounts so that all 
CMCs on Twitter simultaneously appeared as status posts on Facebook (see 
Appendix F for an example).  
How Networking Occurred between Online Identities  
Networking occurred within the virtual transnational networks in ways 
that appeared designed to disseminate information within the network and 
beyond, to the maximum capacity (a dynamic often called “going viral”). With 
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regard to what online identities most frequently posted or tweeted (the nature 
of CMC contents will be explored in more detail in subsequent sections), the 
majority of CMCs included photographs and links to online content on another 
SNSs, such as photographs posted on other sites, news stories from 
mainstream media outlets, and content from diaspora online newspapers, 
public blogs, and online media, such as radio stations. 
A common way of disseminating online content throughout the network 
involved the utilization of the “share” option integrated into most online 
mediums, which permits the instantaneous posting of the online material onto 
one’s own SNSs (see Appendix G for examples). Online identities included in 
the study also engaged in networking through the reposting of a connection’s 
CMCs onto one’s own SNS. For instance, Facebook has a function that allows 
online identities to click a “share” icon adjacent to a networked friend’s wall, 
which then allows the user to share the friend’s CMC on their own wall (now 
called a timeline), the walls/timelines of selected online identities within the 
network, or the wall/timelines of a group and/or community page in which they 
are a member. Similarly, Twitter permits users to re-tweet the tweets of those 
they are following or tweets posted on public Twitter accounts to their own 
twitter feeds. Another method observed for disseminating CMCs, including 
cultural artifacts, was the practice of “tagging”46 a post or photo with several 
networked “friends” names so that the CMC appeared on all of their Facebook 
walls, and/or Twitter feeds. This practice was most frequently utilized as a 
form of dissemination when an online identity wanted to share a photograph, 
cartoon, or online news article with a wide range of people. For instance, a 
photograph of the pre-genocide Rwandan flag, or a doctored photograph of 
President Paul Kagame was posted with approximately 30 networked friends’ 
names tagged. Tagging a photo with an online identity’s name results in the 
photograph being permanently placed in the tagged identity’s photo album 
(unless the online identity refused the tag).  
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Another interesting trend revealed in the analysis of the data is what 
appeared to be a newer, and increasingly utilized practice (for networking 
purposes) of posting the same CMC numerous times on the same SNS. For 
instance, many online identities in the study posted or tweeted the same CMC 
three times in a row, often within a few minute timeframe. A newer function on 
many SNSs permits observers to see how many times a post is seen and how 
many times it has been shared, and it appeared as though the repeated 
posting of the same CMC may significantly increase the likelihood of greater 
dissemination, with more identities viewing the material, as well as reposting 
the CMC on their own SNSs. It was not uncommon to view the same news 
story (favorable to an online identity’s particular cause) posted repeatedly on 
linked SNSs over a prolonged period of time, which due to the extended 
immersion in the Rwandan diaspora online networks revealed the way in 
which content often “went viral” on a global basis.  
For instance, if an online identity included in the study had thousands of 
online connections in overlapping networks of linkages (i.e., mutual friends on 
Facebook, or members of the same open group, following each other on 
Twitter, and/or connected on LinkedIn), then one CMC posted on a Facebook 
wall and tweeted on Twitter could potentially appear on thousands of 
networked SNS sites. Yet since not all CMCs appear on all networked sites 
consistently (i.e., only a small percentage of networked friends’ CMCs will 
appear at any given time on one’s SNS, depending on the frequency of a user 
checking the SNS, and other variables such as individual settings), repeatedly 
posting a CMC would increase the likelihood of everyone in the network 
seeing the CMC at some point, and having the opportunity to acknowledge it 
in some manner through the utilization of the like and share function, as well 
as through commenting on the CMC. The ethnographic immersion revealed 
that on many occasions a CMC would be viewed by hundreds of people each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Tagging involves linking an online identity to a photo for the purposes of identifying the individual as 
being in the photo, but it is often used as a way of posting a photo or other post onto the walls of one or 
more online identities. 
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time it was posted, with a majority of online identities sharing, reposting/re-
tweeting the CMC, and commenting on the content on a global basis. 
This same type of reposting/retweeting occurred in what appeared to be 
an attempt to keep discussions going. For instance, on numerous occasions 
the online identities included in the study would post a news story (for 
example) with a question or statement asking for comment and discussion. 
When the conversation went dormant (no responsive CMCs for a few weeks), 
frequently the original poster would repost the same news story in a new CMC 
(status post or tweet) in what appeared to be an attempt to re-engage 
networked connections in the previous discussion, or perhaps to initiate a new 
discussion/debate with other networked connections. Similarly, if an event 
occurred in the offline world that rendered the old story once again relevant, 
online identities often reposted old news stories with different questions or 
comments, encouraging comment and discussion. Rarely would the online 
identity make reference to the story having been previously posted, but would 
often repost the story as an original CMC with a comment making it appear as 
though the news story was recent. A retrospective review of SNSs walls, 
twitter feeds and public websites revealed that the “regurgitation” of an older 
news story would often be posted and re-posted for years.47 
Frequently, the linked content shared within the network appeared to be 
from online sources that were not authored by or connected to the online 
identity facilitating the posting, yet at times the relationship between the poster 
and the material being posted was difficult to determine, or appeared to be 
purposely masked. For instance, frequently the online material being linked to 
a CMC originated from an online media outlet, such as BBC or Reuters, thus it 
was obvious that the source of the linked content was unrelated to the online 
identity doing the posting, and the information was being posted because it 
was of interest to the online identity and the broader network (i.e., news of 
what was occurring in the homeland and/or region). On other occasions an 
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online identity would make the relationship with the source of the linked 
content explicit, as was the case with one Facebook online identity that posted 
an article from its related online blog (which was included in the contact 
information section on its “About” page). The article was posted on its 
Facebook timeline with an introduction that began: “In this article we take a 
look at…,” thus making it clear to others within their network, and outside 
observers that the online identity facilitated both SNSs. 
In some instances though the connection between the online identity 
doing the posting, and the source of the content being posted was not only 
unclear, but appeared to be purposely masked. This dynamic became 
apparent when during the immersion it was noted that an online identity would 
post a CMC with linked content along with a statement making it appear as 
though the two SNS were unrelated (e.g., “This blog has several great posts 
that will help our cause, please share!”), when in fact it was determined that 
the online identity was the author of both the CMC disseminating the article, 
and the article itself.  Finally, there was such a high level of linkages and 
integration between SNSs that it was at times difficult to draw distinctions 
between one SNS and another. For instance, many online news articles 
included content and links to Facebook content, and many Twitter feeds and 
Facebook pages were integrated in such a manner that the origin of the CMCs 
were at times difficult to determine. This level of integration was noteworthy for 
two reasons, first, it demonstrated the online identities’ intention to render their 
CMCs public; and second, it illustrated the sophisticated nature of the online 
identities’ utilization of SNSs (and online technology in general) demonstrated 
in their ability to utilize the networking capabilities of various SNSs to their 
maximum capacity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 It is important to note that with many SNSs it is possible to scroll back in time, which allows observers 
to note historic patterns. This ability was noted in Chapter 5, within the section entitled ‘Virtual Field Site: 
Altered Space and Time.” 
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An Ethnographic Analysis of CMC Content: The “What” and “Why” 
 An ethnographic analysis of the data collected from the Rwandan 
diaspora online CMCs and activities revealed several themes with regard to 
the nature of the content of CMCs, as well as with regard to the nature of the 
diaspora’s online activities using SNSs within their virtual transnational 
networks. Overall, virtually all of the CMC content and SNS activities were 
overwhelmingly political in nature, although most political activities were often 
not framed as such (this dynamic will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7). 
The primary themes that emerged in the data were related to imagined 
homeland; relationship to homeland; ethnic identity; religion; genocide denial 
and historical revisionism; and anti-Kagame propaganda. Another very strong 
over-arching theme that emerged in the data was anti-Tutsi rhetoric, but since 
virtually all CMCs analyzed in the present study involved some level of anti-
Tutsi sentiments, ranging from the subtle (scapegoating Tutsis for the plight of 
Hutus), to the profound (anti-Tutsi extremist rhetoric seemingly rooted to the 
pre-genocide propaganda campaign), it was deemed impossible to consider 
“anti-Tutsi propaganda” as a distinct theme.  
Despite clear themes emerging from the data, It is important to note 
that virtually all CMCs evaluated in this study depicted numerous overlapping 
themes, such as anti-Kagame sentiments expressed while denying or 
trivializing the Tutsi genocide, or a CMC that demonstrated a strong religious 
overtone while expressing themes related to a perceived identity as a Hutu. An 
example of this dynamic is a blog that was frequently linked to a number of 
Rwandan diaspora SNSs. The blog’s name and “about” statement 
demonstrated strong themes of promoting democracy and human rights in 
Central and Eastern Africa, but the flash banners on the cover page of the 
website indicated themes consistent with imagined homeland and identity, 
particularly with regard to ethnic membership in the Hutu ethnic group. The 
blog is a public website with a name that includes the words “Democracy 
Watch” and its “about” description clearly emphasized its purported 
commitment to democracy, human rights and justice, stating: 
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 Welcome to “[…] Democracy Watch Blog.” Our objective is to promote 
the institutions of democracy, social justice, Human Rights, Peace, 
Freedom of Expression, and Respect to humanity in Rwanda, Uganda, 
DR Congo, Burundi, Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. 
We strongly believe that Africa will develop if only our presidents stop 
being rulers of men and become leaders of citizens. We support 
Breaking the Silence Campaign for DR Congo since we believe the 
democracy in Rwanda means peace in DRC.  
 
Despite the pretense of focusing broadly on a wide range of countries in 
Central and East Africa, as well as a wide range of topics, virtually every post 
focused on Rwanda and the DRC, where the ethnic conflict spread after the 
genocide. The primary focus of articles and responsive CMCs were quite 
political in nature and focused almost exclusively on attacking the current 
Rwandan government, particular its president, Paul Kagame. Appendix H 
includes a screen shot of the flash content that consistently scrolled across the 
screen, prominently portraying a doctored photograph of President Kagame as 
Hitler, as well as a scrolling banner with the words, “Rwanda is our Father’s 
Land.” Thus while the blog creators portray the goal of advocating for human 
rights throughout Africa, a more in-depth evaluation of the content on the site 
reveals several themes found in this study, including an extremely negative 
depiction of the current Tutsi president of Rwanda, a seeming attempt to frame 
political activity and grievances in human rights terms, and a sentimental 
depiction of homeland as the land of their fathers.   
Imagined Homeland  
 Several diaspora scholars have described a dynamic where diaspora 
reflect homeland symbolically through a range of historic cultural artifacts, as 
well as with words describing homeland in terms that reflect an earthiness (i.e. 
roots), or heritage (i.e., motherland, fatherland)  (Cohen, 2008; Lyons, 2004). 
These types of symbolic representations of homeland were prevalent 
throughout the data, both in the form of textual and cultural artifacts. For 
instance, Rwanda was consistently referred to as “our beloved country,” “our 
motherland,” “our fatherland,” and “the land of our fathers.” Homeland was 
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also demonstrated through photographs. For examples, photographs of 
Rwanda’s landscape of “1000 hills,” of traditional Rwandan women carrying 
baskets on their heads, and of gorillas in the Virunga volcano mountains were 
often used as profile photos and banners on various SNSs.  
Many reflections of the imagined homeland of Rwanda were often 
presented within the context of homeland sub-themes, including references to 
their “fatherland’s invaders,” as well as taking retaking their beautiful country 
and returning it to its “prior glory.” For example, numerous online identities 
referenced how Ugandans stole their homeland from them, and how they were 
going to fight to get their country back, as demonstrated in the following CMC 
addressing ways in which the Tutsi population manipulated the international 
community: “I mean look at them…all were part of the creation of RPF back in 
Uganda and at that time already their plans were evil.” Additionally, several 
online discussions posed theories that RPF members were not true 
Rwandans, but were Tutsis of Ugandan origin. Historic themes of the Hamitic 
theory were often used as a justification for wanting all Tutsis out of the 
country, such as the CMC stating, “Let them go home where they belong – to 
Uganda!!”  
A significant focus of many online discussions centered on returning to 
Rwanda, as well as ways in which the online identities were going to take their 
country back. For instance, in one online interactive discussion between two 
online identities representing political opposition groups, references were 
made to the political structure they developed in the diaspora, and in the 
process of one wishing the other a happy birthday (the “birthday” of the 
formation one of the political opposition group), the online identity wrote 
“Happy birthday! Next year we will be celebrating in Rwanda!” As previously 
stated, most often these sub-themes were expressed collectively – rescuing 
motherland from its invaders and returning to the country and reinstating it to 
its prior condition. Within these types of CMCs, there were also strong themes 
of collective identity within the context of being members of the Hutu ethnic 
group.  
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A particularly noteworthy sub-theme that emerged in the data relates to 
how several online identities representing political opposition/rebel groups 
joined forces to achieve these collective goals. For instance, a public press 
release posted on numerous SNSs was entitled “Rwandan Opposition FDU-
Inkingi and Rwanda National Congress (RNC) agree to Operate together to 
Liberate the Motherland.” Another example of online identities working toward 
collective goals pertaining to their homeland of Rwanda is a CMC posted by 
an online identity which stated: “FDU, GREEN PARTY, PS, PDP, 
PARTENARIA, RNC, FDLR, duhurije hamwe, imbaraga zacu ni iki 
cyatunanira” (translated: if we put our strengths together, what will defeat us?). 
Themes of imagined homeland and the collective goal of returning 
home were also demonstrated on important anniversaries, such as the month 
of genocide commemoration (explored further in the section on genocide 
denial and historical revisionism), and Independence Day (independence from 
colonization). For example, an invitation to a celebration of Rwanda’s 50th 
anniversary of independence, organized by several political opposition groups 
in exile, was widely disseminated online for mobilization purposes. The 
invitation invited all Rwandans in exile to a conference in Brussels, Belgium 
hosted by the Hutu-majority opposition parties formed in the diaspora, 
including FDU-Inkingi, PS-Imberakuli (Imberakuri), PDP-IMANZI, PRD-
Ihumure (PDR), and the newest opposition group, Rwanda National Congress 
(RNC).48 The most prominent feature of the invitation, consistent with 
imagined homeland themes, was a map of Rwanda reflecting the names of 
cities and provinces prior to the RPF taking control in 1994. The sponsoring 
groups, all of which have significant representation online as well as deep ties 
to the former regime, self-identified as political organizations focused on 
intervention, or “associations of action” (“Intervention des Assocations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The RNC is a political opposition party that was created by three Tutsi politicians who escaped into 
exile after being charged criminally for corruption in Rwanda. Although these three individuals are Tutsi 
and have strong leadership roles in the RNC, the ‘rank and file’ of this new group appear to be drawn 
from existing Hutu rebel groups in the diaspora, the core of which appear to be from PDR-Ihumure and 
PS-Imberakuri. The RNC and FDU-Inkingi issued a press statement indicating that while they were not 
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Politiques”). This invitation was widely disseminated via online newspapers, 
blogs and chat rooms, as well as being posted as an event on Facebook by 
the online identity “Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza” (see Appendix I). 
Imagined Homeland Expressed Through Photographs 
With regard to cultural artifacts relating to imagined homeland, online 
identities posted numerous photographs reflecting Rwanda prior to the 1990 
civil war, and the take-over by the current government. Several online 
identities posted picturesque photographs of Rwanda, with sentimental titles 
such as “our beloved homeland,” “the land of our parents,” and “Rwanda, the 
land of a thousand hills, the land of our ancestors.” Additionally, many 
photographs were couched within sub-themes of fighting for the human rights 
of those they left behind, including demanding the release of all Hutu political 
prisoners (a frequent term used to describe Hutus currently imprisoned for 
acts of genocide).  
Examples of cultural artifacts representing imagined homeland that 
were posted, shared and linked to various SNSs include photographs of 
Rwanda’s pre-genocide flag; photographs and cartoons reflecting Rwanda’s 
traditional colors of green, red and black; audio recordings of the pre-genocide 
Rwandan national anthem; an audio recording of former President 
Habyarimana’s swearing in ceremony posted on YouTube (linked to 
Facebook, Twitter, and public blogs); and pre-genocide maps reflecting the 
names of cities and provinces prior to the new government taking power (the 
geographic names of cities and provinces were changed after July 1994). One 
map that was posted numerous times by several online identities had the 
following notation at the bottom of the photograph:  
 
Keep your history alive. Thea [sic] shall work hard to Make you slaves 
by deleting your History but thea [sic] will will [sic] never win over 
History. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
officially merging, they were coordinating (see http://www.fdu-rwanda.com/en/english-rwanda-political-
opposition-fdu-inkingi-and-rnc-held-joint-meeting-in-johannesburg-19-24-2-2013/). 
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Oftentimes these symbolic representations of imagined homeland were 
combined with other symbols that mirrored the text conversations, reflecting 
sub-themes of the “myth of return” and returning Rwanda back to its pre-
genocide state. For instance, one commonly posted photograph depicted the 
traditional Rwandan flag with a fighting fist in the center of the flag. Another 
photograph depicted a map of pre-genocide Rwanda with handcuffs and the 
phrase “Free Rwanda” in the center of the map (see Appendix J for examples 
of symbolic representations of homeland). These symbolic photographs were 
frequently used as profile photos on Facebook and Twitter, included in online 
photo albums, as well as being disseminated individually throughout the virtual 
transnational network. 
The Myth of Return Expressed through Memorializing Former Regime 
Members 
The “myth of return” was also expressed through the elevation and 
memorializing of prominent Hutu politicians, including former Hutu presidents, 
Grégoire Kayibanda (in office from 1962 to 1973), and Juvenal Habyarimana 
(in office from 1973 to 1994), as well as genocide architect Theoneste 
Bagosora. As explored in Chapter 4, Kayibanda, Habyarimana and Bagosora 
were all known for their extremist and racist ethnonationalist views, as well as 
for their embracing of Hutu Power anti-Tutsi rhetoric, and yet each of these 
individuals had several memorial pages and impersonated profiles on 
Facebook memorializing their role in a seemingly romanticized past. Although 
many of these memorial pages were used to disseminate propaganda against 
the current government of Rwanda, they were also used to preserve perceived 
history, memorialize heroes, and educate the next Hutu generation. These 
goals were also accomplished through statements in the “About” or “Info” 
pages on the SNSs, CMCs posted by various online identities (many of which 
were included in the present study), and the posting of historic photographs of 
Kayibanda, Habyarimana and Bagosora on various SNSs, many of which 
included captions reflecting nostalgic reflections of Rwanda between 1959 (the 
“Hutu social revolution”) and 1994 (the year the genocide occurred and Hutus 
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lost power). For instance, one of Habyarimana’s memorial pages that was 
created by one of the online identities included in the study49 had the following 
statement reflecting an idealized vision of Rwanda’s past: 
 
THIS IS TO REMIND ALL RWANDANS THOSE STILL LIVING TODAY 
AND THOSE BEING BORN AND THOSE WHO ARE TO COME THAT 
RWANDA USED TO BE A PEACEFUL COUNTRY UNTIL THE DAY 
OF HABYALIMANA’S DEATH THIS MARKED THE BEGINNING OF 
MISERIES TO OUR NATION…ALWAYS PRAY FOR PEACE. 
 
Nostalgic and sentimental CMCs were often posted on these memorial pages, 
such as the following CMCs posted in 2010 on one of Habyarimana’s 
memorial pages: 
“I miss you l’presidente”  
“GONE TOO SOON our beloved president…” 
“I love u and I will love u all my life” 
“May your soul rest in eternal peace…it is unfortunately [sic] that your 
life was cut short by the enemies while you were working hard to bring 
unity, peace and stability in our nation.” 
 
Historic photographs of memorized members of the former regime were 
also used symbolically to represent pre-genocide Rwanda, as well as to 
preserve history. Each memorial page referenced above had online photo 
albums that included several photographs of Kayibanda, Habyarimana and 
Bagosora. Individual historic photographs were also disseminated widely, 
through posting and tagging on Facebook pages and timelines, as well as 
through online blogs and websites. Most photographs had captions that were 
sentimental and nostalgic, expressing a longing for the past, and a desire that 
Rwanda’s history not be forgotten. For instance, a widely disseminated 
photograph of Kayibanda had the caption, “Let us all Rwandans restore our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 This memorial page included ‘contact info’ on the ‘Info’ page that included the email address: 
Habyarimana@xxx.com, a website to a blog facilitated by a Hutu-majority opposition group that was very 
politically active in Rwandan politics (included in the study), an ‘office location’ of “Bruxxelles Maison du 
Rwanda” (Rwanda’s house in Brussels), and a location of Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. 
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history the way it should be.” Another photograph depicted Kayibanda and 
other high-ranking Parmehutu officials during Rwanda’s official independence 
ceremony in 1962 (see Appendix K for examples of memorializing former 
regime members).  
Ways in which Diaspora Related to Homeland 
Several scholars have noted how CGD have a relationship with their 
homeland that is primarily political in nature (Anderson, 1992; Lyons, 2004, 
2007; Brinkerhoff, 2010), because they view themselves as being key 
stakeholders in homeland affairs (Faist, 2000; Lyons, 2004).  In addition to the 
psychological orientation toward homeland, Chapter 2 references ways in 
which diaspora, particularly originating from Africa, relate to their homelands, 
including providing financial remittances on a collective level, lobbying the 
hostland on issues that pertain to diaspora, and engaging in homeland affairs 
on a political level. The data revealed that the online identities related to their 
homeland of Rwanda, particularly with regard to its past and current conflicts 
in all of these ways. 
Relating to Homeland through Financial Remittance 
Although the data did not verify indications that the online identities 
included in the study directly transferred funds to rebel groups on a collective 
level, considered to significantly contribute to the risk of renewed violence 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2000), there were indications that funds were being raised 
by the online identities for their collective causes. For instance, several 
opposition groups were linked to charities engaged in fund-raising for a variety 
of causes, most of which related to the promotion of human rights and 
democracy in Rwanda, as well as providing assistance to genocide orphans 
and widows. Most often there appeared to be a consistent attempt to mask the 
connection between online identities and the charities for which they were 
associated. For instance, frequently online identities would post a CMC with a 
link to a charity while claiming no connection (e.g., “we just found this charity 
and believe it to be a valuable resource for our people…please consider 
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supporting their work”).  
Upon further immersion, it became clear that on many occasions the 
online identities were actually connected to the charities that they were 
promoting. For instance, one online identity self-identified as representing a 
major Hutu political opposition group with strong ties to the former regime, 
actively posted on a public Facebook page that was overtly political in nature, 
and that disseminated a significant amount of anti-Rwanda propaganda. On 
numerous CMCs posted on the Facebook page this online identity promoted a 
charity purported to be unrelated. This same online identity (an organization) 
also served as an online moderator for a public blog. The online identity’s 
posts were accompanied with an auto-inserted signature line with its 
Facebook pseudonym and a link to the charity’s website and a plea to 
contribute to their charity. This same online identity organized an anti-Kagame 
demonstration in Washington, D.C. with two other online identities 
representing at least three Hutu political opposition/rebel groups with strong 
ties to the former regime. Thus although CMCs posted by this online identity 
on Facebook made it appear as though the charity was unrelated, the auto-
signature on CMCs in the public blog revealed that they were in fact related, 
and the charity was clearly being utilized as a source of funding for the 
organizations’ collective efforts. 
Several online identities included in the study linked their SNSs to 
websites of not-for-profit charities that included photographs of African 
children, many of whom were purported to be genocide orphans.50 Sometimes 
these websites demonstrated that the charity’s purpose was to raise funds for 
orphans, but the majority of the time the charity focused on human rights, 
democracy and “truth and reconciliation” programs related to Rwanda’s history 
of ethnic conflict. Due to the complex nature of the networks though, it was 
often difficult to determine whether an online identity was the founder of a 
charity or whether the charity was actually the political organization presented 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 If references to genocide orphans were intended to refer to the 1994 Tutsi genocide the orphans 
would be 19 years old or older. 
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as a humanitarian organization (see Appendix L). For instance, many online 
identities that were clearly presented as a political opposition group possessed 
not-for-profit status in the United States (501c3 status), and were registered as 
non-political charities. Regardless of the nature of the connections, the data 
revealed that when online identities representing political opposition groups 
advocated for a particular charity, in the majority of cases, these charities were 
either directly or indirectly linked to the political organizations that the online 
identity represented.  
Relating to Homeland through the Dissemination of Information and 
Propaganda 
Theoretically, all CMCs could be categorized as “dissemination” of 
some type. In light of the high level of conflation with other thematic 
categories, the CMCs posted or linked on SNSs that illustrated how the 
Internet was used to relate to homeland through dissemination of information 
and propaganda will be limited to media-related information about current 
affairs affecting Rwanda from online newspaper articles, blogs, online radios, 
and YouTube videos, and then linked to other SNSs, such as blogs, Facebook 
and Twitter. 
The majority of CMCs included in the study involved the dissemination 
of some type of propaganda, almost all of which was against the current 
government of Rwanda. The primary way in which propaganda related to 
Rwanda was disseminated was by linking online articles, either from 
mainstream media outlets, or online articles, blogs and YouTube videos 
generated from online identities within the network. Some CMCs disseminated 
information seemingly for the purposes of sharing relevant information, such 
the dissemination of U.S. State Department articles and updates. At other 
times information from mainstream media outlets was disseminated with false 
or misleading commentary rendered by the online identity. In fact, the majority 
of CMCs disseminated propaganda that was either embellished commentary, 
or completely false. Most CMCs disseminating propaganda about Rwanda 
focused on current events, such as the current renewal of violence in the 
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DRC; the downfall of President Kagame; the arrest of Victoire Ingabire 
Umuhoza; Rwanda’s “No-Scalpel Vasectomy” family planning program; 
dynamics involving the Rwandan Ambassador to the UK; and the current state 
of poverty in Rwanda.51 
For instance, numerous CMCs focused on the arrest and trial of Victoire 
Ingabire Umuhoza, the 2010 presidential candidate and party president of 
FDU-Inkingi (explored in Chapter 4). Several CMCs cited political persecution 
and closed political space, as well as poor treatment of Victoire, while also 
citing her as a hero. Typically, the FDU-Inkingi public website would publish an 
article, and then link it to its open Twitter and Facebook accounts, which were 
then shared and retweeted throughout the network. An example of this 
dynamic is a widely disseminated online article that detailed the abuse of 
Victoire’s supporters in Rwanda, entitled, “Rwanda: Police attacks Ingabire 
supporters heading to the Supreme Court to hear the case of the political 
prisoner.” This article was self-generated and was inconsistent with reports 
published by mainstream media outlets. 
Another current event that sparked a considerable amount of activity 
within the virtual network is the current conflict in the DRC involving Hutus 
(primarily the FDLR), Tutsis (primarily the M23), the DRC military (the 
FARDC), and a UN peacekeeping force (MONUSCO). Graphic photographs of 
slain M23 soldiers were widely disseminated with captions congratulating the 
forces that killed them. Numerous online articles from mainstream media 
outlets were also posted with captions predicting the outcome of the conflict. 
Additionally, numerous articles were posted challenging Rwanda’s denial of 
providing assistance to the M23 rebel group. One CMC that was widely 
disseminated throughout the virtual network included unsubstantiated claims 
that Rwanda was recruiting children to fight in the M23. The online article was 
entitled: “Rwandan Children and young people forcibly fighting with M23 are 
victims not enemy combatants.” Of particular interest with regard to this CMC 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The majority of propaganda disseminated throughout the virtual network was focused on President 
Kagame, thus is organized thematically as ‘anti-Kagame’ propaganda. 
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was that the photograph included in the online article depicted a child soldier 
carrying a large gun, but the photograph is not of a Rwandan child conscripted 
by the M23, rather, it is of a child soldier conscripted by the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement, the military wing of the South Sudanese political party, 
disseminated widely throughout international human rights organization 
websites. 
 The online network’s response to Rwanda’s “No-Scalpel Vasectomy” 
program initiated as a part of a broader family planning initiative targeting all 
Rwandans52 was also the focus of numerous CMCs and involved a 
considerable amount of propaganda dissemination. CMCs posted by 
numerous online identities and disseminated broadly accused the Rwandan 
government of attempting to eradicate the Hutu population so that Tutsis could 
become the majority population in the county. For example, one CMC posted 
a link to a BBC article that was generally positive about Rwanda’s “No Scalpel 
Vasectomy” program, yet the commentary posted by the online identity 
introducing the linked article wrote the following generally misleading caption 
introducing the article: “KAGAME SAID THAT ALL HUTU MALE MUST BE 
CASTRATED IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE HIS PLAN OF MAKING TUTSIS THE 
MAJORITY TRIBE BY VISION 2020.”  
False propaganda was also disseminated throughout the virtual 
network in order to elicit fear within the diaspora regarding Rwanda. Often this 
type of propaganda was generated in response to the government of 
Rwanda’s organization of diaspora events, such as “Rwanda Day,” an annual 
government-sponsored outreach event. For instance, in advance of “Rwanda 
Day UK,” a blog facilitated by an online identity widely disseminated an article 
entitled “A mind defiled by Dictatorship! Rwandan ambassador to UK 
instructed to recruit women for deadly mission!” The blog then provided the 
following dire warning to all Hutus living in the diaspora in the UK:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The Rwandan government Ministry of Health, in cooperation with several international partners, 
including USAID, WHO, and UNFPA initiated a ‘No-Scalpel Vasectomy’ program as a part of their 
existing family planning and HIV/AIDS prevention program, with the goal of addressing unplanned 
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…Paul Kagame believes that after capturing the hearts of these women 
it will be easy to infiltrate the opposition through their own mothers who 
will threaten their men with taking their children from them, divorce or 
even poisoning them. This group of women have access to large 
amount of money and they have been meeting and discussing how to 
capture the hearts of the mothers in Diaspora. Some of their ideas are 
creating jobs, opportunities and organisations to coerce the mothers 
with. However, the Police in the UK may have to investigate these 
women due to some activities which involve fraud and criminal 
allegations according to an unnamed legal expert we spoke to 
regarding these activities.  
 
Interactive CMCs posted in response to the blog included numerous 
statements from online identities purporting to know someone in the Rwandan 
government who had confidentially confirmed this plan as well as similar ones, 
including plans to poison the food any Hutu who attended the government-
sponsored event.  
Another CMC that disseminated false propaganda involved an online 
article on a public domain facilitated by an online identity included in the study 
and then linked to the same online identity’s linked SNS, entitled: “Hunger and 
poverty increasingly alarming in Rural Rwanda.” The online identity (a 
pseudonym) wrote the following commentary, which did not accurately reflect 
the content of the article:  
SOS for Rwanda. To those who care about Rwanda: There are 
indicators which don’t lie. The silence and frustration of people should 
not be a license to ignore their plight. Ongoing people’s suffering can 
lead to more social unrest and loss of life. Please listen to the 
anguished murmurs of the silenced rural farmers. Please open the 
eyes, read the signs and advise wisely.  
 
A final example that illustrates the nature of how the Internet was used 
to disseminate propaganda throughout the diaspora virtual network relates to 
Canada’s decision to extradite Leon Mugesera, a member of the former 
regime who had delivered an anti-Tutsi speech at an MRND rally, that many 
cite as being at the root of the genocide (see Chapter 4). An article posted on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
pregnancy, maternal health, and population management. See the following USAID report on this 
program: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS635.pdf. 
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an online newspaper that was disseminated widely throughout the virtual 
network was entitled “Leon Mugesera’s extradition: The Rwandan community 
is outraged.” The article begins with the following bolded statement: “Leon 
Mugesera will die tortured.” It is with these words that the President of the 
Rwandan […] of Canada […] expressed outrage about the deportation of Leon 
Mugesera to Rwanda to be tried for ‘incitement to genocide’.” The article 
included a photograph of a man holding two signs: “Reconciliation in Rwanda 
without Fair Justice” and “Extradition to Rwanda = Torture” (see Appendix M 
for this example as well as others reflecting how CMCs were used to 
disseminate information and propaganda). 
Relating to Homeland through Political Mobilization 
 The online identities included in the study used the Internet prolifically 
for the purposes of mobilization of political activities pertaining to Rwanda. The 
majority of CMCs focused on mobilizing diaspora to act in some manner, such 
as attending an anti-Kagame demonstration, or signing a petition relating to a 
political matter – for example, the UN’s decision to no longer provide refugee 
status to Rwandans (many of whom are Hutus). A very frequent focus on 
mobilization was for the facilitation of anti-Kagame demonstrations in response 
to the trips President Kagame made to a country where diaspora resided (this 
dynamic is explored in greater detail in the subsequent section on “Anti-
Kagame Propaganda”). A considerable proportion of the CMCs involving 
mobilizing activities included the facilitation of telephone-calling campaigns, 
online petitions and letter-writing campaigns within the diaspora. Targeted 
members of the Rwandan diaspora as well as Western allies were often 
provided with contact information for the hosting organizations and were 
provided scripts and sample letters and asked to bombard the hosting 
organizations with phone calls, emails and letters protesting the focus of the 
cause (e.g., President Kagame’s visit, the cessation of refugee status, etc.). 
Diaspora members and Western allies were also often asked to attend offline 
events, such as demonstrations and protests (see Appendix N for examples of 
how SNSs are used for mobilization purposes). 
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Lobbying the Host Countries 
 The Internet was used frequently by the online identities included in the 
study for lobbying purposes. For instance, most online mobilizing efforts were 
often for the purposes of lobbying the host country or international community 
in some manner, in relation to a collective cause concerning Rwanda. For 
instance, online identities often posted open letters written to foreign leaders 
and dignitaries asking for their support, including a reduction in aid to Rwanda, 
and the general condemnation of the government of Rwanda. During the 
ethnographic immersion, open letters were disseminated that were written to 
former U.S. President George W. Bush, former U.S. President Bill Clinton, 
former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, the U.S. Pentagon, and the Archbishop 
of Canterbury.  
Additionally, off-line lobbying was often coordinated with on-line efforts, 
through the posting of videos, or written updates of the off-line events. 
According to these updates (oftentimes in the form of YouTube videos), online 
identities and related diaspora organizations frequently met with UN 
representatives, members of U.S. Congress and the U.S. State Department, 
as well as human rights organizations based in Western host countries and 
major media outlets, such as the National Press Club. CMC updates reporting 
on offline lobbying efforts often included commentary seemingly designed to 
encourage online identities within the network (e.g., “UK Rwandans spoke and 
the UK government listened! Kagame lost again!”) 
Online identities engaging in lobbying efforts often presented 
themselves as experts on the “on-the-ground” conditions in Rwanda and the 
DRC, as evidenced by YouTube videos of media events, congressional 
testimony, statements on public websites and press releases posted on SNSs 
(which were then linked to a range of SNSs and disseminated widely, both 
outside the network as well as inside). Most lobbying efforts facilitated by 
diaspora presenting themselves as experts focused on demanding that 
financial support be withdrawn from Rwanda, at times alleging that the 
withdrawal of support was the only way to prevent future ethnic violence. The 
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information shared during online and offline lobbying efforts was often 
interspersed with historical narratives that were consistent with the pre-
genocide propaganda campaign.  
An interesting pattern that emerged in the data analysis indicated that a 
significant proportion of online identities that used the Internet for lobbying 
efforts consisted of groups representing Hutus who were children during the 
genocide, including children of those accused of genocide, or Hutu children 
whose parents died in the post-genocide refugee camps. This pattern was 
demonstrated in the online identities’ historical narratives that included 
testimony of fleeing to the DRC as children with family members, including 
descriptions of traumatic experiences surviving in the camps in the DRC 
(formerly Zaire). Such testimony demonstrated what might be considered a 
somewhat narrow perspective of post-genocide dynamics in Rwanda, but 
many testimonies used in lobbying efforts appeared to be quite sincere, and 
despite their narrow focus many testimonies were consistent with historic fact, 
particularly with regard to the conditions in the camps.  
There were also several testimonies used in lobbying efforts that were 
not consistent with historical fact, and appeared contrived for the purposes of 
manipulation. For instance, several YouTube videos widely disseminated 
throughout the virtual network and used for lobbying purposes depicted 
members of the Hutu diaspora testifying before a U.S. Congressional panel, 
mainstream media outlets, and the UN identifying themselves as “genocide 
survivors.” Yet the organizations with which they were associated had online 
connections with extremist Hutu groups, such as the “Bagosora, Theoneste” 
Facebook community page, and other Hutu Power SNSs. In some instances it 
appeared that those providing this type of testimony purposely attempted to 
confuse the audience by mixing fact with fiction, such as sharing a commonly 
known experience (involving Interahamwe-controlled roadblocks, for instance), 
but switching the ethnic groups, claiming that Tutsis were the aggressors. 
Another way in which those providing personal testimony appeared to 
purposely confuse audience members was to make reference to “the 
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genocide” implying the Rwandan genocide, yet the genocide to which most 
were referring was actually a genocide against the Hutu – a reference to the 
military incursions into militarized refugee camps in Rwanda and the Kivus. 
When asked what ethnic group the diaspora were members of, many stated 
that they were “mixed,” despite a strong online association with groups clearly 
aligned with extremist Hutu causes. 
Additionally, some of the testimony captured in a YouTube video and 
published by an online identity included in the study included patently false 
information, which appeared designed to mislead. The YouTube video 
depicted an individual testifying before a national political organization in 
Washington, D.C., clearly implying he was Tutsi, despite being a founding 
member of a Hutu Power organization with an online presence. The individual 
testified about his experiences as a child escaping ethnic conflict in Rwanda, 
which included a story about how the Interahamwe was going door-to-door 
killing his neighbors. He also shared how he and his mother escaped in their 
car only to be stopped at a roadblock manned by Interahamwe. He stated that 
he and his mother were dragged out of the car and threatened with machetes 
while being ordered to dig their own graves. He then stated that neighbors 
confronted the Interahamwe and demanded that he and his mother be 
released. He then shared the story of their escape into the DRC (formerly 
Zaire), as well as their ongoing persecution by the RPF. His narrative included 
elements of accuracy, in that such events occurred consistently throughout the 
genocide, but they were exacted against the Tutsi population by the extremist 
Hutu government and militia. The testimony appeared to be intended to 
confuse the audience as he clearly implicated the current government of 
Rwanda as being responsible for the genocide. This diaspora member also 
presented himself as a “genocide prevention activist,” and disclosed that he 
was the recipient of a major U.S. genocide prevention research fellowship, and 
yet at no point during the testimony did he disclose that he was Hutu, or had 
family who worked within the former regime. Although there were only a few 
such incidences found in the data reflecting this level of overt manipulation 
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(the majority of lobbying attempts included the dissemination of widely held 
pre-genocide historic narratives applied to contemporary Rwanda), when such 
incidences of blatantly false propaganda did occur, the testimonies were 
widely disseminated throughout the virtual network, and frequently relied upon 
in subsequent lobbying and mobilizing efforts. 
Ethnic Identity  
Another theme that emerged in the data relates to identity, particularly 
in relation to overlapping sub-themes of ethnic identity, collective identity, 
historical identity, and identity as a victim. Frequently CMCs reflecting identity-
related themes were immersed or intertwined with other themes, such as 
imagined homeland, genocide denial and historical revisionism, and anti-
Kagame propaganda themes. There was considerable discussion within the 
online identities’ virtual network focusing on how their Hutu ethnicity, or being 
a member of the Hutu ethnic group was the core of their identity. Many online 
discussions clearly articulated perspectives that being a Hutu was 
synonymous with being Rwandan, yet there was a tremendous amount of 
identification with Hutus in the DRC, often referred to as “our brothers and 
sisters in the jungle,”53 implying that one remained a Rwandan Hutu 
regardless of location. In other words, the online identities included in the 
study appeared to stand by their Hutu “brothers and sisters” regardless of their 
location and/or other identity indicators, such as gender, exile status, age and 
religion.  
One incident that demonstrated how ethnicity is at the core of the 
identity of those included in the study was the Rwandan government’s 
decision to abolish any reference to ethnic classification on national identity 
cards, in order to promote a singular national identity as “Rwandans.” The 
following online discussion (portions of which were translated to English from 
Kinyarwanda), illustrates the passion with which many online identities reacted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 This term is known among Rwandans as a reference to those Hutus who fled to the refugee camps 
after the 1994 genocide, particularly those who remain in the jungles of the DRC near the Rwanda 
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to the government’s policy. Despite the fact that this policy was implemented 
in 1997, it remained a relatively frequent topic of online conversation. 
 
Online Identity 1:  
You may also ask why they removed ethnicity on ID cards? To be able 
to fake DEMOCRACY and a MINORITY ruling instead of the 
MAJORITY ruling and apply the rules of minorities. ~From a friend of 
Mine~  
 
Online Identity 2:  
Removing ethnicity in the ID cards is another manifestation of idiocy! 
Ethnic belonging is intrinsic value to Human being so you don’t need to 
write it down! I know they know their paranoic [sic] decisions in so many 
things will end up as a trap to their rule! It’s genocidal ideology to deny 
somebody’s ethnicity! So the whole regime of Kagame is committing an 
act of genicede [sic] by denying Rwandans to belong to their ethnic 
background! He shall answer this when time comes   
 
Online Identity 3: 
I hear that they use 213lood213 [sic] criteria to describe who is a Hutu 
who is a Tutsi. The ugly is Hutu the beautiful is a Tutsi! Oh poor 
things!... So my handsomeness can make me their president  · 
 
Online Identity 1: 
To remove ethnicity or a tribe from our ID, I support it, it is a step 
forward to try and make Rwandans feel one, although sometimes it’s 
hard. BUT BUT, I DON’T SUPPORT THOSE WHO DID IT, BECAUSE 
THEIR INTENTION WASN’T IN MAKING RWANDANS ONE, BUT AS 
A TACTIFUL AND SMART WAY TO OPPRESS AND ISOLATE ONE 
TRIBE IN THE GOVERNMENT, IN THE CONTEXT THAT THERE IS 
NO MORE TRIBE IN RWANDA. But if it was done for unity, nothing 
good like that, but although they did it with an evil intention, I can’t wish 
ethnicity to be in our ID again. And I tell you, it is not easy at all, to 
identify Hutu from Tutsi and Tutsi from the Hutu where there is no ID, 
without killing your own brother and your own sister!!!! But despite all 
those efforts, if I say there is no tribe in Rwanda, I am a lier [sic], 
because already every Rwandan feels he belongs to a certain tribe, but 
we will try to make it almost impossible to identify the ethnicity of an 
individual, unless he tells as much as we can, but as I said, since 
Rwandans already feels ethnicity in their inside, we can’t destroy that 
feeling in any way, but we can minimize it  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
border, and who continue to engage in cross-border fighting with Rwanda. A similar statement, “our 
brothers (and sisters) fighting in the jungle” is often a direct reference to the FDLR.  
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Online Identity 4: 
I don’t think that ethnicity on ID makes any difference who doesn’t know 
that he is a Hutu, Twa or Tutsi? Who doesn’t know that RWANDA gives 
scholarships to Tutsis only? How does it know whom to give bourse 
and whom not to give? That’s a pure rubbish,, [sic] it was done in order 
when Tutsis are given privileges only it not look like they are favoring 
Tutsis only but Rwandans, then Hutus will not have facts to show that 
they are being sidelined, […] wake up man...everything has been 
crafted to suit TUTSIS not RWANDANS all in the bid to establish 
TUTSILAND  
 
Collective identity was expressed in many of the CMCs as well, in both 
opinion as well as action. For instance, when confronted with differences of 
opinions on issues of importance, such as the history of Rwanda, the nature of 
the genocide, whether a Hutu in the Rwandan government was still “true” to 
being a Hutu, or whether some Tutsis could be trusted, there was often a 
harsh reaction, and references to the those with significantly differing opinions 
as being traitors. In virtually all instances when the online identity challenging 
an accepted narrative was Tutsi, the online identities engaging in the 
discussion would accuse him or her of being a paid agent of the “pro-RPF 
Rwandan government.”  Another example of collective identity was a variant of 
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend” attitude expressed in numerous CMCs 
such as to the following: 
Dear friends, I’m happy to have interacted with you in 2012. Being my 
friend is first to adhering to an ideology. You are at least 400 to agree 
with me that Kagame is a kind of nightmare for our beloved country. 
Let’s go forward in a non-voolance [sic] denunciation of kagamism. 
Don’t forget all victims of his regim [sic]. i.e. all Rwandans he caused 
death since 1990, and Congolese since 1996. Let’s hope 2013 will 
bring change in our region, particularly in Rwanda. Best wishes for all of 
you towards 2013. 
 
Although this CMC encompasses multiple themes, including victimization and 
imagined homeland, it also demonstrates a strong sense of collective identity 
and unity in a mutual hatred for Kagame, and a strong desire for change within 
Rwanda.  
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Hutu Power as an Expression of Collective Identity 
A significant aspect of collective identity revealed in the data was 
related to ways in which the online identities included in the study expressed 
perspectives consistent with Hutu Power ideology. This dynamic was 
expressed prolifically and consistently in CMCs monitored during the 
ethnographic immersion, as well as in CMCs captured retrospectively on 
SNSs54. Ways in which Hutu Power ideology was expressed included overtly 
espousing (and defending) Hutu Power ideology, representing a united front 
on issues related to Hutu extremist causes, and defending those high profile 
Hutus and Hutu political opposition/rebel groups that were perceived as being 
persecuted by the Rwandan government and/or the international community 
(donor countries, the UN, and the ICTR).  
Overall, there were elements of Hutu Power ideology in a majority of 
the online identities’ CMCs, many of which will be explored in a subsequent 
section on genocide denial and historical revisionism. The following are 
examples of online identities defending Hutu causes and/or Hutu political 
opposition/rebel groups that were related to ethnic and collective identity: 
On a public blog: 
Reports from diverse media outlets this week indicate that a 2nd military 
operation is about to be launched against the FDLR by the UN’s 
MONUC peace keeping forces and the DRC army. Traditionally, UN 
peace keeping forces do not take sides overtly in any conflict, but 
that’s exactly what they are doing in the DRC conflict. We need to find a 
way to expose the criminal nature of this bias in order to save our FDLR 
brothers and sisters under threat of extermination. We will also have 
updates about the on-going persecution of […].55 Please notify your 
friends about this meeting and its critical importance so they can attend 
in big numbers. 
 
A press release expressing support of Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza that was 
widely disseminated throughout the virtual network on numerous SNSs was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 By way of reminder, CMCs were monitored and collected that were posted in the past and still 
available on SNSs. 
55 The redacted name is of a Hutu in exile in the United States who was charged with crimes of genocide 
in Rwanda and in 2012 was arrested by U.S. Immigration officials. He is currently awaiting deportation 
proceedings, which may result in his returned to Rwanda to face charges. 
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reflective of collective identity in action. The press release was disseminated 
by a high profile Hutu political opposition group formed in the U.S. diaspora, 
and stated (in part):  
We will stand in unity with our brothers and sisters in the opposition, 
whether armed or non-armed, against the current brutal RPF military 
dictatorship in Rwanda.  
 
Another example of a CMC reflecting collective identity defends the FDLR 
while indicating a clear commitment to its cause. The CMC was disseminated 
by an online identity clearly allied with Parmehutu ideology (Hutu Power) and 
reposted and retweeted through the network. This CMC is particularly 
noteworthy because its use of the term “finish the job,” a term that was 
prolifically used throughout the genocide as a reference to the killings of Tutsis 
being a “job.” Using this term in a current day context is a reference to 
finishing the genocide and killing all remaining Tutsis56 
 
FDLR and Hutu power are not terrorist and they are not listed 
anywhere, not even on the UN or USA lists. 
Don’t be fooled by the Rwandan government anymore let’s all stand up 
with the FDLR and Hutu power and get rid of that government of 
genocidaires for years. 
Everyone who doesn’t want to be their slaves, come and stand with us 
to finish the job and be able to stop it 
 
Another CMC posted by an online identity that was well connected to 
the virtual network demonstrated collective identity based in Hutu ethnic 
membership included the following: 
 
Hutu power, yes, yes  
FDLR, yes, yes   
True Mai Mai, yes, yes  
True FARDC, yes, yes  
MDR-Parmehutu, yes, yes  
CDR, yes, yes 
MRND, yes, yes  
Hutu resistance fighters, yes, yes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See Susan E. Cook’s “Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: A New Perspective.” 
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Long live the Hutu people in Rwanda, Burundi, Congo and Uganda. 
 
An online identity posting a response to a story about an FDLR soldier 
who testified on behalf of Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza during her trial in Rwanda 
serves as yet another example of the online expression of Hutu collective 
identity. The online identity refers to the FDLR soldier who testified on behalf 
of Victoire as a “courageous soldier,” and the FDLR soldier who testified 
against her, a “mole” from the “RPF Academy of Lies.” 
 Additionally, the data included numerous CMCs that appeared 
designed to promote a “majority rules” philosophy, a Hutu Power ideology 
used by the former regime to justify anti-Tutsi policies. References to “majority 
rules” philosophies are based on the principle that since Hutus constitute the 
majority population in Rwanda, they should have that relative level of power. 
For instance, an open letter from one of the Hutu political opposition parties to 
a branch of the U.S. government, posted on the party’s public website, states 
(in part): 
President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, who is a member of the Tutsi 
minority, would not have won the war and be in power today without the 
full backing of the American government. In the entire Great Lakes 
region of Africa, which comprises the countries of Rwanda, Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Tanzania, Tutsis 
represent at most 5% of the total populations of these countries 
combined. Is America really serving its interests by backing 5% of the 
population and alienating the rest? The only way 5% can rule over 95% 
of the population is through repression and tyranny, and that’s exactly 
what President Kagame has been doing. It seems not only logical but 
also humane, democratic and beneficial to everybody that the right way 
for America in the Great Lakes region of Africa is to side with the 
majority, while making sure the rights of minorities are protected. If the 
American government adopts this policy, there is no question that its 
interests will be safeguarded, recurring violence will end, and the 
economy and the people of the region will flourish. 
 
Victim Status as an Expression of Identity 
A significant portion of CMCs that highlighted elements of ethnic identity 
presented within the context of victimhood, primarily at the hands of Tutsis, but 
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also the international community. The international community was often 
accused of either directly collaborating with Tutsis, or of being non-
interventionists in matters involving grave human rights violations against 
Hutus. As with previously explored sub-themes related to identity, multiple 
themes were interlaced with themes of ethnic victim identity, including themes 
expressing a very strong anti-Tutsi sentiment that appeared to be solidly 
grounded in pre-genocide propaganda and rhetoric, as well as themes 
espousing “anti-Kagame” propaganda, and genocide denial and historical 
revisionism.  
Again, many of CMCs that evinced an identity based on a sense of 
victimhood expressed broader themes that paralleled the pre-genocide 
propaganda campaign, including perceptions that all Hutus had been slaves of 
the historic Tutsi monarchy, that Hutus were liberated by the Parmehutu party, 
perceptions that Rwanda under Kayibanda and Habyarimana was a 
democracy concerned with the human rights of its citizenry (particularly on 
behalf of Tutsis), perceptions that all Hutus were victims of the RPF (perceived 
as foreign invaders), that Hutus were unjustly and forcibly expelled from their 
country, and finally, that Hutus were the true victims of the genocide, as well 
as ongoing persecution at the hands of Tutsis, particularly the RPF.57 
Numerous CMCs included references to a Hutu history of being the 
slave of the Tutsi, reflecting the “staying power” of what many scholars assert 
was a false narrative implemented by Belgian colonizers (explored in Chapter 
4). Such CMCs were used for a variety of purposes, including denying the 
genocide narrative that holds Tutsis as the victims of Hutu aggression and the 
genocide; warnings against trusting any Tutsi; and teaching the next 
generation about the “real” history of the Hutus. The overriding purpose of 
CMCs that cast Hutus as victims of Tutsis, appeared to be a sort of “sounding 
of the alarm” that the time for action (often referred to as a “revolution”) was 
now. The following is an excerpt from a long article describing the history of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 There was considerable conflation between CMCs with victim-identity themes and genocide denial 
and historical revisionism. 
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the Tutsi/Hutu conflict that was widely circulated among the online identities 
included in the study, through numerous SNSs: 
The decade before the African independences saw in 1959 what 
historians have called the Rwandan revolution, where the excluded 
Hutu majority was enslaved from birth by the Tutsi minority, managed to 
become owners of their destiny in the years that followed. Fifty years on 
the spirit and values of the Rwandan revolution have been crashed. 
Rwanda has fallen in the hands of a local and international mafia type 
of political leadership which is using oppressive policies of the past to 
control and use the population for its own greed.  
 
The article ends with the following “call to action”: 
What Rwanda has experienced in recent months and which culminated 
in a masquerade of presidential election on August 9th, 10 calls every 
Rwandan from all ethnic groups young and old, literate and illiterate, 
inside and outside the country, rich and poor, and friends everywhere of 
the real Rwanda and not the one of oppressors, to come out more than 
at any other time of the country’s history to stop a criminal political 
system led by Paul Kagame. By coming out together and taking back 
their destiny into their hands Rwandans can bring and give to their 
country a transformative revolution which can and will undoubtedly 
address effectively current and future political economic and social 
challenges. 
 
Responses to this online article also revealed a belief in the Hutu victim status, 
as these excerpts illustrate: 
 
Response 1:  
Why do you start Rwandan history in the 50s when you know very well 
that we were already puppets in the 50s !? 
  
Response from Author:  
… Puppets or not, what really matters is the significance of their action 
at that time and today […] The problem with democracy in Rwanda is 
not the fact there is a Hutu majority population but the only fact that 
some people particularly among Tutsi think that they are God’s agents 
on earth. And for that simple reasons [sic] they have to dominate and 
exploit other ethnic groups. They think they were born to rule. 
 
Several CMCs warned diaspora not to become “lazy” or too comfortable 
living in the West, forgetting about their Hutu brothers and sisters they left 
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behind, while others noted that they would probably not return to Rwanda, but 
felt a responsibility for their “brothers and sisters” in the DRC and Rwanda to 
fight their victimization.  Additionally, many online identities cited the Belgian 
historical narrative of Hutus as victims of Tutsis as a reminder of why working 
with Tutsis was impossible, particularly in matters relating to the political 
leadership of the country. The following excerpt from an online dialogue 
(translated from Kinyarwanda) illustrates this sentiment: 
 
These Inkotanyi have never and will never acknowledge or accept the 
1959 revolution and will always try to make us their slaves. 
 
Similarly, the following excerpt from a popular online blog facilitated by Hutus 
in the diaspora in Belgium appears to rely on the historic feudal narrative, 
casting Hutus in the victim role in the 1994 genocide: 
 
The assassination on April 6, 1994 of […] Habyarimana […] was 
interpreted in many Rwandans’ understanding as the fall of Kigali into 
the hands of the attacker of the country – the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
of Paul Kagame…Hutus on the hills fearing a restoration of the feudal 
system and being subjected again to slavery, began eliminating their 
Tutsi neighbours.  
 
Anniversaries of important events, such as Independence Day and 
genocide(s) or massacres of the Hutu,58 as well as holidays such as Easter 
and Christmas were often commemorated with online reminders of their victim 
status. The following poem/song posted on several SNSs and widely 
distributed on July 1, 2011 (Rwanda’s date of independence from Belgium), is 
an example of this dynamic: 
 
HAPPY INDEPENDENCE DAY59 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Genocide commemorations were often held in the same week as Tutsi commemorations, yet upon 
analysis it became clear that Hutus in the diaspora were not commemorating the same genocide, 
although it appeared as though they were often attempting to make it appear as though they were. This 
dynamic will be explored in more detail in the section on genocide denial/trivialization. 
59 Although the lyrics did not include an author, they appeared to have originated from a website 
facilitated by anonymous identities self-identified as being members of Rwandan Hutu youth, many of 
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Eeeee!  Remember the whip and the chore!  
Remember the days you spent  serving the master without 
remuneration  
 
And therefore rejoice of Independence! 
 Chorus:   We said goodbye to the monarchy  
The feudal and colonial yokes disappeared at the same time  
And we got the democracy that suits us.  
Come and let us celebrate the independence.  
Remember the days of walking,  
The many nights that you spent in difficult conditions,  
Carrying tribute to the home of the head or the royal court,  
At the expense of your family who had needed you  
And when, exhausted, you arrive at your destination,  
We were not even appreciated.  
Come, let us celebrate the independence. 
 
 [Chorus]  
 
I am very young and I did not know it 
I was told and I’ve learned through reading  
And when I preserved the death penalty; 
It is for this reason that I look forward to independence.  
 
[Chorus] 
 
 Numerous CMCs also referenced Tutsis’ desire to kill all Hutus, both 
inside and outside of Rwanda, until they are all dead or slaves of the Tutsi, 
reflecting a significant fear of ongoing victimization despite living in the 
diaspora. Although most of these CMCs were written within a context of 
denying or historically revising the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, an 
additional dominant theme was related to identity, as the content of these 
CMCs were animated by a perception of Tutsis as a threat to their Hutu 
identity, as well as a threat to their majority status. The following CMCs 
capture these sentiments: 
A “status” posted in 2011 on a public Facebook page using a 
photograph of Kayibanda and his Parmehutu party as profile photo ran as 
follows: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
whom have parents who are currently imprisoned for crimes of genocide, or who were killed during the 
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One of the big achievement [sic] that the Tutsi led regime of Kagame 
and his cronies achieved so far is to kill as many Hutus as possible as 
they had planned in 1985. He killed Mumutara, BYUMBA, 
RUHENGERI, Ibivugwa Gisenyi60 then he continued his bid to make the 
Hutu the minority to the south where now you can hardly find any 
middle aged Hutu in Butare. Banyarwanda aho muli mswese 
mwagombye guhaguruka mukamagana iyingoma mbisha kdi 
mukayikiza itarabamara….Rukundo reka iza mperi sibwo bwambere 
zatubuza amahoro [Translation: Rwandans wherever you are, you 
should all stand and fight against this bad government before they kill 
all of you]…they did it for over 400 years and now they are still happily 
killing us. 
 
Similarly, an article posted on the same public Facebook community 
page, also in 2011, demonstrated an attempt to instill fear into the Hutu 
diaspora based on their collective membership in the Hutu ethnic group:  
There was a meeting in Boston which brought together all Rwandans of 
Tutsi ethnic background to discuss and plan for the following with the 
Rwandan Ambassador to the USA: 
1. All pro Kagame must know by names and residential areas of all 
Hutus living in North America and try to understand and know 
what they do for living and what they say and who they like 
interacting with. 
2. All Tutsi students in the USA and Canada must make sure they 
identify all Hutu students in their schools and try to know what 
they talk about Rwanda and its leadership. They even planned to 
use any kind of threats and elimination if necessary to defend 
Kagame against Hutu intellectuals and some American 
scholars...because of the above reasons all Hutus and Kagame 
critics in USA are asked to be cautious....” 
 
Another CMC on a public SNS provided a list of the various ways that 
current government programs in Rwanda place Hutus living in Rwanda at risk 
of being killed or returned to the era of feudal domination: 
You remember when he said that he could empty a barrel of water with 
a small coffee spoon! Of course he meaned [sic] that he could eliminate 
all the opposition and the so called Hutu genocidaires, one per 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1990-1994 civil war.  
60 These are all cities in the Northern Provinces of Rwanda, which had high numbers of Hutus in the 
population.  These cities are often referenced in Hutu narratives since they suffered high losses when 
the RPF invaded Rwanda in October of 1990. 
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one…one per one without Nyakatsi huts till 700,000 huts are 
destroyed…one per one Hutu and Twa man sterilized till 700,000 
hereditary enemies of his mafia are sterilized…one per one Hutu male 
condemned to slavery and poverty on the gacaca trials till 1,000,000 
males work as slaves or TIGists for RPF-State…meaning 6,000,000 
Bahutu without decent revenues…But Kagame Kagoome forgets that 
the barrel of water is an impossible Sisyphean task! In fact, what is his 
size? For the shoes it is N-53, but for the costume? I’d like to offer him 
a pink costume61 for his trial. 
 
This CMC is particularly noteworthy because it cites several current 
Rwandan government initiatives perceived by the online identity as targeting 
solely Hutus, including the campaign to remove all grass-thatched huts (called 
“Nyakatsi”) occupied by the Twa, which the Rwandan government alleges are 
no longer safe or appropriate in light of Rwanda’s infrastructure development 
goals, called “Vision 2020;” 62 Rwanda’s “No Scalpel Vasectomy” program 
(referenced earlier in this chapter); and the government program, Travaux 
d’Interet General (TIG), where individuals convicted of genocide-related 
crimes in Gacaca trials, work as manpower for development programs (TIG is 
particularly used for those who engaged in property destruction during the 
genocide). 
Finally, the following excerpts from an online article posted on 
numerous SNSs during Genocide Commemoration week in April 2013 
incorporates multiple aspects of Hutu identity within the context of Hutus being 
the historic victims of Tutsis, as well as the international community. This 
online article is particularly noteworthy for several reasons, including its close 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 This is a reference to the color of prison uniforms in Rwanda, which are pink. 
62 According to Rwanda’s Ministry of Local Government, the “Nyakatsi eradication campaign” (commonly 
referred to as “Bye Bye Nyakasti” program) is a part of the government’s community and social welfare 
program. The government of Rwanda asserts that modern replacement homes are being provided for 
Twa families displaced by this campaign. Information on the nature and progress of this program can be 
found on the government’s website here: http://www.minaloc.gov.rw/index.php?id=514. The program has 
been criticized by international aid organizations citing numerous problems with implementation, 
including the possible violation of human rights of the Twa. According to Globalissues.com, an 
international advocacy organization the “Bye Bye Nyakasti” campaign is a genuine attempt to lift the Twa 
out of poverty, as well as addressing safety concerns posed by the grass-thatched huts, but they 
challenge the rapid implementation of the program on a local level, which resulted in the destruction of 
several hundred huts prior to the completion of the replacement homes, leaving already poverty-stricken 
Twa homeless or residing to unsuitable temporary housing. Global Issue’s statement about this program 
can be found here: http://www.globalissues.org/news/2011/04/27/9429. 
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adherence to pre-genocide propaganda,63 its seeming defense of convicted 
genocidaires in Rwanda’s prisons, and its negative reference to Ibuka, a Tutsi 
genocide survivor advocacy organization. This CMC, as with several others, 
served as a “call to action” to all Hutus, in order to protect innocent Hutus 
inside and outside the country: 
 
“The Blood of Rwandan Hutu: Is it not Red?” 
 
The persecution of Hutu Rwandans did not begin yesterday or today. It 
is rooted in the Tutsi monarchy XVI th century and the period of African 
independence in the 1950s through the European colonization. Indeed, 
the Hutu Rwandans have been subjected, abused, persecuted and 
massacred without thank you, the so-called civilized countries of the 
planet Earth and the so-called international community playing the role 
of interested observers. If one starts from the earliest period when the 
RPF and Inyenzi-INKOTANYI attacked RWANDA Monday, October 1, 
1990 from Uganda, the report is damning. They called themselves 
224lood224224 INKOTANYI RWANDA invaded from the customs in 
Kagitumba Prefecture BYUMBA giving border with Uganda. In three 
and a half years, the RPF-INKOTANYI had killed 650,000 innocent 
ethnic Hutu BYUMBA Prefecture alone without including others that 
were killed elsewhere in the prefectures of Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Kibungo 
and Kigali. This carnage was perpetrated under the complacent eye of 
the so-called international community and the perpetrators of this grisly 
task were not worried to date!”  
[…] 
What to say Hutu languishing in jails Rwandan death houses since 
1994 to date and without criminal records established?? Many people 
have lost their lives. Do not forget the Arusha tribunal (ICTR), which 
condemns the innocent on the basis of false testimony prefabricated 
and / or assembled from scratch by the RPF-Inkotanyi and its network 
of informers as Ibuka! Furthermore, those trying to flee the continued 
RWANDA, abused if not killed by death squads of DMI Paul Kagame in 
the country of refuge in BURUNDI, in UGANDA, KENYA, Belgium, etc 
...  
[…] 
Oh! Great people of this world, international community and 
humanitarian organizations who take pleasure in such crimes of 
Kagame and his regime continue to let you destroy the Hutu Rwandan 
across the globe and is an open secret for now! 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Among the various elements of pre-genocide propaganda, the numbers of Hutu killed during the 1990 
to 1994 civil war are not supported by research cited in Chapter 4. 
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We urge you to reconsider your strategies if the history and God 
Almighty, the Great Judge, you will condemn leaders bloodshed of 
innocent Hutus. 
 
Conclude with these words of Albert Einstein: ‘The world will not be 
destroyed by those who do evil, but by those who look and refuse to 
act.’! 
 
To all the people for the human misery and injustice to the poor and the 
weak, know that war does not build that simply exacerbate the hatred! 
 
Story of a Rwandan, an eyewitness to the tragedy of his people. 
 
Religion  
A more subtle but consistent theme found in the data involves religion, 
primarily in respect to how religion was used as a source of support and 
motivation in the political activities of the networked online identities included 
in the study. This dynamic occurred in three primary ways: 1) identifying 
members of the Hutu diaspora who were members of the clergy and elevating 
them in some manner as leaders of their cause, 2) defending members of the 
clergy who were charged with genocide, and 3) the most frequent pattern 
noted was the posting of religious materials, including scriptures that were in 
some way related to their plight (as a source of motivation), including asking 
God for protection in their fight to take their country back from the Tutsi.  
The data revealed that the primary role the Internet served within a 
religious context was the posting of religious content on SNSs, including 
scriptures, prayers, songs (or poems), and sermons (e.g., textual artifacts, 
cultural artifacts in the form of photographs of churches and Hutu leaders in 
the clergy, online radio sermons and YouTube videos). Religious content 
disseminated by the online identities was most often focused on providing 
encouragement to the network, including reminding online identities that God 
was on their side, and would liberate them soon. Such CMCs were often 
responded to by comments such as “Amen!” and “Yes, God is on our side!” 
The dissemination of scripture from the Old Testament was particularly 
prevalent, especially scripture related to the Israelites time in the desert and 
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God’s promise to deliver them to the “Promised Land.” The following are 
examples of CMCs invoking the Christian God that demonstrates these 
patterns and dynamics: 
 
A tweet posted on a Twitter feed of an online identity integrated into a public 
Facebook profile: 
 
GOD SPEAKS TO ALL OF US TO GET UP AND TO REBUILD OUR 
COUNTRY WHICH IS IN RUINS.... 
 
Now this is what the Lord Almighty says: “Give careful thought to your 
ways. You have planted much, but harvested little. You eat, but never 
have enough. You drink, but never have your fill. You put on clothes, 
but are not warm. You earn wages, only to put them in a purse with 
holes in it.” 
 
Haggai 1:5-6 
 
A public Facebook status with 22 online identities tagged: 
For I know the plans I have for you, declares the Lord, plans to prosper 
you and not to harm you, plans to give you hope and a future. Then you 
will call on me and come and pray to me, and I will listen to you. You 
will seek me and find me when you seek me with all your heart. I will be 
found by you, declares the Lord, and will bring you back from captivity. I 
will gather you from all the nations and places where I have banished 
you, declares the Lord, and will bring you back to the place from which I 
carried you into exile. 
 
Jeremiah 29:11-14 
 
A Facebook post on a public community page linked to a public blog: 
God created 226lood226 for reason. To show his power like the way he 
created usama bin laden,iddi amini,226lood226,and everyone.and hey!! 
Remember the time of 226lood226 people when they was slave in 
226lood.what God has said about Faraoh? I created you to show my 
power.what do u think about 226lood226? Can be the samething.it’s 
only God who knows why 226lood226 killing everyone,hutu,tusi 
twa,even he was not 226lood226226226n what he have done in his 
coutry,till he went beyond to kill in congo,without 226lood226226226ng 
darfour.guess what!!? He was born killer.what the 226lood226226 say? 
Akamasa kazaca inka kazivukamo.but,we will never give him any 
chance anymore. Its over 
 
	  	   227 
 One particularly noteworthy CMC involving religion was posted by an 
online identity that was highly connected within the network, and which 
claimed to represent the FDLR. The identity used a pseudonym that consisted 
of a combination of French and Swahili words, which translated means 
“Armored Tank.” The online identity appeared to be used primarily for 
disseminating information about the FDLR’s activities on the front lines of the 
most recent Congo/Rwanda conflict, including the posting of a February 2013 
documentary on the plight of the FDLR, as well as numerous very graphic 
“victory” photographs of soldiers alleged to be Tutsis from Rwanda who were 
captured, tortured and killed. Additionally, this online identity also posted 
numerous CMCs containing sexually explicit and offensive content toward 
women. Amidst these CMCs was the following prayer posted during genocide 
commemoration week asking for God’s protection over the FDLR as they fight 
for their God-given cause: 
 
In the name of Jesus Christ our Lord, Jesus Christ is the true salvation; 
Jesus Christ governs, Reigns, defeats and conquers every enemy, 
visible or invisible; 
 
Jesus, be with FDRL Soldiers at all times, forever and ever, 
Upon all roads and ways, upon the water and the land, 
On the mountain and in the valley, in the house and in the yard, 
 
In the whole world wherever We are, stand, run, ride, or drive;  
Whether We sleep or wake, eat or drink, 
There be thou also, Lord Jesus Christ, at all times, late and early, 
Every hour, every moment; and in all Our goings in or out. 
 
Your five holy red wounds, oh Lord Jesus Christ, may they 
Guard us against all firearms, be they secret or public, 
That they cannot injure us or do us any harm whatever, 
In the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
 
The blessing which came from Heaven at the birth of Christ be with 
You,  
The blessing of God at the creation of the first man be with us; 
the blessing of Christ on being imprisoned, bound, lashed, crowned so 
dreadfully and beaten, and dying on the cross, be with us;  
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Evangelists, Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, be with us; the Archangels 
St. Michael, St. Gabriel, St. Raphael and St. Uriel, be with us; the 
twelve holy messengers of the Patriarchs and all the Hosts of Heaven, 
be with us; and the inexpressible number of all the Saints be with us.  
 
In the name of God the Father, the Son and Holy Spirit: As Christ 
stopped at the Mount of Olives, all guns shall stop! If Jesus is on our 
Side none of our Soldiers will be damaged through the enemy’s guns or 
weapons, none of us shall be taken prisoner, nor wounded by the 
enemy. As true as it is that Jesus Christ died and ascended to Heaven 
and suffered on earth he shall not be shot, but shall stand unhurt, and 
adjure all guns and weapons on earth by the living God, the Father, the 
Son and the Holy Spirit, I pray in the name of Christ’s blood that no ball 
shall hit us, be it gold or silver, but that God in Heaven may deliver us of 
all sins in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. 
 
God give us strength; We shall not fear robbers and murders, nor guns, 
pistols, swords and muskets shall not hurt us through the command of 
the Angel Michael, in the name of the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit, 
God with us. 
 
Amen. 
 
This CMC was accompanied by what appeared to be a relatively recent 
photograph of an FDLR soldier carrying a high-powered automatic weapon. 
The post had numerous positive responsive posts, as well as 10 “likes,” four of 
which were online identities included in the study. In fact, two of the online 
identities that “liked” this CMC were major political opposition groups based in 
the diaspora that claimed to be fighting for “truth and reconciliation,” human 
rights and peace in the region.  
Although CMCs of a religious nature were not as prevalent as other 
themes, they are noteworthy in light of the role some religious leaders played 
in the genocide, including how religion was used to justify the killings of Tutsis, 
and how many priests and pastors of various Christian denominations were 
leaders in the genocide, engaging in the coordination of killings by alerting the 
Interahamwe when Tutsis sought refuge in churches (explored in Chapter 4). 
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Genocide Denial and Historical Revisionism  
Another theme that emerged from the data relates to how the 1994 
genocide was perceived, including attempts to deny the genocide, and/or 
engage in historical revisionism by those within and outside of the diaspora 
virtual network. Genocide was the topic of, or referenced in most of the CMCs 
reviewed in the study, but content regarding genocide emerged within a 
variety of contexts. Generally, the CMCs concerning genocide expressed deep 
grievances in response to what many online identities perceived as the 
neglect and ignorance of the international community, as well as anyone else 
who appeared to believe the generally accepted narrative that the Tutsis were 
victims, and Hutus were perpetrators.  
There appeared to be a variety of ways in which the 1994 genocide 
against the Tutsi was referenced and perceived by the online identities 
included in the study. In fact, there are so many narratives emanating from the 
data that it was difficult to organize them in any systematic manner. This was 
particularly the case because many CMCs incorporated numerous narratives 
concerning the genocide at one time, merging “bits and pieces” of older 
genocide narratives in order to create new ones. Additionally, there was often 
only a slight distinction between genocide denial and historical revisionism 
with many claims of denial occurring on a continuum (i.e., several online 
identities posted CMCs that were consistent with double genocide, and 
subsequently posted CMCs that outright denied a genocide in Rwanda). 
Additionally, some CMCs included both, denials and historical revisionism, in 
an “either/or” sort of manner.  
Overall, CMCs focusing on genocide denial and historical revisionism 
represent a collective attempt to deny and/or historically revise the genocide 
against the Tutsi population in several ways. Examples include claiming that 
the killings were the result of the civil war, and thus did not constitute 
genocide; claiming that genocide was actually against the Hutus, not the 
Tutsis, supported through the manipulation of statistics indicating that more 
Hutus died than Tutsis; and a failure to acknowledge the 1994 genocide in 
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Rwanda, while claiming that the military incursions into the post-genocide 
militarized refugee camps (explored in Chapter 4) were the “real” genocides.  
As mentioned earlier, many CMCs included both genocide denial and 
historical revisionism, particularly when advancing the argument that Tutsis 
were the perpetrators and Hutus were the victims. This was accomplished in 
three primary ways: 1) claiming that Tutsi killings were a justified response to 
the 1990 RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990; 2) that the RPF could have 
stopped the genocide earlier but kept the war going in order to secure 
complete control over the country; and 3) that the Interahamwe was infiltrated 
by Kagame without the knowledge of the Interahamwe, thus the Tutsis 
committed genocide against themselves. Although the RPF was often blamed, 
in many CMCs the Tutsi were blamed collectively for genocide(s) against the 
Hutu. Other noteworthy subthemes that emerged from the data included 
responses to and engagement in genocide commemorations, as well as how 
photographs were used to deny and/or historically revise the 1994 genocide 
against the Tutsi.  
Deaths from Civil War: ‘More Hutus died During the Genocide than 
Tutsis’ 
Several CMCs advocated the position that the 1994 genocide against 
the Tutsi was not genocide, but rather civilian deaths caused from the 1990 to 
1994 civil war. Often this argument was based on a manipulation of statistics, 
asserting that more Hutus died than Tutsis, or an equal number died from 
each ethic group. For instance, one post on a public Facebook community 
page, linked to Twitter and tagged with approximately 14 other online identities 
within the virtual network asserted that there was no genocide at all, but rather 
a civil war: 
Fighting between government troops and armed insurrenctionists is not 
genocide. It is civil war…it is wrong to characterise every violence as 
genocide or imminent genocide so as to use it as a pretext for 
undermining of the sovereignty of states. 
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CMCs that argued that more Hutus were killed during the genocide than 
Tutsis, or that an equal number died often cited the Davenport and Stam study 
(referenced in Chapter 4) in order to add legitimacy to their stance. Some 
CMCs even exaggerated statistics far beyond the Davenport and Stam study, 
thus having no basis in fact, as the following excerpt from an online news 
article illustrates. The article, which was disseminated throughout the virtual 
network, featured a Hutu in the diaspora speaking to schoolchildren in the U.S. 
about the “1994 Rwandan genocide”: 
There was a civil war in Rwanda from 1990 to 1994, against the Hutus. 
“There were 50,000 civilians killed in the conflict,” he said…. He said 
more than 100,000 people were killed in 100 days.64 
 
The reference to first 50,000 killed and then 100,000 people killed “in 100 
days” (a clear reference to the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi) 
demonstrates a gross underestimate that even the most prolific propagandists 
within the diaspora did not cite.  
The “double genocide theory,” was frequently postulated early in the 
ethnographic immersion, which asserted that there was not one, but two 
genocides starting on April 6, 1994, since “every time a Tutsi was killed, a 
Hutu was killed as well.”  For instance, a CMC posted by an online identity 
included in the study, in response to a Tutsi diaspora member’s CMC posting 
information about “Rwanda Day” in Boston in 2010 asserted the belief that 
both sides experienced equal losses: 
IF YOU ARE SENT BY KAGAME TO CONTINUE SPREAD LIES NO 
ONE IS GONNA COME. YOU ARE USED TO TELLING LIES…WHEN 
WILL YOU TALK ABOUT RECONCILIATION, PEACE, AND 
DEMOCRACY WITHOUT LYING ABOUT GENOCIDE. DON’T YOU 
KNOW I DESERVE TO MOURN FOR MY FATHER AND 300 PEOPLE 
KILLED WITH HIM IN KIYOMBE?  
 
Another perspective that was frequently circulated online asserted that 
starting the genocide narrative on April 6, 1994 did not tell the whole story, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Chapter 4 explores the legitimate range of Tutsi killed during the 1994 genocide at between 500,000 
and 800,000, and Hutus killed at between 30,000 and 50,000. 
	  	   232 
thus the killings of each ethnic group must be counted from October 1990, the 
date that the RPF invaded Rwanda. According to numerous online identities, if 
the October 1990 date was used, then the number of Hutus killed far 
exceeded the number of Tutsis.  Additionally, many online identities overtly 
denied that extremist Hutus engaged in any killings of Tutsis, while decrying 
Hutus killed when the former regime and the Interahamwe were fleeing into 
the DRC (formerly Zaire). These postulations appeared to still hold that all 
deaths were caused by the civil war, or what was often called the “RPF 
guerrilla invasion,” and did not constitute a genocide (unless genocide was 
considered against the Hutu).  
How the word “genocide” was used when in reference to Tutsi killings 
also constituted a type of genocide denial and/or revisionism. For instance, 
when CMCs did reference the genocide, it was often referenced in a manner 
that made it appear as though the term “genocide” was used rather 
begrudgingly and in a highly qualified manner. For example, when used in a 
sentence the word genocide was often placed in quotations (i.e., “the 
Genocide”), or the genocide was referred to as “the so called Genocide,” or 
“what has become known as the Rwandan genocide.” These types of 
references were used particularly when the CMCs were written in English or 
French. When CMCs were written in Kinyarwanda, and appeared directed 
primarily toward the online identities included in the virtual network, the 1994 
genocide was referred to as “mutual killings,” the “1994 massacres,” or as the 
“civil war.”  
The ‘Real Genocide’: Military Incursions into Hutu Camps 
The significant number of CMCs that espoused some variation of 
genocide denial and/or historical revisionism focused on the conflicts in the 
DRC, both past and current. The most frequent narrative expressed in the 
CMCs framed the real genocide as having occurred in the DRC, not Rwanda. 
Many CMCs referenced Hutus who were killed by the RPF after they took 
control of the country, and consistently referenced all Hutu deaths, even of 
those who committed genocide, as persecution. Online identities also cited 
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deaths caused by border conflict, and the military incursions that resulted in 
civilian deaths in the Kibeho camp in southern Rwanda in 1995, and in the 
refugee camps in the Kivus in 1996 and 1997 (referenced in Chapter 4) as 
genocides. The majority of CMCs focusing on allegations that Hutu genocides 
have occurred and continue to occur in the DRC will be explored in the next 
section on “Anti-Kagame” CMCs since the majority of CMCs that accused 
Rwanda of genocide in the Congo did so by leveling blame at President 
Kagame on a personal level, as if he personally engaged in the killing of 
Hutus. 
An important practice noted in the data was how the online identities in 
the virtual network used photographs to express grief, disseminate 
propaganda, and mobilize support both from within the network as well as with 
outsiders. Numerous online identities facilitated online photo albums and 
disseminated photographs widely throughout the network depicting massacre 
sites. Often these photographs were extremely gruesome, showing 
dismembered bodies, bodies piled on top of one another, some with children 
looking on, or children holding onto what was presumed to be a deceased 
parent’s hand. Most of the massacre photos had captions identifying the 
massacre site(s), as well as other information about the photograph(s). For 
instance, one photograph depicting the charred remains of a woman and 
infant had the caption: “A woman and her child burned to death in DRC.” 
Another photograph of a young child holding a deceased woman’s hand had 
the caption “Hutu orphan holding the hand of his dead mother killed by RPF 
murderers.” Most of the photographs appeared to originate from SNSs that 
existed for the sole purpose of memorializing a massacre, such as the Tingi 
Tingi public Facebook page. Others were placed into online albums on public 
SNSs that contained a range of other photographs. Many of these 
photographs were also enlarged and placed on posters, and then used during 
real world anti-Kagame demonstrations. 
What was particularly noteworthy about these photographs is that a 
Google image search revealed that the majority were not photographs of 
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Hutus slaughtered at refugee camps, or in Rwanda. Although a few 
photographs appeared authentic, and were accompanied by photo credit 
information, the majority of the photographs did not appear to be authentic 
photographs in that they were not from massacre sites involving Rwandan or 
Congolese Hutus. Roughly two-thirds of the photographs of massacre sites 
posted on SNSs of the online identities included in the study were not of the 
sites/conditions claimed by the online identities. In fact, some of the worst 
massacre photos depicting bloody piles of slaughtered corpses that were 
frequently disseminated throughout the virtual networks (as well as during off-
line demonstrations) were actually photographs of the Pagak Massacre in 
Uganda involving the slaughter of Acholi by the LRA. The photograph 
referenced earlier of a burned and deceased Hutu mother and child, was 
actually a mother and child slaughtered in Jos, Nigeria by Muslim extremists.  
The majority of the photographs though were actually of Tutsis 
slaughtered by Hutu extremists in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, and 
incorrectly identified as being of Hutus slaughtered in refugee camps by 
Tutsis. An example is a photograph of a group of children laying strewn about 
some stairs with the caption “bodies of Hutu children at Kihendo refugee camp 
1996.” The photograph was actually taken by a Human Rights Watch 
photographer of Tutsi children slaughtered during the 1994 genocide against 
the Tutsi. Another example involves the use of a photograph showing 
numerous dead bodies wrapped and laying on the side of a road. The online 
identity wrote the following caption: “Paul Kagame is a war criminal and he 
deserved to be executed 20 times a day for his crimes against humanity.” The 
original photograph (actually a video) was taken from a Public Broadcasting 
System (PBS) documentary entitled “Confronting Evil,” and the bodies were 
identified in the film as Tutsis killed by Hutu extremists during the genocide. 
Also, the majority of the original photographs appeared to be captured from 
legitimate sources such as the UN, PBS and educational sites, providing 
strong indications of the photographs’ original source (see Appendix O for 
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examples of genocide denial and historical revisionism using false 
photographs). 
Victims Really Victimizers: ‘It was the Tutsis Fault, not the Hutus’ 
 Numerous online identities posted CMCs arguing that the Hutus were 
the true victims of the genocide, not the Tutsis, either because the RPF 
allowed the genocide to unfold as a strategy to gain control over Rwanda by 
infiltrating the Interahamwe, thus the Tutsis committed genocide against 
themselves. CMCs that relied upon manipulated statistics often did not provide 
a detailed rationale, except to say that the 1994 genocide was committed 
against the Hutu. For instance, a photograph widely disseminated throughout 
the virtual network showed a genocide memorial in Rwanda that displayed 
skulls of Tutsi genocide survivors,65 with a caption alleging that the bones 
were actually from Hutus, not Tutsis (see Appendix P). The caption stated: 
FPR INKOTANYI has been using our Parents Remains as the main 
income for the War criminals Party, mostly Kagame. If I may ask can 
anyone point out among the skulls which one belong to a HUTU, TUTSI 
or TWA? 
 
Many CMCs also included allegations that Tutsis had been the historic 
aggressors, both during and after the genocide, as this segment of a widely 
disseminated post directed to President Kagame suggests: 
THE RPF INKOTANYI ITINERARY OF BLOODSHED Staring from 
KAGITUMBA all the way to MBANADAKA.  
 
The post then proceeds to list numerous massacres against the Hutus ranging 
from October 1, 1990 through 1997. An online chat ensued that included 
several identities included in the study referencing plans to take their country 
back. One identity appearing to be located in Rwanda held a dissenting 
opinion, challenged the narrative as well as the online identities’ perceptions of 
the conditions inside the country. Numerous online identities then responded 
quite aggressively, using rather threatening language, taunting what appeared 
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to be a Tutsi responder, referencing the possibility of Hutus invading the 
country. The Tutsi online identity wrote: “I’ve told you one thing, let me repeat 
it. We are not, and we have never been scared by homosapiens. If you want 
to know the determination and heroism of Rwandans, try to wage a war 
against us; we’ll put you where genocidaires deserve.” When one Hutu online 
identity praised the others for attempting to engage the Tutsi on an intellectual 
level, another online identity posted the following:  
 
What do you mean by intellectual engagement if there are people who 
think intellectually the pro-RPF people are nothing but empty trolleys 
because u think intellectually, you know Kagame caused the death of 
many innocent Tutsis when he killed Habyarimana Juvenal [name 
linked to Facebook memorial page] and Ntaryamira then after that he 
continued killing Hutus from 1990s to this day as millions of Hutus are 
either in jail or at Iwawa Island..another think u guys you are blind that 
is why u say that people who are well educated like us I engage 
intellectually its coz u cant match up to our thinking because we are 
beyond your anarchy and think in more civilized way. Here is a list of 
the people u drunk their blood three of them being my uncles... [website 
included] and you still think that KAGAME IS NOT A MURDERER? 
 
A similar CMC that was widely disseminated referenced the 1994 
genocide as having been started by the antichrist from the North (a reference 
to Kagame’s birthplace): 
INDEED, 1994 WAS THE REIGN OF ANTICHRIST IN 
RWANDA…AND THIS ONE CAME FROM THE NORTHERN PART OF 
IKIRIINGA MUHABUURAI 
 
The data did not reveal a single incident where the online identities 
included in the virtual network referred to the genocide as “the genocide 
against the Tutsi.” Tutsis were never referred as the victims in the genocide in 
a collective sense, and although the counter-accusations of genocide were 
primarily leveled at President Kagame and his “RPF cronies” (which will be 
explored in the subsequent section), some CMCs accused all Tutsis in general 
of engaging in several genocides against the Hutu, as well as other types of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 A key feature of Tutsi genocide memorials in Rwanda is the displaying of bones of murdered Tutsis. 
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killing campaigns. Tutsis were also accused of manipulating the international 
community for sympathy. The following post, translated from Kinyarwanda, 
provides an example of these types of accusations that portrayed Tutsis as the 
perpetrators of the genocide, rather than the victims: 
 
The Tutsi have launched a global campaign of disinformation to believe 
that the killers are victims and victims murderers. 
 
I announce the extermination of Hutu people of the Great Lakes: I 
announce that “Agaciro Development Fund”66 is a clear ideological and 
racist anti-Hutu I announce that “Rwandan Vision 2020” is a clear 
ideological and racist anti-Hutu. 
 
I announce the extermination of Hutu people of the Great Lakes I 
announce the extermination of Hutu people of the Great Lakes I 
announce the extermination of Hutu people of the Great Lakes 
Here the Tutsi killers in the heart of the tragedy in Rwanda, Congo, 
Burundi and ugandaise: 
 
Yoweri Museveni is a real monster and sangineur genocidal Rwandan 
Tutsi extremist. 
 
Paul Kagame is a real monster and sangineur genocidal Rwandan Tutsi 
extremist. 
 
Hippolyte Kanambe alias Joseph Kabila is a real monster genocidal 
sangineur and Tutsi extremist. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!! 777777777!!!!! 999999! !!!! 333333333!!!!!!! 1. Many Hutus were 
victims: More than 5 million of death in Rwanda!! Catch these Tutsi 
killers in the heart of the Rwandan tragedy ................ 2. Many Hutus 
were victims of more than 10 million dead in Congo!! Catch these Tutsi 
killers in the heart of the Congolese tragedy ................ 3. Many victims 
were Hutus in Burundi Catch these Tutsi killers in the heart of Burundi 
tragedy ................ 4. Many Hutus were victims in Uganda. Catch these 
Tutsi killers in the heart of the tragedy ugandaise! 
 
Although Tutsi were consistently referred to as aggressors, perpetrators 
and genocidaires, online identities within the network never referred to any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The bones serve as a gruesome reminder to ‘never forget.”  
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Hutu genocidaire or suspected genocidaire as such, even those considered to 
be the “masterminds” of the 1994 genocide prosecuted by the ICRT. In fact, 
there was a significant amount of online activity focused on defending any and 
all Hutus who were suspected, charged and/or convicted of genocide, either in 
Rwanda or in a host country. This dynamic included the posting of mainstream 
newspaper articles reporting on the arrest and/or sentencing outcome of a 
suspected genocidaire, and complaining about the outcome. In dialogues 
within the virtual network that did not appear to be directed to Westerners 
(often written in Kinyarwanda or French), genocidaires were often referred to 
by a number of terms, such as “our brothers and sisters,” “our persecuted 
brother,” “our hero,” “comrade,” and “soldiers.” CMCs referencing the arrest 
and/or sentencing of Hutu genocidaires often included responsive CMCs that 
very emotionally pronounced their innocence. For instance, a 2010 CMC that 
included what appeared to be the “copy and pasting” of an article about a 
notorious genocidaire Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi, a Pentecostal pastor (and the 
first genocide suspect to be returned to Rwanda by the ICTR), was responded 
to by an online identity challenging the veracity of the article. The CMC, written 
in Kinyarwanda admonished the original poster for publishing something that 
was “factually incorrect,” ending the CMC an all-caps profession: “HE IS 
INNOCENT!!”  
 In articles written in English, genocidaires were sometimes referred to 
as “genocidaires,” but most often they were referred to as “so called 
genocidaires.” Numerous CMCs expressed the belief that any Hutu who was 
charged with genocide was being persecuted by Tutsis (assisted by the 
international community), with several referencing a large cover-up of the 
truth, commonly referenced as “Tutsi propaganda,” or the “RPF propaganda 
machine.” Widely disseminated articles providing the “true” history of Rwanda 
appeared to have as their goal a continuation of the propaganda campaign 
spread prior to the genocide that cast Habyarimana as the hero of not only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 A relatively new self-initiated anti-poverty campaigning in Rwanda established to enable Rwandans, 
both in the country and outside of it (diaspora) to fund development projects in order to reduce the need 
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Hutus but of Tutsis as well. An example is an article posted on a public online 
blog frequently linked to Facebook and Twitter accounts included in the study, 
entitled “President Habyarimana protected Tutsis between October 1990 and 
1994 as much as he could.” The article, written by a pseudonym, provided a 
historical version of events leading up to the genocide and included the 
following statement that appeared to provide a justification for the genocide: 
 
Despite the troubled and war time that the country experienced 
between October 1, 1990, date of RPF invasion of Rwanda from 
Uganda, and the day he died on April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana 
demonstrated a humanity towards Tutsis inside Rwanda that RPF 
would not dare to credit him for, because this would deprive Paul 
Kagame, President of Rwanda, of claiming that he has been their savior 
[…] The assassination on April 6, 1994 of the two Presidents, 
Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi, when the 
aeroplane they were travelling in was shot down while attempting to 
land at Kanombe airport, was interpreted in many Rwandans’ 
understanding as the fall of Kigali in the hands of the attacker of the 
country – the Rwandan Patriotic Front of Paul Kagame.  
 
In this same article, references to the genocide were placed in quotation 
marks, perhaps as an indication that the genocide was not real, and 
references to genocide perpetrators were consistently referred to as “alleged 
Hutu perpetrators” or “alleged Hutu genocidaires,” even in regard to those who 
were convicted by the ICTR (see Appendix P for examples of how SNSs were 
used for genocide denial and historical revisionism). 
One of the most dramatic and blatant examples of outright denials by 
genocidaires is an instance of one depicting himself  as a victim, in the form of 
a letter and personal testimony statement written by Georges Rutaganda, a 
top leader of the Interahamwe, and shareholder of Radio Television Libre des 
Mille Collines (RTLM). The letter was written to the president of the ICRT, on 
the 10th anniversary of his incarceration for genocide and crimes against 
humanity, and contained 37 pages of what Rutaganda called his “personal 
testimony.” The letter was sent to numerous international figures as well, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for foreign aid. 
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including the head of the UN Security Council, the Prime Minister of Sweden, 
the President of Appeals Chamber at The Hague, and the head of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). In his letter and 
testimony, Rutaganda decries his conviction by the ICTR, expressing outrage 
and contempt for the international institution he claimed to have trusted to 
seek truth and exonerate him. His testimony presented what appeared to be a 
very sincere and heartfelt attempt to profess the injustice of his conviction by 
the ICTR, and the betrayal of the international community as a whole. The 
letter was widely disseminated throughout the virtual network, where it was 
celebrated by numerous diaspora identities included in the study, many of 
which identified Rutaganda as a hero of Rwanda. 
Rutaganda begins his letter by stating that he was compelled to tell the 
truth because of the vast number of lies circulating about the “tragedy” in 
Rwanda, which was causing innocent people to be convicted of genocide. He 
then dedicates his letter to all Rwandans, stating:  
I dedicate this testimony to all the victims, dead or alive, the tragic 
events that hit my country, Rwanda. I join all Rwandan families who 
have been bereaved and continue to be bereaved by these tragic 
events whose extensions are always difficulty experienced by our 
people. 
Claiming to speak for victims of the “tragedy” from both ethnic groups, 
Rutaganda writes:  
“Enough is enough”: ten years of various manipulations, ten years of 
deliberate concealment of the truth on the Rwandan tragedy, ten years 
of blatant injustice against Mr. Georges Rutaganda. I am forced out of 
my silence out of respect for all Rwandans and in memory of victims of 
the Rwandan tragedy, whatever ethnicity they come. How can I 
continue to remain quite quiet in response to false speech on 
reconciliation of Rwandans, before rigged judgments based on 
manipulation, lying and official denunciation? I decided to talk to restore 
dignity to the victims of tragic events that have befallen my country 
Rwanda, giving my testimony to the truth violated by a two-tier justice, a 
discriminatory justice, justice for the winner. 
 
He also proclaimed to be fighting for truth and reconciliation in Rwanda when 
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he writes: “…without truth there is no Justice and without justice there is no 
real reconciliation.”  
In his letter and testimony Rutaganda outright denied that there was 
any attempt on the part of the Interahamwe to commit genocide. With what 
appeared to be sincerity and authenticity, he presented himself and others in 
the Interahamwe as the victims of a conspiracy to keep the truth of the killings 
of Tutsi hidden, stating: 
 
Even before the tragic events that have devastated our country, 
Rwanda, up to date, all power hungry critics of Habyarimana and his 
party MRND have conspired to allocate all the ills suffered by the 
people of Rwanda to “Interahamwe,” creating a malicious suspicion 
around the MRND youth wing, called ‘Interahamwe za MRND”…Acts of 
terrorism and vandalism that have engulfed the country from 1990 to 
1994, were also placed on the back of the Interahamwe za MRND, 
without providing any tangible evidence. The legend of the 
Interahamwe za MRND militia’s formidable militarily-trained incredible 
killing machine that would travel throughout the country and facilitate 
the “Tutsi genocide” with the main weapon of systematic rape of Tutsi 
women, is a fallacious manipulation orchestrated and maintained to the 
extent that it has become almost a reality, indelible in the minds of 
certain categories of people, rigged as based on manipulation, lying 
and official denunciation. I decided to talk to restore dignity to the 
victims of tragic events that have befallen my country Rwanda, giving 
my testimony to the truth violated by a two-tier justice, a discriminatory 
justice, justice for the winner. 
 
Rutaganda also professed his own innocence as well as his bitterness 
at having been betrayed by long-time friends for whom he claimed he did 
favors for (e.g., saving the lives of their Tutsi friends and family). Rutaganda 
provided painstaking details of incident after incident where he saved Tutsis, 
often risking his own life to do so. For example, in one section of his letter 
Rutaganda states: 
 
Responsibilities in the Rwandan tragedy are well documented, but no 
one wants to look at reality and act accordingly. My bitterness has 
another justification much more personal. I was betrayed by the 
selfishness of some of my colleagues of the National Transitional 
“Interahamwe za MRND” which sold to the Prosecutor by telling lies to 
	  	   242 
secure personal benefits and/or family. I was dragged through the mud 
by the very people whose lives I saved, often at the cost of mine... I was 
betrayed by longtime friends and partners … 
He concludes by professing a hope that in time, he would be exonerated and 
seen as the true hero that he is: 
The truth is that I saved a lot of Tutsis. But, I ask nothing in return, 
except the recognition of the humanitarian acts that I performed, often 
risking my life to save many lives. To accuse me of trying to eliminate 
the Tutsi ethnic group is quite wrong. I claim that an injustice was done 
to me. I will continue to proclaim my innocence with the hope that one 
day, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about the Rwandan 
tragedy will one day become public.  
‘The RPF could have Stopped the Genocide Earlier’ 
A more recently postulated version of the genocide disseminated online 
in articles addressing the “true history” of Rwanda alleges that President 
Kagame committed genocide against both Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda in 
1994 in order to gain control over the country. For instance, in a widely 
disseminated online article entitled   “Kagame Political Ambitions Triggered the 
Genocide” published by one of the online identities included in the study, the 
author writes: 
Kagame’s guerrilla war was aimed at accessing to [sic] power at any 
cost. He rejected all attempts and advice that could stop his military 
adventures including the cease-fire, political negotiations and 
cohabitation, and UN peacekeeping interventions. He ignored all 
warnings that could have helped him to manage the war without tragic 
consequences.  
 
Not only is this statement factually incorrect, it demonstrates how stories of 
denial evolved, becoming almost folklore as they were passed from one SNS 
to another. 
The Interahamwe was Infiltrated by Kagame 
Several online identities accused Kagame of being responsible for the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda, through an elaborate take-over of the 
Interahamwe, without the knowledge of the extremist Hutus running the 
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county. The following excerpt is from an interview of a high level member of 
the Hutu diaspora associated with a Hutu extremist group with ties to the 
Interahamwe. The interview was published on numerous online sites, including 
the opposition group’s public website. The online identity states in part: 
 
Because Kagame had infiltrated the Habyarimana’s army [FAR], and 
the militias, everywhere; he [Kagame] had his own militia within a 
militia… Kagame had infiltrated the militias…most of those guys who 
were just on the roadblocks, where so much killing was done, were 
Kagame people…and the Interahamwe were not aware that they were 
working for him [Kagame].  
 
Genocide Commemorations 
A majority of the online identities included in the virtual networks held 
genocide commemorations both online and offline. Online commemorations 
consisted of an online event attended virtually in an asynchronous manner, 
whereas offline commemorations were coordinated via the Internet through an 
event posting, and a video of the event was then subsequently disseminated 
through the posting of YouTube videos on various SNSs.  
Hutu diaspora groups often held genocide commemorations in April 
(the same month as Tutsi commemorations) that were attended solely by Hutu 
diaspora members. Many of these events were commemorating the victims of 
the Kibeho killings, but it was often difficult to determine what genocide the 
CMC was referencing. For instance, in the following CMC the poster appears 
to be commemorating victims of Kibeho, but then references April 6, 1994, 
which is the date of the genocide against the Tutsi. The date of the Kibeho 
tragedy was April 27, 1996: 
 
FROM APRIL 6, 1996 MORE THAN 99% OF ALL RWANDANS FROM 
WITHIN AND WITHOUT RWANDA ARE REMEMBERING THEIR 
LOVED ONES WHO LOST OF THEIR LIVES BECAUSE OF THE 
CURRENT MURDERER KAGAME PAUL..PLEASE JOIN US ALL 
RWANDANS TO GIVE OURSELVES DIGNITY 
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Indications that members of the virtual network were not 
commemorating the Tutsi genocide, but were either referencing a double 
genocide, or a Hutu genocide were expressed in a variety of ways. Although 
no CMC acknowledged that the majority of those killed during the 100 days of 
genocide in Rwanda were Tutsi, many did express outrage that official 
commemorations focused solely on Tutsis killed, and not Hutu. Other CMCs 
complained about Rwanda’s genocide ideology laws that prohibited genocide 
denial and historical revisionism, as these laws were perceived as barring 
Hutus from mourning their losses, and speaking about their perceptions of the 
genocide. Additionally, many CMCs posted during commemoration did not 
make reference to a particular ethnic group, but were clearly focused on 
Hutus. For instance, the following CMC was posted on April 6th, the 
anniversary of the initiation of the Tutsi genocide, by an online identity that 
consistently espoused Hutu Power/Parmehutu ideology, as well as genocide 
denial. Those outside of the network might easily assume that the poster was 
referencing the Tutsi genocide: 
 
The misfortune of losing them should not make you forget the joy of 
having known them. Never forget your friends, your family disappeared 
during the 1994 genocide. 
 
A noteworthy dynamic that emerged in the data was what appeared to 
be a growing pattern of some members of Hutu diaspora identities attempting 
to “hijack” or disrupt Tutsi commemorations in some manner. This dynamic 
was discussed on several public SNSs, reporting some Hutu diaspora 
members showing up at a Tutsi commemoration and pretending to be Tutsi 
genocide survivors or supporters, and then heckling speakers and survivors, 
particularly those who broke down crying at the event. Similarly, CMCs 
demonstrated a pattern of some Hutu diaspora members engaging in what 
was perceived as an attempt to confuse commemoration attendees by 
facilitating commemorations and inviting Tutsis, but then commemorating 
Hutus killed in RPF military incursions into refugee camps in southwest 
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Rwanda and the Kivus.67 A similar tactic appeared to involve offering 
assistance to commemoration organizers, particularly if they were Westerners, 
but not disclosing their ethnic affiliation, or that the genocide they were 
commemorating was either a double genocide, or the killings of Hutus in the 
DRC refugee camps after the 1994 genocide.  
This same pattern of apparent deception was evident in online 
genocide commemorations as well. For instance, many online identities 
included in the study posted captions and photographs on their SNSs of 
symbols representing the Tutsi genocide commemoration, such as the term 
“Never Again” and/or photographs of a single lit candle with a purple 
background (a global symbol for Tutsi survivors). Quite commonly Westerners 
would post responsive CMCs on these public SNSs offering sympathy. It was 
clear that many of the outsiders were confused about what genocide was 
being commemorated (particularly because of the use of universal Tutsi 
symbols), as they posted responsive CMCs referencing regret about how 
many Tutsi were killed, or asking a question about what it was like to be Tutsi 
now. Often the Hutu online identities did not correct them, but rather accepted 
their condolences, often using the exchange as an opportunity to introduce an 
alternate genocide narrative.  
A holistic review of many of the online identities’ CMCs and SNSs 
during the month of genocide commemoration revealed a strong tendency to 
denigrate Tutsi commemorations and Tutsi genocide survivors. Many CMCs 
internal to the network included comments criticizing or even ridiculing Tutsis 
who attended the commemorations, particularly those who expressed 
emotions, such as crying. For instance, many of the online identities that 
facilitated online genocide commemorations were members of the “Bagosora, 
Theoneste” Facebook page.68 Another example of denigrating Tutsi genocide 
survivors involves an article featuring the official Tutsi commemoration held in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The Tutsi genocide began on April 6, 1994, and the military incursion into the Kibeho refugee camp in 
southwest Rwanda occurred on April 27, 1995.  
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Washington, DC in 2011 with a photograph of a Tutsi survivor crying. The 
article was reposted throughout the virtual network, and included a range of 
derogatory comments, including an online identity asking: “Are these fake 
tears?” 
The few Tutsi online identities that did attempt to challenge the 
narrative of the Hutu diaspora through posting challenging statements online, 
by appearing at demonstrations as a counter force or by appearing at a public 
debate later published on a YouTube channel, experienced an overwhelmingly 
aggressive response by the online identities in the virtual network. For 
instance, YouTube videos of public debates demonstrated that the debates 
were often widely attended by Hutus in the diaspora, many of whom appeared 
to overwhelm participating Tutsis with vehement and aggressive responses, 
(sometimes screaming). Online identities self-identifying as Tutsi, and Tutsi 
counter-demonstrators were often confronted with accusations that they were 
“paid agents” for President Kagame, RPF spies and informants. This dynamic 
was particularly prevalent if Tutsis identified themselves as genocide 
survivors.  
For instance, an online identity posted a CMC with a linked newspaper 
article about a group of Tutsi genocide survivors in the diaspora who 
demonstrated against the presence of high profile Hutus in the diaspora giving 
a public speech at an event at a Martin Luther King exhibit in Europe, focusing 
on peace and reconciliation. The Hutu speaker was a self-described member 
of the Hutu diaspora, and the leader of a political opposition group with strong 
ties to the former regime. Although the speaker consistently testified on behalf 
of genocidaires prosecuted by the ICTR,69 and had a strong online presence 
where he consistently espoused anti-Tutsi ideology and genocide denial, he 
presented himself to Western audiences as a human rights activist who 
actively advocated for truth and reconciliation between the Tutsis and Hutus. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 As explored in Chapter 4, Theoneste Bagosora was a former high-ranking leader in Rwanda’s military 
under Habyarimana who took control of the country after Habyarimana’s death was widely believed to be 
the architect of the genocide. 
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Tutsis in the diaspora wrote letters of protest and demonstrated at the event. 
One CMC posted by an online identity included in the study referred to the 
Tutsi demonstrators not as genocide survivors, but as “self-described 
survivors of the Rwandan genocide,” with responders within the network 
claiming that Tutsis who demonstrated were all paid by the RPF, and even 
included an amount of money. Another online identity, self-identified as a Tutsi 
genocide survivor group, challenged this allegation, citing the nature of the 
grievances of the Tutsi demonstrators. One online identity included in the 
study responded with sarcasm, claiming to be applauding at the Tutsi’s ability 
to “read the script” of Kagame so well. What is noteworthy about this 
exchange was that it served as an example of a consistent and collective 
response leveled at any Tutsi in the diaspora who challenged the narrative of 
the online identities in the virtual network. There was not a single incidence 
found within the data, or during the ethnographic immersion that demonstrated 
an attempt to engage self-identified Tutsis who responded online in an 
authentic and constructive manner. Rather, the accusations of alliance with 
and allegiance to President Kagame and the RPF were swift and definitive. 
Allegations of Ongoing Perpetration of Genocide Against the Hutu 
Numerous CMCs included content expressing the belief that the RPF 
was continuing to target Hutus for extermination. Often these allegations were 
focused on the current conflicts in the DRC, but some referenced any high 
profile development initiative undertaken within Rwanda. For instance, 
Rwanda’s “No-Scalpel Vasectomy” program was the target of numerous 
CMCs that arose in various thematic categories within the data (ethnic identity, 
anti-Kagame propaganda, etc.). Many of these CMCs accused the Rwandan 
government of targeting only Hutus with this program, thus the accusations 
most frequently leveled included passionate pleas for the international 
community to intervene and stop the most recent genocide on the Hutu 
population. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 This high level online identity’s testimony for the defense on behalf of a leader in the genocide charged 
and subsequently convicted by the ICTR was included as data in the study. 
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In fact, hundreds of CMCs leveled accusations of genocide against the 
Hutu population, including an article on the FDU-Inkingi website, entitled “Is 
the U.S. Government Funding a Silent Genocide in Rwanda?” The article’s 
author, the party spokesperson, argued that the real goal of the program was 
to compel all Hutu men to undergo a vasectomy, in order to annihilate the 
Hutu race. The author represented Hutus as being ethnically different, and 
thus in need of international protection. His conclusion that the vasectomy 
program constituted genocide against the Hutu population was based on the 
UN Convention against Genocide, which includes the following criteria: 
“imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.” The author 
concluded: “what’s taking place since 2006 is actually a silent genocide 
targeting the Hutu community.”  
Another online identity wrote several CMCs making similar statements, 
such as “Vasectomy in Rwanda or legalization of genocide against Hutu 
majority?” and “The eugenic acts actually practiced in Rwanda are ones in 
which the intended result is the Hutu ethnic member’s loss of the ability to 
reproduce,” and “Unlawful acts of tubal ligation, vasectomy, and other such 
medical procedures are already used by the Tutsi-led minority ethnic 
government and not yet reported to the public opinion. In all circumstances, 
these non medical acts are primarily used to exterminate undesirables through 
forced sterilization.”  
Creating International Coalitions as Partners in Genocide Denial 
Throughout the ethnographic immersion several CMCs were posted by 
Western organizations and online identities, 70 many of which engaged in 
genocide denial and historical revisionism for what appeared to be self-serving 
purposes, including the often extensive praise received by members of the 
Hutu diaspora (e.g., including receipt of humanitarian awards, CMCs praising 
their expertise and intelligence), as well as for the promotion of their careers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 As with other online identities Westerners who engaged online under their real names were not 
included in the study, thus the information contained in this section on international allies is limited in 
order to remain in compliance with the ethical guidelines adopted in this study.  
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through the promotion of Western allies’ career-related events, speaking 
engagements, and publications. Such Western online identities were primarily 
academics, Western human rights activists, and self-described online 
journalists (or human rights activists who advocated through online 
journalism). Although some online identities responded negatively to Western 
advocacy (i.e., referencing Africa not needing Western rescuers), most 
applauded such efforts to negate the Tutsi genocide narrative. Oftentimes, it 
appeared as though the online identities were in fact recruiting Westerners by 
engaging them in dialogue (e.g., online requests to join various online groups), 
and promoting their activities within the network.  
The online identities included in the study engaged the international 
community in a variety of ways, including sending the Western identities e-
vites to online and offline events, as well as inviting them to speak at Hutu 
commemorations, debates, and various speaking events, often hosted at 
universities and churches. Westerners were also asked to partner in charity 
fund-raising events, and in the creation of NGOs. Academics were often asked 
by online identities to host Hutu diaspora groups as speakers at university 
events. Additionally, academics, human rights activists and Rwandan diaspora 
online identities often worked in concert to organize anti-Kagame 
demonstrations where genocide denials were disseminated.  
Anti-Kagame Propaganda 
As referenced earlier, a significant portion of the CMCs posted on SNSs 
evaluated in this study focused on Paul Kagame, the current president of 
Rwanda. The CMCs not only vehemently attacked his leadership of Rwanda, 
but were also quite personal in nature, holding him directly responsible for the 
challenges the country and region face (historically and currently), and 
personally blaming him for the deaths of up to six million Hutus. Additionally, 
many CMCs attacked the president’s wife and children. 
Very few of the CMCs included in the study involved productive 
discussions on a political level, but when an online identity did attempt to 
engage in higher level discussions the dialogue quickly escalated to 
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derogatory and inflammatory language, such as name-calling, as well as the 
posting of “doctored” photographs, and offensive cartoons featuring Kagame 
engaging in various compromising and egregious activities. The data revealed 
numerous CMCs in the form of postings of linked news articles, shared 
statuses on SNSs, and originally generated textual artifacts in the form of 
online news articles and blogs, often involving derogatory and highly critical 
allegations against the president. The dissemination of such CMCs appeared 
to fall within two categories, 1) the dissemination of anti-Kagame propaganda 
within the network through the posting of CMCs on SNSs; and 2) the 
dissemination of anti-Kagame propaganda outside of the network, primarily 
through off-line demonstrations protesting the president’s appearances outside 
of Rwanda, as well as lobbying the international community against President 
Kagame. 
Anti-Kagame Propaganda Disseminated within the Virtual Network 
 The data revealed a considerable amount of anti-Kagame propaganda 
disseminated throughout the virtual network, using a range SNSs, such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and online newspapers. The in-network activities involved 
both the general dissemination of derogatory photographs and commentary, 
as well as in-network mobilization for off-line activity. In the latter instance, 
anti-Kagame propaganda also included the posting of photographs and 
commentary published online and used in offline activities.  
In most CMCs containing anti-Kagame propaganda, the president was 
consistently called derogatory names such as “War Criminal,” “Genocidaire,” 
“The Butcher of Kigali,” “Pilato”71, “Killer Kagame,” “Antichrist of Rwanda,” and 
“Murder Kagame.” Additionally, numerous cultural and textual artifacts made 
comparisons between Kagame and Hitler, both in more formal articles 
analyzing political dynamics, as well as informal CMCs, photographs and 
cartoons. In fact, Kagame was frequently referred to as the “Hitler of Africa.”  
Additionally, a significant portion of online communication centered on making 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 A nickname for Pontius Pilote  
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fun of Kagame, through the posting of derogatory photographs that were 
clearly doctored, as well as cartoons designed to be offensive. For instance, 
one photograph that was disseminated widely throughout the virtual network, 
and often used as a profile photo for anti-Kagame groups, depicted a 
photograph of Kagame that made it appear as though he was Adolph Hitler, 
wearing a Nazi uniform and making a Nazi salute. The caption on many of the 
Hitler photographs read “Heil Kagame!”  
Doctored photographs of President Kagame often accompanied CMCs 
accusing him of being a serial murderer. For example, several photographs 
that were disseminated quite widely throughout the virtual network depicted 
Kagame with blood dripping down his face and vampire teeth, or with wild red 
eyes and rather mangled and jagged teeth. Photographs of President Kagame 
inserted into online articles of a serious political nature were often extremely 
unflattering, featuring Kagame with squinting eyes and an exaggerated frown. 
Although not overtly doctored, they appeared to have been digitally enhanced 
to make facial lines more pronounced.  
Examples of offensive cartoons include one with President Kagame 
bare-chested, wearing only boxer shorts made from a USA flag, and the 
words: “Its only me Kagame that has killed 6 million” inside a speech bubble 
coming from his mouth, contained the caption: “The Cold Blooded Killer of 
Congolese.”  Another cartoon was posted in the midst of numerous online 
discussions about the president being invited to the U.S. to be a keynote 
speaker and award recipient at a university commencement. The cartoon 
featured the president wearing academic regalia and holding a scroll, with an 
exaggerated grimace, and the caption: “Criminal Awards.” 
Many online identities appeared to be quite proficient at using online 
photo enhancing programs enabling professional-looking photo enhancements 
and scenario creations. For instance, one photograph that was widely 
disseminated depicted a distorted and unflattering photograph of President 
Kagame’s face superimposed on a Time Magazine cover with the caption 
“THE CHANGE WE NEED?” and the sub-caption: “Heil Kagame Welcome 
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Back to the 30’s.” Numerous photographs superimposed Kagame’s face onto 
the Kony 2012 campaign poster. One such CMC included the caption: “Join 
our hands together to make the true Kony 2012 be seen, the world should 
know who is the true Kony, and here he is…” Another photograph/cartoon 
seemed to incorporate a variety of these themes by featuring a doctored 
photograph of Kagame’s face in the middle of a “spray” of machine guns made 
to appear as wings. The commentary included the following: 
 
I PAUL KAGAME AS A WAR CRIMINAL I WAS BORN A KILLER I 
PROVE IT BY THE 6 MILLION PEOPLE I HAVE KILLED SO FAR. 
THANK GOD FOR MY BROTHER FROM ANOTHER MOTHER BILL 
CLINTON WHO BLESSED ME WITH ALL THESE GUNS TO KILL 
AND DESTROY INNOCENT PEOPLE AND FOR YOUR 
INFORMATION I DON’T CARE IF YOU ALL DIE AND I CAN KILL 
ANYONE ANYTIME!!! [Photo] ALL-TIME NUMBER ONE KILLER 
NUMBER ONE WORLD KILLER TIPS: IF YOU WANT TO TAKE MY 
TITLE SAY NO TO JUSTICE SAY NO TO DEMOCRACY, NEVER 
GIVE PEOPLE FREEDOM JAIL ANYONE WHO DOES NOT AGREE 
WITH YOUR PLANS NEVER LISTEN TO ANYONE. JUST KILL 
OPPOSITION LEADERS JOURNALISTS, SHUT DOWN MEDIAS, 
AND FINALLY TO ENOY WHAT I AM ENJOYING GET BIG DEALS 
WITH BIG PEOPLE LIKE BILL CLINTON, TONY BLAIR DO SMALL 
JOB LIKE WHAT I DID IN DRC CONGO BY KILLING 6 MILION AND 
GIVING THEM A HIGHWAY TO THE BLOOD MINERALS THEY 
NEED…. THANK YOU ALL. 
  
Another photograph disseminated widely throughout the virtual network 
on each July 1st, (Rwanda’s Independence Day), included a series of 
photographs of post-independence presidents of Rwanda, each with a 
descriptive captive, including, “Dominique Mbonyumutwa HERO 59-62 
…Fought 4 Rwandan independence,” “Gregoire Kayibanda HERO 62-
73…fought 4 Rwandan independence,” “Juvenal Habyarimana HERO 73-
94…was killed by Kagame on 6/4/1994 in Kigali,” Théodore Sindikubwabo72 
“HERO 94-94…led transitional govt after RPF killed HABYARIMANA,” Pasteur 
Bizimunga “BETRAYOR 94-2000…betrayed Rwandans & joined RPF which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 This photograph was erroneously labeled as Dominique Ntawukuriryayo, the former sub-
prefect of a city in southern Rwanda convicted for genocide crimes in 2010 by the ICTR. 
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killed millions of RWANDANS,” Paul Kagame “MURDERER 2004…shot 
Habyarimana plane & Killed him & Ntaryamira of Burundi.” This CMC was 
posted with a status that stated: “RWANDAN LEADERS, HEROS, 
BETRAYOERS, AND MURDERS IN THIS PICTURE” (see Appendix Q for 
examples of derogatory photographs of President Kagame). 
 Textual artifacts incorporating anti-Kagame propaganda often 
accompanied the linking of online news articles involving past and/or current 
affairs of a political nature. At times the articles were generated from the 
mainstream media (e.g., BBC, Reuters, etc.), but often the articles were 
authored by online identities from within the virtual network. These linked 
articles were often posted with editorializing comments that were highly critical 
of the president and the RPF. For instance, an article that was authored by an 
opposition group and widely disseminated throughout the virtual network 
focused on changes made within the Rwandan government (shifting of official 
posts, etc.). The status comment included by the poster stated: “That fool of 
Tutsi has not finished talking about him [sic], the man of blood, who kills 
without regret, he knows: that kills by sword, perished by the sword…Your day 
will come….” Another example of text-based propaganda included the linking 
of an online article published on BBC UK online announcing that President 
Kagame would be on live on the air answering questions on a special edition 
of the BBC radio show “Africa Have Your Say.” The widely disseminated CMC 
included a link to the story with a CMC stating: “The super killer will be on 
Africa have your say, can anyone ask him where he buried the Hutus he killed 
in TingiTingi?” This CMC also serves as an example of how President 
Kagame is consistently held personally responsible for virtually all cited 
atrocities against the Hutus, rather than being held responsible in a collective 
sense. 
 Another particularly noteworthy pattern revealed in the data was the 
nature of language and choice of words used within the virtual network 
compared to dialogue directed to those outside the network (i.e., Westerners). 
This pattern related to tone as well as to how President Kagame was 
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referenced. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, language used internally 
within the virtual network in the course of political engagement was often rife 
with aggressive language and informal tone. When communication was 
directed outside of the network to Western audiences, the tone of CMCs was 
often very formal, and included language rooted in themes of democracy, 
human rights and reconciliation. This pattern was particularly the case when 
the focus of the CMC was President Kagame. For instance, the online 
identities consistently used the title “President Kagame” when directing their 
comments toward Western audiences, and “General Kagame,” when their 
comments were directed toward those within the virtual network.73 
Anti-Kagame Propaganda Disseminated Outside of the Network: 
Mobilizing and Lobbying  
 A considerable amount of anti-Kagame propaganda was generated in 
the process of mobilizing for demonstrations, and lobbying Western 
audiences. Although the mobilizing to act against Kagame occurred for the 
most part within the virtual network, the lobbying engaged in by the online 
identities consistently engaged members outside the network with the goal of 
changing public opinion within host countries, as well as lobbying the 
international community to take action against President Kagame in some 
manner. 
 With regard to anti-Kagame demonstrations, the data revealed that a 
demonstration protesting the appearance of President Kagame was held on 
the majority of occasions that the president visited a host country where 
diaspora resided. The online identities consistently engaged in online and 
offline activities that appeared to be focused on lobbying those outside the 
network for the purposes of disrupting Kagame’s travels in some manner. In 
fact, during the ethnographic immersion there were at least 26 online 
mobilization events where the online identities included in the study used 
SNSs to mobilize those in the network, as well as those in the general public, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 There were some deviations from this pattern, particularly with CMCs that were directed to both 
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to lobby the host government and/or inviting organization to cancel Kagame’s 
visit. Mobilizing efforts also involved engaging those outside the network to 
attend demonstrations protesting the president’s appearance at an 
international venue. The most likely candidates to attend these protests were 
Western university students (see Appendix R for examples of anti-Kagame 
demonstrations organized online identities using SNSs). 
Examples of some events that the online identities attempted to disrupt 
include various UN meetings, including Security Council meetings in New 
York, and the MDG progress meetings in Spain in 2012, official meetings with 
other Heads of State and government dignitaries in the U.S. and Europe, 
diaspora events such as the annual “Rwanda Day” events, and speeches at 
universities in the United States and Europe. The data revealed that online 
identities would post “e-vites” on a range of SNSs, including Facebook 
announcing a peaceful protest, as well as posting urgent “calls to action” 
pleading with those inside and outside the network to barrage hosting 
governments and organizations (e.g., the UN, politicians in the hosting 
country, the hosting university, etc.) with emails, phone calls and faxes 
condemning their agreement to host a “war criminal” and “Genocidaire.” Often 
such information was accompanied by inflammatory information explored 
earlier in this chapter, such as gruesome photographs of severed limbs with 
claims that President Kagame was responsible for genocides in Rwanda and 
the Congo. Facebook was often used as the mobilizing site where online 
identities would mobilize and disseminate information, including reporting back 
on their progress. Captions included in anti-Kagame material were often quite 
inflammatory and appeared to be designed to frighten hosting organizations, 
such as the following CMC: “Experts warn that if War Criminal Kagame is 
hosted at […] violence will break out.”  
When the president was invited to speak at a university 
commencement, for instance, the online identities would often lobby the 
university’s professors, appealing to their commitment to human rights. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
audiences – internal network members, and those outside the network. 
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some instances, online identities even posted names and contact information 
of university personnel online, as well as a script with an urgent appeal for 
others to continue the lobbying until they were successful in pressuring the 
university to cancel Kagame’s appearance. The data also revealed that after a 
protest demonstration SNSs were used to disseminate CMCs describing the 
success of the demonstrations, and the damage it caused to the president. 
CMCs included textual descriptions, linked articles, photographs and YouTube 
videos of the demonstration. These descriptions often included commentary, 
at times exaggerated, describing the large turnouts at the demonstrations and 
low turnouts at the hosted event (see Appendix S for examples of mobilizing 
and lobbying focused on anti-Kagame demonstrations). 
 Overall the ethnographic analysis of the data revealed clear but 
overlapping themes that demonstrated various ways in which political activities 
were facilitated online by Rwandan diaspora residing in Western countries, 
with a particular focus on the Rwandan conflict between Hutus and Tutsis. An 
analysis of these results and a discussion of their contextual position within 
existing literature on CGD political engagement in homeland affairs and 
conflict will be explored in Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 There exists a relatively well-developed knowledge base within the 
literature on diaspora in general (see Cohen, 1996 and Safran, 1991, 1999, 
2010), as well as on diaspora populations within contemporary contexts, both 
including a now-established literature devoted to the CGD typology (see 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2000, 2002; Demmers, 2005; Horst, 2008; Lyons, 2004; 
Mohamoud, 2005). The literature devoted to diaspora as external actors in 
homeland conflict, while newer, is growing rapidly, particularly in light of the 
recent increase in armed civil conflict in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (SIPRI, 
1993, 2008). Although research focusing on collective diaspora political 
activities in homeland affairs has garnered considerable recent attention 
among scholars (see Brinkerhoff, 2009, 2012; Cheran, 2003; Cohen, 1996; 
Demmers, 2005; Horst, 2008; Lyons, 2004, 2006ab; Mohamoud, 2005; 
Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Vertovec, 2005; Wayland, 2004), research focusing 
on the nature of CGD use of ICTs (particularly social media and networking 
sites) within virtual transnational networks, while gaining increased interest, 
remains largely unexplored as a distinct area of focus.  
This study set out to answer several questions about Rwandan CGD, 
including whether the attitudes and activities of those diaspora members 
engaging politically in homeland affairs conform to the current literatures on 
diaspora. This study also addressed questions about the how Rwandan CGD 
use the Internet for political purposes, particularly social media, including how 
their virtual networks and communities are structured and utilized for the 
purposes of political engagement, mobilization and action. Additionally, this 
study set out to explore any significant differences between internal and 
external narratives—In other words, were there differences in perceptions, 
attitudes, methods and narratives when diaspora members were 
communicating amongst each other compared to when they were engaging 
those outside of their network, particularly Western audiences. Finally, while 
focused far more on process than effect, this study set out to explore the 
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nature of what diaspora members hoped to achieve (purported and actual 
aims) as a result of their political engagement in homeland conflict, with a 
particular focus on the impact diaspora online political engagement had on the 
conflict cycle in the home country of Rwanda, and surrounding regions.  
 Several conceptual models on CGD activities and motivations to act 
have been developed, and these conceptual models continue to evolve as 
more case studies are carried out on a range of diaspora populations. 
Currently, there is a growing consensus among diaspora scholars that 
diaspora communities, particularly those generated from conflict, are 
becoming powerful external actors in conflict, a dynamic that is being 
significantly facilitated by the forces of globalization, particularly the Internet. 
According to the conceptual models developed by scholars such as Lyons, 
Brinkerhoff, Demmers and Østergaard-Nielson, CGDs have a strong tendency 
to view their homelands in mythical terms, and are often motivated to return 
home in order to restore their homelands to their prior conditions. These 
conceptual models, (as well as other theories in diaspora typologies) posit that 
CGD are often motivated to act in large part due to the nature of their forced 
dispersal, including trauma they may have endured both during the conflict, 
and during their rapid and often violent departure. Thus, the conditions that 
influence how diaspora feel about their homelands and consequently motivate 
them to engage in homeland dynamics are in large part influenced by the 
violence they experienced, and in some cases perpetrated, individually as well 
as collectively.  
The themes that emerged through the ethnographic analysis of the data 
revealed that the Rwandan CGD that engaged in cyberactivism, particularly in 
relation to homeland conflict, were overwhelmingly Hutu. Although the failure 
to locate any Tutsi-dominated SNSs focusing on homeland conflict on a 
political level was initially unexpected, several scholars have intimated that it is 
the CGD members who are forced to migrate due to conflict, and who are 
aligned against their home country governments who are most likely to 
engage in homeland conflict on a political level. With regard to Rwanda, the 
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primary political party is the RPF, which despite attempts to become ethnically 
integrated, remains Tutsi dominated, at least with regard to its leadership. 
Thus, it would make sense that the CGD members who would be engaged in 
homeland conflict using the Internet would be Hutus. Additionally, it may be 
possible that Tutsi CGD are also engaged in the use of social media, but at 
the present time are engaging primarily on a social and humanitarian level.  
Generally, the CMCs included in this study demonstrated attitudes, 
perceptions and activities that were highly consistent with contemporary 
diaspora conceptual models and typologies, particularly those put forth by 
Lyons, Brinkerhoff, Demmers and Østergaard-Nielson. For instance, as 
explored earlier, Lyons’ conceptual model posits that it is the homeland conflict 
that drives CGD identity, their relationship with homeland, as well as their 
transnational political practices. Lyons’ model also asserts that 
ethnonationalist diaspora generated from conflict are distinguished from other 
migrant groups by the cause of their migration; the nature of their relationship 
with their homeland influenced by the violent nature of their forced dispersal; 
their relationship with their host country; and their tendency to develop 
transnational networks used to reinforce their identity, as well as for a platform 
for political engagement.  
The CMCs posted on various SNSs of the Rwandan CGD included in 
the study displayed an orientation toward homeland that was quite similar to 
Lyons’ typology including the tendency to conceptualize Rwanda in 
romanticized and nostalgic terms, amply demonstrated in terms used to 
describe their former homeland, as well as the cultural artifacts posted 
reflecting pre-genocide Rwanda. The dynamics of an imagined homeland and 
the myth of return appear to have been made stronger by the ethnonationalist 
nature of the historic conflict in Rwanda, as well as the fact that the diaspora 
identities included in the study were Hutu, since a diligent search of SNSs 
facilitated by both ethnic groups was unsuccessful. Lyons (2004) also noted 
how CGD were less likely to use SNSs for everyday issues, such as 
acculturation, and more likely to use SNSs to focus on the original conflict in 
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the territory of their homeland. This was certainly true for the Rwandan 
diaspora included in the study in that the majority of CMCs posted in their 
virtual network were focused on the 1990 to 1994 civil war in Rwanda, as well 
as subsequent conflicts emanating out of the civil spilling into then Zaire.  
Themes Related to Identity as A Hutu in Exile 
The Rwandan diaspora’s conceptualizations of their former Rwanda 
appeared largely influenced by their identity as members of the Hutu ethnic 
group, including their collective belief in the false Belgian narrative that Hutus 
were the original inhabitants of Rwanda, and that Tutsis were foreign invaders 
(the Hamitic Myth). Ethnonationalism also appeared to strongly influence the 
identity formation and expression of those diaspora engaging in online 
activities within the virtual network. Additionally, a strong theme that emerged 
in the analysis of the data demonstrated what Brinkerhoff (2008) refers to as 
“victim diaspora,” where a diaspora group develops a collective perception that 
they were the victims in the original conflict, which then serves as motivation to 
act. In fact, the manner in which ethnonationalist identity manifested within the 
Hutu diaspora population included in the study appeared to be highly 
influenced by the pre-genocide propaganda campaign, which was in large part 
based on numerous false narratives about Rwanda’s historic and recent past, 
including the nature of Hutu-Tutsi relations, the perceived history of Hutu 
victimhood (at the hands of Tutsis, as well as the international community), as 
well as a deeply rooted conceptualization of the positive character of Hutus, 
which was often juxtaposed with the negative character of Tutsis.   
CMCs that demonstrated strong themes of identity also revealed that 
the Hutu diaspora included in the study defended and even guarded their 
ethnic identity rather fiercely, and perceived most attempts to present well 
documented and widely accepted narratives about the controversial nature of 
the Hutu/Tutsi ethnic group dichotomy, as threats to their Hutu identity. What 
was interesting to note, and what contributes significantly to the knowledge 
base on diasporic identity expression, was the pattern noted in diaspora 
narratives directed toward external audiences that espoused far more 
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conciliatory attitudes, particularly toward Tutsis in general, whereas intra-
diasporic narratives demonstrated far more rigid and uncompromising 
attitudes, particularly relating to any dynamic that was perceived to dilute or 
threaten Hutu identity, such as the Rwandan government’s decision to no 
longer include ethnic membership on national identity cards. 
The collective identity expressed in the Rwandan diaspora included in 
the study also revealed strong elements of in-group/out-group dynamics 
described by Bradatan, Popon and Melton (2010). These demarcations were 
based on the perception that they were co-ethnics (Hutu), thus as Smith 
(1991) noted, in general terms, all Hutus were “bound by historical forces, both 
with regard to national identity as well as a perceived historical culture, 
involving culturally-based myths believed to be rooted in pre-modern ethnic 
identities.” As explored earlier, according to Bradatan, Popon and Melton 
(2010) social identity is strengthened when group membership is difficult to 
attain, such as when membership is based on a belief in common ethnic 
ancestry. Thus groups based on shared ethnic membership tend to have rigid 
boundaries making joining difficult since there is a requirement of being 
“bonded by blood” (Conner, 1997). Not only was this perception strongly 
expressed throughout the data, but it was interesting to note that alliances with 
Tutsis (as was the case with a newer political opposition group claiming to be 
inclusive) were tenuous at best, with numerous references made to fearing 
that the Tutsis in exile who at were at odds with the current government of 
Rwanda, and who had joined forces with Hutu opposition groups, were at their 
core self-serving and would ultimately abandon and betray Hutus when they 
all returned to Rwanda.  
The in-group/out-group dynamic was also expressed when Hutus 
challenged traditional narratives espoused by the group. Hutus who veered off 
course in their ideology were commonly called traitors and at time subjected to 
online bullying, while Tutsis were consistently cast as outsiders, and treated 
collectively as threats, as well as other out-group dehumanizing 
characterizations, such as being referred to as crickets (Inyenzi), and “RPF 
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moles” – a dynamic that Bain, Kashima, & Haslam (2006) referred to as 
infrahumanization. And while CMCs directed toward international allies and 
Western audiences generally demonstrated attitudes of openness, flexibility, 
and compromise, with an overriding commitment to peace, internal dialogues 
demonstrated very strong in-group/out-group dynamics inherent in groups 
based on ethnonationalism. These dynamics also were consistent with Lyons’ 
(2005) and Demmers’ (2005) assertions that a lessening of group boundaries, 
a requirement for authentic compromise and reconciliation would be 
threatening to CGD’s sense of identity, particularly when the collective identity 
is based on a historic sense of victimhood.  
Overall, in the case of Rwanda, it appears that the typology of conflict-
generated diaspora not only applies quite strongly, but that Rwanda’s strong 
history of ethnonationalism and violence culminating in genocide appears to 
have increased the intensity of the diasporic dynamics noted in the literature. 
Thus the motivations and transnational activities of the Rwandan diaspora 
included in the study must be considered within the context of the extended 
propaganda campaign and genocide against the Tutsi.  
Themes Related to Diaspora Political Engagement in Virtual 
Transnational Networks  
The data clearly revealed that Rwandan diaspora members included in 
the study operated within large, seemingly cohesive and well-organized 
transnational networks, both in online and offline domains. The data also 
revealed that those Rwandan diaspora included in the study were prolific 
users of the Internet, particularly with regard to maximizing the functionality of 
SNSs for the purposes of political engagement. In most respects, the data 
revealed that the Rwandan CGD expressed attitudes and engaged in activities 
in ways that were consistent with the literature on similar populations, 
particularly the literature focusing on ways in which diaspora relate to their 
respective homelands. For instance, several scholars noted how the Internet is 
increasingly the medium of choice for migrant and ethnic populations, 
particularly for the purposes of mobilization and recruitment for a range of 
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political activities and social movements (Akin, 2011; Brinkerhoff, 2009; 
Demmers, 2007; Fullilove, 2008; Lyons, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Østergaard-
Nielson, 2006, Vertovec, 2005). Further, as explored in previous chapters, 
several scholars noted how CGD relate to their homelands in ways that are 
tangibly different from other migrants groups (such as voluntary/economic 
migrants) (Lyons, 2004, 2007; Mohamoud, 2005). 
The extent to which the Rwandan diaspora included in the study utilized 
the Internet for political purposes supports these assertions, particularly with 
regard to the emergent theme of how the Hutu online identities used SNSs to 
relate to their homeland politically. For instance, the high rate at which the 
online identities were able to network with each other, how they networked 
their various SNSs, as well as the way in which the network facilitated political 
activities in online and offline spheres demonstrated a high level of 
sophistication with technology, as well as with how SNSs function. In fact, it 
was clear that many of the diaspora identities were aware of new functions 
offered by the various SNSs, as soon as they were offered, particularly those 
functions that increased the reach and power of their online communication. 
 The nature of the Rwandan CGDs’ transnational political engagement 
mirrored those found in case studies conducted on other diaspora groups 
generated from ethnonationalist conflict. This was particularly the case with 
Mohamoud’s (2005) and Lyon’s (2004) work on ways that diaspora may 
contribute to conflict in the home country by engaging in political activities 
focusing on destabilizing the home country, by means such as lobbying the 
international community to act against the homeland, or funding rebel groups 
still engaging in regional fighting against the homeland government  (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2000, 2002; Demmers, 2005; Horst, 2008; Mohamoud, 2005; 
Lyons, 2004).  
Although the data did not reveal a direct connection between diasporic 
fundraising and rebel support, several indirect connections were revealed, 
including some diaspora identities representing or linked to Hutu political 
opposition groups supporting the FDLR, which raised funds through non-
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political charities purporting to support humanitarian causes in Africa. 
Additionally, the Rwandan diaspora’s use of the Internet to facilitate their 
transnational political engagement included mobilizing others to their cause, 
disseminating information (including propaganda against the current Rwandan 
government), supporting rival political groups, and acting as a political wing of 
a rebel group, most notably in this case, the FDLR (see Collier & Hoeffler, 
2000; Demmers, 2007; Lyons, 2004; Mohamoud, 2005).   
As explored earlier, several diaspora scholars, including Wayland 
(2004) have noted how diaspora often become involved in home country 
dynamics on a political level by forming ties with co-ethnics across the globe, 
and seeing the support of “international allies” in their collective activities. A 
significant component of diaspora political engagement according to the 
literature involved political lobbying (cyberactivism) for diaspora causes, which 
in the case of CGD fighting against the new home country government, most 
often involved lobbying the host country against the home country (Lyons and 
Uçarer, 1998; Mohamoud, 2005, Smith, 2007).  Although the Rwandan 
diaspora included in the study used the Internet for a range of purposes 
(including social interaction, providing social support, and reminiscing), one of 
the most frequent online activities involved aggressive and persistent lobbying 
against the Rwandan government, by taking advantage of political opportunity 
structures of their host countries, particularly the United States, in order to 
influence foreign policy (see Brinkerhoff, 2009; Baser and Swain, 2009 and 
Shain, 1994, 2002).  
Despite differences in the nature of their conflicts and migration 
experiences, the Rwandan CGD exhibited strikingly similar characteristics in 
both motivations and activities as Østergaard-Nielsen’s study of conflict-
generated Kurdish refugees, Bernal’s (2006) study of conflict-generated 
Eritrean diaspora, and Lyons’ study of conflict-generated Ethiopian diaspora. 
For instance, as explored earlier, the Ethiopian diaspora in Lyons’ study used 
blogs, newsgroups, and websites to lobby the U.S. government demanding 
that they act against the new ruling government of Ethiopia. Additionally, they 
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used the Internet to facilitate well-coordinated and simultaneous lobbying 
efforts of international organizations, such as NGOs, the European Union and 
the UN (Lyons, 2005, 2007). Consistent with Bernal’s (2006) study of Eritrean 
diaspora, nearly all lobbying and cyberactivism engaged in by the Rwandan 
diaspora included in the study were aimed at impacting international 
perceptions of the Rwandan government, particularly President Kagame, with 
the goal of influencing the international community to reduce support for 
Rwanda. For instance, the Rwandan diaspora used the Internet to disseminate 
negative propaganda about the Rwandan government, as well as Tutsis in 
general, including allegations of past and present human rights violations. 
Some of these accusations were clearly exaggerated, such as the claims that 
the Rwandan government was committing genocide against Hutus through the 
“No Scalpel Vasectomy Program.” Other aims of Rwandan diaspora 
cyberactivism included demands that the international community reduced aid 
if Rwanda didn’t comply with a host of Hutu diaspora demands, including 
engaging in talks with the FDLR. Lobbying also included demands that 
government leaders refuse to meet with Kagame, and inviting organization 
“disinvite” Kagame from speaking engagements. In fact, a key goal of the 
diaspora cyberactivism appeared to be to humiliate President Kagame at 
almost any cost.  
Political lobbying and cyberactivism by the Rwandan diaspora occurred 
both “in the Net,” and “through the Net” with real world activities being 
facilitated and/or bolstered by online activities (Morris & Langman, 2002). 
Examples of “in the Net” activities included using SNSs to facilitate online 
petitions, email-writing campaigns, and the dissemination of propaganda 
against the current Rwandan government.  Examples of “through the Net” 
activities included using the Internet to mobilize, recruit and facilitate real world 
activism such as attending anti-Kagame demonstrations, and meeting with 
U.S. State Department officials, U.S. legislators, and UN delegates, in a 
manner similar to the findings of Lyons (2007) and Vertovec (2005).  
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The data also revealed several instances of the Internet being used for 
what Carty and Onyett (2006) describe as swarming, (see Chapter Three), 
where the Internet is used to virtually mobilize multiple online groups that 
appear at live demonstrations, making it appear as though the demonstrations 
are spontaneous, when in actuality, they are organized through the Internet. 
The data also revealed incidences of swarming by “smart mobs,” where 
mobilization occurs among complete strangers, and results in aggressive 
attempts to overwhelm a subject in order to compel compliance of some type. 
The Rwandan diaspora’s proficient ability to use the Internet to mobilize others 
to action on a global basis, including complete strangers, both within the 
broader Hutu diaspora community, as well as within the “Western world” was 
quite important, particularly in light of Rheingold’s (2002) observation that the 
mobilization of complete strangers who are spread widely geographically 
renders the social movement almost impossible to ‘decapitate.” As explored 
earlier, Rheingold cites the example of how smart mobs successfully ousted 
the Philippine president after multiple mass demonstrations were organized 
solely via text messaging.  
The data in the current study revealed a similar dynamic of “swarming” 
by “smart mobs,” particularly in relation to online identities’ significant negative 
focus on President Kagame. As referenced in previous sections, President 
Kagame was the target of the majority of CMCs, whether within the context of 
defending Hutu identity, political mobilization and lobbying, or genocide denial 
and historical revisionism. For example, a significant amount of energy 
appeared to be invested in harassing, bullying and humiliating the current 
Rwandan president, through prolific dissemination of negative propaganda 
about him, facilitation of anti-Kagame demonstrations, as well as lobbying the 
international community to act against the president in some manner. The 
latter activity often included the targeting and even bullying of individuals 
within the international community who invited the president to speak, or who 
gave the president an award of some kind. The data demonstrated multiple 
incidences of diaspora online identities mobilizing others to “swarm” Kagame’s 
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hosts in a manner that was clearly intended to intimidate them into 
withdrawing their support and/or invitation. Also as previously referenced, the 
online identities often posted reports of their successes, including claims of 
foreign dignitaries who had allegedly succumbed to the campaign of 
harassment by refusing to meet with President Kagame. Although one might 
argue that such tactics are warranted if in fact a foreign leader is a ruthless 
dictator (as alleged by the Rwandan online identities) without an empirical 
study designed to evaluate the level of influence the relentless dissemination 
of false propaganda about a foreign leader and/or government has on the 
development of public perceptions, it is impossible to assess whether such 
tactics are, in the words of Østergaard-Nielsen (2006) the actions of altruistic 
freedom fighters, or of irresponsible long distance nationalists. 
The online political activities of the Rwandan CGD were also quite 
similar to Egyptians’ use of online platforms in the recent overthrow of the 
Mubarak regime, particularly with regard to how Facebook and Twitter were 
used. For instance, the Tahrir Project found that Facebook and Twitter were 
used to disseminate news, to increase international awareness, to mobilize 
and recruit supporters, to coordinate protests, to inspire political activism, and 
to expose human rights violations. The Egyptians’ use of Facebook and 
Twitter had the singular goal of ousting Mubarak; and the Rwandan CGD 
included in the study have the key, if not the singular goal of ousting President 
Kagame. As noted in the previous chapter, while a traditional content analysis 
was not conducted in the present study, the activity level of online identities 
relative to the greater Rwandan CGD population may indicate that the former 
are “power posters” within the Hutu-dominated diaspora who engaged and 
mobilized a broader number of diaspora members, which is consistent with the 
findings in the Tahrir Project, which found that the majority of “tweets” were 
initiated by about 200 “power users,” the majority of whom resided within the 
diaspora in Western countries.  An interesting finding that strengthens this 
comparison was that the Rwandan CGD online identities often discussed 
overthrows of foreign leaders in their online discussions, such as the 
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overthrow of Mubarak and Moammar Gadhafi of Libya, and attempted to 
garner similar support while mimicking grassroots tactics. 
Political Activities Framed as Humanitarian 
It was also interesting to note that the Rwandan diaspora included in 
the study frequently framed their political activities as humanitarian efforts, and 
often fought the designation of their activities as being political in nature. 
Leaders of political opposition groups often referred to their organizations as 
“humanitarian organizations,” and even registered many in the U.S. as non-
political charities, despite their overt political nature. This dynamic was also 
demonstrated in the Rwandan diaspora’s prolific use of terms pertaining to 
human rights as names of their online identities and online and offline 
organizations, including terms such as “freedom,” “justice,” “democracy,” 
“rights,” and “equality.” Many of the CMCs clearly demonstrated diaspora 
members’ awareness that this was the language of the West, and would likely 
increase the chance of creating international alliances. This practice among 
the Rwandan diaspora included in the study is consistent with Collier and 
Hoeffler’s (2004), and Lyons’ (2004, 2007) assertions that diaspora political 
activities are often masked as a fight for human rights, and as a commitment 
to the development of democracy in the home country, when they actually 
have another agenda. 
Additionally, the Rwandan diaspora identities’ exaggerated claims of 
human rights violations (past and present) by the RPF appeared at times 
contrived and opportunistic, in that virtually every noted action on the part of 
the Rwandan government, including programs that received international 
praise, was the subject of harsh criticism among those diaspora identities 
engaging in the virtual network. Other claims of human rights violations 
appeared sincere, albeit often rooted in the pre-genocide propaganda 
campaign that scapegoated Tutsis prolifically. This practice is also consistent 
with Lyons’ (2007) description of how CGD often exaggerate claims of human 
rights violations of homeland governments because their information is 
outdated since they are often disconnected with the current activities in their 
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homeland, leading to most of their information being based on rumor. As 
explored previously, Lyons (2007) also describes how CGDs’ tendency to tell 
and retell stories of their trauma experienced during the homeland conflict 
freezes images of the past “making it difficult to incorporate new information 
that may be from “untrusted” sources” (p. 533). This may very well be the case 
with the diaspora identities included in the study since the majority of them self 
identified that they had fled Rwanda either when the RPF took control in July 
of 1994, or shortly thereafter.  
Overall, the Rwandan diaspora included in this study used the Internet 
prolifically to disseminate negative propaganda about the Rwandan 
government, with a primary focus on President Kagame. These activities 
clearly had an impact on the Rwandan government, evidenced by the 
diaspora identities’ prolific posting of CMCs featuring their various successes. 
Although there was a likely certain amount of boasting and embellishment 
included in these CMCs, a considerable amount appeared to for the most part 
to accurately portray the ways in which the Rwandan government was 
consistently put on the defense, particularly by many mainstream media 
outlets and human rights organizations that allied with the diaspora identities 
and organizations included in the study.  
Use of Online Photographic Displays  
A sub-theme that was noted in the ethnographic analysis related to how 
the Rwandan diaspora used online photographs for a variety of purposes. 
Although this sub-theme was explored in the results section within the context 
of identity, particularly with regard to Hutu diaspora’s identity as victims, for the 
purposes of the discussion, it is important to explore this dynamic somewhat 
more broadly, particularly since the use of photographs was interrelated with 
several other themes, including imagined homeland, lobbying and 
cyberactivism, the dissemination of propaganda, genocide denial and 
historical revisionism and anti-Kagame propaganda. In Axel’s (2004) study on 
the Sikh diaspora he noted that photographs were posted online as a way of 
expressing feelings about their displacement, particularly as a “self-identified 
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subjugated ethnic population.” A similar dynamic was noted in the present 
study with the Rwandan diaspora using photographic displays as a way of 
reflecting their status as a displaced and victimized ethnic group. Axel noted 
how the Sikh diaspora posted a map of their imagined homeland of 
“Khalistan,” a yet-to-be realized nation-state of the Sikhs. Similarly, Lyons 
noted how Ethiopians posted a map of their historic country that included 
Eritrea; and in the present study the Hutu diaspora also posted maps 
illustrating the pre-1994 Rwanda, with the old names of provinces prior to the 
current government changes.  
Axel also noted how the Sikh diaspora posted collections of 
photographs depicting their victimization and genocide by Indian government 
officials, including photographs of victims being tortured and even murdered. 
This practice is strikingly similar to the many photographs posted in the Hutu 
diaspora’s virtual network of Hutu refugees purported to have been tortured 
and murdered by the current RPF government. The posting of such 
photographs online may be an important human rights tool to create 
awareness among broader audiences that may not be aware of the atrocities 
committed against a targeted population, and they may also serve as 
important avenues for expressing collective grief, by allowing survivors to 
memorialize their dead. 
What was unique about the Rwandan diaspora in the current study 
though, was that the majority of photographs were false depictions. The 
majority of photographs posted by the online identities included in the study of 
Hutus killed by Tutsis were actually of Tutsis killed by Hutus during the 
genocide, or photographs of other massacres elsewhere in Africa, such as in 
Nigeria. The relevance of this finding is significant in that it begs the question 
of whether the practice of copying and pasting any photograph lifted from any 
website is deemed somehow justified since the victim diaspora so firmly 
believe that the massacres did occur, but photographic evidence cannot be 
located (thus finding any photograph is deemed necessary). Or alternatively, 
this practice may represent a new form of denial, in this case genocide denial, 
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where the perpetrators claim to be the victims, by “stealing” photographs as 
well as narratives. Regardless, it is a dynamic worthy of further exploration, 
particularly in light of new online search technologies (e.g., Google Image 
search), not available until recently. 
Use of Online Newspapers for Political Purposes 
 Another way that the Rwandan CGD engaged in online activities in 
ways similar to other CGD groups, was in how online newspapers were used, 
as well as the nature of the online articles. In Skjerdal’s (2011) case study of 
nine Ethiopian online newspapers he found that political activism was often 
masked as journalism. Noting that the online newspapers did not meet 
journalistic standards for objectivity, Skjerdal found that the website’s articles 
were “presented as regular news bulletins in politicized wrapping” (p. 236). He 
also found that the majority of online articles were extremely negative toward 
the Ethiopian government.  
The Ethiopian CGD online newspapers included in Skjerdal’s study, and 
the online newspapers included in the present study, are again, strikingly 
similar in a number of ways. For instance, the Ethiopian online journalists 
consistently referred to the Ethiopian prime minister as a “dictator,” “tyrant,” 
and “genocidal dictator,” which are among the very same terms that the 
Rwandan CGD used to refer to President Kagame. Also strikingly similar was 
how the Ethiopian prime minister was depicted in photographs, with horns, 
vampire teeth, and a long forked snake tongue, while President Kagame was 
also depicted in photographs and cartoons with horns, vampire teeth, and an 
array of other distortions intended to reflect his “evil” nature.  
Another similarity between the Rwandan online identities and the 
Ethiopian diaspora was the way in which online journalists and newspapers 
were facilitated (as well as by whom). For instance, many of the online 
journalists operating in the Ethiopian and Rwandan CGDs had connections to 
political opposition groups or former politicians allied with the former regime. 
Additionally, both the Ethiopian and the Rwandan online newspapers 
facilitated by CGD allied with the former regimes displayed a lack of objectivity 
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and a high level of political bias in reporting, as well as in their analysis of 
current events. In both cases, public participation was limited to those online 
identities that expressed like-minded perspectives, and journalistic 
independence appeared limited to perceptions and attitudes that were 
embraced by the political opposition parties opposed to the current 
governments. Hirji’s (2006) content analysis of an interactive online 
newspaper facilitated by Muslim diaspora living in Canada also revealed 
similarities to the online newspapers facilitated by Rwandan CGD, including 
the practice of diaspora partnering with mainstream human rights 
organizations working for “social justice,” the inclusion of a significant amount 
of commentary, editorials, and action alerts, and the superficial appearance of 
covering a multitude of topics, while primarily focusing on a narrow set of 
political issues, including the original conflict. 
In the case of Rwanda, many of the online newspapers espoused 
narratives that were very consistent with the pre-genocide propaganda 
campaign, reflecting strong anti-Tutsi sentiments and were essentially used to 
disseminate extremely negative propaganda against the Rwandan 
government, with a particular focus on President Kagame. Skjerdal concluded 
that “given the political character of the Ethiopian diaspora websites … the 
immediate impression would be that the editors are primarily motivated by 
political activism rather than journalistic professionalism” (p. 738), which is a 
conclusion that clearly applies to the Rwandan diaspora online newspapers as 
well.  
Genocide Denial and Historical Revisionism 
 One of the most significant and noteworthy findings of this study relates 
to how social media and social networking was used by Rwandan CGD 
opposed to the current Rwandan government as a way of denying and 
historically revising the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis. As discussed in the 
prior chapter, virtually all of the CMCs included in the study contained strong 
elements of genocide denial and/or historical revisionism. In fact, this theme 
was highly interrelated with the other themes that emerged in the analysis, but 
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remained distinct due to the very explicit ways in which social media were 
used to deny and/or historically revise the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.  
Differences between internal and external narratives with regard to 
genocide denial were significant, in that more overt denials were reserved for 
internal consumption, particularly those CMCs that included derogatory 
statements about Tutsis, such as making fun of crying Tutsis at a genocide 
memorial, or the membership in a public, but difficult to find Facebook group 
memorializing Theoneste Bagosora, the architect of the genocide. For 
instance, diaspora identities that lobbied Western audiences by espousing a 
commitment to peace and reconciliation did not disclose that they were 
members of the Theoneste Bagosora Facebook page, that they embraced 
Hutu Power ideology, or that they actively supported and/or sympathized with 
the FDLR. More sophisticated forms of genocide denial that included strong 
elements of historical revisionism were expressed more consistently with 
outsiders, such as Western audiences. For instance, versions of genocide 
denial and historical revision that were boldly expressed within the network 
were often suggested as alternate theories during lobbying efforts (e.g., 
placing the word genocide in quotations, rather than making a joke about a 
Tutsi survivor). 
Many of the narratives espoused within the context of denying the 
genocide are highly consistent with the pre-genocide propaganda war, 
including the belief that all Tutsis were the enemy (not distinguishing between 
civilian Tutsis and the RPF), that Tutsis would never accept power sharing 
with Hutus, the belief that Hutus should rule the country because they were 
the majority, and the belief that Hutus were the rightful inhabitants of Rwanda, 
whereas Tutsis were foreign invaders (see Des Forges, 1999). Additionally, 
while a significant portion of genocide denial and historical revisionism was 
expressed in writing in the form of textual artifacts contained in a range of 
CMCs, genocide denial occurred in more subtle ways as well. For instance, an 
argument could be made that joining an online group that exists to promote 
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Parmehutu ideology, expressing support for an online memorial page for a 
former regime member, posting an online prayer asking God for protection and 
support of the FDLR (the remnant militia responsible for the genocide), and 
the conscription of photographs of Tutsis slaughtered by Hutus and displaying 
them online claiming the reverse, are also forms of genocide denial and 
historical revisionism via the Internet. 
 Charny’s classification system of genocide denial explored in Chapter 4 
is an effective way to examine the genocide denial and historical revisionism 
expressed by the diaspora identities included in the study through their various 
SNSs. As explored in Chapter 4, Charny categorizes genocide denial into five 
classifications, including denial and revisionism by genocidaires (“Malevolent 
Bigotry”), denial by non-perpetrators for self-serving purposes, such as for the 
advancement of one’s career and realpolitik (“Self-serving Opportunism”), 
denials by non-perpetrators who cannot accept that human beings could be so 
evils as to commit genocide (“Innocent Denials/Innocent Disavowals of 
Violence”), denials leveled by academics and legal scholars who engage in 
debates on the legal and academic definitions of genocide for its own sake, 
often absent any real acknowledgement or awareness of that their scholarly 
debates involve real atrocities that were exacted against real people 
(“Definitionalism”), and denials leveled by people who are either indifferent 
toward the targeted group, or who have become desensitized to the horrors of 
past genocides due to time and the human tendency to trivialize (“Nationalistic 
Hubris and Human Shallowness”). 
 The genocide denials and historical revisionism that occurred within the 
virtual network included in the study fit within all of these categories, with the 
majority being consistent with Charny’s first, second and fourth categories. In 
fact, the majority of the CMCs containing content that denied and/or 
historically revised the circumstances surrounding the 1994 genocide were 
consistent with Charny’s first category, involving post-genocide denials and 
revisionism leveled by perpetrators or those allied and/or sympathetic to them. 
Although determining whether diaspora members leveling such denials were 
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genocidaires was beyond the scope of this study, there were numerous 
indications that diaspora identities engaging in the most prolific genocide 
denial and historical revisionism were quite sympathetic toward the 
genocidaires, and often stated so in their CMCs. Charny refers to a 
genocidaires attempt to attach some honorable meaning to the genocide, as 
genocide terrorism. Genocide terrorism can include framing the killings as 
authentic attempts to resist occupation and defend one’s homeland, which 
was a prominent rationalization used by those in the virtual network. This 
dynamic may also explain the rationale behind many of these same diaspora 
identities joining groups and engaging in online activities that elevated 
members of the former regime to hero status. After all, they were not 
genocidaires, but were heroes, attempting to save an ancestral homeland from 
falling into the hands of foreign invaders. 
 Charny also notes how genocidaires often decry post-genocide 
counter-attacks against them “as if it cancels the record of their genocidal 
actions” (p. 16). This practice describes the dynamic revealed in the study, 
where a significant proportion of diaspora identities consistently denounced, 
decried and commemorated perceived victims of extrajudicial and retaliatory 
killings of Hutus attempting to flee Rwanda shortly after the genocide ended, 
as well as those killed in military strikes against militarized Hutu refugee 
camps. What was particularly striking in this collective outcry of Hutu diaspora 
denouncing the post-genocide killings of Hutus in the DRC was that any 
attempt to contextualize post-genocide killings of Hutus within the context of 
the Tutsi genocide was largely absent. In other words, in the midst of 
complaints that the international community did not “start the clock” on the 
killings in Rwanda early enough (a reference to the belief that the killings 
began in October 1990, not April 6, 1994), the diaspora online identities 
	  	   276 
skipped right over the slaughter of 800,000 to 1 million Tutsis, focusing instead 
on the strikes against Hutus subsequent to the genocide.74 
 There were also numerous incidents demonstrated in the data of 
genocidaires and their sympathizers engaging in what Charny describes as 
denials by perpetrators during genocide trials, professions of the outright 
innocence of the leaders of a genocide, denials that the genocide was 
intentional, and denials of any personal involvement in the genocide, as well 
as portraying genocidaires as victims, rather than perpetrators. For instance, 
in the letter and personal testimony of Georges Rutaganda, the Vice President 
of the Interahamwe, and chief organizer of Interahamwe forces, he not only 
forcefully and passionately defended himself and the Interahamwe in general, 
but he also cast the Interahamwe as victims of an international conspiracy to 
scapegoat the Interahamwe (and himself) as villains, when in fact they were 
“heroes.”  
The diaspora online identities engaging in genocide denial and 
historical revisionism also fit what Charny described as efforts to politicize 
denials and historical revisions by attempting to gain the cooperation and 
assistance of the international community, such as democratic nations and the 
UN, which would lend a level of legitimacy of their denials. Rutaganda’s letter 
is again an example of this tactic, as are the other open letters to international 
figures and dignitaries, including present and former government leaders, UN 
officials and religious leaders. For instance, several authors wrote open letters 
that altered historical evidence by claiming President Kagame’s responsibility 
for shooting down former President Habyarimana’s plane was irrefutable and 
historical fact, when in fact it is not, as well as claiming that the RPF had 
infiltrated the Interahamwe, as evidence that the Tutsis committed genocide 
against themselves.  
An additional example of portraying Tutsis as the perpetrators of the 
genocide were the prolific and overwhelming number of CMCs that attributed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 It is not the intention of this author to trivialize any potential human rights violations against innocent 
Hutus, including Hutu refugees in the DRC who were and are caught between warring parties, nor is it 
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the genocide almost single-handedly to President Kagame. The CMCs 
revealed an elaborate and confusing collection of narratives in which historical 
truth was mixed with misrepresentations, portraying Habyarimana and his 
MRND as innocent, and Kagame and his RPF as responsible. This type of 
denial was perpetuated consistently through online textual artifacts (testimony, 
news articles, analysis articles, and status posts), as well as through cultural 
artifacts (photographs and cartoons). 
Genocide denial and historical revisionism was also noted in the data 
fitting within Charny’s second and fourth categories, Self-Serving Opportunism 
and Definitionalism. Charny cites that these deniers are often the most 
dangerous, because they appear well intentioned and give legitimacy to the 
genocidaires’ causes. In the case of Rwanda, it appeared that Western allies 
espousing similar genocide narratives as the Rwandan CGD online identities 
worked in concert with the online identities included in the study. Further 
analysis was not pursued in this study in order to remain in compliance with 
the ethical guidelines used in this study, which prohibited the collection of data 
and from real identities– and approach that may have warranted the 
application of the human subject model.  
Charny notes that while this type of genocide denial is quite dangerous, 
“peace-seeking people, including a considerable number of bona fide 
academics […] found in all Western countries” who engage in genocide denial 
and historical revisionism for self-promoting purposes related to their careers 
often do not intend to purposely engage in genocide denial (p. 16). He further 
describes these Western allies as generally “upright citizens who identify 
themselves with the search for truth and justice” yet who partner with deniers 
“because of conscious and unconscious economic or political interests served 
by their cooperative stances” (p. 17). The pattern of Westerners denying the 
Rwandan genocide for self-serving purposes by parroting the denials of 
“genocidaires and their sympathizers” is also reflective of Collier and Hoeffler’s 
earlier reference to Westerners being perceived by rebel groups as “useful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the intention of this author to justify any retaliatory killings of Hutus by Tutsi armed forces. 
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idiots,” particularly those Westerners sympathetic to causes framed in human 
rights terms. Despite indications that this dynamic occurred, as stated in the 
Results section, further exploration into the nature of potential Western allies’ 
posts was avoided due to ethical parameters barring the inclusion of data from 
real identities, which would have required informed consent. 
The Impact Diaspora Political Engagement Using Social Media on the 
Conflict Cycle 
 Several diaspora and new war scholars have explored the real and 
potential impact of diaspora political engagement in homeland affairs, 
including whether such engagement has the potential to contribute to peace or 
conflict. As explored in an earlier chapter, many diaspora groupings have 
made significant positive contributions to peace-building efforts in their 
homelands by serving as a conduit and liaison to warring parties, as well as by 
transferring knowledge gained from living in an open democracy to their home 
countries (Abdile, 2010; Baser & Swain, 2008; Brinkerhoff, 2006; Kent, 2005; 
Mohamoud, & Osman, 2008; Zunzer, 2005). Other scholars have cautioned 
that diaspora are powerful external actors that make peace more difficult, 
particularly if they possess hardline, extremist, and uncompromising attitudes 
(Lyons, 2004, 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006; Ramsbothem, Woodhouse & 
Miall, 2011). Although few scholars adopted an “either/or” stance on whether 
CGDs have the capacity to contribute to peace (i.e., they are either “peace 
makers” or “peace wreckers”), numerous scholars have noted the tendency for 
certain diaspora groups, particularly those generated by conflict, to be 
motivated to keep the conflict going due to a range of collective dynamics that 
render compromise and authentic reconciliation threatening (Bercovitch, 2007; 
Lyons, 2004, 2007, Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006). 
 The roles played by diaspora in conflict, and the nature of the impact 
diaspora engagement may have is dependent upon several factors, including 
the size of the diaspora (relative to the in-country population), the collective 
strength of the diaspora, as well as their ability to organize politically 
(Bercovitch, 2007), the political opportunity structures available in the host 
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country (Smith & Stares, 2007), the level of their self-perceived victim status 
(Brinkerhoff, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006), the consequences for diaspora 
if the conflict were resolved (Lyons, 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006), and the 
nature of the activities in which diaspora engage.  
 Several scholars have described the types of activities diaspora may 
engage in that would be more likely to result in contributions to peace, as well 
as those activities that are more likely to exacerbate conflict (see Bercovitch, 
2007 and Mohamoud, 2005). A general consensus among diaspora scholars 
has evolved and holds that diaspora engaging constructively through 
humanitarian and social activities, will be more likely to contribute to peace-
building and processes (Bercovitch, 2007; Cochrane, 2007; Cochrane, Baser 
& Swain, 2009; Mohamoud, 2005), whereas diaspora who engage politically in 
homeland affairs, will be more likely to contribute negatively, increasing the 
likelihood of increased conflict in the home country, as well as rendering 
homeland conflict more protracted. This is particularly true when CGD engage 
in political activities using virtual transnational networks based on an 
ethnonationalist agenda, with the goal of destabilizing the home country 
government (Anderson, 1992; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2007; Ignatieff, 2001, 
Kaldor, et al., 2003; Lyons, 2004). 
 This study focused on a distinct group of Hutu CGD who actively 
engaged in Rwandan politics through the development of virtual transnational 
networks comprised of a wide array of social media and social networking 
sites. The data revealed that the motivations that appeared to drive the online 
diaspora identities to engage politically, as well as the nature of their activities 
were highly consistent with other case studies on CGD political engagement. 
What is particularly important about the results of this study is the dramatic 
disparity between the diaspora’s external narrative, which was for the most 
part focused on peace, democracy and ethnic reconciliation, as compared to 
their internal narrative, which primarily demonstrated anger, rigidity, 
dehumanization of President Kagame, the entire Tutsi population, and an 
ardent refusal to cooperate with the current government of Rwanda. Thus it 
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was demonstrated repeatedly in the data that the online identities in the study 
would not deny their true intentions to another Hutu diaspora identity, but 
would deny their true intentions and agenda (and frequently did) to Western 
audiences. In fact, the online identities included in this study were quite adept 
at using language that would appeal to Westerners committed to the ideals of 
democracy, social justice and human rights, yet considerable effort was 
expended to mask their true intentions, and activities, particularly in relation to 
their collective stance on the genocide, their identification with Hutu Power 
ideology, and their unrelenting support for the FDLR. 
 Based upon the consensus of the literature, in terms of the most likely 
impact that diaspora political engagement in homeland affairs would have on 
the conflict cycle, it seems likely that the actions of the Rwandan CGD 
represented by the online identities included in the study are contributing to 
the ethnonationalist conflict in Rwanda in a negative way, and are not 
contributing constructively to peace-building efforts, ethnic reconciliation and 
democratic processes, as many of the online identities claimed. As is also 
consistent with the literature, the Rwandan CGD’s prolific use of the Internet to 
engage politically increases their reach and power, often rendering them a 
powerful external actor with access to technology and resources largely 
unavailable in Rwanda. Additionally, the fact that Rwanda experienced not 
solely a civil war, but genocide likely renders any dynamics related to 
motivations, role and impact of diaspora political engagement (particularly 
among Hutu diaspora allied with the former regime) far more complex.  
Contributions to the Literature And Limitations of the Study 
CGD Online Activities and Dynamics 
Evans (2010) and Hine (2000) assert that the transferability of the 
results of virtual ethnographies to other “research environments without 
affecting the quality of [the] research” must be done with caution as 
transferability is dependent on context, which can vary widely from one CGD 
community to the next. Acknowledging the importance of taking this cautious 
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approach, it can be asserted that this study has made several contributions to 
knowledge related to ways in which CGD engage in homeland conflict on a 
political level, as well as ways in which social media is used for political 
purposes. Specifically, contributions have been made to the growing body of 
knowledge focusing on ways in which CGDs use the Internet to engage in 
political activities focusing on homeland conflict. For instance, this study 
revealed additional ways in which virtual transnational networks develop; ways 
in which they are used; and how social media and social networking sites are 
facilitated, particularly for the purposes of political engagement in homeland 
conflict. In fact, the level of sophistication and power wielded by CGD through 
social media is remarkable. Whether one considers these activities “virtual 
war,” or the savvy public relations campaign of opposing parties, the results of 
this study demonstrate just how much the Internet has changed the ways that 
protracted conflicts are variously perpetuated, enlarged and amplified. 
Perhaps there is no better indication of just how much the Internet has 
influenced conflict processes than the case of the M23, the newest rebel militia 
group operating in the DRC, which has a Twitter account, a Facebook page, 
an online blog and an online newspaper. Through these SNSs, the M23 is 
able to circumvent traditional conflict resolution processes and make its case 
directly to the public through the dissemination of status updates, 
photographs, videos and conflict analyses. Although these CMCs were 
discovered after data collection was completed, and also could not be 
confirmed as being facilitated from the diaspora (thus the SNSs may not have 
been appropriate data sources for the purposes of this study), they certainly 
illustrate the “new” in “new war” studies. 
Using a Multidisciplinary Approach  
Additional contributions were made in the area of diaspora studies by 
linking several bodies of knowledge (ethnonationalism, new wars, collective 
identity development, forced migration, social media studies, cyberactivism, 
genocide denial) with diasporic studies. By using a multidisciplinary approach 
to explore CDG dynamics, a broader picture of diasporic processes was 
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developed, which can significantly contribute to a better understanding of how 
protracted ethnonationalist armed civil conflict resulting in violent and forced 
migration, impacts transmigrant identity development in such a way that 
influences the perceptions, motivations and actions of a group of people who 
often feel a collective sense of alienation, isolation and victimhood. Another 
key contribution made relates to ways in which diaspora may contribute to 
genocide denial and historical revisionism using social media and social 
networking sites. Although there has been a considerable amount of research 
on several factors involved in genocide denial, to date, a diligent search of the 
literature yielded no research on the role CGD play in the denial of genocide 
committed by co-ethnics against an opposing ethnic group. 
The goal of this study is not to scapegoat the entire Hutu diaspora for 
the ongoing challenges facing the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Rather, a 
primary goal of this study is to further explore ways that Rwandan CGD 
engage politically in homeland conflict, particularly during the age of 
globalization, with the ultimate hope of finding ways that ethnonationalist 
conflict can be reduced. In order to achieve this goal, a greater understanding 
of the motivations, methods and aims of CGD who are inclined to keep the 
conflict going must be gained, so that enduring peace, based on authentic 
reconciliation can be attained whenever possible. Otherwise the international 
community risks inadvertently exacerbating conflict by failing to understand 
that ethnonationalist conflicts are so enduring, that the ideologies that often 
fuel intergroup hatred and resentment often increase in exile, while effectively 
being masked by a veil of democracy. In the case of Rwanda, Demmers’ 
(2002) characterization of diaspora “long-distance interference with conflict in 
the homeland” representing a continuation of the original conflict on a virtual 
level, appears to apply quite well (p. 94).  
Research Methodologies and Internet Research Ethics 
Contributions have also been made in the area of research 
methodologies, by contributing to the development of virtual ethnography as a 
research method. This includes contributions that were made in the areas of 
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data collection strategies, data storage, and analysis, as well as methods for 
exploring SNS functionality, how CMCs can be pushed to “go viral,” and new 
ways in which virtual transnational networks can be mapped. These are 
important contributions, particularly in light of recent technological advances in 
the area of social media, and have significant implications for the area of IRE. 
For instance, this study highlighted numerous ways in which current ethical 
guidelines regarding Internet research were inadequate in addressing the wide 
ranges of ways that SNSs were being used. This was particularly the case in 
the area of the public/private debate, as well as when the human subject 
model should be applied.  
Despite a commitment to adhere to the various SNSs’ TOSs and IRE 
guidelines this author was consistently faced with ethical quandaries not 
anticipated in the existing literature on IRE, or in SNS TOSs. For example, the 
integration functionality available with most SNSs that permits a user to post a 
CMC on several SNSs simultaneously made determining whether a personal 
identity was detached from a cultural artifact quite challenging. This was 
particularly true when a single online identity owned several integrated SNS 
accounts (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, blogs) and used a different screen name 
with each SNS (which was often the case). In other words, when a user 
posted a CMC on an SNS that was integrated with several other SNSs, the 
CMC appeared on all SNSs under the user’s different screen names, some of 
which may be variants of the user’s real name, and some of which may be 
pseudonyms. Thus, with increased integration functionality, “personal identity” 
and “cultural artifact” became blurred (if not merged), and determining whether 
to apply a human subject model became even more challenging.  
Increased integration functionality also rendered many SNSs’ TOSs 
essentially useless in the sense that it was frequently impossible to determine 
what TOS would take precedent over the others when a user had the ability to 
post a CMC on several SNSs simultaneously. This action was not possible 
even one year ago when a user had to initiate a CMC on one SNS and then 
share it on others, but recent technological advances have integrated the 
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various SNSs into the same platform meaning that CMCs are published to 
SNSs simultaneously through integration functions contained in the user’s 
mobile device (e.g., smart phone, tablet, etc.).  
In addition, the integration and merging of multiple SNSs often results in 
content from various SNSs being published on a single Web page, which has 
implications for data collection. For instance, several Internet researchers, 
particularly those engaging in virtual ethnography recommend collecting data 
through the taking of screen shots, which takes a photograph (PNG) of the 
researcher’s computer screen. While this is an effective way of capturing 
snippets of an online community, with technology that allows for the integration 
and merging of several SNSs, it is likely that the screen shot will contain both 
private and public content.  Consider for example a public online newspaper 
that has networking capabilities allowing online identities to post responses to 
an article. Prior to SNS integration, the poster would be required to register 
with the online newspaper and create an online identity prior to posting a 
CMC. Yet with SNS integration capabilities, online identities can post using 
their Facebook, LinkedIn or Twitter accounts, thus CMCs posted by personal 
identities will likely be included on the same screen as public cultural artifacts. 
In the present study, a decision was made to “crop” screen shots so that only 
public content was included, and due to the possibility of a merging of 
personal and public identities, a decision was made to redact screen names 
whenever such caution was deemed appropriate. 
The results of this study also revealed that many online identities 
utilized SNSs in ways that were inconsistent with the SNS developers’ 
expectations, and/or SNSs’ TOSs. For example, an individual Facebook profile 
designed for personal use was often used as a public online newspaper or 
blog by the online identities included in the study, which allowed for the 
cultural production of artifacts intended for public consumption at no cost to 
the user (compared to the often high cost of establishing and facilitating a 
public website). If an Internet researcher considered CMCs posted in this 
manner as private (“text as authors”), simply because the users found an 
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ingenious way to publish material for free, the researcher risks engaging in 
what Basset and O’Riordan (2002) caution against—diminishing the cultural 
capital of those engaging in cultural production through Internet technologies” 
by being “over-protective of virtual material in an attempt to protect online 
users’ ethical rights to privacy” (p. 244). As Basset and O’Riordan (2002) 
assert, such over protectiveness risks the marginalization of online identities, 
thus while some might not like the views the Rwandan CGD included in the 
study are espousing, they have to right to have their collective voices heard.  
As noted in Chapter 5, the current literature on IRE recognizes the 
complexities involved in Internet research which is why several IRE experts 
recommend that ethical decisions must be made contextually, based on the 
nature of the research, the specific methods being used in the study, the level 
of sensitivity of the topics being discussed and the perceived expectations of 
privacy of online participants (Ess & AoIR Ethics Working Committee, 2002; 
Eysenbach & Till, 2001). This study will assist in the further development of 
ethical guidelines by increasing awareness of emerging complexities related to 
increased functionality and merging of SNSs that will render ethical decisions 
more informed. 
Limitations of the Study 
There were several limitations of this study that are important to 
acknowledge. One limitation of this study relates to the issue of language, and 
the challenges in obtaining reliable translations, as well as translating a 
sufficient amount of the data in order to capture a balanced picture of the CMC 
content. Translating CMCs in the present study presented a challenge due to 
the isolated use of Kinyarwanda. Although this challenge was addressed 
through the engagement of two certified translators, the potential for bias 
remained significant due to a shortage of translators certified in Kinyarwanda. 
Although great effort was taken to ensure an accurate translation of the data, 
accuracy may have increased had one of the translators been a member of 
the Hutu ethnic group. Also, since translating all CMCs written in Kinyarwanda 
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was cost prohibitive, there was more data in English and French used than 
Kinyarwanda.  
Another limitation relates to the way the research questions were 
framed, by structuring the focus of the research in such a way as to 
inadvertently exclude members of the Tutsi CGD. Focusing only on those 
Rwandan CDG who engaged politically in homeland conflict may have 
targeted specifically Hutu CGD since as Lyons and others have noted, the 
CGD members who are the most likely to engage in conflict, are those co-
ethnics who are from the losing side of a civil war, which in the case of 
Rwanda, are the Hutus. While this dynamic does not preclude the possibility of 
Tutsi political engagement, as many CGDs engage in homeland politics when 
the homeland government is dominated by co-ethnics (e.g., Israel), the fact 
that the current president of Rwanda is a member of the Tutsi ethnic group 
may influence Tutsis within the diaspora to engage in homeland affairs in more 
social and humanitarian ways, because they may not feel a need to engage 
politically.  
Additionally, while the results of this study may suggest that Hutu CGD 
are more likely to engage in conflict on a political level that Tutsis, this 
suggestion may not present a full picture of CGD dynamics, as Hutus are likely 
over-represented in the diaspora due to the nature of the conflict in Rwanda. 
In order to gain a more complete picture of all actors involved in Rwandan 
ethnonationalist conflict, it would be necessary to expand the focus of the 
study beyond Western-based CGD communities.  
A possible additional explanation of why only Hutu CGD appeared to 
engage politically in homeland conflict on a virtual level, may relate to the 
protracted nature of the conflict in Rwanda, which was extremely violent, 
resulting in genocide. The heightened level of violence, coupled with the 
extended pregenocide propaganda campaign may have enhanced the CGDs’ 
propensity to focus on the conflict. If this theory has any merit, then it makes 
sense that more Hutu CGD would be engaged politically in homeland conflict, 
which may in turn render Tutsis silent, since Tutsi CGD may perceive that to 
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engage politically in open online forums puts them at risk of future ethnic 
violence. This theory is particularly noteworthy in light of the findings that many 
of the ideologies expressed by the Hutu CGD online identities mirrored those 
from the pre-genocide propaganda campaign. Designing future studies more 
broadly in order to capture a wider range of diasporic processes may shed 
light on these dynamics, particularly within the Rwandan context.  
Using additional methodologies beyond virtual ethnography in future 
studies may also assist in ascertaining the breadth of who the Hutu CGDs in 
this study actually represent. For instance, the Hutu CGD online identities may 
be the voice of all Hutus everywhere, as many proclaimed, or they may only 
represent a small fraction of the entire Hutu diaspora, and an even smaller 
fraction of Hutus in Rwanda. Expanding the focus of future studies to include 
additional methodologies that can tap into real world realities may provide a 
more accurate and complete picture of the heterogeneous nature of the Hutu 
CDG, by seeking out less vocal members. 
Finally, the potential existence of additional important themes were 
noted, but further exploration was barred by the ethical standards adopted in 
this study, prohibiting the collection of data from real identities without applying 
the human subject model. An example of this is the nature of international 
alliances formed between the diaspora online identities and online identities 
that were members of international communities, such as Western academics 
and human rights organizations. Since many of those in the latter group were 
engaging online using their real identities, their data was not included in the 
study, even if their SNSs were public. The reason for this decision is explored 
in Chapter 5 in the section on ethical considerations, and relates to the current 
debate on what constitutes public versus private CMCs. As described in 
Chapter 5, a decision was made by this author to collect data from sources 
that are clearly intended for public consumption, and are text as object, not 
text as authors, thus the human subject model was not applied. Any data 
regarding the existence of international allies was drawn from content included 
in the publications of diaspora online identities included in the study, and not 
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from the CMCs of any international identities outside of the Rwandan 
diaspora. This presents as a limitation in the sense that when balancing the 
right of online identities to have their CMCs remain private (for the purposes of 
research) with the right of researchers to examine public CMCs, researchers 
are wise to take a cautious approach, at least until the development of ethical 
guidelines can keep pace with technological advances.  
Future Studies 
This study opens up several opportunities for future studies that would 
allow for more in-depth explorations into a variety of areas, including ways in 
which CGD engage in genocide denial using the Internet, cross-comparative 
studies that explore whether other CGDs use social media and social 
networking sites in similar ways, both with regard to the development of 
transnational networks, as well as with regard to political engagement in 
homeland conflict. Additionally, studies that examine the role of gender in 
online political engagement in homeland conflict extending Al Ali’s study on 
the role of women in the diaspora in homeland peace processes would 
contribute to greater understanding in ways that diaspora can contribute to 
peace building and ethnic reconciliation. Studies that focus on the effect that 
CGDs’ political activities and involvement in homeland conflict have on 
opposing ethnic groups, particularly survivors of genocide would contribute to 
bodies of knowledge in diaspora studies as well as genocide studies. Finally, 
future studies using virtual ethnography that include a broader range of 
methods, such as online interviews with human subjects, would yield 
interesting information, even if it was perceived that covert agendas may 
influence the veracity of any disclosures. Including online surveys and 
interviews of human subjects (which would require the application of the 
human subject model, including ethical review and informed consent) would 
also allow for a more in-depth examination into the range, nature and impact 
of alliances between CGD and members of the international community. 
The area of diaspora studies, particularly CGD involvement in 
homeland conflict will no doubt continue to grow, especially as violent 
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ethnonationalist armed civil conflict remains an enduring part of contemporary 
globalized society. Gaining greater understanding into the “who,” “what,” “why” 
“where” “how” of ethnonationalist armed civil conflict, particularly the 
development of a greater understanding of the power of external actors, such 
as diaspora, serves as a vital component of developing effective methods for 
securing authentic and lasting peace. 
 
 
	  	   290 
References 
Abdile, M.A. (2010). Diaspora and their role in homeland conflicts and 
peacebuilding: The case of Somali diaspora. Diaspeace Working Paper 
No. 7, 
https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/bitstream/handle/123456789/36881/DIASPEAC
E_WP7.pdf?sequence=1. 
Adamson, F. B. & Demetriou, M. (2007). Remapping the boundaries of “State” 
and “National Identity”: Incorporating diasporas into IR theorizing, 
European Journal of International Relations, 13, 489 doi: 
10.1177/1354066107083145. 
Agence France Presse [AFP]. DRC: M23 ready to disarm–on conditions, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-09-09-drc-m23-ready-to-disarm-if-
conditions-are-met/ 
Akin, A.I. (2011). Social movement on the Internet: The effect and use of 
cyberactivism in Turkish Armenian reconciliation. Canadian Social 
Science, 7(2), 39–46. 
Al-Ali, N. (2007), Gender, diasporas and post-Cold War conflict. In H. Smith 
and P. Stares (Eds.), Diasporas in conflict: Peace-makers or peace-
wreckers? (pp. 39–61). Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press. 
Al-Ali, N., Black, R. & Koser, K. (2001). The limits to “transnationalism”: 
Bosnian and Eritrean refugees in Europe as emerging transnational 
communities. Ethnic & Racial Studies, 24(4), 578–600. 
Alessi, E. J., & Martin, J. I. (2010). Conducting an Internet-based Survey: 
Benefits, pitfalls, and lessons learned. Social Work Research, 34(2), 
122–28. 
Alinejad, D. (2011). Mapping homelands through virtual spaces: Transnational 
embodiment and Iranian diaspora bloggers. Global Networks, 11(1), 
43–62.  
Amnesty International. (2010). Safer to stay silent: The chilling effect 
Rwanda’s laws on “genocide ideology” on “sectarianism.” London: 
Amnesty International Publications.  
	  	   291 
Anderson, B. (1992). The new world disorder. The New Left Review, 193, 3–
13. 
Attride-Stirling, J. 2001: Thematic networks: An analytic tool for qualitative 
research. Qualitative Research 1, 385–405. 
Axel, B.K. (2004). The context of diaspora. Cultural Anthropology, 19(1), 26–
60.  
Bailey, O. (2011). The online practices of diaspora: Self-representation and 
resistance? Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International 
Communication Association, Boston, MA, 
http://ww.allacademic.com/meta/p489161_index.html. 
Bain, P. G., Kashima, Y. & Haslam, N. (2006). Conceptual beliefs about 
human values and their implications: Human nature beliefs predict 
value importance, value trade-offs and responses to value laden 
rhetoric. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 351–367. 
Basch, L., Schiller, N., & Blanc-Szanton, C. (1994). Nations 
Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and 
Deterritorialized Nation-States. Routledge: London and New York. 
Baser, B., & Swain, A. (2008). Diasporas as peacemakers: third party 
mediation in homeland conflicts. International Journal on World Peace, 
7(7), 7-28. 
Baser, B., & Swain, A. (2009). Diaspora design versus homeland realities: 
Case study of Armenian diaspora. Caucasian Review of International 
Affairs, 3(1), 45–61. 
Baser, B. & Pejcic, M. (2007). Diaspora and their involvement in Peace 
Processes. Conference June 2007. Department of Peace Conflict 
Research in Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Uppsala University, 
Sweden. 
Bassett, E.H. & O’Riordan, K. (2002). Ethics of Internet research: Contesting 
the human subjects model. Journal of Ethics & Information Technology, 
4, 233–247 
	  	   292 
Battles, H. T. (2010). Exploring Ethical and Methodological Issues in Internet-
Based Research with Adolescents. International Journal of Qualitative 
Methods, 9, 1, 27–39. 
Behr, H. (2008). Deterritorialisation and the transformation of statehood: The 
paradox of globalization. Geopolitics, 13, 359-382. doi: 
10.1080/14650040801991654 
Bellamy, A.J. (2011). Mass atrocities and armed conflict: Links, distinctions, 
and implications for the responsibility to prevent. A Policy Brief: The 
Stanley Foundation, 
.http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.p
df 
Beneito-Montagut, R. (2011). Ethnography goes online: Towards a user-
centred methodology to research interpersonal communication on the 
Internet. Qualitative Research, 11(6), 716–735. 
Bercovitch, J.  (2007), A neglected relationship: Diasporas and conflict 
resolution. In H. Smith & P. Stares (Eds.), Diasporas in conflict: Peace-
makers or peace-wreckers? (pp. 17-38). Tokyo, Japan: United Nations 
University Press. 
Bernal, V. (2006). Diaspora, cyberspace and political imagination: The Eritrean 
diaspora online. Global Networks, 6(2), 161–179. 
Betancourt, T. S., Borisova, I. I., Williams, T. P., Brennan, R. T., Whitfield, T. 
H., De La Soudiere, M., Williamson, J. & Gilman, S. E. (2010), Sierra 
Leone’s former child soldiers: A follow-up study of psychosocial 
adjustment and community reintegration. Child Development, 81, 1077–
1095. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.01455.x. 
Bijleveld, C., Morssinkhof, A. & Smeulers, A. (2009). Counting the Countless: 
Rape victimization during the Rwandan genocide. International Criminal 
Justice Review, 19(2), 208–224. doi: 10.1177/1057567709335391. 
Blank, T., & Schmidt, P. (2003). National identity in a united Germany: 
Patriotism or nationalism? An empirical test with representative data. 
Political Psychology, 24, 289–312. 
	  	   293 
Blurton, C. (1999). New directions in education. In UNESCO's world 
communication and information, 1999–2000 (pp. 46–61). Paris, France:  
UNESCO. 
Bober, M. (2004). Virtual youth research: an exploration of methodologies and 
ethical dilemmas from a British perspective. In E. Buchanan (Ed.), 
Readings in virtual research ethics: Issues and controversies, (pp. 288–
315). Hershey, PA: Information Science Publishing. 
Boellstorff, Tom; Nardi, Bonnie; Pearce, Celia; & Taylor, T. L. (2012). 
Ethnography and virtual worlds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.  
Boyatzis, R.E. (1998). Transforming qualitative information: thematic analysis 
and code development. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishers. 
boyd, D. & Ellison, N.B. (2007). Social network sites: Definition, history, and 
scholarship. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13(1), 
210–230. 
Bradatan, C., Merton, R. & Popan, A. (2010). Transnationality as a Fluid 
Social Identity. Social Identities, 16(2), 169–178.  
Brah, A. (1996). Cartographies of diaspora: Contesting identities. NY: 
Routledge.  
Brahm, E. (2003). Conflict stages: Beyond intractability. In G. Burgess & H. 
Burgess (Eds.), Conflict information consortium. Boulder, CO: Posted: 
September 2003 http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/conflict-
stages. 
 Brainard, L.A. & Brinkerhoff, J.M. (2004). Lost in cyberspace: Shedding light 
on the dark matter of grassroots organizations. Nonprofit & Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly, 33, 32S–53S. 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. 
Qualitative. Research in Psychology, 3, 77–101. 
Brenner, J. (2012). Pew Internet: Social networking. Pew Internet & American 
Life Project/Pew Research Center, 
http://pewInternet.org/Commentary/2012/March/Pew-Internet-Social-
	  	   294 
Networking-full-detail.aspx 
Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2004). Digital diasporas and international development: 
Afghan Americans and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Public 
Administration & Development, 24(5), 397–413. 
Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2005). Digital diasporas and semi-authoritarian states: The 
case of the Egyptian Copts. Public Administration & Development, 
25(3), 193–204. 
Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2006a). Diasporas, skills transfer and remittances: Evolving 
perceptions and potential. In C. G. Wescott & J. M. Brinkerhoff (Eds.), 
Converting migration drains into gains: Harnessing the resources of 
overseas professionals (pp. 1–32). Manila, Philliphines: Asian 
Development Bank. 
Brinkerhoff, J.M. (2006b). Digital diasporas and conflict prevention: The case 
of Somalinet.com. Review of International Studies, 32, 25–47. 
Brinkerhoff, J.M. (2008). Diaspora identity and the potential for violence: 
Toward an identity-mobilization framework, Identity, 8(1): 67–88. 
Brinkerhoff, J.M. (2009). Digital diasporas: Identity and transnational 
Engagement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brinkerhoff, J.M. (2012). Digital diasporas' challenge to traditional power: The 
case of TibetBoard. Review of International Studies, 38(1), 77–95. doi: 
10.1017/S0260210510001737. 
British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC]. (2006). Rwandan guilty of tourist 
murders, January 9, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4594440.stm 
British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC]. (2009). Germany arrests top Rwanda 
rebels, November 17, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8364507.stm. 
British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC]. (2012). Rwandan opposition leader 
Victoire Ingabire jailed, October 30, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-20138698. 
Brubaker, R. (2005). The “diaspora” diaspora. Ethnic & Racial Studies, 28(1), 
1–19. 
	  	   295 
Bruckman, A., Karahalios, K., Kraut, K., Poole, E., Thomas, J. & Yardi, S. 
(2010). Research ethics in the Facebook era revisited. CSCW 2010 
workshop. February 6, 2010, Savannah, GA, 
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~yardi/pubs/Yardi_ResearchEthics10.pdf. 
Brynen, R. (2002). Diaspora populations and security issues in host countries. 
Paper presented at the Metropolis Interconference Seminar. Dubrovnik, 
May 2002.  
Buchanan, E. (2004). Readings in virtual research ethics: issues and 
controversies. Hershey, PA: Information Science Publishing. 
Buchanan, E. & Ess, C. (2008). Internet Research Ethics: The Field and Its 
Critical Issues. In The Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics. 
Edited by H. Tavani and K. E. Himma (Eds). Boston, MA: Wiley 
Publishing. 
Carty, V. & Oynett, J. (2006). Protest, cyberactivism and new social 
movements: The reemergence of the peace movement post 9/11. 
Social Movement Studies, 5(3), 229–249. 
Castells, M. (1997) The power of identity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Castells, M. (2001) The Internet galaxy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Castells, M (2007) Communication, power and counter-power in the network 
society. International Journal of Communication, 1, 238–266. 
Castles, S. (2002). Migration and Community Formation under Conditions of 
Globalization. International Migration Review, 36, 4, 1143-1168. 
Caverlee, J. & Webb, S. (2008). A large-scale study of MySpace: 
Observations and implications for online social networks. Paper 
presented at the annual 2008 meeting of the Association for the 
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 
http://faculty.cs.tamu.edu/caverlee/pubs/caverlee08alarge.pdf. 
Cederman, L., Weidmann, N. B., & Gleditsch, K. (2011). Horizontal 
Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global 
Comparison. American Political Science Review, 105(3), 478–495. 
doi:10.1017/S0003055411000207. 
	  	   296 
Charny, I. (2003). A classification of denials of the Holocaust and other 
genocides. Journal of Genocide Research, 5(1), 11-34. 
Cheran, R. (2003). Diaspora circulation and transnationalism as agents for 
change in the post conflict zones of Sri Lanka. Berlin; Germany: 
Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies. 
Chrétien, J.P., Dupaquier, J.F., Kabanda, M. & Ngarambe, J. (1995). Rwanda: 
les médias du génocide. Karthala (with Reporters sans Frontières), 
Paris, France: Karthala. 
Clegg Smith, K. M. (2004). “Electronic eavesdropping”: The ethical issues 
involved in conducting a virtual ethnography. In M. D. Johns, S. S. 
Chen & G. J. Hall (Eds), Online social research: Methods, issues, and 
ethics, New York: Peter Lang. 
Cochrane, F. (2007). Civil society beyond the state: the impact of diaspora 
communities on peace building. Global Media Journal Mediterranean 
Edition, 2(2), 19–29. 
Cochrane, F., Baser, B., & Swain, A. (2009). Home thoughts from abroad: The 
variable impacts of diasporas on peace-building. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 32(8): 681–704. 
Cohen, M. H., Fabri, M., Cai, X., Shi, Q., Hoover, D. R., Binagwaho, A. & 
Anastos, K. (2009). Prevalence and predictors of posttraumatic stress 
disorder and depression in HIV-Infected and At-Risk Rwandan 
women. Journal of Women's Health, 18(11), 1783–1791. 
doi:10.1089/jwh.2009.1367 
Cohen, R. (1996). Diasporas and the nation-state: From victims to 
challengers. International Affairs, 72(3), 507–520. 
Cohen, R. (2008). Global diasporas: An introduction. New York: Routledge. 
Collier, P. (2000). Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for 
policy. Policy Research Working Papers (Washington D.C.; The World 
Bank. June). 
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (1998). On economic causes of civil war. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 50, 563-573. 
	  	   297 
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2000). Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Policy 
Research Working Papers (Washington D.C.; The World Bank. May). 
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2001). Ethnic diversity: An economic analysis of its 
implications. Economic Policy, 32, 129–66. 
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2002). On the incidence of civil war in Africa. The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 13–28. 
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 56, 563-595. 
Conner, W. (1973). The politics of ethnonationalism. Journal of International 
Affairs, 27(1), 1-21. 
Connor, W. (1984). Eco- or ethnonationalism. Ethnic & Racial Studies, 7, 342–
359.  
Conner, W. (1993). Beyond reason: The nature of the ethnonational bond. 
Ethnic & Racial Studies. XVI (July 1993): 373–389.    
Connor, W. (1997). Ethnic Identity: Primordial or modern?’ In T. Andersen, B. 
Bull, and K. Duvold (Eds) Separatism. Bergen, Norway: University of 
Bergen Press (pp. 27–40).  
Conversi, D. (2004). Conceptualizing nationalism: An introduction to Walker 
Connor’s work. In D. Conversi (Ed). Ethnonationalism in the 
contemporary world: Walker Connor and the study of nationalism. 
London: Routledge. (p. 1).   
Conversi, D. (2007-03-16). Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World 
(Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics). 
Taylor & Francis. 
Conversi, D. (2012). Irresponsible radicalization: Diasporas, globalization and 
long-distance nationalism in the digital age. Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, 38(9), 1357–1379.  
Cook, S.E. (2009). Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: A new perspective. 
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Crisp, J. (1999). Policy challenges of the new diasporas: Migrant networks and 
their impact on asylum flows and regimes. Geneva, Switzerland: 
	  	   298 
UNHCR Working Paper. 
Dallaire, R. (2003). Shake hands with the devil: The failure of humanity in 
Rwanda. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press. 
Davenport, C. & Stam, A.C. (2009). What really happened in Rwanda? Pacific 
Standard, http://www.psmag.com/author/cdavenport/. 
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1987). A Thousands Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minneapolis Press. 
Demmers, J. (2002), Diaspora and conflict: Locality, long-distance nationalism, 
and delocalisation of conflict dynamics. The Public, 9(1), 85–96. 
Demmers, J. (2007). New wars and diasporas: Suggestions for research and 
policy. Journal of Peace Conflict & Development, 11, 1–26.  
Democratic Republic of the Congo (2002, September 22). Peace Agreement 
Between the Governments of the Republic of Rwanda and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan 
Troops from the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
the Dismantling of the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe Forces in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_a
greements/drc_rwanda_pa07302002.pdf 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (2009, March 23). Peace Agreement 
Available online at: between the Government and le Congres National 
pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), 
http://www.iccwomen.org/publications/Peace_Agreement_between_the
_Government_and_the_CNDP.pdf. 
Des Forges, A. (1999). Leave none to tell the story. New York: Human Rights 
Watch. 
DeVotta, N. (2000). Arresting the post-Cold War Sisyphean Quandary: 
Ethnonationalism, internal conflicts, and the quest for conflict resolution. 
Journal of Third World Studies, 17(1), 177–196. 
	  	   299 
Dholakia, N., & Zhang, D. (2004). Online qualitative research. In the Age of e-
commerce: Data sources and ppproaches. Forum: Qualitative Social 
Research, 5(2), 1–9. 
Djuric, I. (2003). The Croatian diaspora in North America: Identity, ethnic 
solidarity, and the formation of a “Transnational National Community.” 
International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society, 17(1), 113–130. 
Duffield, M. (2001), Global governance and the new wars: The merging of 
development and security. London: Zed Books. 
Elijah, D. (2011). The geo-politics of the Great Lakes Region: Towards a 
regional discourse of peace and stability. Parliament of Zimbabwe, 
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/attachments/article/11/great_lakes.pdf. 
eMarketer. (2012). Worldwide social network usage: Market size and growth 
forecast, http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?R=1008903. 
Emerson, R.M., Fretz, R.I. & Shaw, L. (2011). Writing ethnographic field notes. 
(2nd/ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Eriksen, T. H. (2006). Nations in cyberspace. Short version of the 2006 Ernest 
Gellner Lecture, delivered at the ASEN conference, London School of 
Economics, 27 March, http://www.philbu.net/media-
anthropology/eriksen_nationscyberspace.pdf. 
Ess, C. & AoIR Ethics Working Committee (2002). Ethical decision-making 
and Internet research: Recommendations from the AoIR ethics working 
committee, http://www.aoir.org/reports/ethics.pdf 
Evans, L. (2010). What is virtual ethnography? http://www.inter-
disciplinary.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/evanspaper.pdf 
Eysenbach, G. and Till, J. (2001). Information in practice. Ethical issues in 
qualitative research on Internet communities. BMJ, 323(10), 1103–
1105. Available at http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/reprint/323/7321/1103. 
Fair, C. (2005). Diaspora involvement in insurgencies: Insights from the 
Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements. Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 
11(1), 125–156. 
	  	   300 
Faist, T. (1998). Transnational Social Spaces out of International Migration: 
Evolution, Significance, and Future Prospects. Archives of European 
Sociology, 39(2): 213–247. 
Faist, T. (2000). Transnationalization in international migration: implications for 
the study of citizenship and culture. Ethnic & Racial Studies, 23(2), 189-
222. 
Faist, T. (2008). Migrants as transnational development agents: An inquiry into 
the newest round of the migration-development nexus. Population, 
Space & Pace, 14, 21-42. 
FDU-Inkingi. (2013). On unity of the Rwandan opposition. FDU-Inkingi 
Newsletter, February, http://www.fdu-rwanda.org/2013/02/newsletter-
fdu-inkingi-fevrier-2013/. 
Fereday, J. & Muir-Cochrane, E. (2006). Demonstrating rigor using thematic 
analysis: A hybrid approach of inductive and deductive coding and 
theme development. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 5(1), 
Article xx, http://www.ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/5_1/pdf/fereday.pdf 
Fox, S. & Tang, S. (2000). The Sierra Leonean refugee experience: traumatic 
events and psychiatric sequelae. Journal of Nervous and Mental 
Disease, 188, 490-495 
Fullilove, M. (2008). World Wide Webs: Diasporas and the international 
system. Lowy Institute Paper 22: Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
Double Bay, NSW, Australia: Longueville Media. 
Goemans, H. (2006). Bounded communities: Territoriality, territory attachment, 
and conflict. In Miles Kahler and Barbara Walter, (Eds.) Territoriality 
and Conflict in an Era of Globalization (pp. 25-61). New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gordon, M. (1961). Assimilation in America: Theory and reality, Daedalus, 
90(2), 263-285. 
Guarnizo, L.E., Portes, A. & Haller, W. (2003). From assimilation to 
transnationalism: Determinants of transnational political action among 
contemporary migrants. American Journal of Sociology, 108(6), 1211–
	  	   301 
1248. 
Hall, S. (1990). Cultural identity and diaspora. In J. Rutherford (Ed.), Identity: 
Community, Culture, Difference (pp. 222-237). London: Lawrence & 
Wishart,  
Hamptom, K., Goulet, L., Rainie, L., & Percell, K. (2011). Social networking 
sites and our lives. Pew Internet & American Life Project/Pew Research 
Center,  http://www.pewInternet.org/Reports/2011/Technology-and-
social-networks/Summary.aspx. 
Hansen, M.L. (1952). The problem of the third generation immigrant. 
Commentary, XIV, 492–500. 
Hatzfeld, J. (2005). Machete season: The killers in Rwanda speak. NY: Farrar, 
Straus & Giroux, LLC. 
Heilferty, C.M. (2011). Ethical considerations in the study of online illness 
narratives: A qualitative review. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 67(5), 
945– 953. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2648.2010.05563.x. 
Helland, C. (2007). Diaspora on the electronic frontier: Developing ritual 
connections with sacred homelands. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 12(3), 956–76. 
Hine, C. (2000). Virtual ethnography. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Hine, C. (Ed.). (2005). Virtual methods: Issues in social research on the 
Internet. Oxford, UK: Berg. 
Hine, C. (2008). Virtual ethnography. In L. Given (Ed.). Sage encyclopedia of 
qualitative research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
http://www.cirst.uqam.ca/pcst3/pdf/Communications/hine.pdf. 
Hirji, F. (2006). Concerns and constructed communities: Muslim Canadians, 
the Internet, and the war in Iraq. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 
30(2), 125-141. 
Hoeffler, A. & Reynal-Querol, M. (2003), Measuring the costs of conflict. 
Working paper. 14. 
Hogan, B. (2007). Analyzing social networks via the Internet. In N. Fielding, R. 
Lee, & G. Blank (Eds.), Sage Handbook of Online Research Methods. 
	  	   302 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Holloway, Richard. (2001). Using the Civil Society Index: Assessing the Health 
of Civil Society. CIVICUS, 
http://www.civicus.org/new/media/IndexHandbook.pdf 
Horst, C. (2007). The role of diasporas in civil war. Paper presented at the 
Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) workshop on the 
transnational facets of civil war. Oslo, Norway, March 16, 2007. 
Human Rights Watch [HRW]. (1996). Shattered lives: Sexual violence during 
the Rwandan genocide. New York: Human Rights Watch. 
Human Rights Watch [HRW]. (2009). DR Congo: Rwandan rebels slaughter 
over 100 Civilians: Congolese and Rwandan Forces should make 
protecting civilians a priority, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/02/13/dr-
congo-rwandan-rebels-slaughter-over-100-civilians. 
Human Rights Watch [HRW]. (2010a). Rwanda: End attacks on opposition 
parties: Intimidation of political opponents increases in advance of 
presidential election, http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/02/10/rwanda-end-
attacks-opposition-parties. 
Human Rights Watch [HRW]. (2010b). DR Congo: Rogue leaders, rebels 
forcibly recruit youth: Tensions rise as armed groups expand their 
ranks, http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/20/dr-congo-rogue-leaders-
rebels-forcibly-recruit-youth. 
Human Rights Watch [HRW]. (2012a). Country summary: Rwanda, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/rwanda_2012.pdf. 
Human Rights Watch [HRW]. (2012b). Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Awaiting justice one year after ethnic attack, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/506e92ae2.html. 
Huntington, S.P. (2004). Who are we? The challenges to America’s national 
identity. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
Ignatieff, M. (2001). The hate stops here. Toronto Globe & Mail, 25 Oct.  
Ilibagiza, I. & Erwin, S. (2006). Left to tell: Discovering God amidst the 
Rwandan Holocaust. Carlsbad, CA: Hay House Publishing. 
	  	   303 
Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada [IRBC]. (2000). Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC): The Banyamulenge (Munyamulenge) ethnic group; 
whether members of this group are targeted by government authorities, 
December 1 2000, RDC35883.F, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f7d4dfe1c.html [accessed 9 September 
2013] 
Inglehart, R. (2000). Culture and democracy. In L.E. Harrison & S.P. 
Huntington, (Eds). Culture matters: How values shape human progress 
(pp. 80–97), New York, NY: Basic Books.  
International Criminal Court [ICC]. (2013). Bosco Ntganda in ICCs custody, 
March 22 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages
/pr888.aspx. 
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda [ICTR]. The indictment of Georges 
Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda with Genocide, crimes against 
humanity and violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions. Available online at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/RUTAGANDA_ICTR-96-
3/Rutaganda_Intro.htm#Indictment 
International Crisis Group [ICG], (2010). The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora after 
the LTTE, 23 February 2010, Asia Report N°186 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b8b94512.html [accessed 3 
January 2013] 
Internet World Stats. (2012). Internet users in the world distribution by world 
regions–2012 Q2 http://www.Internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. 
Jacobson, D. (1999). Doing research in cyberspace. Field Methods, 11(2), 
127–145. 
Johnson, R. (2010). Rwanda takes a strict line on genocide denial. The U.S. 
should support that. The Christian Science Monitor, June 28 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0628/Rwanda-
takes-a-strict-line-on-genocide-denial.-The-US-should-support-that. 
	  	   304 
Kahler, M. (2006). Territoriality and conflict in an era of globalization. In M. 
Kahler & B. Walter (Eds), Globalization, territoriality, and conflict. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kaiser, R. J. (2004). Making and the territorialization of national identity. In 
Ethnonationalism in the contemporary world (Routledge Advances in 
International Relations and Global Politics), New York, NY: Taylor & 
Francis. Kindle Edition. 
Kaldor, M. & Anheier, H. & Glasius, M. (2003). Global civil society in an era of 
regressive globalisation, in H. Aheier, M. Glasius, & M. Kaldor, Global 
Civil Society. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Kaldor-Robinson, J. (2002). The virtual and the imaginary: The role of 
diasphoric new media in the construction of a national identity during 
the break-up of Yugoslavia. Oxford Development Studies, 30(2), 177–
186. 
Kamalu, N.C. (2012). Internet use among racial/ethnic groups in the United 
States. Government & History Faculty Working Papers. Paper 15  
http://digitalcommons.uncfsu.edu/govt_hist_wp/15 
Kangura (1990). Hutu 10 commandments. Kangura, No. 6. [ICTR Exhibit 
K0157990] 
http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/pdf/k06,23,26,28,33,40,41,46,59.pd
f 
Kangura (1993). I’m not concerned, I am a CDR’s member. Kangura, No. 46. 
[ICTR Exhibit K0157995]  
http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/pdf/k06,23,26,28,33,40,41,46,59.pd
f. 
Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in 
international and regional politics. International Social Science Journal, 
51, 89-101. 
Kellner, D. (2001). Globalization technopolitics and revolution 
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/globalizationtechnopolit
icsrevolution.pdf. 
	  	   305 
Kent, G. (2005) Diaspora power: Network contributions to peace-building and 
the transformation of war economies. Paper presented at the 
“Transforming War Economies” Seminar, Plymouth, UK, June 16–18. 
Kenyon-Lischer, S. (2006). Dangerous sanctuaries: Refugee camps, civil war, 
and the dilemmas of humanitarian aid. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press.  
Khamis, S., & Vaughn, K. (2013). Cyberactivism in the Tunisian and Egyptian 
Revolutions: Potentials, limitations, overlaps and divergences. Journal 
of African Media Studies, 5(1), 69–86. 
Khamis, S. & Vaughn, K. (2011). ‘We are all Khaled Said’: The potentials and 
limitations of cyberactivism in public mobilization and promoting political 
change. Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research, 4(2+3), 145-163. 
King, C. & Melvin, N. J. (2000). Diaspora politics: Ethnic linkages, foreign 
policy, and security in Eurasia. International Security, 24(3), 108–38. 
Kitschelt, H.P. (1986). Political opportunity structures and political protest: 
Anti-Nuclear movements in four democracies. British Journal of Political 
Science, 16, 57-85. 
Kivlahan K. & Ewigman N. (2010). Rape as a weapon of war in modern 
conflicts. BMJ, 340, c3270 http://ts-si.org/guest-columns/25855-rape-
as-a-weapon-of-war-in-modern-conflicts. 
Kleist, N. & Hansen, P. (2005). The Big Demonstration–A study of transborder 
political mobilization. AMID Working Paper Series 42/ 
http://www.amid.dk/pub/papers/AMID_42-2005_Kleist&Hansen.pdf 
Koinova, M. (2009). Conditions and timing of moderate and radical diaspora 
mobilization: Evidence from conflict-generated diaspora, global 
migration and transnational politics. (Working Paper no. 9), Fairfax, VA: 
George Mason University 
http://www.gmu.edu/centers/globalstudies/publications/gmtpwp/gmtp_w
p_9.pdf. 
Kozinets, R. (2010). Netnography: Doing ethnographic research online. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
	  	   306 
Kperogi, F.A. (2008). Guerrillas in cyberia: The transnational alternative online 
journalism of the Nigerian diasporic public sphere. Journal of Global 
Mass Communication, 1(2): 72–87. 
Krueger, B.S. (2002). Assessing the potential of Internet political participation 
in the United States: A resource approach. American Politics Research, 
30(5), 476–498. 
Langman, L. (2005). From virtual public spheres to global justice: A critical 
theory of internetworked social movements. Sociological Theory, 23(1), 
42–74. 
Lemarchand, R. (1970). Rwanda and Burundi. New York: Praeger Publishers. 
Lemarchand, R. (1999). Ethnicity as myth: The view from Central Africa. 
Occasional Paper, Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen 
http://www.teol.ku.dk/cas/research/publications/occ._papers/lemarchan
d1999.pdf 
Lemarchand, R. (2009). The dynamics of violence in Central Africa. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Lenhart, A., Purcell, K., Smith, A., & Zickuhr, K. (2010). Social media & mobile 
Internet use among teens and young adults. Pew Internet & American 
Life Project/Pew Research Center 
http://pewInternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-
Adults.aspx 
Leurs, K. & Ponzanesi, S. (2011). Mediated crossroads: Youthful digital 
diasporas. M/C Journal, 14(2), 5-17.  
Leyens, J., Paladino, M. P., Rodriguez, R. T., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S., 
Rodriguez, A. P. & Guant, R. (2000). The emotional side of prejudice: 
The attribution of secondary emotions to ingroups and outgroups. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 186–197. 
Lyons, T. (2003). Notes on globalisation: Diasporas and conflict. Paper 
presented in a workshop on Globalisation, Territoriality and Conflict. 
Institute for International, Comparative, and Area Studies, University of 
California, San Diego, January. 
	  	   307 
Lyons, T. (2004). Engaging diasporas to promote conflict resolution: 
Transforming hawks into doves. Paper presented at the Institute for 
Global Conflict and Cooperation Washington Policy Seminar 
http://tamilnation.co/conflictresolution/lyons.pdf. 
Lyons, T. (2006a). Conflict-generated diasporas and peacebuilding: A 
conceptual overview and Ethiopian case study. Paper presented at the 
University for Peace Expert Forum on Capacity Building for Peace and 
Development: Roles of Diasporas. 
Lyons, T. (2006b), Diasporas and Homeland Conflict. In M. Kahler & B. Walter 
(Eds), Globalization, Territoriality, and Conflict. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lyons, T. (2007a). Conflict-generated diasporas and transnational politics in 
Ethiopia. Conflict, Security, & Development, 7(4), 529-549. 
Lyons, T. (2007b). Diasporas and transnational politics in Ethiopia. In A. Swain 
(Ed.), Diasporas, Armed Conflicts and Peacebuilding in their 
Homelands (pp. 32-49). Uppsala, Sweden: Department of Peace & 
Conflict Research, Uppsala University. 
Lyons, T., and Mandeville, P. (2008). Global migration and transnational 
politics: A conceptual framework. Global Migration and Transnational 
Politics (Working Paper No. 1). Fairfax, Virginia: Center for Global 
Studies, George Mason University. 
Lyon, A.J. &. Uçarer, E.M. (1998). The transnational mobilisation of ethnic 
conflict: Kurdish separatism in Germany, http://www2.hawaii.edu / 
~fredr / kurds.htm. 
Mamdani, M. (2001). When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism, and 
the genocide in Rwanda. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Mamdani, M. (2002).  African States, citizenship and war: A case-study. 
International Affairs, 78(3), 493–506. 
Margolis, M. & Resnick, D. (2000). Politics as usual: The cyberspace 
“revolution”, London: Sage. 
	  	   308 
Markham, A., & Buchanan, E. (2012). Ethical decision-making and Internet 
research: Recommendations of the AoIR working committee (version 
2.0) http://aoir.org/reports/ethics2.pdf. 
Martin Carter, D. (2010). Navigating the African diaspora: The anthropology of 
invisibility. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.  
Mathy, R. M., Kerr, D. L., & Haydin, B. M. (2003). Methodological rigor and 
ethical considerations in Internet-mediated research. Psychotherapy: 
Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 40, 77–85. 
McCaughey, M. & Ayers, M. (Eds). (2003). Cyberactivism: Online activism in 
theory and practice. New York, NY: Routledge. 
McDoom, O. (2005) Rwanda’s ordinary killers: Interpreting popular 
participation in the Rwandan genocide. Crisis States Research Centre 
(Working Papers Series 1, no. 77). London: Crisis States Research 
Centre, London School of Economics & Political Science. 
Mearsheimer, J.J. & Walt, S.M. (2006). The Israel lobby and U.S. foreign 
policy. (Working Paper RWP06-011, March 13), Cambridge, MA: 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 
Melvern, L. (2006). Conspiracy to murder: The Rwandan genocide. Brooklyn, 
NY: Verso Books. 
Midlarsky, M.I. (2005). The killing trip: Genocide in the twentieth century. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Milan, S., & Hintz, A. (2013). Networked Collective Action and the 
Institutionalized Policy Debate: Bringing Cyberactivism to the Policy 
Arena?. Policy & Internet, 5(1), 7–26. 
Miller, D.E., & Miller, L.T. (2004). The Armenian and Rwandan genocides: 
Some preliminary reflections on two oral history projects with survivors. 
Journal of Genocide Research, 6(1), pp. 135–140.  
Mohamoud, A. A. (2005). Mobilising the African diaspora for the promotion of 
peace in Africa. (Policy Report for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs no. Amsterdam: African Diaspora Policy Centre [ADPC]. 
http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/MobilisingAfricanD.pdf. 
	  	   309 
Mohamoud, A. A. (2006). African diaspora and post-conflict reconstruction in 
Africa. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) 
http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/PeacebuildingPaper.pdf. 
Mohamoud, A. A. (2007). The contribution of African diaspora to post-conflict 
reconstruction. Migration & Development Research, Amsterdam: 
African Diaspora Policy Centre [ADPC]. 
Mohamoud, A., & Osman, S. (2008). The African diaspora as agents of peace 
on the continent. Conflict Trends, 4, 38-44. 
Mohapatra, S., Ratha, D. and Silwal, A. (2011). Migration and development 
brief, migration and remittance unit. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Morris, D., & Langman, L. (2002). Networks of dissent: A typology of social 
movements in a global age. In M. Gurstein & S. Finquelievich (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Community 
Informatics. Montreal, Canada, October 8, 2002. 
Mukamana, D. & Brysiewicz, P. (2008). The lived experience of genocide 
rape survivors in Rwanda. Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 40(4), 379-
84. 
NAS Insights. (2010). Internet usage in the United States 
http://www.nasrecruitment.com/docs/white_papers/Internet_Usage_Unit
ed_States.pdf. 
Navarro, S. (2003). Border narratives: The politics of identity and mobilization. 
Latin American Politics and Society, 45(3): 129-139. 
Niane, D. T. (1984). Africa from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, UNESCO. 
International Scientific Committee for the Drafting of a General History 
of Africa. University of California Press.  
Office of Air Force History. (2002). Helping Rwanda recover from genocide: 
RAAF medics serving with UNAMIR in 1994-95 
http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/UploadedFiles/General/02_Rwanda.pdf. 
Oiarzabal, P. J. (2012). Diaspora Basques and online social networks: An 
analysis of users of Basque Institutional Diaspora Groups on 
	  	   310 
Facebook. Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies, 38(9), 1469–1485. 
doi:10.1080/1369183X.2012.698216. 
Omar, A. (2000). Challenges of human security in Africa. Peace Magazine, 
July–September, p. 9. Available online at: 
http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v16n3p09.htm. 
Orozco, M. (2003). Hometown associations and their present and future 
partnerships: New development opportunities? Report commissioned 
by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Washington, DC: 
Inter-American Dialogue, September. 
Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003). The politics of migrants' transnational 
practices. International Migration Review, 37(3): 665-690. 
Østergaard-Nielsen, E., (2006). Diasporas and conflict: Part of the problem or 
part of the solution? DIIS Brief no. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 
International Studies (DIIS) 
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/%F8stergaard-
nielsen_diaspora_conflict_resolution.pdf. 
Paccagnella, L. (1997). Getting the seats of your pants dirty: Strategies for 
ethnographic research on virtual communities. Journal of Computer 
Mediated Communication, 3(1)  
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol3/issue1/paccagnella.html. 
Patel, K. (2013). Q&A: Bertrand Bisimwa, the man leading M23. The Daily 
Maverick (South Africa), April 16 
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-04-16-qa-bertrand-bisimwa-
the-man-leading-m23/#.Ui6nGWTXiAN 
Payne, J., & Barnfather, N. (2012). Online data collection in developing 
nations: An investigation into sample bias in a sample of South African 
university students. Social Science Computer Review, 30(3), 389-397. 
doi:10.1177/0894439311407419 
Public International Law & Policy Group [PILPG] (2009). Engaging diaspora 
communities in peace processes. Assessment Report and Program 
Strategy. Public International Law & Policy Group. Author. 
	  	   311 
Pflanz, M. (2012). DRC rebels capture Goma without firing a shot.  The 
Telegraph, November 20  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/dem
ocraticrepublicofcongo/9689774/DRC-rebels-capture-Goma-without-
firing-a-shot.html	  
Pittenger, D. J. (2003). Internet research: An opportunity to revisit classical 
problems in behavioral research. Ethics & Behavior, 13, 45-60. 
Prunier, G. (1995). The Rwanda crisis: History of a genocide. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press. 
Prunier, G. (2009). Africa’s world wars: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and 
the making of a continental catastrophe. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rafaeli, S., Sudweeks, F., Konstain, J. & Mabry, E. (1998). A collaborative 
quantitative study of computer-mediated communication 
http://www.it.murdoch.edu.au/~sudweeks/papers/techrep.html 
Rafti, M. (2003-2004). The dismantling of the Rwandan political opposition in 
exile. L’Afrique des Grands Lac Annuaire 
http://www.ua.ac.be/objs/00110836.pdf. 
Rafti, M. (2004-2005). Crumbling in exile: The changing nature of the 
Rwandan opposition. L’Afrique des Grands Lacs Annuaire 
http://www.ua.ac.be/objs/00111828.pdf. 
Rainie, L., Smith, A., Schlozman, K., Brady, H. & Verba, S. (2012). Social 
media and political engagement. Pew Research Center’s Internet & 
American Life Project/Pew Research Center 
http://pewInternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2012/PIP_SocialMediaAnd
PoliticalEngagement_PDF.pdf 
Reuters. (2013). UN reviewing Congo army support over M23 abuse 
allegations July 18 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/18/us-congo-
democratic-un-idUSBRE96H03620130718. 
Rheingold, H. (2002) Smart mobs: The next social revolution. New York, NY: 
Perseus Books Group. 
	  	   312 
Rice, P., & Ezzy, D. (1999). Qualitative research methods: A health focus. 
Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press. 
Rootes, C.A. (1999). Political opportunity structures: Promise, problems and 
prospects. La Lettre de la maison Francaise d’Oxford, 10, 75–97. 
Rybas, N. & Gajjala, R. (2007). Developing cyberethnographic research 
methods for understanding digitally-mediated identities. Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research, 8(3) http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/282/619. 
Safran, W. (1991). Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and 
return. Diaspora, 1(1), 83-99. 
Safran, W. (2004). Deconstructing and comparing diasporas. In W. Kokot, 
Khachig Tololyan and Carolin Alphonso (Eds.). Diaspora, identity and 
religion: New directions in theory and research, (pp. 9-29). London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Safran, W. (2005) The Jewish diaspora in a comparative and theoretical 
perspective. Israel Studies, 10(1), 36–60. 
Salehyan, I., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2006). Refugee flows and the spread of civil 
war. International Organization, 60(2): 335-366. 
Sandoval-Almazan, R., & Gil-Garcia, J. R. (2013). Cyberactivism through 
social media: Twitter, YouTube, and the Mexican political movement 
"I'm Number 132.” HICSS ‘13 Proceedings of the 2013 46th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences  (pp. 718–727). IEEE 
Computer Society, Washington, D.C. 
Schiller, N.G., Basch, L., & Blanc-Szanton, C. (1995). From immigrant to 
transmigrant: Theorizing transnational migration. Authropological 
Quarterly, 68(1), 48–63. 
Shain, Y. (1994–1995). Ethnic diaspora and U.S. foreign policy. Political 
Science Quarterly, 109(5), 811-841.  
Shain, Y. (2001). Diasporic Financial Flows and their Impact on National 
Identity. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 7(4), 1–36. 
	  	   313 
Shain, Y. (2002). The role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation or resolution. 
SAIS Review, 22(2), 115-144. 
Shain, Y. & Barth, A. (2003). Diasporas and international relations theory 
International Organization, 57(3), 449-479. 
Sheffer, G. (1994). Ethno-national diasporas and security. Survival 36 
(Spring), 60-79. 
Sheffer, G. (2003). Diaspora politics: At home abroad. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sheffer, G. (2007). The Jewish diaspora and the Arab-Palestinian-Jewish 
Conflict. In H. Smith & P. Stares (Eds). Diaspora in conflict: Peace-
makers or peace-wreckers? (pp. 65–89). Tokyo, Japan: United Nations 
University Press  
Skjerdal, T.S. (2011). Journalists or activists? Self-identity in the Ethiopian 
community. Journalism, 12(6), 727-744. 
Smith, A. (1991). National Identity. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press. 
Smith, A. (2010). Home broadband 2010. Pew Internet & American Life 
Project/Pew Research Center 
http://pewInternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/Home%20broadban
d%202010.pdf 
Smith, H. (2007). Diasporas in international conflict. In H. Smith & P. Stares 
(Eds.), Diasporas in conflict: Peace-makers or peace-wreckers? (pp. 3-
16). Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press. 
Smith, H. & Stares, P. (2007). Diaspora in conflict: Peace-makers or peace-
wreckers? Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press. 
Straus, S. (2004). How many perpetrators were there in the Rwandan 
genocide? An estimate. Journal of Genocide Research, 6(1), 85-98. 
Straus, S. & Waldorf, L. (2011). Remaking Rwanda: State building and human 
rights after mass violence. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin 
Press.  
	  	   314 
Stelzner, M. (2009). Social media vs. social networking: What’s the difference? 
Examiner.com, Home & Living http://www.examiner.com/article/social-
media-vs-social-networking-what-s-the-difference. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (1993). Yearbook 
of world armaments and disarmaments. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press.  
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (2008). Yearbook 
of world armaments and disarmaments. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press.  
Sveningsson, M. (2004). Ethics in Internet ethnography. In E. Buchanan (ed.) 
Readings in virtual research ethics: Issues and controversies (pp. 45–
61), Hershey, PA: Idea Group. 
Taylor, V., & Van Dyke, N. (2003). Get up, stand up: Tactical repertoires of 
social movements. In D. Snow, S. Soule & H. Kriesi (Eds.), The 
Blackwell Companion to Social Movements Reader (pp. 262–293). 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Terrill, S. (2012). Economic growth pulls Rwandans out of poverty. Global 
Post. Available online at:  
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/120328/rwanda
-economic-growth-pulling-rwandans-out-poverty. 
Tichenor, D. (2002). Dividing lines: The politics of immigration control in 
America. New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Toft, M. (2003). The geography of ethnic conflict: Identity, interests, and the 
indivisibility of territory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Tölölyan, K. (1991). The nation-state and its others: in lieu of a preface. 
Diaspora, 1(1): 3–7. 
Tulbure, B. (2011). The Internet: A productive research environment for social 
scientists. Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Brasov. Series VII: 
Social Sciences. Law, 53, 71-78. 
Turner, M. (2008). Three discourses on diaspora and peacebuilding. Paper for 
WISC 2008, Ljubljana, 23-26 July 2008 
	  	   315 
 
Turner, S. (2008). The waxing and waning of the political field in Burundi and 
its diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31(4), 742-765. 
United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]. (1999). Human 
Development Report 1999. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Retrieved online at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_1999_EN.pdf. 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, [UNHCR]. (2012). UNHCR 
Global Trends 2012 
http://unhcr.org/globaltrendsjune2013/UNHCR%20GLOBAL%20TREN
DS%202012_V05.pdf. 
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
[MONUC]/Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2009,). 
Consolidated Report on Investigations Conducted by the United 
Nations Joint Human Rights Office (Unjhro) into Grave Human Rights 
Abuses Committed In Kiwanja, North Kivu, In November 2008 
http://monusco.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ALdPEPIXX0g
%3D&tabid=10770&mid=13783&language=en-US. 
United Nations Peace Operations. (2004). Year in review 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/2004/ch4.htm 
United Nations News Centre. (2013). DR Congo: Peacekeeping mission 
denounces M23’s alleged abuse of civilians, July 27 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45511&Cr=dr%20con
go&Cr1=#.Ui60mmTXiAM 
U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants [USCRI]. (2009). World refugee 
survey http://www.refugees.org/article.aspx?id=2370. 
U.S. Congress. (2012). Examining the role of Rwanda in the DRC insurgency -
- Hon. Christopher H. Smith (Extensions of Remarks - September 19, 
2012). Congressional record, 112th Congress http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?r112:E19SE2-0068: 
	  	   316 
Van Hear, N. (2003). Refugee diasporas, remittances, development and 
conflict. Migration Information Source 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=125 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L. & Brady, H. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic 
voluntarism in American politics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Verpoortan, M. (2005). The death toll of the Rwandan genocide: A detailed 
analysis for Gikongoro Province. Population, 60(4), 331-367. 
Vertovec, S. (1997). Three meanings of “Diaspora,” exemplified among South 
Asian Religions. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 6(3), 
277–99. 
Vertovec, S. (1999). Conceiving and researching transnationalism. Ethnic & 
Racial Studies, 22, 447–62. 
Vertovec, S. (2005), The political importance of Diasporas. (COMPAS Working 
Papers no. WP-05-13). Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society 
(COMPAS), University of Oxford. 
Verwimp, P. (2003). Testing the double genocide thesis for central and. 
southern Rwanda. Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, 423-42. 
Victoire 2010. (2010). Right of rectification and reply to libels published in 
Sunday Times on 17th January 2010 and The New Times of 18th 
January 2010. Victoire 2010 website. Available online at: 
http://www.victoire2010.com/uploads/media/False-allegations-in-The-
New-Times-Daily-against-Ingabire-victoire-rwanda.pdf 
Viki, G., & Calitri, R. (2008). Infrahuman outgroup or suprahuman ingroup: The 
role of nationalism and patriotism in the infrahumanization of 
outgroups. European Journal of Social Psychology, 38(6), 1054-1061. 
doi:10.1002/ejsp.495 
Vindevogel, S; Coppens, K; Derluyn, I; De Schryver, M; Loots, G.; & 
Broekaert, E. (2011). Forced conscription of children during armed 
conflict: Experiences of former child soldiers in northern Uganda. Child 
Abuse & Neglect, 35(7), 551-562. 
	  	   317 
Vissers, S., Hooghe, M., Mahé, V., & Stolle, D. (2008). The potential of 
political mobilization: An experiment on Internet and face-to-face 
mobilization. Conference Papers -- American Political Science 
Association, 1-43. 
Walther, J. (1996). Computer-mediated communication: Impersonal, 
interpersonal, and hyperpersonal Interaction. Communication 
Research, 23(1), 3–43.   
Warnecke, A. (2010). Introduction. In Warnecke, A., (Ed). Diasporas and 
peace: A comparative assessment of Somali and Ethiopian 
communities in Europe. Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for 
Conversion (6–12). 
Warnecke, A., Brethfeld, J., & Franke, V. (2007), Agents of Peace or Agents of 
War? The Role of the African Diaspora in Conflict Processes. (Concept 
Papers no. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). 
Wayland, S. (2004). Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: 
The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora. Review of International Studies, 30, 
405–426. 
Webb, M. (2012, May 18). Thousands flee renewed violence in DRC. Al 
Jazeera [English].  
Weber, M. (1968). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. 
Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich (Eds). New York, NY: Bedminister 
Press. 
Weiner, M. (1986). Labor migrations as Incipient Diasporas. In G. Sheffer (Ed.) 
Modern Diasporas in International Politics, (pp. 47–74). New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Wheeler, D. (2001). New technologies, old culture: A look at women, gender 
and the Internet in Kuwait. In C. Ess (Ed.) Technology, communication 
toward an intercultural global village (pp. 187-212). Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press.  
Whiteman, E. (2007). “Just chatting”: Research ethics and cyberspace. 
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 6(2) (Article 7) 
	  	   318 
http://www.ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/6_2/whiteman.pdf  
Wilson, C. & Dunn, A. (2011). Digital media in the Egyptian Revolution: 
Descriptive analysis from the Tahrir data sets. International Journal of 
Communication, 5, 1248–1272. 
World Bank. (2003), Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil war and development 
policy. Washington: co-publication of the World Bank and Oxford 
University Press, pp. 85-86. 
World Bank (2010). Defining civil society 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,content
MDK:20101499~menuPK:244752~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theS
itePK:228717,00.html 
Worship, P. (2010). UN’s Ban sends top aide to Congo after mass rape. 
Reuters August 24 http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/24/oukwd-
uk-congo-democratic-rape-idAFTRE67N5VQ20100824?sp=true. 
Zartman, W. (2001). The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and 
ripe moments. Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1(1), 8-18. 
Zunzer, W. (2004). Diaspora communities and civil conflict transformation. 
(Berghof Occasional Paper no. 26). Berlin, Germany: Berghof Research 
Centre for Constructive Conflict Management. 
 
	  	   319 
Appendix A: Historic Timeline of Events in Rwanda 
 
1959 – Hutu “Social Revolution” puts “Hutu Power” 
 
1959 – 1990 – extreme marginalization and oppression of Tutsi who remained 
in the Rwanda. Cyclicanti-Tutsi pogroms, arbitrary incarcerations, lead to 
mass forced migration, under President Habyarimana mono-party rule, the 
fundamentalist Hutu party; the MRND.  The  “Hutu Power” ideology is 
systematically nurtured in schools and all sectors of life in Rwanda. 
 
October 1990 – RPF invasion (RPF was essentially made by second 
generation Tutsis refugees, but it was led by a Hutu. They were also a 
significant number of Hutus within its Ranks.) 
 
October 1990 to July 1992 – Civil War 
July 1992 – August 1993: Arusha Peace Negotiations - Deployment of UN 
peacekeeping mission. Romeo Dallaire – Commander of UN Peace Keeping 
mission cites numerous examples of  "Hutu Power" (hardliners within 
Habyarimana regime) sabotaging peace deal/powersharing scheme 
 
Jan 1994 to April 1994 – Dallaire seeks UN authorization to intervene in order 
to prevent genocide preparations. Specific evidence of preparations are 
provided but ignored by UN HQ and the International Community. 
 
April 6 1994 – President Habyarimana returning from Arusha where he signed 
peace accord and plane is shot down, most likely, by Hutu extremists (who 
immediately blame RPF) 
 
April 9, 1994 – Roadblocks are up within hours. Interahamwe (armed militias) 
reports to all communes to disseminate machetes and massacres begin. 
Within 24 hours, Hutu moderates including the Prime Minister Agatha 
Uwilingiyimana, and the President of the Supreme Court Joseph Kavaruganda 
are killed, leaving full power within the hands of the 'Hutu Power' extremists 
who unleash genocide through out the country 
 
April 6, 1994 to July 4, 1994 – Genocide – over 1 million Tutsis (and some 
moderate Hutus) are slaughtered 
 
July 4, 1994 –RPF defeats genocidal forces and takes power, forming a 
Government of National Unity with five opposition parties. 
 
June/July 1994 – Defeated army (FAR) and militias (Interahamwe) flee to 
neighboring Congo (then Zaire), pushing ahead of them more than 2.1 people, 
primarily Hutu, into a gigantic forced exodus. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, a 
leading Hutu-Power ideologist boasted from Goma (Eastern Zaire) that "even 
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if the RPF has won a military victory, it will not have the power. We have the 
population!" 
 
Late 1994 – Ex-FAR and Interahamwe joined to form Army for the Liberation 
of Rwanda (ALiR) 
 
April 4, 1995: meeting with Hutu Genocidaires in refugee camps in the DR 
Congo to form RDR (Rally for the Return of Refugee and Democracy in 
Rwanda)– goal is to regain power in Rwanda by force– refer to RDR as 
“National Army in Exile” in communiqué. Government of Rwanda repeatedly 
warns it will send its troops into Congo if nothing is done to neutralize the 
rearming genocidal forces or move them away from its borders. 
 
Late 1996- Rwanda troops invade Congo, dismantle the border camps, 
leading to the return to Rwanda of up to 700,000 refugees. Others move 
further into Congo. 
 
1997 – ALiR creates paramilitary wing: Party for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(PALIR) 
 
1998 – Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda (RDR) 
changes name to Republican Rally for Democracy in Rwanda (RDR)  (after 
meeting in Paris) 
 
1998 – Three Hutu military opposition groups create coalition called UFDR – 
three groups are: FRD(Resistance Forces for Democracy), RDR  and Initiative 
Group for Reconciliation (IGR) 
 
1998 – 2000 – Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza represents RDR in Netherlands and 
Ignace MURWANASHYAKA was selected to represent RDR in Germany 
 
April 2000 – Victoire Ingabire releases statement under FDU-Inkingi name but 
with same address used for RDR 
 
May 2000 –FDLR created - First congress elects Ignace Murwanashyaka 
president (now arrestedon genocide charges) and Jean Marie-Vianney Higiro 
elected 1stVice President (Higaro was former government employee but was 
evacuated on April 9, 1994 by US. His sisters did not flee and were involved in 
genocide. Both living in New Hampshire and have charges against them: 
Prudence Kantengwa and Béatrice Munyenyezi (married to militia convicted 
by ICTR). 
 
August 19, 2000 – “Third Congress” of RDR - Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza 
elected president of RDR 
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September 30, 2000 – ALiR merges with another Hutu rebel group in DRC 
and forms Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) now the 
primary “remnant” of the original Hutu power group. 
 
March 2001 – RDR releases statement pledging to use arms to regain power 
in Rwanda 
 
January 14, 2002 – ADR (RDA)-Isangano formed by top former Hutu Power 
politicians in Belgium. 
 
March 22, 2003 – “Fourth Congress” of RDR– Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza 
remains president of RDR 
 
September 2003 – FOCA was developed as separate formal armed branch of 
FDLR 
 
September 12, 2004 Jean Marie-Vianney Higiro leaves FDLR with treasurer, 
Félicien Kanyamibwa and forms “Rally for Unity and Democracy’ RUD-
URUNANA. Higaro currently is professor in Massachusetts. Kanyamibwa (not 
in Rwanda during the genocide), is now Executive Sec. of RUD and lives in 
New Jersey 
 
October 4, 2005 UN demand that FDLR stop fighting Rwanda and leave 
Congo 
 
April 29, 2006 – UFDR changes name to FDU-Inkingi (United Democratic 
Forces of Rwanda) Victoire Ingabire remains President 
 
December 2008 – December 2009 – Joint Rwandan and Congo offensive 
against FDLR 
 
January 2010 – to August 2010 – Hutu opposition groups wage offensive to 
attempt win of election. 
 
 
August 6, 2010 – Presidential Elections in Rwanda 
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Appendix B:  “Hutu 10 Commandments” 
(Original located here: 
http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/pdf/k06,23,26,28,33,40,41,46,59.pdf) 
1. Every Hutu male should know that Tutsi women, wherever they may be, 
are working in the pay of their Tutsi ethnic group. Consequently, shall 
be deemed a traitor: 
o Any Hutu male who marries a Tutsi woman; 
o Any Hutu male who keeps a Tutsi concubine; 
o Any Hutu male who makes a Tutsi woman his secretary or 
protégée. 
2. Every Hutu male must know that our Hutu daughters are more dignified 
and conscientious in their role of woman, wife or mother. Are they not 
pretty, good secretaries and more honest! 
3. Hutu women, be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers and sons 
back to their senses. 
4. Every Hutu male must know that all Tutsi are dishonest in their 
business dealings. They are only seeking their ethnic supremacy. “Time 
will tell.” Shall be considered a traitor, any Hutu male: 
o who enters into a business partnership with Tutsis; 
o who invests his money or State money in a Tutsi company; 
o who lends to, or borrows from, a Tutsi; 
o who grants business favors to Tutsis (granting of important 
licenses, bank loans, building plots, public tenders…) is a traitor. 
5. Strategic positions in the political, administrative, economic, military and 
security domain should, to a large extent, be entrusted to Hutus. 
6. In the education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be in the 
majority Hutu. 
7. The Rwandan Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. That is the 
lesson we learned from the October 1990 war. No soldier must marry a 
Tutsi woman. 
8. Hutus must cease having pity for the Tutsi. 
9. The Hutu male, wherever he may be, must be united, in solidarity and 
be concerned about the fate of their Hutu brothers; 
o The Hutu at home and abroad must constantly seek friends and 
allies for the Hutu Cause, beginning with our Bantu brothers; 
o They must constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda; 
o The Hutu must be firm and vigilant towards their common Tutsi 
enemy. 
10. The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu ideology 
must be taught to Hutus at all levels. Every Hutu must propagate the 
present ideology widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his Hutu brother for 
having read, disseminated and taught this ideology shall be deemed a 
traitor. 
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Appendix C: Editorial: A Cockroach (Inyenzi) Cannot Bring Forth a 
Butterfly 
(Original located here starting on p. 78: http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/pdf/k40.pdf) 
 
Genetic scientists tell us that intra-Tutsi marriages are responsible for their 
minority status (wherever they are found). Can you imagine people from the 
same family getting married to each other and procreating! However, they 
should know that if they are not careful, this segregation could lead to their 
total disappearance from this world. If such were the case (and such will be 
the case), they should not take it out on anyone, for they will be solely 
responsible. Would it then be the Hutus who eliminated firm with Machetes? 
In fact, they propagate everywhere that their minority status was the work of 
the Hutus who eliminated them with machetes. It’s like Landuald Ndasingwa, 
Minister in the Nsengiyaremye Government, who deceives the people and 
the international community that his disability resulted from beatings he 
received during his arrest among the accomplices. But, everyone knows that 
he was born disable. Disability is not a sin. It should be understood that this 
phenomenon is not peculiar to the Hutus. Even the nobles can become 
disabled, for God does not discriminate. 
From the outset, we said that a cockroach cannot bring forth a butterfly, and 
that is true. A cockroach brings forth a cockroach. I do not agree with those 
who state the contrary. The history of Rwanda tells us that the Tutsi has 
remained the same and has never changed. His treachery and wickedness 
are intact in our country’s history. Administratively, the Tutsi regime has been 
marked by two factors: their women and cows. These two truths have kept 
the Hutus in bondage for 400 years. Following their overthrow during the 
1959 social revolution, the Tutsis have never given up. They are doing 
everything possible to restore their regime by using their vamps and money, 
which has replaced the cow. In the past, the latter was a symbol of riches. 
We are not wrong to say that an Inyenzi brings forth another Inyenzi. And in 
fact, can a distinction be made between the Inyenzi that attacked Rwanda in 
October 1990 and those of the 1960s? They are all related since some are 
the grand children of others. Their wickedness is identical. All the attacks 
were meant to restore the feudal-monarchy regime. The atrocities that the 
Inyenzi of today are perpetrating against the population are identical to those 
they perpetrated in the past, namely killings, plundering, rape of young girls 
and women… etc. 
The simple fact that the Tutsi is called a snake in our language is enough 
and indeed says a lot. He is smooth-tongued and seductive and, yet, he is 
extremely wicked. The Tutsi is permanently vindictive. He does not express 
his feelings. He even smiles when he is in great pain. In our language, the 
Tutsi bears the name cockroach (Inyenzi), because under cover of darkness, 
he camouflages himself to commit crimes. The word cockroach again 
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reminds us of a very poisonous snake. It is therefore not accidental that the 
Tutsi chose to be called that way. Whoever wants to understand should 
understand. Indeed, the cockroach cannot bring forth a butterfly. At close 
examination, the Tutsi treachery of today is not at all different from that of the 
years gone by. The history of Rwanda which bears witness teaches us that 
the Tutsis had enslaved the Hutus for a long time by using their women and 
cows. Following their overthrow in 1959, they again used their vamps and 
money (cows in the past) to subject the Hutus once again to slavery. The first 
Republic managed to stay afloat thanks, in particular, to late Grégoire 
Kayibanda who knew the Tutsi treachery very well. For its part, the second 
Republic fell at its inception into the Inyenzi-Tutsi trap. The Tutsis mainly 
blinded the Hutus who held important posts in the government. The latter 
assured them that there would be “peace” and “unity” in which, they, 
themselves, did not believe. For a long time, the Tutsis married their vamps 
to them. While the Hutus were engaged in community development activities, 
the Tutsis were preparing the attack to regain power. 
When the Hutus arrived, Rwigema and his colleagues had already crossed 
Kagitumba, and there was talk about a surprise-attack. Had not been for the 
bravery of our army, Rwanda would have been captured without resistance. 
While Tutsi vamps sent to sleep, distracted the influential Hutus in this 
country, the Tunis were pursuing university studies and, today, they are 
medical doctors, professors, lawyers, religious leaders… they monopolize 
the entire business sector of the country. What is more, the Hutus are tearing 
each other apart, in the full glare of the Tutsis, under the pretext that some 
are Abakiga and the others Abanyenduga, or that the some are Interahamwe 
and the others Inkuba, C.D.R. or Abakombozi. If the Hutus are not careful, 
spin-offs from their 1959 revolution may go over to the Tutsis. 
And even during this time of multi-party politics, the Tutsis continue to 
mislead the Hutus. The Tutsi would tell you that he is an M.R.N.D. member 
whereas he fights it by urging its Hutu members to kill each other and to 
destroy each other’s homes. The Tutsi would tell you that he is an M.R.N.D. 
member whereas he not forgotten that this party overthrew the Tutsi regime 
in 1959. The Tutsi will fight the Hutu party, the C.D.R., under the guise that it 
segregates. How can the C.D.R. do this whereas the Hutus are the same? 
And yet, they say nothing about the P.L. composed exclusively of the Tutsis, 
except the Hutus it recruits to serve as a front. When the Tutsis formed their 
parties (P.L., R.P.F.), they never could have imagined that the Hutus would 
have their own party, the C.D.R., which tells them the truth. A Tutsi can 
declare that he is Tutsi but when the Hutus does likewise he is considered a 
segregationist! The Tutsi has laws governing him, but the Hutu who declares 
that he has 10 commandments that he must observe to defend himself, he is 
considered a killer. And the Hutus who say that no cockroach can bring forth 
a butterfly are considered as segregationists. 
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Appendix D: “I am Not Concerned, I am a CDR’s Member” 
(Original is located here on page 10: 
http://trim.unictr.org/webdrawer/rec/37586/view/[MEDIA]%20-
%20NAHIMANA%20ET%20AL%20-
%20STIPULATION%20B~ENSE%20REGARDING%20PROPOSED%20ADMI
SSION%20OF%20TRANSLATIONS%20ARTICLESEXCERPTS%20FROM%
20KANGURA.PDF) 
 
1. You the Hutu who took back your property in 1959 after Inyenzi had fled 
from Rwanda, leave your property as the Arusha agreements say. 
“I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.” 
2. Rwandese citizen, get ready to be ruled by the force of whip and to give 
taxes in order to enrich the Inyenzi as the Arusha agreement says it. 
“I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.” 
3. Soldier, member of the Rwandese army, give out your arm and go to 
cultivate the marsh as the Arusha agreements say it. 
“I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.” 
4. Rwandese tradesman, you who are always worried, get ready to pay 
more taxes to enable the government comprising Inyenzi to pay the 
loans taken in order to buy arms to attack the majority mass as the 
Arusha agreement say it. 
“I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.” 
5. Hutu Minister, leave Kigali and go to work in Byumba where the 
Inkotanyi can capture you as the Arusha agreement say it. 
“I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.” 
6. Rwandese who goes by taxi, get ready to go on filling the Inyenzi’s 
pockets, you see that their relatives are constantly raising their prices 
before they come, now that they are coming, forty will be multiplied by 
four. 
“I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.” 
7. Civil servant, give out your office, and give the place to the Inyenzi as 
the Arusha agreements say it. 
“I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.” 
8. All the Hutus, get ready to be treated by the Inyenzi who do not look at 
injections full of AIDS, because the Arusha agreements gave them the 
Health (the ministry of health.) 
“I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.” 
9. Hutu who is still asleep even if you are intelligent, get ready to be 
liquidated by Inyenzi as the Inyenzi Museveni has done in Uganda. 
“I am not concerned. I am a CDR’s member.” 
10. You innocent people, get ready to lose your peace as the Arusha 
agreements say it. 
“We are not concerned. We are CDR’s members” 
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Appendix E: Example of how an SMSs Conflicting Geographic 
information  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Although this page is open (signified by the globe), some information 
was purposely masked, including a portion of the profile name (a pseudonym). 
The profile photo is Malcolm X, a famous U.S. black activist. 
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Appendix F: Example of Integrated SMSs 
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Appendix G: Examples of ‘Share’ icons 
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Appendix H: Example of Homeland Representations  
 
 
 
Pre-genocide province names represented on map of Rwanda 
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Appendix I: Examples of Homeland Romanticized Images 
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Appendix J: Examples of online Memorial Pages  
 
 
 
 
	  	   332 
Appendix K: Example of Imagined Homeland 
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Appendix L: Example of Online Identity Fundraising using Linked Charity 
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Appendix M: Examples of CMCs used for the Dissemination of 
Information and Propaganda 
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The entire article can be found at: 
http://www.jambonews.net/actualites/20120108-extradition-de-leon-mugesera-
la-communaute-rwandaise-s%E2%80%99indigne/ 
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Appendix N: Examples of Online Political Lobbying  
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Appendix O: Examples of Genocide Denial 
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Appendix P: Examples of Propaganda Disseminated involving False 
Photos 
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Appendix Q: Examples of Derogatory Photographs of Paul Kagame  
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Appendix R: Examples of anti-Kagame Demonstrations organized via 
SMSs 
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Appendix S: Examples of Online Mobilization and anti-Kagame Lobbying  
 
 
